heh, prophets.

If so then the gods I see are a little bit pathetic ;)

Sure.

But I want to avoid speaking for the Muslim, or any other religious perspective. I've attended Islamic service and that's where my knowledge of Muhammed and Jesus both being profits in Islam comes from; since there's also theological disputes I append "generally"

So here I resort to what I see -- I grant the possibility, but religious claims often come back to this basic relationship of "seeing as": the point of the scripture is to help the reader see the world as such-and-such a person. The subject of the work isn't God as much as humanity.

From my perspective it's because performing miracles is a trope of the literature -- the Buddha also performed miracles in various stories. What it does is differentiate the character from the rest in the story so that you know you should listen to them as a font of special wisdom. Also I think these are features of the stories for the more literally minded who will shrug at doing virtue for its own reward, but when put in earthly terms like magic which fulfills desires and other earthly, human rewards then the more literally minded will understand.

I know that generally speaking Jesus is considered to be a prophet like Muhammed was a prophet -- so I'm inclined to read "We gave Jesus son of Mary the clear proofs" as saying he's on par with Muhammed, but not God.

Cool. And yes, the next step is the iterative and constructive aspect of language, allowing the construction of our social world. — Banno

Yes, there is something of the deflationary account in ↪Count Timothy von Icarus's reply. Although ""truth is the adequacy of thought to being" is pretty obtuse, and might look a bit like correspondence. — Banno

@Count Timothy von Icarus's account looks to me to be a correspondence theory.

The dog thinks, I think, and we can conform our thoughts to the world in our own way and when we do so we have some kind of truth.

I'm wondering if some of the conflict here is due to our preferences on whether we ought start on the side of metaphysics or whether we ought start on the side of epistemics.

I look forward to reading your contribution :)

I see. From my point of view, "nothing is really true tout court, but this varies by context," seems like a very consequential metaphysical position. It claims that most metaphysical outlooks (certainly historically, but also likely in contemporary thought) are crucially mistaken. — Count Timothy von Icarus

True! That's pretty much what I suspect -- I don't know if I believe it yet or not because I remain uncertain about how one justifies metaphysical beliefs.

These days I tend to think of the real as absurd -- "atoms and void" swerving about without any meaning. And the atoms need not be how we understand atoms today, though they can be. But it's an explicitly metaphysical belief rather than the science of chemistry. Chemistry will survive even if a metaphysics of the absurd -- atoms and void -- turns out false.

Likewise, what is the status of moral realism when the truth values of moral facts are allowed to vary based on "whim," as you put it? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Now I could turn you off entirely by admitting what I believe :D -- I'm still a moral nihilist in the sense that I don't think there are true "ought" statements. There's more to this based on what I see in the world and how human beings behave, but that's way off course.

But moral realism can work with what I'm proposing. Suppose we have a sentence like:

"Everyone ought take care of their parents in their old age because they took care of you in your young age"

We can say this is true. If it's true then it's a fact. (My belief on facts is that they are true sentences)

Now, as I think of facts that does not thereby mean there's a moral reality which secures our moral propositions or makes them true. But a moral realist would assert that just as we have objects in the world to which we're referring to there are also morals -- of some kind or other, that are hard to specify -- which "ought" statements can refer to. And they can be true or false on the basis of that reference (which, I take it, would be to possible acts we can take)

One can bracket the question of "what is truth," and investigate how the term is used in language, mathematics, etc. without having to commit to deflation however. I do not agree that it is a position that comes with fewer commitments. Agnosticism would be a position that comes with fewer commitments. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think the idea is to minimize, rather than eliminate, commitments. Else we run into problems of begging the question when we come to arguments about what is real. (though if we're truly agnostic, sure, that's fewer commitments -- but it doesn't say anything either)

Deflation is at least a position though, and I respect it for that. The only approach that really irks me is the methodology of trying to present every significant philosophical problem as a "pseudoproblem." Some problems are pseudoproblems of course, but these folks are like someone who thinks every problem must be a nail because they have discovered a hammer.

Oh, yes. I'm not one to reduce philosophical questions to pseudoproblems, except to say that they need not be solved to live a good life: I don't think people need to do philosophy to live fulfilling and happy lives.

But that doesn't mean they're pseudo-problems, from my perspective. And even if they were I don't mind investigating them for fun.

Makes sense.

I think what animals are doing is offer a contrast to what we're doing in order to understand language. The way I'm thinking about language the dog doesn't have the capacity to refer, though I suspect they can individuate -- food is different from bowl.

The animal is serving as a kind of "substitute" for our animal side in trying to separate out what makes human language different.

Or, on the other hand, it's a counter-example if we believe that the dog can refer or have true beliefs.

I think part of the motivation for deflation arises from the position that truth applies only to sentences. Such a position seems to lead down that path. Perhaps the idea that knowledge is just belief that happens to be justified and true also leads down this way. Earlier eras distinguished between many types of knowledge. Continental philosophy also tends to be more likely to differentiate many types of knowledge. Plato had four, Aristotle five (and arguably more). "Knowing how to ride a bike," sense knowledge, noeisis, etc. However, if knowledge, the grasp of truth, is always propositional, then it makes more sense for sentences to be the primary bearers of truth, and also for what is "known" or "true" to vary by language game.

Anyhow, an interesting consequence of sentences being true "of themselves" without relation to the intellect is that a random text generator "contains" all truths. There is some interesting stuff to unpack there. From an information theoretic perspective, a random text generator only provides information about its randomization process, the semantic meaning of any output being accidental (and highly unlikely). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I see attraction to deflationary theories because I don't like to decide metaphysical questions on the epistemic side -- there's going to be implications no matter what, but the epistemic side is attempting to minimize the number of implications a given theory of truth will have. A correspondence theory will require a mind, a world, objects in the world, and something the mind does that's related to the world such that "correspondence" is real. A pragmatic theory of truth will imply that truth is something that arises from human activity and so we came up with this word "true" in order to help us do things in the world.

The deflationary account says there's nothing much to say about truth -- and can, in a way, accommodate both substantive theories by referring to a context -- this is the context of correspondence which is determined by the conversation we're participating in, and this is hte context of "I don't care what the real explanation is I just want to get the job done" so we adopt the pragmatic theory.

It allows us to choose a substantive theory of truth for the context we're in -- but that suggests that there's nothing really to truth.


I don't think that the LLM's we presently have contains truth in them because they're not people with desires and relationships but a toy. While I don't think there's much to the metaphysics of truth I do think that truth is a very human concern. Or, at least, something which we become concerned about because we're able to think about why I was wrong that one time and how can I make it better in the future.

Mostly to help us make sense of the Dog, I think. We are so accustomed to thinking in terms of belief that we have to interpret the dog as having them in order to understand their behavior, much as we do with other people.

And, us being animals, we really have some things in common with them -- like what mentions in this post: Frustration, confusion, error, correction all seem to happen.

But since they're not doing math or using money or making laws we can tell they're different.

Truth is determined by whims? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Pretty much.

We desire to know the truth for -- what reason?

Some people desire to know the truth so that they might be able to predict the future.

Some people desire to know the truth so that they know where they came from.

Sometimes it's out of curiosity. Sometimes out of wonder. Sometimes out of love. Sometimes out of hate.

The number of desires which lead a person to desire truth is myriad. And desires are what drive us to seek out truth. We want to be able to say "Thought conforms to being" -- but couldn't say that without language, or even think it without language.

But sometimes we want to be able to say "My perception corresponds to an object" -- here pointing out that we can us "...is true" for more than sentences, albeit still being a meta-lingual predicate. Why would we do such a thing?

Because we like truth. We want to be certain. We want the airplane to fly or to know what is good.

What doesn't matter is how we theorize truth -- we'll still want it to do pretty much what it's been doing the entire time. It's just gets complicated when we try to theorize it, and generally it's easier to say "I know you know what truth is, and we don't need to define it at all if we want to seek it out"

Note how the T-Sentence has a similar form to your notion of truth, it's just using a smaller vocabulary.

"P" is true if and only if P. So we have language, or thought, on the left hand side and the sentence which is being used in a context on the right-hand side -- or Being.

The same form as you have is there, it's just trying to assume less about truth.

And it's worth noting that truth and reference are separate topics. At least to my mind -- I don't see the relationship between truth and reference until we're talking about whole sentences, at least.

It's debatable if deflationary theories of truth "do not say there are no truths." They say that truth is just how we use the token "true" in speech and thought, as the post you quoted points out, so it was clear what was being discussed. And if one affirms that one selects logics and "ways of speaking" based on what is useful, it follows that truth will determined by usefulness. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think it's determined by the individual's whim more than even usefulness.

The thing is, we like truth. It's something we seek for its own sake. But a theory of truth cannot tell us what is true, except perhaps for what is true about truth.

I prefer deflationary theories of truth if we have to say anything about truth at all, but usually I think it's best to understand truth as something very simple, which is part of why it escapes our theorizing. The deflationary theory is there to try and escape some of the criticisms of the substantive theories of truth, but for the most part I take it that truth is embedded in language -- it's a meta-lingual predicate which talks about sentences and the properties we attribute to sentences. Our changing a theory of truth won't change truth, but it's really only because we like truth -- attribute truth to sentences -- that we wonder about and theorize about truth.

But the theory of truth is not the phenomena, truth.

And I think we can separate out theories of truth from theories of reference -- one does not decide the other.

Davidson took language perhaps too seriously, holding that a dog for example could not believe that there was food in its bowl becasue it could not form the sentence "There is food in my bowl".

For my part, I have argued that the dog does not need to form the sentence, but that we can form the sentence may be sufficient for us to ascribe the belief to the dog.

And further, the belief is not a thing in the mind of the dog, but is attributed to the dog by those with language. And in the case of human belief, one is able to attribute belief to oneself. Attributing a belief to itself is not something a dog can do. — Banno

That's pretty close to how I think of language -- the dog has a kind of animla-belief, but doesn't believe the English sentence "The kibble is in my bowl"

A dog will mark its territory and defend it, but it won't appeal to a bigger dog to enforce some agreed upon social rules. It may try to get friends, but it won't make an appeal to a law.

Heh, yes -- Kind of asking if "Sky Father" is a pejorative in the same sense. I don't think it is, and will keep it in mind for the future.

Fair enough. I've been pinned to the matt on that one.

How do you feel about 's term?

Well, when you say "Pejorative" I agree.

It's pejorative, though I didn't think of it as a slur -- not in the way people use racial terms, for instance.

But pejorative in the sense that it's meant to indicate we don't believe that's the case, yes.

And insulting -- I can see that. Better words can be chosen if we want open communication, that's for sure.

What's the better way to refer to God when speaking about people who believe that God is above us, in a literal sense, and male, and providing us guidance?

Between two atheists who walked into the bar?

It's a public board, but he was responding to me -- I get the slogan. "Sky Daddy" need not be the word, and I wouldn't use it towards a believer because anyone who bothers talking about this stuff probably doesn't believe in a sky daddy at all -- it's more sophisticated than that.

I think it's important to note how many people believe in literal interpretations of scripture, though.

They resort to slurs like "sky daddy" because they are too dumb to mount a coherent argument. — Leontiskos

I want to say -- while "sky daddy" is something which any philosophically inclined person would think of as false, it's not hard to see that people really do believe in a sky daddy. Or something along those lines.

It's not a slur because there are people who literally believe in that. Demons walk earth, God floats above, Hell is underneath the earth -- the whole bit. I know this because I've had people claim things to me like "Dark magic exists" or "I've seen a demon, I know they are real" or "The Bible says giants existed, therefore they exist" or, or or or or -- so many claims. We need not say "sky daddy", but we could say "wrestling warrior", since Israel gained his name by wrestling God down. In the literal sense.

It's not trolling so much as pointing out that many people really do believe these things.

That they accept and move on with life doesn't mean that they are not awed by thunder or enraptured by a sunrise. — Banno

I agree with you here. I often struggle in making a distinction between human beings and our close cousins, but it really still seems to me that language is what differentiates us from those species.

But problems happen when folk think they can prove that their sky daddy exists using the ontological argument, and so that anyone who says otherwise is anathema. — Banno

Yeah.

And before that, really. "This land is my land, not your land..."

I'll show you!


(EDIT: Silly joke that popped to mind immediately and I had to say it)

I agree with that distinction. That makes sense to me.

It's a human desire. It doesn't seem to be the case that other animals share that same desire. So how could it be natural? Unless such a desire is part of human nature. But we humans are not just humans. — Arcane Sandwich

"Natural" as in "understandable" -- and I do tend to think of human beings as animals, and that insofar that a human being can conceive of something more than the basic life process they will, naturally, come to want more than a biological existence.

That is, I don't think there's a God in the external world, though there may be one in someone's internal life. And maybe we could visit him through the spiritual rituals. Though in keeping with dropping internal/external, I would simply say "Even though God exists, there will not be an afterlife, and there is no knowledge of goodness. God exists to sooth the human soul, not to create the world"

So the God which mystics speak about, how they mean it, would not exist for all that. They mean it a bit more literally than I tend to think of these things.

By 'ineffable' I mean our experience cannot be adequately described. Every experience is unique, and giving word to it only generalizes something which is profoundly particular. It is the particularity of experience which is ineffable. — Janus

Sometimes I feel like I do know what other people mean and feel, though -- it takes a long-term relationship of care, and we'll never be one another, but we're able to communicate our experiences just fine.

Now, if there is no relationship there or something then I'd say my experience is ineffable -- language doesn't magically give the ability to communicate.

But I do think there are conditions in which we can describe our experiences to one another and that language enables us to do that (not all by itself, but it enables).

It seems to me that language enables much more than mere "species' reproduction"—language is not even really needed for that, although of course humans use it for that purpose.

O I agree with you here. I think it's our niche, but much "came along with" basically -- things unrelated to what language does for us in terms of our biological niche.

The thing with religious experiences (speaking only from my own personal experiences) is that they sort of impose themselves upon you, whether you're an atheist or not. Granted, I've only had them under the influence of psychoactive drugs. — Arcane Sandwich

Heh. I would call some of my experiences mystical, at least -- reveries or communions or a dissolution of the self. Much of life is not explicable in terms of scientific knowledge. I grew up in a church and noticed how the feelings which are evoked to persuade people into belief are frequently evoked everywhere in order to maintain beliefs. So it wasn't God, exactly, but us who cared about all these various things and human beings being human beings. From my perspective the desire for the mystical and God is about as human as human comes -- it's a natural desire to want more than to eat, shit, sleep, fuck, and die.

For my part I also see value in keeping science out of mystical experiences for the sake of the science -- I've often found it very interesting how people of competing faiths can nevertheless find common ground in producing knowledge. It hints at, to me, that metaphysics are entirely disconnected from the sciences -- whether we are material or spiritual we can still know things about the world.

But the moment you start talking about what the science ultimately means, in some philosophical sense, then the same people who can work together in producing knowledge will wildly disagree.

But this is just a theory, it could be false, and it probably is. — Arcane Sandwich

Oh I think it's definitely a worthy theory! It's possible!

I certainly don't think that my just-so story is even a theory -- just a way to answer the question so I can then say "But I don't know" without feeling completely lost.

Are they really that different? — Arcane Sandwich

At the level of function they're not -- but conscious experience has no function, as far as I can tell. There is no point to it.

But mostly I'm meaning that as a reductio that what we are is our brain since we do experience a similar world and are even able to determine that our brains are similar.

Sure. And perhaps the similarities of our brains are, in part, responsible for that shared world. That's another way to think about it. We both speak English, but we also have similar brains, at least anatomically, and I'd argue that their neurochemistry is similar as well. — Arcane Sandwich

It's possible, but I don't think it's true. I think it takes much more than a brain -- a body, a community, and language all seem to be a part of conscious experience to me.

Maybe Reality (with a capital "R") is like a multi-faceted crystal, such that each mystic perceives one facet at a time. It's not that one of them is right and the other one is wrong, maybe each of them perceives just a small part of what ↪Wayfarer (and I) call "the great perfection". — Arcane Sandwich

That's basically what I think, but not crystalline.

But I can tell that the mystic means something different than this -- by visiting God they are taken away from this world, this world is somehow lesser, or the divine is somehow greater.

Whereas for me, while I believe the mystic I don't think that the mystic has scientific knowledge, and going back to the "if forced to choose" thing I simply don't believe that such experiences are anything more than a deeply human need that not everyone has.

Basically I think about it in terms of psychology and anthropology rather than what the mystic often means. I can tell that we don't believe the same thing because even if I had the experience I would be skeptical of God's existence -- mystical experience may satisfy the need for meaning, but it does not provide a basis for scientific discovery.

Notice that there's also something else that seems to remain invariant: religious experiences seem to be distributed worldwide. There are tribes in the Amazon rainforest that have never had any contact with tribes in West Africa. Yet both tribes have their own religions, with their corresponding religious experiences. And we could also mention native Australian tribes, which have never had any contact with the Amazonian or the African tribes. And they have religious experiences as well. How is that even possible? What is the explanation for this phenomenon? Is it just a coincidence? — Arcane Sandwich

I tie it to language -- with the ability to know comes the ability to crave more than the animals. We can conceive of things which are impossible to satisfy. We have fears which cannot be assuaged. In a way the acquisition of language, looked at metaphorically, is The Fall as portrayed in the Bible. Before the ape lived an animal life, and after new desires were born.

Insatiable desires are what religion seeks to satisfy.

But this is very "Anthropologist sitting in a chair looking back" wondering -- it's not something I really believe I know an explanation for. It's part of why these arguments are interesting to me; but at the end of the day I know I'm more like an anthropologist of religion than a true believer. (I just don't claim that this is based on rationality) -- and I definitely think that science has nothing to say on the matter, for or against. The psychology or anthropology of religion just isn't treating the phenomena the same as the mystic is.

True, it's not what's being claimed, but is that the only (or the main) reason why you're hesitant to say that it's just something going on in the brain? — Arcane Sandwich

First thing that pops to mind is the problem of consciousness and the problem of other minds: brains all by themselves are as dumb as a pile of guts.

In terms of the mystic it's sort of undermining to attribute their philosophical or religious belief to a brain-event. If I were to utilize that same reasoning I'd have to be consistent and note that my own belief is also the result of my brain-events, and furthermore, since our brains are different, I would have to conclude that their brain-events are not like my brain-events, and therefore, I would have no real way to disbelieve the mystic.

Since all of our brains are different we all live in our own worlds and the mystics claim is probably true in his world, though not in mine.

But I really don't believe we are in our brain or our experiences are in the brain like that. I think we have a shared world, and the mystic saw a different part of it than I did. Which part of the world we seek out depends much on what we want in the first place -- if we're building a bridge we want predictable repetition to hold it sturdy.

But if we're seeking meaning in life then visiting God probably is a bit better at that.

I just don't really think these experiences secure scientific justification. There's no science which will tell us which mystic is right -- and while there is some overlap in their feelings when it comes to more concrete claims and descriptions there's a lot of divergence too. Sometimes people come away from mystical experience with a deeper appreciation for life, and some people prefer that there's a strict list of rules by which to judge oneself and others and so seek out the mystical experience, and some people are just born poets and so don't have to jump through all those hoops to appreciate the beauty of the world.

But for all of these people the sciences will remain relatively invariant. They'll have different takes or develop things in different directions and find different flaws because of that, but the justifications there demand more intersubjective agreement than what the mystics provide.

Which is kind of a naturalized, bastardized Kant -- there may be mystical knowledge which helps us live pragmatic lives, but it won't be a proper scientific knowledge.

↪Moliere I think we are always already back there—and that's the ineffable part of our experience our words cannot capture. Poetry, literature, perhaps come closest. — Janus

I'm less certain of ineffability (at least, in principle ineffability), though I can see how inscrutability could dove-tail into that.

I think of becoming-enlanguaged in analogy to a baptism: before language there is experience, after language the experience becomes effable, but also changes entirely such that most of the time our perceptions will be guided by our linguistic abilities. And I think of this is an enhancement of experience, where we are able to do more than follow our biological imperatives and wonder about things that no one wondered about before -- and be correct.

I don't think ants are curious like this, though they have their own ways of communicating -- and "ant-language" if we want to call it that. And closer to home it doesn't seem that Bonobos and orangutangs wonder about what reality is fundamentally made of.

There are clearly some examples of animals acting human-like, but my suspicion is that our language is kind of what forged an evolutionary niche for us, but that it's capable of doing much more than aiding the species' reproduction.

Once the divide is crossed, once language occurs, it is very difficult to go back. — Banno

If it's possible to go back, it's certainly not possible to express that going-back in language.

Why not? — Arcane Sandwich

No reason, exactly. Just a cause.

To differentiate the two -- I'd give you a reason if I thought maybe it'd be important to your thinking, but I'm saying that there's merely a historical cause for the belief.

Nothing rational here, just a report. I believe the mystics -- and given my weird positions that means I have to understand what it is they are referring to -- but I don't know how to get there.

I'm not quite sure I understood this part. Could you explain it to me, in a simpler way? — Arcane Sandwich

You're gracious for saying "simpler" when I'm just garbling along the best I can :)

I only meant that if someone were to come to this thread and claim something similar to Anselm, but with unicorns, I'd be able to come up with another example they haven't thought about which attributes perfection to the new named thing (which is also a fiction, to my mind)

What would that "something" be, if not God? — Arcane Sandwich

The atheist is forced to say "well... not-God, at least"

But that "not-God" is pretty ambiguous. The atheist and the spiritual seeker can understand one another in saying "not-God" because they've tried to make sense of it but couldn't, or at least didn't find some kind of conditions which were persuasive.

If forced I'd put it back onto poetry and literature. I read the Bible because it's ancient literature which reveals things about human beings, but as an atheist, I don't really even care if it's true or false.

When the mystics talk about seeing God I'm a little jealous, but I know that it's not for me because I can have spiritual reveries without all the structure. I only need to go for a walk and see things in the right way -- a poetic way -- and it's the same experiences I had when I was in church.

So my skepticism on mystics is somewhat based in experience, though not science -- the world is amazing if you let yourself look at it and stop caring about this and that.

Yes, they are making sincere claims. They really do have those experiences. So what would we make of that? If religious experiences are literally experiences, the least we could say is that something is going on inside the brains of those who have those experiences. When I look at my kitchen table, I'm having an experience. A visual experience, to be more precise. Something is going on in my brain while I'm looking at my kitchen table. But there is an external correlate in this case: the kitchen table itself. Do religious experiences have an external correlate? — Arcane Sandwich

If forced I'd prefer to drop the distinction between external/internal, but that's not easy to do.

I don't like to reduce experience to the brain, naturalist or otherwise, but it might take us too far astray. I just wanted to note that.

I think, even as atheist materialists, we can say that people are experiencing things. There can be "physical" correlates to that -- starvation, LSD, etc. -- which are frequently part of the mystical literature. But I'm hesitant to say it's just something going on in the brain -- that's not what is being claimed. It's not what they are saying means -- and I suppose I believe meaning is much wider than true/false, or even truth-aptness.

This piqued my curiosity. Can you please elaborate? How can mystics visit God if, by atheist lights, God doesn't exist? — Arcane Sandwich

The "how" I'm not sure on. It's part of why I'm uncertain about all the other things we've been talking about :D

They claim something that's meaningful to them. Insofar that there is an object "God" as they describe it with various predicates I don't really think it's there. But I do believe the words mean something, and that my belief that they are false isn't really that important after all. And I believe that words mean, and they are sincere, so there's something there, like you said here:

True, but I think there's a difference between God and the perfect unicorn, because some people have religious experiences (mystics, for example) while no one has had a religious experience involving unicorns, perfect as they may otherwise be. Not to my knowledge, at least. — Arcane Sandwich

Even if someone did have a mystical experience with unicorns -- which really might not be that unlikely, now that I think on it, just embarrassing so people wouldn't say it -- I think I'd put it in the same box as other religious experiences.

But we could come up with another example to demonstrate the point that we can say true things about what we name which are still fictional and thereby not persuasive when we're talking about attributing existence to things.

The mystics, however, really do attribute existence to things which others do not because of their experience. Given my fixation on empirical justification for existential claims it throws a wrench into my thinking which I have to accommodate.

I still think what I think, but I think the mystics make sincere claims that are pretty much on par with saying "The cat is on the mat".

But given many people spend a lot of time living emotionally and aesthetically, it is easy to see how god might be of use to them. — Tom Storm

Definitely. So I ought tone down my assertion that science says they're all false -- the sciences which have true things to say about religion are sociology and psychology.

What do you think of the uses of logic? — Tom Storm

I like to use logic when I feel the need for something clear and explicit. Sometimes, even in philosophy of religion, that's necessary to do.

I don't think anyone believes religious things due to the arguments, though. Like you said, and I think it's a good analogy, religious beliefs are more like a sexual orientation than an attitude towards a particular proposition "God exists" or "Jesus is God"; we have less choice over it than is often presumed by rationalist discussions on religion.

I'm all for rationalism, but I think the philosophy of religion is a good place to begin showing its limits. Not-pejorative -- I hold poetry in the highest regard, and so I hold religion. Religion, and its texts, expresses something deep about human beings.

Even though I'm an atheist I believe that Mystics have visited God, for instance.

True, but I think there's a difference between God and the perfect unicorn, because some people have religious experiences (mystics, for example) while no one has had a religious experience involving unicorns, perfect as they may otherwise be. Not to my knowledge, at least. — Arcane Sandwich

Religious practice develops its own kind of knowledge is what I tend to think. The logic within can be important, but oftentimes it's not.

But, as a philosophy nerd, I like to clarify things and see where they go -- and where they don't go -- so I am pro-logic, even if it's often misused.

Hence, "scientific justification" of that sort has some pretty severe limits. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yup!

I feel the need to say that one of the distinctions I keep coming back to is the difference between science and history, even at the academic level, for a basis of judging knowledge (and noticing it's hard to unify it all in some kind of conceptual structure)

People do make arguments based on the natural sciences for the existence of God though, teleological arguments, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Also yup!

Still... seems odd to infer from God's existence that God is such and such, yes?

EDIT: Also goes to show my skepticism credentials -- I don't question God on the basis of Science, I question Inferences about God on the Basis of a Skepticism of Science as the Truth of a Propaedeutic of Metaphysics. lol

Capital letters to make fun of myself for how many distinctions I feel the need to make.

Though it occurs to me -- if anyone who is lukewarm on participation because they want more guidelines then please say something.

We can come up with more guidelines together if that's necessary for participation.

I don't think that's true.

Though the meaning would not be the same kind of meaning.

I care about these arguments because of my history, so they have a meaning -- it's just not the same as those on a spiritual ascent.

And there's nothing wrong with a spiritual ascent, in my worldview. It's only different from what I'm doing.

I don't want people to worry about the rules too, too much. I'm mostly hoping to hear from many contributors who are stretching their creative sides and trying out something new, insofar that they are enjoying themselves.

One of the reasons I thought this a fun activity is I like to read other people's thoughts, no matter what they are thinking.

Less cryptically -- I believe that the Atheist and the Christian and the Muslim and the other various persuasions can believe in the Big Bang (even if that theory may be false), and believe it means something in a different way.

Heh, fair. I gave an irreverent example of influence -- there are influences which helped people through intellectual difficulties which we don't have to contend with, even.

I have a deep respect for the history of thought. I don't mean to be dismissive of that history, religious or not.

Just... I suppose Kant has influenced me enough, while I don't agree with him (being a materialist, and a realist -- if skeptic), I think he has a point.

Yet that wasn't always the case. As Hegel suggests, in The Phenomenology of Spirit, the history of philosophy is like the maturing of a plant. We wouldn't say that the fruit refutes the flower, or that the flower refutes the seed. I believe the same can be said about science. In its contemporary version, it's the end product of a history in which its roots were deeply interwoven with matters of theology, whether we like it or not. It is what it is, as you oosians like to say. — Arcane Sandwich

:)

It wasn't always the case, and our ideas have come from these influences. Newton stayed up late doing math to prevent himself from masturbating when he was horny -- it likely helped him in his career.

Still... determining if God exists by modern science can't be done, either way. I like to say that this is a positive thing -- in a way Kant's philosophy is attractive because people can be of any religious persuasion and still believe the same things about the world we experience, and independently believe whatever makes them fulfilled in a moral sense.

The metaphysics of Liberalism :D

I think he has a point with respect to science, though.

By "the science" I do not mean the broad definition -- which even carries over into my favorites like Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Marx -- but whatever the modern beast that is science says.

If I investigate textbooks which academic departments use to teach science -- there is absolutely nothing in there about Jesus or God.

Which paper ought I reference in proving the identity of God? :D

Got it.

At least in terms of the ontological argument it seems to me that "God" says very, very little. God exists because God is perfect, and to exist is more perfect than to not exist.

Or any rendition. Godel, I'm given to understand, formulated a valid form of the argument so the logical side isn't the issue, in my opinion.

It feels to me that when someone says that they are saying an analytic truth, rather than a synthetic truth -- which gets at a way in which this is very different from Quine. I can understand the argument, but I don't have any reason to believe that "God" is a part of reality -- that God exists.

"Empty" goes too far because of, what I would call, the poetic dimensions of religion. The meaning that's there, though false, is more meaningful than many true propositions.

It's just not rational in terms of scientific justification -- there's not a science which can evaluate which religious concept of god is superior because, by the science, they're all false, and mostly useless. So the science doesn't have much to say on the issue. (which is what Kant's "theoretical knowledge" is based upon)