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  • The simulation argument and the Boltzmann brain paradox
    You completely misunderstood my post, that's all that I can say.Fafner

    Here what I can do:
    Suppose that we start with the assumption that there is no knowledge out there in the objective reality.
    Then I construct evidence:
    Knowledge is a cognitive construct, an idea just like the idea about God. Some people treat God as real, some people treat knowledge as real.
    Knowledge is not real like a tree, you can't see, touch, hear, smell and so on knowledge. The idea that there is an objective reality independently of the mind, which you none the less, have access to is a contradiction, because reality can't be independent of you and yet you have access to it.
    Reality is your experiences and your beliefs about how to make sense of it. There is no "The objective reality", because then subjectivity is not a part of reality.
    That facts, evidence, truth, knowledge and so on matter to you is because, that it matters to you, is what makes it subjective.
  • The simulation argument and the Boltzmann brain paradox


    You don't get that you are doing a case of begging the question- (
    Suppose that scenario (a) is the actual one)
    -when you assign the odds.
    Now I don't do metaphysics and epistemology as knowledge. I do it as different beliefs and the telling sigh is here that so do you:
    So I believe...
    Now Fafner, the objective reality does not conform to what you believe, not matter what you believe. That you can't understand, that you have just admitted that it is a belief and not knowledge, tells me, that you don't understand the skeptic position - You don't know what reality is and you only believe.
    Further you are biased because of theses words:
    ...by virtue of some miracle...
    You turn it being about God, if reality is not as it appears. You don't understand the examples in this thread, do you? None of them has to do with God. Both examples are naturalistic.

    So you have shown your hand - You are begging the question if you assume you can determine the odds. You admit that you believe and you argue as if this thread could be about God. I do get that you properly don't believe in God, but neither do I. I believe reality is as it appears, but I don't know that, nor do I know the odds.

    In the end no matter what you believe won't determine what reality you are in. No matter how you believe, it won't affect what reality you are in. You don't control reality based on how you think, reality controls you. That is part of what objective reality entails.
    You are doing magical thinking, because you believe that your thinking determines, what reality is. It is similar with some religious believers, namely that some people don't like the unknown and will try to offer beliefs as evidence. You have given no evidence, because you are begging the question, when you believe you can assign actual odds. Further it appears that you don't understand that you believe and don't know, despite you use words like belief and trust. You believe and trust in a naturalistoc reality, you just have to give up the notion that you know
  • The simulation argument and the Boltzmann brain paradox


    Now I see a tree. That is non-inferential, I will accept that for now. But what that have to do with the objective reality? What do you mean by objective reality and how do you know that there is such a thing as an objective reality?
  • The simulation argument and the Boltzmann brain paradox


    How can something be not real?
    If you have a hallucination, then is that a not real or unreal hallucination or is it real?
    What is real and how do you know that?
    What is not real and how do you know that?

    In other words within methodological naturalism and science a hallucination is a process in a brain, so how can it be unreal? How can something, a brain, produce something unreal?
    How can something, which is real, produce something, which is unreal?
    Take time, space and processes in the world. Now it is a brain(real) then time and space passes and it becomes unreal. At what time, in what space and what process make something real not real/unreal?

    Do you understand that you have made an incoherent argument, because you claim that in one moment some is real and then it turns unreal, but how can something become unreal, which is real? It is no different than ontological dualism, we have two ontological categories; real(matter) and unreal(mind), and something real can turn unreal.
    You are taking for granted that something can turn unreal, but that this is real. I.e. unreal is real, because it is really unreal and it is something, which take place in the real; i.e. a brain.

    Fafner, you have simply hidden the problem with your claim of real and not. But it doesn't stand up and your claim that all experiences including hallucinations can be explained non-inferential, doesn't hold, because you can't explain the non-real with your model of the world
  • The simulation argument and the Boltzmann brain paradox


    How do you explain a hallucination?

    I once lived at the coast and could look out on a bay. Once day I saw an island, which I hadn't seen before and never saw again; i.e. a hallucination. How is that possible?
    How can an experience be wrong?
    Now if you claim that hallucinations are not real, then I have to ask - How do you know that?
  • The simulation argument and the Boltzmann brain paradox
    Now you are just using the Cartesian argument which I discussed in my other post. I thought that your 'trilemma argument' was a different argument from the classical argument from illusion (and by the way, you said previously you agreed with me that the argument is incoherent).Fafner

    It is incorrect, because I believe despite evidence that you are something even if I wasn't around. Of course, I believe I will die one day.
    Now you take for granted that there is something. E.g. I exist :) But you have given no evidence. Further there is a problem with your notion of taking for granted. Let us say, I take for granted that there is a God. Now that is not evidence for a God, so why should the fact, that I take for granted that you exist, be evidence for your existence.
    You still haven't given any evidence. It boils down to that I have no evidence, therefore you have evidence. Namely that when between P and non-P, non-P is wrong, then P is true. That is not how logic works.
    You have made a naive realistic claim - "You know that you perceive something by perceiving it, how else?", but you have given no evidence.
    #I know, that I perceive something by perceiving it.
    #I know; that I don't perceive something by perceiving it, because I know, that I am a Boltzmann Brain.
    #Either case is not knowledge.
    You don't get the last one, do you?

    To be an old school Skeptic means in some sense not to believe in knowledge, just like some people don't believe in the concept of a god/gods.
    I use the word knowledge as an idea that some people believe in, but I don't believe in knowledge.
    You don't seem to understand doubt.
    I doubt that I am in the world, you know you are in.
    I doubt that I am a Boltzmann Brain and I doubt that we are in a simulation.
    But none of that is evidence for the fact that we have knowledge.
  • The simulation argument and the Boltzmann brain paradox
    What do you mean? You know that you perceive something by perceiving it, how else?Fafner

    How do you know that it is something and not an illusion?
    You take for granted that there is a screen in for of you. How do you know that there is? How do you know, that it is not a simulation or that you are not a Boltzmann Brain? How do you know, that this something is, what you claim, it is? How do you, that it is not something else?
    How do you know???
  • The simulation argument and the Boltzmann brain paradox

    Know what?Fafner
    That you are perceiving them!
    How do you know that?
  • The simulation argument and the Boltzmann brain paradox
    I already told you - by perceiving them. This is what 'non-inferential' means - the reason for your belief is not in the form of an argument which you can give to someone, it just suffices to have the right sort of experience without needing any additional reasons.Fafner

    How do you know that?
    Well, because you told me so, which makes it a dogmatic claim. You don't get Agrippa's Trilemma, because you keep claiming that it is so, because you say so. That is what makes it dogmatic.
  • The simulation argument and the Boltzmann brain paradox
    My point is that your argument doesn't prove that we don't know things non-inferentially, and since most people believe that they do know things on the basis of their sense experience (and not arguments), your argument simply doesn't engage the most plausible view out there regarding knowledge. I'm not trying to assert that I'm right that we do know things non-inferentially, I'm just saying that your argument doesn't show that we don't (and so I don't have to prove that we do, in order to show that your argument doesn't succeed).Fafner

    I don't know ;) how to get this across. It is pointless to point out that my argument about knowledge fails, if all arguments about knowledge fail.
    In short:
    Me: Argument X.
    You: It fails.
    Me: Argument Y.
    You: It fails.
    Me: Argument Z.
    You: It fails.
    ...
    If all arguments about knowledge fails, then why single out the skeptical ones?
    What is the point, Fafner?
    That you believe you have knowledge, means you have knowledge? Is that your point?
    It doesn't hold up! I believe that you don't exist, means that you don't exist? Or rather do you believe that all beliefs work?

    Further you claimed that there are things, which are know non-inferentially, so would you please explain, how you know that?
  • The simulation argument and the Boltzmann brain paradox

    You can know many things non-inferentially
    For which you run into Agrippa's Trilemma, because now you have to make a reasoned argument as how you know that. Or you simply declare dogmatically that it is so. hit infinite regress or beg the question.
    What you said was this: "I know, that you can know many things non-inferentially."
    For which I answer: "How do you know that?"
    And off we go into Agrippa's Trilemma. :)

    The hidden assumption you hold can be viewed like this:
    # We can explain knowledge with reason, logic and experience.
    Versus these 2:
    # Knowledge is meaningless, unless we can explain knowledge with reason, logic and experience.
    # The idea, that we can explain knowledge with reason, logic and experience, is just that - an idea, which doesn't hold up to reason and logic. In other words reason and logic are limited and can't explain knowledge including if we can fundamentally trust our experiences.
  • The simulation argument and the Boltzmann brain paradox
    The obvious answer is to say that not all knowledge is based on arguments with premises. You can know many things non-inferentially, say by basing your beliefs on a perceptual experience which you take to reveal to you directly how things are in the world (and that means that there's another horn to the trilemma).Fafner

    That is a variant of a dogmatic claim. There is a screen in front of me, because that is how it is and it is not worth questioning and anyway it is absurd, illogical, meaningless, wrong and what not to question if there is a world as I know there to be. THERE IS A SCREEN IN FRONT OF ME - PERIOD!!! Stop asking silly questions. :)
  • The simulation argument and the Boltzmann brain paradox
    What's "Agrippa's Trilemma"? Would you mind explaining?Fafner

    Agrippa's Trilemma is a variant of skepticism about knowledge.
    It can be explained in the following manner:
    When you claim something, you ask yourself how you know that. Then you make a reasoned argument about that and repeat - "How do I know that?". When you continue to do that, you realize that you run into these 3 problems. You will do one of the following:
    #1: Run into an infinite regress turning to ground your knowledge in something, for which you can stop asking how do I know that.
    #2: You dogmatically declare that it is so.
    #3: You beg the question.

    So as a Skeptic, I have stopped claiming I have knowledge and just explain what I believe in.
    Relevant to this thread, I believe that there is a world like you believe, but I don't know that nor do I claim that I know it. I believe it.
  • The simulation argument and the Boltzmann brain paradox
    You completely misunderstood my argument (from that other thread on skepticism). I didn't assume that we have knowledge, or that there is a world, but I made an internal criticism of the skeptical argument, and that's a different thing. But I don't want to go into details since I already explained the main idea in my OP, and I don't think it's appropriate to discuss it here.Fafner

    You in this thread dismiss an argument, because it is incoherent, That is fair and well, but it misses the following possibility: That all claims with knowledge in mind about what the world is, is not possible with reason and/or logic, because all such claims run into Agrippa's Trilemma.
    In other words, it only matters that a specific argument is incoherent if you can make an argument for a given area which is within reason and/or logic. So I am trying to get you to understand that all strong claims to metaphysics and knowledge run into Agrippa's Trilemma.

    In general words as in the regards to regards to knowledge within methodological naturalism, then we, humans, live inside a cognitive bubble. We can't know what the world is, we just hold differently beliefs about what the world is.
  • The simulation argument and the Boltzmann brain paradox
    Where did I make such claims?Fafner

    You claim by extension of your demands for logic and e.g. coherence in regards to knowledge, that knowledge is possible with logic and e.g. coherence, unless your point is that there is no knowledge, which abides to logic.
    So I suspect that you believe that there is such a sensible concept as knowledge and that it must abide to reason, logic and so on.
    So if knowledge must abide to reason, logic and so on, then that is also the case for your claims to knowledge. So what do you claim about knowledge?
    That there is a world, which is non-solipsistic and for which our experiences (in general) match the world. The problem is that is begging the question and thus not logical.
    So for once, try to give reason, logic and evidence for the fact, that there is a screen in front of you, which you read this on and don't follow into the following trap:
    It is absurd, if we can't trust our senses, therefore we can trust our senses.

    P1: We can't trust our senses.
    P2. That is absurd.
    Conclusion: Therefore we can trust our senses.
    As a deduction it is invalid.

    PS: "How often have I said to you that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?" Sir Arthur Conan Doyle
  • The simulation argument and the Boltzmann brain paradox
    But what does a 'simulation' mean? Doesn't it mean that all your experiences are illusory?Fafner

    If all your experiences are illusory, are they then real and how the world works?
  • The simulation argument and the Boltzmann brain paradox
    As philosophical arguments for skepticism, the two arguments are plainly incoherent. It doesn't make sense to doubt our knowledge of the external world (or its existence) by appealing to aposteriori premises that themselves could be known only if we presuppose that we do have knowledge of the external world (or that it exists).Fafner

    Yes, that is the point for all aposteriori premises including your version, that we can trust our experiences. They are all begging the question and so are you. All claims to what the world really is as far as claims of knowledge beg the question. They all show that the trust in reason and the experience are limited.

    It is funny though that you can't spot the problem in your own claim to knowledge.
  • The simulation argument and the Boltzmann brain paradox
    Two different arguments that try to show that a "brain in a vat"-type situation is more likely than a common sense realism situation. Unlike traditional skeptical arguments, these don't simply try to argue that a situation like this is possible, but that we could have more reason to believe that a situation like this is in fact the case.Michael

    The problem is in a sense that our reasoning and beliefs are the same for a common sense universe and the two other possibilities. In other words we have no ability to decide what is the case, because our reasoning and beliefs are the same in all variants.
    So it leads to the 3rd answer as being the most reasonable:
    1: We live in a common sense universe.
    2. We live in a non- common sense universe.
    3. We don't know.
  • Answering the Skeptic

    You take for granted that we can know about the world. I don't, because I haven't been able to find any knowledge about the world, which isn't either a tautology or not knowledge, because it runs into Agrippa's trilemma.
    You are begging the question if you start with the assumption that we have non-tautological knowledge about the world.
    What you have in my belief system is experiences about the world and the belief that these experiences match what they imply. I hold the same belief; i.e. e.g. that there is a computer screen in front of me, but I don't know that. I just believe it.

    So I take for granted that you believe that when you read this, there is some form of medium through which you have an experience of "reading"; e.g you might be dyslexic and "read" through have this text read aloud.
    So what caused you to have the experience of read this text?
    Are you seriously going to throw out causation and claim it is irrelevant for the world?
    Again, what caused you to have an experiences of reading this text and how do you know that? You claim knowledge about the world, so you must know this.
  • Answering the Skeptic
    [
    2. Waking experience is indistinguishable from a very vivid dream (or a deception by an evil demon, or being a brain in a vat etc. – insert here your favorite skeptical scenario), since there are no distinct "marks" to distinguish the one from the other.Fafner

    I don't know if this has been brought up, but anyway here it goes.
    What causes you to have experiences?
    What can you control?

    These are the 2 key questions in trying to answer if you can differentiate between P and non-P. So I will use my favorite combinations of skeptical scenarios. A Boltzmann brain and a brain in a vat. Imagine a universe where the universe is your brain and the machinery, needed biological matter, computer, power supply and so on to run you as a brain in vat.
    Notes - the Boltzmann brain part is that the universe you are in, came to existence as only being a universe with you as a brain in a vat. That is what your universe is.

    So now enter causation and control for the following 2 kinds of universes:
    The universe you use P for and the Boltzmann brain universe as non-P.
    Now you ask yourself this:
    Have both universes caused me to come into existence?
    Do both universes cause me to have the same experiences?
    Can I cause(control) the universe I am in to be the P-universe by thinking/reasoning that it is the P-universe?
    Can I step outside either universe to check which one I am in?

    My point is that you can't neither know what universe caused to have your experiences, you can't check it and you can't cause the universe to be the one you want it to be by you reasoning/thinking. Reasoning/thinking is caused by whatever universe you are in.