From here he makes a radical statement that only plays out through the rest of the book. “I can give you no agent who thinks.” (p.6) This seems speculative at this point (and needlessly provocative), and I take it to mean so far that if there is no casual scientific mechanism, then it is the (“external”) judgment of thought that matters, not its agent (though this belies responsibility). — Antony Nickles
We are most strongly tempted to think that here are things hidden, something we can see from the outside but which we can't look into. And yet nothing of the sort is the case. — Blue Book, page 6
The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.
Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found?
You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do not see the eye.
And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye. — Tractatus, 5.633
There is no a priori order of things.
Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality coordinated with it.
Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way.
What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’.
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world—not a part of it. — Tractatus, 5.64
Our craving for generality has another main source: our preoccupation with the method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a generalization.
Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is 'purely descriptive'. (Think of such questions as "Are there sense data?" and ask: What method is there of determining this? Introspection?) — Blue Book, page 18
Quite nerve racking honestly... — Manuel
He then flat out claims that what gives life to a sign is not us, but a system of signs. — Antony Nickles
We may find that such a mind-model would have to be very complicated and intricate in order to explain the observed mental activities; and on this ground we might call the mind a queer kind of medium. But this aspect of the mind does not interest us. The problems which it may set are psychological problems, and the method of their solution is that of natural science.
Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us. And when we are worried about the nature of thinking, the puzzlement which we wrongly interpret to be one about the nature of a medium is a puzzlement caused by the mystifying use of our language. This kind of mistake recurs again and again in philosophy; e.g. when we are puzzled about the nature of time, when time seems to us a queer thing. We are most strongly tempted to think that here are things hidden, something we can see from the outside but which we can't look into. And yet nothing of the sort is the case. It is not new facts about time which we want to know. All the facts that concern us lie open before us. But it is the use of the substantive "time" which mystifies us. If we look into the grammar of that word, we shall feel that it is no less astounding that man should have conceived of a deity of time than it would be to conceive of a deity of negation or disjunction — Blue Book, page 6
The support for Trump extends far beyond the man himself—it's that people want to see a peevish, arrogant, and nakedly contemptuous pseudo-aristocracy punished for its abuses, and re-electing the Orange Man is clearly THE most effective way to do it. — Chisholm
The bleakest work of Russian literature I've read is probably Life and Fate by Grossman. Or maybe it's harrowing, rather than bleak, since it's fundamentally optimistic and non-nihilistic. Anyway, it's great. — Jamal
As for introducing ‘new divinities,’ how could I be guilty of that merely in asserting that a god’s voice is made manifest to me indicating what I should do? Surely those who take their omens from the cries of birds and the utterances of humans form their judgments on ‘voices.’ Will any one dispute either that thunder utters its ‘voice’ or that it is an omen of the greatest moment? Does not the very priestess who sits on the tripod at Pytho divulge the god’s will through a ‘voice’? But more than that, in regard to the god’s foreknowledge of the future and his forewarning of it to whomever he wishes, these are the same terms, I assert, that all people use and credit. The only difference between them and me is that whereas they call the sources of their forewarning ‘birds,’ ‘utterances,’ ‘chance meetings,’ ‘prophets,’ I call mine a ‘divine’ thing, and I think that in using such a term I am speaking with greater truth and piety than those who ascribe the gods’ power to birds. That I do not lie against the god I have this further proof: I have revealed to many of my friends the counsels which the god has given me, and in no instance has the event shown that I was mistaken.” — Xenophon, Apology, 12, translated by Marchant and Todd
Is this a daimonic determination of destiny. A web being spun. — Amity
Nor shall he meanwhile suffer any evil or harm, until he sets foot upon his own land; but thereafter he shall suffer whatever fate and the dread spinners spun with their thread for him at his birth, when his mother bore him. — Homer, Odessey, Book 7, 193, translated by A. T. Murray
It is not clear to me that the relationship is severed at death. Where does it say this in Book 10? — Amity
So, what to make of Er in light of these differences is the question for me. I think that likening the three sisters to spinners of thread is to look at mortality as a production. The experiences of the soul are seen through a "mechanism" of life coming into being. The souls may be immortal but the work of each daimon is complete when Atropos cuts the thread. — Paine
Dionysus and Xanthias: Welcome Charon!
Charon: Who’s for release from cares and troubles? Who’s for the Plain of Oblivion? For Ocnus’ Twinings? The Land of the Cerberians? The buzzards? Taenarum?
Dionysus: Me.
Charon: Hurry aboard.
Dionysus: Where are you headed?
Charon: To the buzzards!
Dionysus: Really?
Charon: Sure, just for you. Now get aboard! — Aristophanes, Frogs, 189, translated by Jeffrey Henderson
Why would the plain of Lethe be given primacy? — Amity
Why do you use the word 'insistence'? — Amity
The souls that throng the flood
Are those to whom, by fate, are other bodies ow’d:
In Lethe’s lake they long oblivion taste,
Of future life secure, forgetful of the past. — Virgil, Aeneid
We should not forget that in the Phaedrus there is the plain of Aletheia or truth. (248b) — Fooloso4
“The reason for the great eagerness to behold the plain of truth is that the nutriment appropriate to the best part of soul lies on the meadow 248C there, and the nature of the wing which lifts the soul upwards is nourished by this. And the ordinance of necessity is as follows: any soul that has become a companion to a god and has sight of any of the truths is safe until the next revolution, and if the soul can do this continually, it is always preserved from harm. But whenever it does not see, because it cannot keep up, and is filled with forgetfulness and vice and weighed down through some mischance and sheds its wings on account of the heaviness and falls to the ground, the law decrees that the soul be not implanted 248D in any beastly nature at its first birth. — Phaedrus, 248b, translated by Horan
“And if after we have acquired it we have not forgotten it every time, we must always be born with the knowledge and live with the knowledge throughout our lives. For that is what knowing is, the retention of knowledge, without loss, once it has been acquired. For we do refer to forgetting as the loss of knowledge, do we not, Simmias?” 75E
“Entirely so, Socrates, of course,” he replied.
“On the other hand, I presume that if we acquired knowledge before birth and lost it in the process of birth, but later on, by using the senses in this regard, we re-acquired the knowledge we previously possessed, then what we call learning would be a re-acquisition of our own knowledge. And wouldn’t we be right to call this recollection?” — Phaedo, 75d, translated by Horan
However, I'm not clear if there are 2 different Greek words. Or if it is one Greek word with different meanings. — Amity
The name of a river. — Amity
