Since language must be a component of the 'natural' society you distinguish from the 'abstract', sharing a language must be natural to some degree. So, the question applies at least to the point where you would place language outside of what a community shares. The burden of explanation falls upon your theory.

Yes, it is obvious that Oppenheimer was referencing Rousseau's " The Social Contract." That is why I responded as I did.

I read the State because you recommended it in that discussion.

I do not think people are connected or related because they use the same language. — NOS4A2

How did the language come into existence?

I would argue that in order to do this, one must be nominalist. He must consider only the concrete, particular things involved, what they themselves tell of their lives and relations with each other, and let go of the pre-conceived, realist account of collectives. — NOS4A2

The dimensions of that concrete community are what I found problematic with your interpretation of a 'social contract' several months ago. Your man [url=http://Oppenheimer]Oppenheimer[/url] misrepresents Rousseau's view of the origin of civic society when he says:

The community, to use Toennies' term, changed into a "society." "Contract" seemed to be the only bond that held men together--the contract based on the purely rationalistic' relation of service for service the do ut des, the "Contraf Social" of Rousseau. — Oppenheimer

What Rousseau actually said:

The first man who, after enclosing a piece of land, got the idea of saying This is mine and found people simple enough to believe him was the true founder of civil society. — Rousseau

This view moves the beginning of "abstraction" to a period considerably antecedent to the one you propose.

I relate to the grocer when I go to the market, for example. This is what I meant by "history", I think, the culmination of our interactions with one another. That is the extent of our relationship. — NOS4A2

There is the language you use to interact. Where does that fit into your theory?

From the IEP article on Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein has been described as a Linguistic Idealist, where language is the ultimate reality and as an Anti-Realist, someone who cannot get outside their own language in order to compare what is in their language with what is in the world. — RussellA

That is precisely incorrect. Consider the following:

182. The grammar of "to fit", "to be able", and "to understand". (Exercises: (i) When is a cylinder C said to fit into a hollow cylinder H? Only while C is stuck into H? (2) Sometimes we say that C ceased to fit into H at such-and-such a time. What criteria are used in such a case for its having happened at that time? (3) What does one regard as criteria for a body's having changed its weight at a particular time if it was not actually on the balance at that time? (4) Yesterday I knew the poem by heart; today I no longer know it. In what kind of case does it make sense to ask: "When did I stop knowing it?" (5) Someone asks
me "Can you lift this weight?" I answer "Yes". Now he says "Do it!"—and I can't. In what kind of circumstances would it count as a justification to say "When I answered 'yes' I could do it, only now I can't"?
The criteria which we accept for 'fitting', 'being able to', 'understanding', are much more complicated than might appear at first sight. That is, the game with these words, their employment in the linguistic intercourse that is carried on by their means, is more involved—the role of these words in our language other—than we are tempted to think.
(This role is what we need to understand in order to resolve philosophical paradoxes. And hence definitions usually fail to resolve them; and so, a fortiori does the assertion that a word is 'indefinable'.) — Philosophical Investigations

I can understand Augustine's position that we can discover the correct sequence of words by observing the world, and finding a correspondence between the words and objects in the world. — RussellA

To which Wittgenstein's first comment upon was:

Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of word. If you describe the learning of language in this way you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like "table", "chair",
"bread", and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself. Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip marked "five red apples". He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked "apples"; then he looks up the word "red" in a table and finds a colour sample opposite it; then he says the series of cardinal numbers—I assume that he knows them by heart—up to the word "five" and for each number he takes an apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer.——It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words.——"But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word 'red' and what he is to do with the word 'five'?"——Well, I assume that he acts as I have described. Explanations come to an end somewhere. But what is the meaning of the word "five"?—No such thing was in question here, only how the word "five" is used. — PI 1

The Wiki article can be discarded at the get go.

One central feature of the Civil War was that the South understood it would have to immediately replace the functions of government after leaving the Union. When MAGA speaks of dissolving the Union, they sound like they will be able to somehow go on as before. National institutions, Federal Courts, Medicaid, National funding for education, health, social security, disaster relief, and the rest will somehow continue without a thought given to the matter.

The complacency is what frightens me.

You call for an individualist autonomy that would dismantle the State, as such.

You defend Trump as a victim of the Deep State.

A Trump administration will not give you the first condition. On the contrary, it will give certain groups more power to exert control over legislation and executive prerogative.

So, how do you harmonize the two projects?

How are those two intentions connected in your mind?

I have asked this question a number of times and you have ignored it.

I think that Sartre tries to address your point by the following distinction:

We may therefore formulate our thesis: transcendental consciousness is an impersonal spontaneity. It determines its existence at each instant, without our being able to conceive anything before it. Thus each instant of our conscious life reveals to us a creation ex nihiio. Not a new arrangement, but a new existence. There is something distressing for each of us, to catch in the act this tireless creation existence of which we are not the creators. At this level man has the impression of ceaselessly escaping from himself, of overflowing himself, of being surprised by riches which are always unexpected. And once more it is an unconscious from which he demands an account of this surpassing of the me by consciousness. Indeed, the me can do nothing to this spontaneity, for will is an object which constitutes itself for and by this spontaneity. The will directs itself upon states, upon emotions, or upon things, but it never turns back upon consciousness. — Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre, Conclusions, translated by Kirkpatrick and Williams

This matter of creation at each instance plays a prominent role in Descartes' Meditations as the activity of God. But in this passage, it is presented as an unsurpassable limit of experience.

One can be confident that when someone speaks of “common ownership” or “public control” of this or that, the political subject in his mind is invariably some kind of association or group, maybe society writ large, but in every case an idea without any particular referent. — NOS4A2

By this measure, do you object to the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court whereby corporations came to have the same rights as individual persons?

The review of the Divine Sign book review is very interesting. It strikes me that the question of the daimonion is a looking glass for different approaches to Plato as a whole.

One example of that in the review is:

Thus when Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith refute Gregory Vlastos's reductionist reading of the divine sign -- the voice as a rational hunch -- they are helping to bring a suppressed side of Socrates back into the picture. Socrates' experience was genuinely religious -- which as Brickhouse and Smith also point out does not make it irrational. — Book review

This expresses a problem I have with Vlastos' method in general, where analysis can make all matters into either/or conditions. Wrestling with either/or conditions in reference to the divine has also been a large component of the discussions in your OPs on Plato. In reading Crito, how to understand 'intuition' is a question when you observed:

His daemon, however, does not provide any reasons when warning him against doing something. — Fooloso4

He didn't say it to particular people in real time but just a general statement as policy. I mentioned examples of the lack.

And in the case of 1/6, he expressed his love for them once he got around to telling them to go home.

Then there are the regular predictions that violence will break out if the trials continue.

The message for peace and lawful behavior is having trouble breaking through.

That general denunciation you linked to does not cancel all the times he avoided calling out specific people. The "good people on all sides" statement at Charlottsville did not mention the neo-Nazis , the "stand back but "stand by" message to the Proud Boys at the debate, the hours of silence on 1/6, etcetera.

You approved of the violent rhetoric at rallies as justified by the circumstances. I am sure you can justify anything you like.

Back in 2015 and 2016, a number of posters on Red State and sites of the Bannon variety boasted of using their participation on "liberal" sites to hone their rhetoric in other places. That chatter shut down when they realized anybody could fake whatever screen being thrown up to participate in the discussion. Ancient history, almost.

TPF could be a resource for that sort of thing. Questioning what is 'politization' may impoverish the efforts.

The decision to deny Meadow's move to be heard in a Federal Court is made on the prerogatives of the State Court.

The Hatch Act finally appears from the shadows.

I agree.
I am also interested in how the agents in play in these scenarios are connected or not to politics as the means of creating law and policy as means to ends. The persecution of Trump as a self-sufficient universe unrelated to the issues confronting us.

The following picture drawn by Socrates captures some of the tension symbolized through gender roles:

203B ‘The story is somewhat lengthy but I will tell you nevertheless,’ she replied. ‘When Aphrodite was born, the gods held a feast, and among them was Resource, the son of Cunning. Once they had dined, Poverty arrived, begging as she usually did at such festivities, and she hung about the doorways. Resource was drunk on nectar – indeed there was no wine in those days – so he went out into the garden of Zeus, was overcome with heaviness and fell asleep. Now Poverty, because she herself was devoid of resource, contriving to have a child by Resource, lies down 203C beside him, thus conceiving Love. That is why Love is also a follower and attendant of Aphrodite. Begotten at her birthday festivities, he is a lover by nature, drawn to beauty because Aphrodite is beautiful.

‘Now, since Love is the son of Resource and Poverty, he finds himself in the following circumstances. Firstly, he is always poor and far from being delicate and beautiful as so many people believe; rather he is hard, squalid, 203D barefoot and homeless, always sleeping on the ground without covers, lying in the open air in doorways or on the streets, possessed of his mother’s nature, dwelling ever alongside lack. Then again, because of his father, he has designs upon anything beautiful and good; he is courageous, energetic and intense, a formidable hunter, always devising some schemes. He desires understanding and is resourceful in obtaining it. He is a life-long lover of wisdom,[45] a clever enchanter, sorcerer, and sophist, by nature neither immortal 203E nor mortal. Rather, on the self-same day he thrives and is alive at one moment whenever he is well-resourced, but the next moment he is dying; yet he comes back to life again because of his father’s nature. Whatever resources he obtains are constantly slipping away, and so he is neither devoid of resources nor wealthy, and what is more he is midway between wisdom and ignorance. — Symposium, 203b, translated by Horan

This view puts Socrates turning down the wealth of Crito as a resource into a certain light. It does not fix the kind of poverty that has befallen Socrates.

Germany: Well, that’s not the case sir. There are things that you guys are entitled to get. And there’s things that under the law, we are not allowed to give out.

Trump: Well, you have to. Well, under the law you’re not allowed to give faulty election results, OK? You’re not allowed to do that. And that’s what you done. This is a faulty election result. And honestly, this should go very fast. You should meet tomorrow because you have a big election coming up and because of what you’ve done to the president — you know, the people of Georgia know that this was a scam. And because of what you’ve done to the president, a lot of people aren’t going out to vote and a lot of Republicans are going to vote negative because they hate what you did to the president. Okay? They hate it. And they’re going to vote. And you would be respected. Really respected, if this thing could be straightened out before the election. You have a big election coming up on Tuesday. — Phone Call

Your comment about "Trump supporters" prompts me to ask you again why you support the man.

What has he done or will do for you and what do you care about?

But the challenge is even more acute for an ideology that aims to destroy the existing social order without any plan for an alternative, which I think fairly describes the average leftist perspective. — frank

Who do you include in this description?

I think the interference with State processes and officials by agents outside of the State helps establish intent since other possible reasons are difficult to imagine. Like Meadows happening to be in town to visit the recount efforts. Or local election officials being defamed by Powell and Giuliani.

The situation would be very different in a system not shaped so profoundly by federalism.

It sounds like you are treating John Durham's last efforts as Special Counsel as conclusive proof of a plot to smear the Trump campaign. Years of investigation did point to some unprofessional behavior but not prove or strongly suggest the sort of organized plot as advertised at its inception.

Your language of:

conspiracy theory that Russia stole an election — NOS4A2

does not fit with the conspiracies you promote because Russia did try to influence the election result. This was acknowledged by the Republicans at the time. The question of the Mueller probe was whether the Trump team was coordinating their efforts with Russia to that end.
Mueller concluded he could not prove that happened but could not rule it out because of the obstructions his investigation encountered. At his last congressional hearing, Durham admitted ignorance of many aspects of that case. It was not a good look for your team. Whoever that is.

The problem of proving organized behavior Is one of the interesting aspects of the Georgia charges. Having the indictment be a RICO offense puts all of these questions of 'organized' behavior as the matter needed to be proved.

If the RICO angle is a fabrication, presented in a court of law, your desire to defend Trump should have its best chance here, where the coordination of agents is the case, as such.

The surrounding of a city seems to be bound up with what it is. The in between places are the premise of many wars. Outside the boundaries, as it is often described, is either a material claim or an existential struggle as Hegel described.

Essays upon Actions and Events by Donald Davidson. The collection with Quine rebuttals in the appendices.

The work is early in comparison to later discussions found in academia. I am finding it very helpful because it presents his distinctions as they occurred to him.

I don't know whether he is a rapist or not. But surely your past and present presidents were capable of other terrible things if not worse than rape. — Hailey

True, that. But the terms of defending a crime are not equal to whether one has kept faith with a sworn promise.

For instance, I take the vow of matrimony very seriously and view those who are adulterous as less trustworthy after finding out about it. This, of course, does not mean that such behavior is equal to betraying the promises to fulfill and protect the Constitution. The matter of public promises and personal trust do become entangled when self-interest is measured against serving a commonwealth.

The question of corruption is usually framed in terms of how much self-interest overtakes the purpose of serving as a public official or the interests of an enterprise. The Tyrant, in the Platonic Dialogues, is the one who uses the appearance of providing justice as a glove to hide their true end to further themselves above all others.

McConnel did not have the courage to face this problem as provided by the Constitution for this very purpose. I remember my grandfather complaining about the judicial system being blamed for the results of other institutions failing to do their jobs.

The Catholic and Orthodox churches. Having an Emperor crawl for forgiveness in order to rule.
The Crusades.
The elimination of 'heresies' wiping out entire communities.
The agreements to have states be designated as having their religion be determined by what the rulers believed.
That sort of thing.

I know of no documented cases where Christians waged war against the roman emperors who so viciously attacked them. — Average

They did that a lot of that sort of thing after they attained state power.

Should we fight when faced with an evil enemy like Micheal or should we do as Christ did and lay down our lives for the ones we love because we are taught by him to love our enemies? — Average

As reported by Paul, the world was about to change so dramatically that the reason to fight (which was generally considered a natural response) was less important than the impending change. The Sermon on the Mount begins with pointing to the end of days as changing the criteria of what was important due to the immediate circumstances.

I cannot argue that the distinction is always clear. The Aristophanes reference is well taken.

I admire Thomas Paine, as my forum handle suggests. His arguments for democracy are in tune with the problem of absolute power as described in Statesman. I wonder if our present condition is one where we cannot distinguish the regimes so clearly. Maybe the tyrannical, the oligarchs, and the dynamic of unfortunate public opinion coexist simultaneously.

In so far as I understand Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein, the rule following aspect of language games is seen as troubling the view that such games involve the description of facts.

I see how that engages the theories of Quine, Davidson, Chomsky, etcetera. But I don't understand how that implicates the treatment of facts in law.

The role of rhetoric may not lead to a 'truth' that cannot be put into question by facts. Crito does, however, put a lot of emphasis on distinguishing persuasion from coercion. Socrates ties his argument with Crito to his argument with Athens:

Soc: Let’s consider this together, good man, and if you are able to contradict 48E what I am saying in any way, do so, and I shall heed you. Otherwise, at this stage, blessed man, please stop presenting the same argument to me over and over, that I need to get out of here without the permission of the Athenians, for it is very important to me that I do all this with your approval and not against your will. — ibid. 48d

And that picture of coercion is said to destroy what was formerly trying to be saved:

“Tell me, Socrates, what are you intending to do? Do you have anything else in mind, for your part, than to destroy us, the laws, and the entire city too, by 50B your plan of action?" — ibid. 50a

The emphasis upon persuasion is twice compared with coercion in the following:

“Or have you, as wise as you are, overlooked the following facts: that your homeland is more worthy of respect than your mother or father or all of your other ancestors, and is more august, and sacred, 51B and more exalted in status, in the eyes of the gods, and of men of intelligence; that when your homeland is angry she should be revered, obeyed and assuaged, even more than an angry father, and you should either persuade her otherwise, or do as she commands, and suffer in silence if she prescribes any suffering by being beaten or imprisoned; that if she sends you to war to be wounded or slain, this is what you must do, for justice consists in this, and you must not surrender or withdraw or desert your post; that in war, in a courtroom, or anywhere else, you must do what your city and your homeland commands, or else persuade 51Cher as to where justice lies; that it is unholy to use force against your father or mother, but much more so against your homeland?” — ibid. 51a

This does not answer your question of when judgements should (or should not) "stand supreme'. And the account does employ the 'noble lie' of our birthplace being said to be prior to our parents. But maybe persuasion has its own laws. Socrates claiming rights within certain conditions.

In the argument he makes in the Crito he is silent on the fact that Athens is a democracy. — Fooloso4

Plato does make one comment that connects to other texts. The following from Crito :

Soc: I really wish the multitude were able to do the greatest harm, Crito, so that they might also be able to do the greatest good, and all would be well.

is echoed in the Statesman:

Stranger: Then again, just as few are intermediate between one and many, so the rule of the “not many” should be regarded accordingly as intermediate in both respects. The rule of the many, for its part, is weak in every respect and, in comparison with the others, is capable neither of great good nor of great evil, because public offices therein are distributed in minute subdivisions to many people. Therefore, when all of the constitutions are lawful, this proves to be the worst of them, and when they are all at variance with the law, it is the best, 303B and when all of them lack restraint, the life in a democracy wins out, but when they are orderly, this is the last one you should live in. But life in the first is by far the best, with the exception of the seventh, for we must separate that one from all of the other constitutions, as we would separate a god from human beings. — Statesman, Horan translation, 303b

The seventh one is that of the Philosopher King. It is deemed the best but most unlikely to ever appear:

Str: So we are saying that a tyrant arises in this way, a king too, and an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy; from the disgust of humanity with that one sole ruler, and their disbelief that anyone worthy of such rule could ever arise; someone who would be willing and able to rule with knowledge and excellence, 301D dispensing just and sacred ordinances properly to everyone, rather than maltreating, murdering and inflicting evil upon whomsoever he wants, whenever he wants. But if a person such as we are describing were to arise, he would be loved, and would dwell there as the benevolent helmsman of what is, strictly speaking, the only proper constitution. — ibid. 301c

To your point regarding the rule of law, Plato distinguishes between good and bad forms of the regimes accordingly:

Stranger: Under the rule of one we get kingly rule and tryanny; under the rule of the few, as we said, come the auspicious form of it, aristocracy and also oligarchy. As for the subdividing of democracy, though we gave both forms of it previously, we must now treat is as twofold.

Young Socrates: How is this: How can it be divided?

Stranger: By the same division as the others, even though the word 'democracy' to be doing double duty. Rule according to law is as possible under democracy as under the other constitutions. — Statesman, translated by J.K. Skemp

I think there is an expression of fear in Crito's argument here. There is also an element of corruption being suggested. The dialogue begins with Crito noting he bribed the jail keeper to get in early. Is the disgrace Crito fears a loss of power at the same time?

The discussion of cowardice reminds me of the following from Cratylus:

What remains to consider after justice? I think we have not yet discussed courage. [413e] It is plain enough that injustice (ἀδικία) is really a mere hindrance of that which passes through (τοῦ διαϊόντος, but the word ἀδρεία (courage) implies that courage got its name in battle, and if the universe is flowing, a battle in the universe can be nothing else than an opposite current or flow (ῥοή). Now if we remove the delta from the word ἀνδρεία, the word ἀνρεία signifies exactly that activity. Of course it is clear that not the current opposed to every current is courage, but only that opposed to the current which is contrary to justice; — Plato, Cratylus, 413

Socrates is using the vocabulary of Heraclitus and connects "manliness" to the willingness to leap into battle against a 'current' that needs to be opposed.

Which brings into focus what is a matter of law versus an appeal to public opinion.

The Giuliana defamation case peels off layers of the onion

So we'll look into his reasons for abiding by the law and discuss whether this is a proto-form of social contract theory. — frank

That is an interesting observation. Plato does talk about how the relationships between classes and skills compose a city. The Republic presents the idea of building one from scratch. And that brings out some of the problems of inheriting what we have.

In that regard, I have long thought the following passage in Crito to be the most striking:

But what if you avoid the well-regulated cities, and the men who are most orderly? But if you do this, will you have any reason to live on? Or will you associate with these people and, without any shame, discuss … what propositions, Socrates? The same ones you discuss here, that excellence and justice, regulations and the laws, are of the utmost value to people? And don’t you think that the conduct 53D of Socrates will appear unseemly? You should think so. — Harmon, 53C

I read this to say Socrates is owned by the City to the extent he has the power to be Socrates. The Republic is not only a start-up idea where policies can be argued about but is the element bringing the new City into life.

So, not either a Hobbes or Rousseau point of view.

how can someone who flouts the rules of a contest be allowed to participate in it? — Wayfarer

That was the question asked at the beginning of the American Civil War.

The Time's magazine piece did provide what I asked for. That message is notably absent from other messages.

What is missing from your representation is the marketing aspect of politics. Trump has a talent at playing to the groups who are hoping he will provide what others did not.

What were you hoping for with his ascendence?

He says different things that do not fit with each other. You have put yourself in the role of clarifying these messages. You suggest that a narrative has been put forward that completely misrepresents his intentions. And we are to accept that this misunderstanding led to events outside of his understanding.

It is a weird thought experiment where the principal cause for an action is completely divorced from the results.

I don't look at it as suite of convictions. I recognize that I have long acted upon presuming some set of facts over another, but it was always provisional, on some level. I had to roll the dice so I did.

So, it has always been hard to distinguish between when I was just fooling myself from times when I actually understood what was happening. Turning out to be correct does not explain very much.