It could also be one reason for falling back when plan A didn’t work. Unlike the fate of all the border cities and villages where bringing in the artillery was the way to liberate their Russian citizens from Nazi oppression. — apokrisis

Your observations upon the reluctance to level Kiev make sense. On the other hand, the distance of supply lines for that sort of thing is much greater than the beating Kharkiv received for example.

In the future, more will be known about the planning in this regard. Coming from Belarus had a lot of limitations in terms of transportation. I wonder who was scheduled to land at Antonov airport if it had been secured.

He is open to talk — Manuel

You have opened up too many wounds to talk about this with equanimity.

I spare you from any curses.

Listen, I think Putin is a thug and a war criminal, but then, I think this is true of most leaders of nuclear armed countries - it comes with the job. Maybe some think he is specifically worse because of his rhetoric or his ramblings. I don't think this should distract from dialogue. — Manuel

I don't understand this idea of withdrawing from dialogue. There are many people desperately trying to talk to a recluse with a special button.

So, as one who promotes dialogue, how does the denial of Ukrainian identity play a part?

Doesn't one have to stop doing that to have a conversation?

Sure. But the propaganda in play here is saying that Nazis have taken control of Ukraine and must be rooted out. Could get rough.

U.S. citizens did fight Canadians in 1812. We both burned down real estate on both sides.

But clever historical references aside, the Putin regime does not recognize any form of Ukrainian identity.

But if they did destroy Kiev, I assume they would have no good propaganda to justify it internally. — Manuel

I guess this is precisely what I question. Russians were cool with the Chechen wars and the tactics used in Syria. If Kiev was a smoking heap, how is that different from the other stuff?

They miscalculated badly and thought that parts of Ukraine would want to willingly go to Russia. They never did destroy Kiev, which they could have - it would go against their propaganda. — Manuel

What do you mean they could have destroyed Kiev? Bomb it out of existence? And what propaganda would that go against?

As for the gap between what they thought the Russians could achieve against facts on the ground, how does one separate the rhetoric justifying the operation from the level of resistance encountered?

The Russians clearly underestimated the response. That mistake is not clearly connected to an expectation of a more favorable reception.

I see where you are going with that. Do you have a passage that underlines that for you?

I did not have a point. I was only asking if you had wrestled with his text.

Edit to add: I am not asking that to establish some kind of authority but to flesh out what you understand to be Aristotle's thinking.

Have you read Aristotle?

I wasn't putting forth what I think may be different but observing that Aristotle intended to highlight knowing for the sake of knowing from solving practical problems with a view toward specific ends.

In its simplicity it describes the innate curiosity of human beings or even cats. — Deus

I am pretty sure Aristotle would object to this on the basis that the desire for knowledge is for its own sake. Wondering what is happening may be related to the instinctual curiosity of many species but Aristotle is doing something else. The desire to understand has its own life.

And the grinding reluctance of the Biden Administration to give the weapons to Ukraine that would fold the Russian invasion in a fortnight is a part of that discussion.

Interesting development in the weapons supply coming from U.S:

In bid for new long-range rockets, Ukraine offers U.S targeting oversight

Far more likely, Russia considers Ukraine at best a proper satellite of imperial Russia. Even the suggestion that Ukraine join NATO challenges this status and is intolerable. — hypericin

Yes, Putin was afraid the store would close before he could rush in to steal the item.

The decision to annex territories where you are set to lose substantial ground right after the annexation obviously isn't what Putin likely had in mind politically. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This exacerbates having partial control of regions where success now requires complete control. Before the annexation, the standard of victory was whatever Putin said it was.

Why would I want to? Attempts at making such assessments properly are foolish at this point, and I wouldn't take them seriously unless they're backed up by serious research — Tzeentch

If that is the case, doesn't that condition apply to your assessment that the attack on Kiev was only a feint?

As a piece of military strategy, a feint draws forces from the true target. But the attack was sprung before movement of that kind changed the conditions on the ground. If you are going to deliver a sucker punch, you better make it work the first time. Do you have a vision of how things would have been different without this 'feint'? An historical parallel, perhaps?

Also, the purpose of taking the airport is to use it. Failure to secure it through combined forces is part and parcel to the failure of the whole operation as detailed in this comparison of Hostomel with the failure of Market Garden in WW2: An Airfield Too Far: Failures at Market Garden and Antonov Airfield

In the face of your criticism of what previous attempts at radical change have amounted to, what do you propose instead?

I have had a long relationship with this bit of music. I like this version because it underscores the dissonance with the harmony.

As the Continental once said: "Pour champagne on me once, shame on you. Pour champagne on me twice, shame on me."

The process of application aside, when Zelensky said that Ukraine is now a 'de facto' member of the alliance, he was pointing to the annexations as Russia invoking Article 5 as already underway. The death of the pretense of a Special Operation means it is no longer clear what lines are not to be crossed. So that does not mean there are no longer such lines, but that they need to be rearticulated by those who support Ukraine.

I read the dialectic as an interaction between people where there are always subjects acting in objective conditions. The subjects are changed through the interactions, and this creates new conditions.

For example, the subjective experiences before the master/slave conflict are different from those that happen after it has gone down.

Well, that was a light and refreshing afternoon snack!

Seeing that both the Russians and the European ultra-nationalists are dependent upon the continuance of the integrated economies, the reach for maximum leverage would be a suicide pact rather than a strategy for victory for all involved.

Slantchev presents a solid argument for how Putin might respond to further losses. I think the logic of proportional response to such escalation would not be to wipe out the Black Sea fleet but to isolate Russian forces in Ukrainian spaces.

By annexing the contested territories, Russia has collapsed the line previously drawn constraining the use of offensive weapons to defend Ukraine. If there is any chance in keeping the escalation from going straight to the unfolding of MAD, response needs to be very specific.

But who am I kidding? I feel like Mandrake while he was stealing a Coke from the vending machine.

I am curious about not considering 'the future enough'

One benefit of being mortal is that line of thinking is not available to us. We can think in terms of generations after us. What do you have in mind?

The purpose of suffering is to learn the causes of suffering so that you don't have to cause yourself suffering anymore. — Yohan

That makes sense to me as an effort to be less stupid. But I am not sure how to apply the maxim to a map of the world.

Before setting forth upon the special operation, Putin was a popular figure in European ultranationalist circles. At the same time, he courted the EU to set up massive infrastructure deals. It seems safe to say that bit of dual theater is gone.

Or if it is not dead, what does that look like?

I ask it that way because the world has changed, whatever his intentions are.

lgor Girkin on Lyman:

“Why the withdrawal from Lyman was not secured in advance by introducing forces into the ‘corridor’ sufficient to hold it and cover the withdrawal – I have no answer to that,” he added.

He said that if Russian forces are not able to withdraw from Lyman, “a relatively insignificant tactical defeat” would turn into “a huge moral success” for Ukraine.

If their command gave a crap about force protection, they would have had them retreat while they could do it in order.

Another factor on Lyman is whether the Russians can retreat. If not, it won't encourage others to hold fast in precarious conditions.

So going nuclear in a delimited tactical fashion wouldn’t be to win in Ukraine and then declare hostilities over. — apokrisis

I don't know what Putin's ambitions are. But if he thought using tactical nukes would give him Ukraine, I think he would use them.

I hear what you are saying how their use would require a frantic discussion amongst those who oppose Putin. On the other hand, the incremental levels of support of Ukraine from the West do have the strategic benefit of matching emerging threats with emerging counter measures. The US., in particular, is saying they will suppress this fire, in whatever form it takes. The more 'tactical' a method is used by the Russians, the more the suppressing of that fire supports the tactics the Ukrainians are currently employing.

Suddenly, clearing Ukrainian air space would not look so provocative.

I see you like Vexler. I agree with his argument that the whole 'NATO as a threat narrative' is a scam. It boils down to complaining that they won't let Putin be an asshole without consequences.

I’m not following. How could lobbing a few tactical nukes in the current war - now framed as a legitimate defence of mother Russian territory - make any difference to the strategic arsenal of subs, missiles and cruise missiles? — apokrisis

I am not convinced that the line between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons is a thing. Thankfully, we don't have any precedent to guide us in the matter. If the Russians start shelling civilians with small nukes instead of with cluster bombs and the like, suppressing that fire will draw NATO and company to become more directly involved. They have said as much. That has a strategic tang to it.

The reason I related its use to the logic of MAD is that once one introduces nukes into the battlespace, it doesn't make sense to send just a few. You need to use as many as you can before the response comes. It is what Zappa referred to as a One-Shot Deal.

Yes, that is why I thought a 'proportional' response would employ 'conventional' weapons. What if that response wiped out strategic use of nuclear weapons by Russia?

MAD only works if you can deliver the destruction on command.

I don't know how deep the support may go toward supporting the use of weapons of mass destruction in the Putin regime. But I am pretty sure that there is not any room to try one thing first and then see how others react. The best chance one has, as the aggressor, is to wipe out the opposing response at the same time one attacks. Otherwise, you are toast.

If they were used for a tactical advantage, then some units would have to advance through the corridor provided. There is no evidence that the existing forces are equipped to do that. The prevailing winds tend to go from west to east. Not good for Russia.

If it was a strategic strike, then wiping out Kyiv would certainly change the calculus. But that would probably prompt NATO and company to strike all of the other Russian weapons with conventional forces. And if the Russians know that would happen then the strike would have to get in front of all the instruments of Mutually Assured Destruction by a preemptive strike from the mother of preemptive strikes.

Those passages are good to compare with Dostoievski's concern for the monsters he depicts who become destructive through their isolation and denouncement of their given circumstances.

Kierkegaard challenges the self-sufficiency of the normative whereas Dostoievski looks at the evil of completely abandoning it.

This topic reminds me of the time when I was at school, reading Aquinas' argument regarding what was a just war. The reaction of one of my colleagues will always stay with me. "With this, the patience with suffering has been abandoned."

I haven't seen any improvements upon the observation.

Søren Kierkegaard is an Existentialist because he accepts, as fully as Sartre or Camus, the absurdity of the world. But he does not begin with the postulate of the non-existence of God, but with the principle that nothing in the world, nothing available to sense or reason, provides any knowledge or reason to believe in God. — javi2541997

I think this misrepresents Kierkegaard attempts to understand the human condition in the terms of sin and redemption. In The Concept of Anxiety, he argues for a psychology that fits our experiences in life.

In Philosophical Fragments, he says that the condition for knowing truth is either given to us or we have it by nature. By arguing that the former is the view of Christianity, he is not saying that is in conflict with nature as expressed in the Augustinian vision of a war between cities. Kierkegaard is a follower of Pascal who notes the scandal of reason in the Christian view but also claims it is the best explanation for our condition.

From that point of view, I don't read Kierkegaard as an anti-modernist. He belongs more in the 'same as it ever was' camp.

Not a convincing argument that your view should prevail over others.