You have not provided any support for this claim. — Paine
In a separate comment, I will list all the places I know of where Aristotle alludes to a separate, independent intellect. I don't have time to run them all down until can get back to my books next week. — Paine
But I will restate the problem I had with your comment the first time around. You are using a certain set of texts to establish your interpretation of what Aristotle means to say. On the basis of that, you declare Aristotle is not consistent with his own principles when he refers to an active, separate intellect. Whatever explanation might be put forward for the conflict of principles, it is always logically possible that the inconsistency belongs to your interpretation. — Paine
Outside of its description in Book Lamba, it should be noted that many of the other books of the Metaphysics try to see how and if the introduction of composite beings relate to the method in the Categories. There is much scholarly debate on these topics and disagreement about which statements are consistent with other statements. The statement in Book Lambda: "the soul is the first substance" is a part of that conversation even if you dismiss the rest of the book as Neo-Platonists propaganda. — Paine
When that possibility is not taken seriously the whole of the text or texts may be distorted in order to accomodate an interpretation. That is just bad hermeneutic practice. I follow the advise of those who say that when there is an apparent contradiction look to see if it is or can be reconciled based on further consideration and closer examination. — Fooloso4
If we assume the the appearance of inconsistency is a deficiency in reading skills, when the inconsistency is real, and within the material, due to a deficient understanding of the writer ... — Metaphysician Undercover
So Plato's works are carefully ordered chronologically, and his thoughts are divided into distinct periods. — Metaphysician Undercover
The problem is that you wildly overestimate your reading skills. Although there may be cases where an inconsistency is real, you are all too quick to declare inconsistencies where the real problem is evidently a deficient understanding on the part of the reader. — Fooloso4
The chronology of when the dialogue were written is not the same as the chronology of when the dialogues are set to have taken place. Parmenides is a "late dialogue" but it takes place when Socrates was young. The chronology of events raises serious questions about dividing Plato's work into distinct periods. Why would he situate what is supposed to be a late development, his criticism of the the theory of forms, at the beginning of Socrates' philosophical education? — Fooloso4
It's safer to say that conclusions cannot be drawn, due to inconsistency, then to assume consistency and draw a false conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover
This leaves us in a position to accept whatever an author says, which appears to be consistent with the truth, and reject whatever one says which appears to be inconsistent with the truth. — Metaphysician Undercover
The person who does not see the possibility of inconsistency — Metaphysician Undercover
I can't understand this. — Metaphysician Undercover
But rather than any further attempt to understand or even leave it open as problematic you have concluded that it should be rejected. — Fooloso4
What may appear to you to be an inconsistency may not be. But rather than any further attempt to understand or even leave it open as problematic you have concluded that it should be rejected. — Fooloso4
What I am saying is that we should not be too quick in deciding there is an inconsistency that a philosopher like Plato is unaware of. — Fooloso4
You say that there are distinct periods in Plato's development. Does he change his mind about Forms?If so, in what way? — Fooloso4
Yes, if it is unintelligible to one's own mode of interpretation, it ought to be rejected for that reason. — Metaphysician Undercover
Consistent with the truth" is a judgement made by an individual subject. If this is not the judgement then we really ought to reject the proposition. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't think there are "distinct periods" — Metaphysician Undercover
So Plato's works are carefully ordered chronologically, and his thoughts are divided into distinct periods. — Metaphysician Undercover
Is it possible that one is wrong? — Fooloso4
That one's own mode of interpretation in this case misses or misunderstands something? If so then rejecting what is read as inconsistent is itself inconsistent. — Fooloso4
Is the judgment of the individual subject always consistent with the truth? If it is not then it is inconsistent to say in this case that we really ought to reject the proposition. — Fooloso4
There is a clear inconsistency here. A contradiction. First you say there are distinct periods then you don't think there are distinct periods. Are you saying that there are distinct periods but you don't think there are?
What you say contains several inconsistencies. It should be rejected. — Fooloso4
How could a person be wrong, in one's judgement that they cannot understand something. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's not a matter of rejecting what is read — Metaphysician Undercover
If this is not the judgement then we really ought to reject the proposition. — Metaphysician Undercover
When a person judges a proposition as inconsistent with truth, this is grounds for the person to reject it ... — Metaphysician Undercover
The fact that the person might make a mistake, does not negate the judgement, — Metaphysician Undercover
"His thoughts are divided into distinct periods", indicates an artificial act of division, so that the divisions produce distinct periods, which have become conventional. Think about the way that the day is divided into morning and afternoon. — Metaphysician Undercover
But your claim is not that you don't understand but that what you are reading is inconsistent. — Fooloso4
In that case you are no longer talking about one's judgment that they cannot understand but that one understands well enough to reject it. It may still be the case that a person still does not understand. — Fooloso4
It means that the judgment was wrong. — Fooloso4
More inconsistency. — Fooloso4
The question is: what significance and conclusion do you draw from the conclusion that some dialogues are placed in the early period, some in the middle, and some in the late period? — Fooloso4
... inconsistency in philosophy is common and pervasive ... — Metaphysician Undercover
You have convinced me of one thing: what you say should be rejected because it is inconsistent. But according to you, you are in good company: — Fooloso4
I don't know if Hitler indulged in sophistry. This little matters. But one of the things he said was "If you tell a big enough lie and tell it frequently enough, it will be believed". It sounds like a confession, most probably not indented. But this is what he did and this is what a lot of politicians were always and still are doing, esp. when people have lost their hopes for a better tomorrow. You lay a hand to someone who is getting drawn in the water, he grasps it, because he would grasp whatever hand is extended to rescue him, and then you drawn him yourself by pushing him deeper into the water. And this is most probably what Hitler did, but most probably not on purpose. He was just insane. Anyway, False promises and lies do not consist "sophistry".Some might say that hitler was especially skilled when it came to sophistry. — Average
If you can be more specific, and esp. give me a couple of examples, I could maybe help you! :smile:I want to be skilled in the art sophistical refutation. — Average
False promises and lies do not consist "sophistry". — Alkis Piskas
Use of clever but false arguments --apparently plausible reasoning--, especially with the intention of deceiving.How would you define sophistry? — Average
Didn't you ask me how do I defined sophistry? Well, this is what I did.If the goal in both cases is deception then I don't really see the difference. — Average
If the end result of both a "lie" and a "sophistry" is deception, this does not mean that there's no difference between them! (In fact, a big one.) — Alkis Piskas
I already did. I shouldn't. A bad habit of mine. My effort is often ignored and, more importantly, I encourage people avoiding looking up words to see for themselves. (In this case, "lie" and "sophistry".)Please explain the difference. — Average
The answer/solution to defending against sophistry (in my opinion) are better media technologies. As another way of looking at this, imagine that there is an Internet Browser plugin, add-on and/or extension that could automatically collate references to/from/for any given statement, in an effort to help you determine its truthiness. That's the kind of approach to combating sophistry that would get my attention at the very least. — Bret Bernhoft
But there are technologies that can help users discern intention and deception. Those are the kinds of solutions I'm interested in. — Bret Bernhoft
The desire to have as a principle, a separate, independent intellect, led to the notion of a complete separation between active and passive intellect. This allows that the active intellect might be free from the influence of the passive matter (potential), allowing the intellect the capacity to know all things. — Metaphysician Undercover
Thus thought and contemplation decay because something else within is destroyed, while thought itself is unaffected, But thinking (dianoiesthai), and loving or hating are not affectations of that, but for the individual which has it, in so far as it does. Hence when this too is destroyed we neither remember nor love; for these did not belong to that, but to the composite thing which has perished. — De Anima, 408b 18, translated Ackrill
In separation it is just what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal. (But we do not remember because this is unaffected, whereas the passive intellect is perishable, and without this thinks nothing. — ibid, 430a 18
But a completely separate, active intellect appears to be impossible by Aristotle's principles. This is because the intellect in each of its capacities, the capacity to know, prior to learning, and the capacity to act, posterior to learning, are all properly described as potentials. — Metaphysician Undercover
The view we have just been examining, in company with most theories about the soul, involves the following absurdity: they all join the soul to a body, or place it in a body, without adding any specification of the reason of their union, or of the bodily conditions required for it. Yet such explanation can scarcely be omitted; for some community of nature is presupposed by the fact that the one acts and the other is acted upon, the one moves and the other is moved; interaction always implies a special nature in the two inter-agents. — ibid, 407b14-21
And, it is later shown how thinking as the act of an intellect is fundamentally a potential, therefore it cannot be used to represent a pure, independent actuality. — Metaphysician Undercover
Thus thought and contemplation decay because something else within is destroyed, while thought itself is unaffected, — De Anima, 408b 18, translated Ackrill
These observations move me to ask for you to provide textual references for the following statement: — Paine
This idea, I cannot accept. The idea that when a person becomes old, and mentally incapacitated, suffering dementia or something like that, the person is still fully capable of "thought", and it's just something else that decays, I believe is completely refuted by evidence. We'd have to really distort the meaning of "thought" to support such a position. — Metaphysician Undercover
The intellect seems to be born in us as a kind of substance and not to be destroyed. For it would be destroyed if at all by the feebleness of old age, while as things are, what happens is similar to what happens in the case of the sense-organs. For if an old man acquired an eye of a certain kind, he would see as well as even a young man. Hence old age is not due to the soul's being affected in a certain way, but this happening to that which the soul is in, as in the case of drunkenness and disease. — ibid, 408b 18, emphasis mine
I believe that in reality we ought to reject this qualification "impassable", and allow the simple solution, that the material aspect of the human mind is what receives forms. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is also the problem of whether the affections (πάθη) of the soul are all common also to that which has it or whether any are peculiar to the soul itself; for it is necessary to deal with this, though it is not easy. It appears that in most cases the soul is not affected, nor does it act (ποιεῖν) apart from the body, e.g., in being angry, being confident, wanting, and in all perceiving. although noein (νοεῖν, thinking, understanding, nous-activity) looks most like being peculiar to the soul. But if this too is a form of imagination or does not exist apart from (μὴ ἄνευ) imagination, it would not be possible even for this to be (εἶναι, einai) apart from the body. — ibid, 403a3-7, Greek terms included by Eugene T. Gendlin
Now, being affected in virtue of something common has been discussed before---to the effect that the intellect is in a way potentially the objects of thought, although it is actually nothing before it thinks; potentially in the same way as there is writing on a tablet on which nothing actually written exists; that is what happens in the case of the intellect. And it is itself an object of thought, just as its objects are. For, in the case of those things which have no matter, that which thinks and that which is thought are the same; for contemplative knowledge and that which is known in that way are the same. The reason why it does not always think we must consider. In those things which have matter each of the objects of thought is present potentially. Hence, they will not have intellect in them (for intellect is a potentiality for being such things without their matter}, while it can be thought in it. — ibid, 429b29
This does not reflect Aristotle's thinking. Only some combined beings are capable of thought. The capacity is directly related to the condition of the body. This is made clear in the passage preceding the one I quoted: — Paine
The intellect seems to be born in us as a kind of substance and not to be destroyed. — ibid, 408b 18, emphasis mine
Here again, it is important to follow distinctions Aristotle makes between the soul as a principle that animates all life from the experience of combined beings. Aristotle states at the beginning of the book that only combined beings can be affected: — Paine
Book 3, chapter 4 follows the discussion of imagination in chapter 3 and begins the argument of how the intellect can be seen as a potential in relation to what makes it actual. The last paragraph of chapter 4 says: — Paine
The following chapters demonstrate how admitting in 431a8 that the 'soul never thinks without an image" is not admitting that the intellect is a "form of imagination" as described at the beginning of the book. — Paine
I don't understand your use of "combined beings". It doesn't appear Aristotelian to me. — Metaphysician Undercover
So, it is evident from what has been said that what is called "a form" or "a substance" is not generated, but what is generated is the composite which is named according to that form, and that there is matter in everything that is generated, and in the latter one part is this and another that. — Metaphysics, 1033b 15, translated by H.G. Apostle
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