You are the one who presented it as a fact when it was only an opinion about the matter.

Now that you are not presenting it as a fact, it doesn't mean anything to argue against why you think it is one. I don't know what actually happened.

Got it. You are merely speculating.

In the sense that they allowed the US to blow up the Nordstream pipeline. I don't know if Germany was aware of this, but, I think that's counterproductive. — Manuel

Asking again why you are convinced of this.

In the sense that they allowed the US to blow up the Nordstream pipeline — Manuel

I was not aware that had been established as a fact.

but Ukraine shouldn't be allowing other countries to blow up the pipeline. — Manuel

In what sense has this happened?

But, alas, it will continue until the US and Russia decide to talk, absent intervention from another third party. It's not Putin alone. Europe too, especially the leaders of the western countries should be less bellicose. — Manuel

No Ukrainians were mentioned in this proposal. So the negotiations you promote means cutting off their efforts. You are in the Isaac camp who says the quicker the Ukrainians lose, the better off they will be.

The sound of one hand clapping empties the air.

Russia does not have the capability to cause significant damage to US soil if at all. — Deus

On what basis do you make this bold claim?

Conceding territory for such idealistic reasons is misguided. — Deus

I don't understand. Which territory and what ideology are you referring to?

I prefer the present approach toward minimizing the scope of the war. Your impatience would destroy billions of lives along with the ecosystem.

While NATO can help (without fighring directly) countries outside of the alliance to withstand aggression, Article 5 only applies to defense from attack on member states.

If Poland attacked Russia unilaterally, the Article does not require the other members to help.

Maybe Poland can start demonstrating their capabilities with or without infantry. — Deus

One irony of NATO participation is that each nation is tied to a collective force and is not free to fight unilaterally. The conditions for Article 5 allow Putin to ignore the surrounding nations.

What’s holding us back from an attack on Russian Soil at the moment is the nuclear threat…I’d say risk it for a biscuit. — Deus

Mutually Assured Destruction is not a biscuit.

If discourse and public debate is to be productive it must avoid descending into a contest - until proven otherwise - we should assume the very best of our interlocutor. — yebiga

What constitutes the condition of "until proven otherwise"?

For example, for one who does not see any gap between Heidegger's philosophy and his political declarations, why is it incumbent upon me to separate the two? He does not do that anywhere that I am aware of. If the burden of proof does not fall upon him, what else is left?

That was just an example. The first question about proof is what confronts all in regard to the situation in Ukraine.

Yes. I wonder how they would have reacted if told beforehand.

Whatever the overall intention of the operation, this report presents a sharp contrast to the U.S. doctrine on Joint Forcible Entry Operations.

The emphasis on keeping the element of surprise was blown via U.S. Intelligence.
Isolation of the 'lodgment' from enemy forces was not achieved.
Being told what was happening on the way to battle is a far cry from the 'rehearsals' called for in complex force integration.
The collection of tactical failures suggests that not much 'red team' process went into the planning.

So what happens in the Ukraine is important but is only one part of a much larger game. What we know about Putin and the war is filtered by our media thru this lens. — yebiga

If that is the case, your observations cannot be supported as evidence by appeal to any resource.

The article is helpful in showing how the misfortune of war will play out in Russian society. A countervailing perspective from the game of Risk underway in many minds:

During an internal struggle for power in Russia, Putin and other Russians will have other things on their minds, and the war will give way to those more pressing concerns. Sometimes you change the subject, and sometimes the subject changes you.

Another smoking accident has happened, this time on the Kerch bridge.

I figure future accounts will confirm your view. All airborne infantry missions are very risky. Many have failed.

Until that time when more has been revealed, Tzeentch's argument amounts to saying nobody could be that stupid to try it. And when that becomes the measure of what is conceivable or not, we are forced to compare that action with other actions and notice that a lot of those other tactics are stupid.

I don't know, linking to a source that says it does not know does not inculcate confidence.

This was a feint, remember? Your story was there was no intended future use at all. Kyiv was a ruse to fix Ukrainian forces who might otherwise head for the Donbas. — apokrisis

I would like to reassert my previous point that arguments about the intentions of the Hostumel operation are not evidence for or against a 'feint'.

An argument for the 'feint' needs an identification of the forces who would have headed east if not held at Kiev. No such identification has been provided. My attempts to find sources on this point have yielded nothing so far.

The use of airborne forces does suggest it was part of a particular plan. On the other hand, the Russians have demonstrated so many bad tactical practices, easily confirmed by the ubiquitous explosions of tightly grouped armor vehicles, that arguing that another tactic is incomprehensively stupid is no guarantee that it was not attempted.

Russia has conquered, occupied, pacified, and defended strategically important territory for 7 months now while inflicting, by any count I've seen, several factors more casualties on Ukraine than suffering itself. — boethius

What is your source for this?

Yes, I see the dance between claims regarding particular circumstances. My point is only to say that once one has retreated from arguing what the actual planning happened to be by means of providing evidence for it, further discussion of what is conceivable or not is no longer germane to the original question.

And that problem of using the language of inconceivability reminds me of scenes in Princess Bride.

For Tzeentch, the question of intent and planning seems to be on hold until the day documents and investigations can prove one view against the other. He has ruled out any reports presently available to us as being valid. Also, he has said that he is not providing a competing assessment of actual intent but only offering 'speculation' of what might be the purpose of the operation.

So, his or her claim that using airborne troops to secure an airport in order to establish an airbridge is simply inconceivable in this situation is not an argument for an alternate purpose. By the rules of evidence being demanded by him or her, that cannot be stated.

How does this pragmatic approach get started when one side is run by a man in a bunker calmly loading his revolver for the final scene? You make it sound like something his opponents could initiate by themselves.

and if there's no good reason to think that doing so will create a major loss in welfare — Isaac

That's the sticky wicket there. How can the good faith be extended to the Russians in this regard when Putin has played so many for fools for doing it in the past?

Yes, I spoke too broadly on that. But my point is that what is shared is horror at what Russia is doing.

We do not share their national pride and it's obscene to pretend we do. — Isaac

Pride? What is being shared is the desire to exist as a people and to defeat an organization that is really good at erasing such people. That is why borders are defended.

It could also be one reason for falling back when plan A didn’t work. Unlike the fate of all the border cities and villages where bringing in the artillery was the way to liberate their Russian citizens from Nazi oppression. — apokrisis

Your observations upon the reluctance to level Kiev make sense. On the other hand, the distance of supply lines for that sort of thing is much greater than the beating Kharkiv received for example.

In the future, more will be known about the planning in this regard. Coming from Belarus had a lot of limitations in terms of transportation. I wonder who was scheduled to land at Antonov airport if it had been secured.

He is open to talk — Manuel

You have opened up too many wounds to talk about this with equanimity.

I spare you from any curses.

Listen, I think Putin is a thug and a war criminal, but then, I think this is true of most leaders of nuclear armed countries - it comes with the job. Maybe some think he is specifically worse because of his rhetoric or his ramblings. I don't think this should distract from dialogue. — Manuel

I don't understand this idea of withdrawing from dialogue. There are many people desperately trying to talk to a recluse with a special button.

So, as one who promotes dialogue, how does the denial of Ukrainian identity play a part?

Doesn't one have to stop doing that to have a conversation?

Sure. But the propaganda in play here is saying that Nazis have taken control of Ukraine and must be rooted out. Could get rough.

U.S. citizens did fight Canadians in 1812. We both burned down real estate on both sides.

But clever historical references aside, the Putin regime does not recognize any form of Ukrainian identity.

But if they did destroy Kiev, I assume they would have no good propaganda to justify it internally. — Manuel

I guess this is precisely what I question. Russians were cool with the Chechen wars and the tactics used in Syria. If Kiev was a smoking heap, how is that different from the other stuff?

They miscalculated badly and thought that parts of Ukraine would want to willingly go to Russia. They never did destroy Kiev, which they could have - it would go against their propaganda. — Manuel

What do you mean they could have destroyed Kiev? Bomb it out of existence? And what propaganda would that go against?

As for the gap between what they thought the Russians could achieve against facts on the ground, how does one separate the rhetoric justifying the operation from the level of resistance encountered?

The Russians clearly underestimated the response. That mistake is not clearly connected to an expectation of a more favorable reception.

I see where you are going with that. Do you have a passage that underlines that for you?

I did not have a point. I was only asking if you had wrestled with his text.

Edit to add: I am not asking that to establish some kind of authority but to flesh out what you understand to be Aristotle's thinking.

Have you read Aristotle?

I wasn't putting forth what I think may be different but observing that Aristotle intended to highlight knowing for the sake of knowing from solving practical problems with a view toward specific ends.