The Freiheit article points to an important dynamic between France and Germany regarding common defense beyond the structure of NATO. The last paragraph:

This wake-up call should serve for Germany to step up efforts to meet at least halfway with French impulses for further defence initiatives. In fact, as a new report of the European Defence Agency just revealed, only 18% of defence investments are jointly run between Member States. Besides the rhetorical agreement, the EU, in particular France and Germany have to mature their relationship in order to seriously and jointly invest in military capabilities instead of losing money and capacity to act through isolated moves. Ideally, Germany considers France in its preparations for its first National Security Strategy.

Such an observation is made in the context of Germany being very vulnerable now because of their past dealings with the Putin regime. It seems like Macron wants to become the sort of pivot Merkel used to be but with less dependency on non-European resources.

Yes. Since Macron also says Ukraine must take the lead on what terms they would accept, this matter of 'security guarantees' provided directly by the West is an alternative to acceding to Russia's demand that Ukraine write "never joining NATO" into their constitution.

For Russia to accept such an approach would undermine the pretext for the invasion whereby Ukraine is merely the foreskin of NATO.

If I think about an apple or any unchanging object and gather all details of its attributes can't I then at the same time examine the thinking process as it is being used to consider the apple? — TiredThinker

Your question is close to what Krishnamurti is asking from a different direction. When accepting that one is a bundle of thoughts and perceptions, is that an observation of the actual process? That question is asked here.

The TTC verse points to a way to avoid the risky nature of 'going up and down the ladder'. Love of persons takes that risk. A lover will always be a day late and a dollar short, wanting to tell the future in a country bereft of oracles or instructions. Taking the risk does not accept the uncertainty with resigned patience. We would go past the boundaries if we could.

The desire to trespass shapes the discovery of what the boundaries are. The utility of strictly psychological maps benefits from the TTC perspective of: "When you stand with your two feet on the ground." There is a tension between the views that will never be resolved. But one can see that Auden is less absolute about the difference than, say, John Donne, for example. Donne says:

Dull sublunary lovers' love
(Whose soul is sense) cannot admit
Absence, because it doth remove
Those things which elemented it.

But we, by a love so much refined
That our selves know not what it is,
Inter-assured of the mind,
Care less, eyes, lips, and hands to miss. — A Valediction Forbidding Mourning

In Auden's country, that is a claim we cannot make.

I like W.H. Auden because he approaches the question through our incapacity. The poem Villanelle:

Time can say nothing but I told you so,
Time only knows the price we have to pay;
If I could tell you, I would let you know.
If we should weep when clowns put on their show,
If we should stumble when musicians play,
Time can say nothing but I told you so.
There are no fortunes to be told, although
Because I love you more than I can say,
If I could tell you, I would let you know.
The winds must come from somewhere when they blow,
There must be reasons why the leaves decay;
Time can say nothing but I told you so.
Perhaps the roses really want to grow,
The vision seriously intends to stay;
If I could tell you, I would let you know.
Suppose the lions all get up and go,
And all the brooks and soldiers run away?
Time can say nothing but I told you so.
If I could tell you, I would let you know.

This is different from the confidence of the Tao Te Ching passage or accepting a ground based upon psychological factors. Wanting to talk about it is alive and uncertain. A final word is a kind of despair.

Got it.

In the spirit of adding stuff, the latest Kremlin speak regarding the annexations and talks:

Spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters earlier that Mr Putin remained open to talks aimed "to ensure our interests". But Moscow was certainly not ready to accept US conditions: "What did President Biden say in fact? He said that negotiations are possible only after Putin leaves Ukraine."

It complicated the search for a mutual basis for talks, he said, that the US did not recognise "new territories" in Ukraine. At the end of September, President Putin declared four Ukrainian regions as part of Russia, but while Russian forces in eastern Ukraine occupy most of Luhansk, their invasion of Donetsk has stalled and they are on the back foot in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia in the south. — https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63832151

I didn't mean to suggest Crimea is now militarily secure for Russia. On the contrary, it is more vulnerable than Donetsk. I was trying to frame the idea of talks based upon each side giving up something significant enough to satisfy the other. I agree with ssu that negotiation of that kind usually only happens when both sides reach the end of their tether. That does not seem to be the case at the moment.

I see what you mean by the annexations being theater, but they do shape any negotiation regarding borders because Russia now holds them directly instead of maintaining the mask of 'independent' republics. Losing them militarily will weaken Putin more than before the annexations.

He becomes trapped by verbs that have lapsed into the indicative mood when he wasn't looking.” — Joshs

Yes, I have seen that.
Speaking for a friend.

Putin + team want Crimea, at least. A secured Donbas would sort of help with connecting Russia and Crimea (Kerch is a bit skimpy) — jorndoe

Now that Kherson and Zaporizhya have been formally annexed along with Luhansk and Donetsk, retaining Crimea has made the Sea of Azov into a Russian Lake. For Russia truly to own Crimea requires keeping enough of Kherson to secure the water supply from the Dnipro River. Perhaps having that much conceded to Russia through negotiations would make it worth for them to agree to an end to hostilities.

It is difficult to imagine that deal happening since it would amount to rewarding the invaders for their efforts so far. The destruction of civilian infrastructure to render the place uninhabitable is a demand for unconditional surrender.

Given how far away the sides are from something like mutual recognition, what else could be a starting place for more than a ceasefire based upon limited agendas?

For my part, I don't know who I am enough to give a report. It makes me nervous when others do so.

I understand indulgence of some desires are done in exchange for others. So, I stopped smoking and taking certain risks for the buzz they gave me. I loved sparring when I was younger but don't want the hurt it would bring me now. I still drink too much. I am not guru material. But I also enjoyed (and still do) more healthy pursuits before giving up the immediate attempts to die quickly. I am pretty sure the whole thing is beyond my understanding.

I do question the Zeno paradox framing of change you present. If we 'are' something at each location of time, then whatever may be good for us or not is at odds with our 'essence'. The tiny possibilities of altering course suggest that we don't exist in that way. Talking about it needs a better model.

It is in this sense that the will as applied both externally and internally is the crux. — Pantagruel

The view of what is 'internal and external' in willing suggests different domains that don't ever become the sole province of the other. One example of this can be found in Proverbs 16:1:

The plans of the mind belong to man,
    but the answer of the tongue is from the Lord. — RSV

So, there are thoughts and deliberations toward ends that we choose to be acted or not acted upon and that gets expressed through something more than the planning preceding it. The instrument that permits the expression is not formed by the plans. Much of the ensuing verses exhort the need to not become uppity or conniving as a consequence. The wise combine understanding with the best use of the instrument. What I find most interesting about this section is how being aware of what is happening is revealed through this focus on what gets revealed beyond or despite our intentions:

There is a way which seems right to a man,
    but its end is the way to death.
26 
A worker’s appetite works for him;
    his mouth urges him on.
27 
A worthless man plots evil,
    and his speech is like a scorching fire.
28 
A perverse man spreads strife,
    and a whisperer separates close friends.
29 
A man of violence entices his neighbor
    and leads him in a way that is not good.
30 
He who winks his eyes plans perverse things,
    he who compresses his lips brings evil to past. — RSV

Your view expresses the logic of Augustine's claim that our free will is a chance to choose our better nature while surrounded by the temptations of sin and the consequences of evil. Spinoza explicitly disagrees with it:

I also want to say something here about the intellect and the will that we commonly attribute to God. If intellect and will do belong to the eternal essence of God, we must certainly mean something different by both these attributes than is commonly understood. For an intellect and a will that constituted the essence of God ​would have to be totally different from our intellect and will and would not agree with them in anything but name – no more in fact than the heavenly sign of the dog agrees with the barking animal which is a dog. I prove this thus. If intellect does belong to the divine nature, it will not be able, as our intellect is, to be posterior (as most believe) or simultaneous by nature with what is understood, since God is prior in causality to all things (by p16c1). To the contrary truth ​and the formal ​essence of things are ​such precisely because they exist as such objectively in the intellect of God. That is why God’s intellect, insofar as it is conceived as constituting God’s essence, is in truth the cause both of the essence of things and of their existence. ​This seems to have been noticed also by those who have maintained that the intellect, the will and the power of God are one and the same thing. — Spinoza, Ethic, Bk1, Prop17,Scholium, translated by Silverthorne and Kisnerby

Yes, Atlas is living the proletariat dream, gnashing his teeth at the pleasure of his masters. I read Spinoza to say that such a view of Providence conceals what actually has been given us.

Well, I figure all expressions of a single divine entity presume a vast disproportion between creature and created. The buzzkill Spinoza brings to your experiment, however, is that he rejects the 'god does whatever he wants' vibe.

With polytheistic visions, one can get a more nuanced view of what a divine order creation involves.

When the Olympic gods won their war with the Titans, Atlas was stuck in the basement, holding up the heavens, leaving Zeus free to throw lightning bolts and get laid.

Probably what would happen is that I would discover that Spinoza is right, the sense of self and intentions that bind my understanding is not the experience of a God who is busy being the possibility and actuality of all that was, is, and will be.

Seeing how much work that requires will make me glad I can quit after punching the clock for just one day.

A governance can be more or less authoritarian. Polity can be more of a cooperative involvement of relatively autonomous people, or a system of coercion executed by less autonomous people. To struggle for that autonomy is not the same as establishing borders. It often involves that dynamic, especially when the coercive authority has no regard for the people they invade.

To view all armed resistance as a fetish ignores the natural revulsion to coercion and degradation. A model of a pragmatic 'modern state' without this being recognized is not very useful.

Maybe? I'm not sure what the Russian stance is on EU membership. Their gripe seems mostly with NATO membership. — Tzeentch

Russia's efforts to weaken the EU takes many forms. One of the most visible is the vigorous support given to ultra-conservatives in individual states. This report points to how the realpolitik of such influence merges with the 'cultural' war aspect. Empowering divisive elements of any commonwealth is the purpose of the activities.

The Russian influence in Ukraine and Belarus, by contrast, is more directly connected to establishing puppet regimes.

Countries within NATO could send in troops to Ukraine if they wanted to and them being attacked in Ukraine would have nothing to do with article 5. — boethius

From the Russian point of view, the presence of NATO troops in Ukraine would mean NATO did not wait to be directly attacked before fighting Russians. It is the most established part of Article 5 as a collective defensive agreement as it relates to the threat of Russian expansion. It is difficult to consider the other dynamics you refer to when this most obvious one is not considered.

I figure the arguments over the larger strategy of Russia and other states do not have to be decided conclusively to observe that Russia has enough confidence to use those troops immediately in the path of NATO to fight in Ukraine instead. That speaks to an acknowledgement of efforts to avoid escalation as much as possible by NATO. The other side of that conversation is the support being given to Ukraine.

The restraint in arming Ukraine has been characterized by boethius as a callous burning of an asset. That view does not take into account the language of limited escalation being used by both Russia and NATO when it comes to Article 5.

Socrates feigning ignorance is ironic for a few possible reasons: he positions himself as an underdog, he self-depreciates, and he gives an idea that is opposed to the reality or actuality. In each of these there is an opposing duality: — introbert

The assumption that Socrates is faking the report of his being ignorant is one way to listen to the texts. It is interesting to read Theaetetus with this question in mind. Plato's later efforts seem directed toward getting past the limits of what was said in that dialogue. And yet that dialogue shows Plato working at his very best.

What's up with that?

There's a big difference. Allies would be in Ukraine right now fighting on behalf of their ally. — boethius

One of the ironies of the collective nature of NATO's decisions is that they protect Russia from individual nations joining the fight by themselves. Any boots on the ground from any member states would be treated as an attack by all. Cue WW3.

Russian confidence in NATO acting with restraint is shown by reports like:
“Russia had this ground force posture facing us for decades that is now effectively just gone.”

Some sort of rebuilding/reparations discussions would be appropriate: — jorndoe

That component is where the support of sanctions goes beyond deals made about territory and people. With the ongoing campaign to destroy residential infrastructure, Russia does not seem to be concerned about racking up costs in that regard to achieve their goals. Whatever deal might be made between the combatants, the Russians seem to think they can avoid some kind of Treaty of Versailles.

With all the talk about what negotiations might look like or made necessary by the limits of combat, the role of the Russians is what is most obscure. No hint has been given yet what they are willing to give in exchange for peace. The notion that they are a reasonable set of blokes, willing to compromise with others, is something they will have to offer to offset the strong impression they are giving that they are only interested in total war,

The social contract (which is, granted, not a signed document. and nobody thinks it is) yields mutual support and benefit. That's how a functioning society works. — Bitter Crank

The language of contracts has befuddled a swath of Libertarians regarding what was meant when the notion was first articulated.

What is often forgotten is the negativity associated with having to accept them. Hobbes argued for authority as the only remedy to the war its absence would permit. Rousseau presented it as a loss of a natural form of life where nobody owns anything so nothing can be stolen. Locke saw it as a need to confirm deals beyond those who make them.

In each of these cases, the challenge is never simply to cancel the original arrangements. It is, rather, to find a better arrangement.

From what I understand from reading him, there is a skeptical spirit. Some of that is directed toward asking why we require explanations above other things. So, to whatever degree that involves, not so Socratic.

Most his writing does not assume something like a "universal consciousness" as a starting point. He spent most his time asking why people thought they knew something about the matter.

when I was growing up in the Seventies, the polished albums of ELP did not show what they were doing in live performances:



Now I get why Wakeman wishes he had had that much freedom.

The conversation highlights the way models of agency shape accounts of experience. When Krishnamurti speaks of "movement of thought", does that originate in the individual as an individual in the way Descartes insisted upon? Or is the reality of self-awareness generated through layers of different agencies?

In ancient Greek thought, Nous is a "thinking itself" that is experienced in different ways by different beings in different circumstances. Plotinus puts it this way:

It is because of these forms, to which the soul owes her exclusive rule over the organism, that arise discursive reason, opinion, and non-discursive thought. This sort of activity primarily constitutes our self. No doubt, that which is superior to this activity belongs to our self. too, but on a lower level, our self is that which from above directs the organism. Nothing prevents us from calling "animal organism" that whole which includes an inferior part, mingled with the body and a superior part. The latter is really the human self, while the former is like a lion or insatiable beast. As man is identified with the rational soul when there is reasoning, it is we who reason because reasoning is an activity of the soul. — Ennead Ii, 7, translated by Joseph Katz

It is pretty unlikely that Krishnamurti would agree with Plotinus' project to clearly distinguish the physical from what it is not. But the idea that our experience of "awareness of being aware" cannot by explored by discursive reason alone accepts a complexity that the Cartesian model does not. Different conditions of our being a living organism who is aware of itself cannot be expressed only in terms of a single agent noticing that it is thinking.

You've got Zelensky negotiating from a position of power. — frank

Who would be setting the terms has not been made clear in the proposal. If it is in line with the view that Ukraine is merely a proxy for foreign powers, Zelensky will have little to do with the actual deal. If the Ukrainian government does have some agency, despite their reliance upon foreign support, the deal would probably be something worked out between them as an approach to the Russians.

Whatever influence the Ukrainians may have in a conclusion of hostilities, they will need the foreign powers to see that the Russians honor their side of it. The removal of sanctions will probably be based upon demonstrations of good faith.

The idea the Russians conceded territory for the sake of a bargaining position certainly does not fit with any notion of Ukrainian agency. The missile attacks upon civilian targets immediately after the retreat solidify the Ukrainian commitment to further war.

Fierce offensives by the Russians are underway. Something more than some of them being saved from destruction is needed to signal a willingness to negotiate.

But that would only be relevant if the deal were to stop Ukraine invading the 'new' Russia ie the deal involved the ceding of Ukrainian territory to Russia. — Isaac

It is relevant to any deal because the annexations make the terms of any compromise to be about how much territory Russia is willing to cede to Ukraine to stop the war. The present efforts by Ukraine to recover territory are, by the measure of Russian law, an invasion of the Federation, just as much as if that effort were directed toward Belgorod, Rostov-on-Don, or even Moscow. Any realistic negotiation will have to address this conflict between current Russian law and the internationally recognized borders of Ukraine.

Outside of that issue are the other oblasts the invasion has attempted to remodel. The Russians were unable to take Kiev or Odesa. The Ukrainian state was not accepted as a legitimate governance of any of the territory up to the western borders. Having gone this far resisting the Russians, it would be ridiculous for the Ukrainians to let this condition continue.

That is why any possible agreement has to start with recognizing a Ukraine that is something more than a tool of foreign powers. A place where Russia does not have the right to remodel the government to its liking.

Perhaps a cease fire is possible in the conditions you imagine. But if it would not resolve the conflict. It woulld not provide the foundation to unwind the sanctions or seek repatriation of deported people The offer, as you described it:

"We don't recognize your right to rule over Donbas, but we will withdraw our forces from there if you stop shelling us"

is so uncharacteristic of the way the Putin regime speaks that it is difficult for me to entertain the thought experiment.

I think it's Ukraine that want Russia to stop their flight. Ukraine are no threat to Russia right now, they're not invading Russia. — Isaac

Russia has annexed the oblasts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Crimea. The Kremlin today: "This is Russian territory."

What physically stops that deal from being struck? — Isaac

Agreeing to a cease fire is far from negotiating an end to hostilities. It is like agreeing to exchange sets of prisoners or to not bomb grain ships. Brokers like Turkey and Saudi Arabia permit minimum contact between the enemies in such cases. That is hardly the stuff of mutual security guarantees.

My comment was not an attempt to establish a general right to sovereignty, applicable to all situations. The observation was to underscore a minimum concession from Russia that could possibly interest the Ukrainians from stopping their fight.

No one is saying that currently there's no such thing as the Ukrainian government and therefore nobody to negotiate with. They're saying that the current powers of that government ought to change. — Isaac

What Putin has said is the following:

Step by step, Ukraine was dragged into a dangerous geopolitical game aimed at turning Ukraine into a barrier between Europe and Russia, a springboard against Russia. Inevitably, there came a time when the concept of ”Ukraine is not Russia“ was no longer an option. There was a need for the ”anti-Russia“ concept which we will never accept.

The owners of this project took as a basis the old groundwork of the Polish-Austrian ideologists to create an ”anti-Moscow Russia“. And there is no need to deceive anyone that this is being done in the interests of the people of Ukraine. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth never needed Ukrainian culture, much less Cossack autonomy. In Austria-Hungary, historical Russian lands were mercilessly exploited and remained the poorest. The Nazis, abetted by collaborators from the OUN-UPA, did not need Ukraine, but a living space and slaves for Aryan overlords. — On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians, President Putin

From this perspective, the organization calling itself the government of Ukraine is not a nation protecting its interests but an instrument of foreign powers. The only parties to negotiate with are the foreign powers. Your idea that one could make a deal with a state but not recognize the people speaking for it is not possible in practice. I am not sure it is even an idea.

In any case, since the invasion of Ukraine was based upon this rationale put forward by Putin, how could any deal be made without specifically withdrawing the claim? Otherwise, the only deal possible would be between the "West" and Russia to partition the lands in dispute.

How much should Putin + team be allowed to get away with scot-free? — jorndoe

Seeing the distance between what people in this discussion think is happening, it seems like any possible talks would have to start with some very basic steps toward living in a shared reality. The Russians would have to explicitly acknowledge that Ukraine is an actual state with the right to protect its sovereignty. This is going to be difficult to admit after selling the war as a fight with NATO itself. Why would Ukraine accept establishing anything less than that as a minimum requirement?

Without that first step, agreeing to investigations of deportations, war crimes, the targeting of civilian populations and the financial liability for repairing destroyed things would be meaningless (in the pre-Beckett sense).

Now that Russia has officially annexed 5 oblasts, any territory deal will either have to be done by fiat as an arbitrary drawing of boundaries or a process of referendums to challenge the nice results given by the Russian authorities. The Ukrainians have been adamant about not considering the former and the Russians are not likely to agree to a referendum 'rematch'. It would require a sharp change of rhetoric.

Another possibility, as pointed out by ssu, is a freezing of the conflict, where neither side concedes anything, but the front lines don't really change. The liberation of Kherson makes that seem less likely. There are certainly many commentators who say that such a stalemate is where things are going despite that development.

If one takes your last question seriously, then it brings into question what you want to learn beyond what you wish to demonstrate.

I love all of the players but this video shows how it was all for naught without Howe:

This part is particularly chewy:

In the Westernized mind, Putin and Xi, Trump and Truss, Bolsonaro and Meloni, Orbán and Kaczyński are all the same, all ‘fascists’. With historical meaning restored to the uprooted individualized life in late-capitalist anomie, there is once more a chance to fight and even die for, if nothing else, then for the common ‘values’ of humanity – an opportunity for heroism that seemed forever lost in the narrow horizons and the hedged parochialism enshrined in the complex institutions of postwar and postcolonial Western Europe. What makes such idealism even more attractive is that the fighting and dying can be delegated to proxies, people today, soon perhaps algorithms.

Pretty fancy language if you are simply objecting to your neighbor stealing all your stuff and people.

Yes, there does appear to be a lot of performative art in the preparations. On the other hand, the trenches being dug near Belgorod are less likely to be employed than the one's in Crimea that are in the path of Ukraine's stated goal to take the territory back.

There has been a lot of discussion in the press about whether Ukraine can push forward in south Kherson to follow up the Russian retreat. This NYT piece gives an account of the different possibilities. The Ukrainians' proven ability to keep plans out of view adds to the opacity.

It doesn't seem the Russians are free to redeploy their forces further east because that would invite Ukraine to push directly toward Crimea.

I nominate Steps to an Ecology of Mind by Gregory Bateson for the job.

Much has changed in science since he wrote it. Nonetheless, it brought into focus the divides between models of consciousness currently being pursued.

I am concerned that even if Russia tried to start returning children, the process of reversing adoptions would be a bureaucratic nightmare. The reports of children being sent far east suggests an intention to make the abductions irreversible.

The collapse of Russian forces in Kherson has Ukraine posting the following:

Ukrainian intelligence agency tells remaining Russian soldiers in Kherson to surrender