I notice that you give quite a lot of importance to events. Why? — Arcane Sandwich

No reason that I can think of.

When you say...

Historical phenomena that occur more slowly, which have a longue durée, are far more "structural" than mere, ephemeral events. — Arcane Sandwich

I don't know how I'd differentiate between the two. Similarly so with the histories you list -- I've read none of them, but on their face I don't see why I'd prefer the history of the mediterranean over the microhistories -- arguably the microhistories are more accurate than the grand narratives. But, really, I think they complement one another. (similar move to what I've been saying with respect to science and history -- there isn't a better or worse, they're just different)

We're not in the 20th century anymore, are we? A lot has happened ever since Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend, and the like. The refreshing originality of such approaches to philosophy of science and history of science has worn off by now, and their epistemological relativism has, pun intended, gotten really old by the epistemic (and even political) standards of 2025. — Arcane Sandwich

We're not, but I haven't seen an adequate response to Feyerabend as much as a shrug.

People don't like the conclusions so they go on to try something new. All well and good.

But it's not their freshness or originality which draws me to their philosophies. Rather, I just read them and they appeal to me and my experience of science; they have good lessons for reflecting on the beast science, and really I think their relativisms are overhyped.

Feyerabend and Kuhn, in particular, are often overhyped as some kind of arche-relativists, but if you just take them at their word they are nothing of the sort.

They poke holes in some pet theories of science, but that's more the philosophy of science than the science itself.

And of course we've absorbed some of those lessons over the course of time. But Feyerabend still strikes me as particularly relevant since people will reject Popper, but then still try to define science by its methods -- that is, find a different criterion or structural description of science that Feyerabend isn't addressing, but totally missing the point that a whole cadre of philosophers and scientists have already tried to build a science of science and failed at it.

For me to take the idea seriously I'd have to know what it is about this science of science that is superior to Popper's theory, which is pretty well articulated.

Of course. I've debated this topic before, though not with you : ) — Arcane Sandwich

Cool. Insofar that you have some intuitive sense of what I'm on about that's enough for me.

Sure. But there are other theories of writing history. How are we to settle which one is preferable? I don't think that's a purely political matter. It's a scientific matter as well. There is such a thing (I believe) as writing history in a more scientific way. — Arcane Sandwich

This might be the in-a-nutshell version of our differences as I see it, at least: Not only are there other theories of writing history, it is not the historians job to settle which theory of writing history is preferable. The best the historian can do is choose a consistent perspective and tell a history, and it's the multiplicity of historical theories that gives a more well-rounded character to an event, whereas a scientist would prefer a singular theory which gives an account of many of the same kinds of events.

Usually the reason a historian chooses a perspective to write from is because it resonates with the way they see history, but not always -- one can purposefully use the concepts of another theory to write a history. What moores this storytelling is that it must be based upon evidence.


...


Actually, this is a better example for the difference between history and science, using the Big Bang.

In science the big bang happened billions of years ago

In history the big bang happened in the 20'th century -- there are no documents to reference in writing a history of the time before human beings. If one's ontology were defined by this historical reality, rather than by science, then we'd say that right now it appears that the Big Bang happened billions of years ago, but by the documentation it didn't exist until much more recently.

I don't think that history is like shop keeping. It's more like physics. The difference between a shop keeper and a physicist (and by extension, a historian) is that the former is running a business while the later is doing basic and applied research. Historians are scientists because they do research, like the physicist does, not because he is running a business, like the shopkeeper is. — Arcane Sandwich

I agree these are closer -- shopkeeper example is meant to point out that numeration is common to many human endeavors, even outside of the academy, and so can't serve as a basis for separating out what makes science, science.

(Also, for what it's worth, I don't think there is a solution to the problem of the criterion)

Can the historian quote Jorge Luis Borges in the same sense that he can quote Emily Dickinson? If so, then he has something in common with the physicists. — Arcane Sandwich

Not something relevant, though. The relevant difference is that for the historian the poem can reasonably be considered evidence in some circumstances, whereas with the physicist it can't: there is no circumstance in which a poem will count as evidence for a scientific belief.

How do you know it's not the other way around? Maybe physics is more permissive than history. That's another way to look at it. — Arcane Sandwich

Study. ;)

Also, "more permissive" can be challenged -- ultimately they're just different, and those differences are what account for why we can have a history of science and not a science of history rather than some sort of fight for the top or a superior discipline with respect to reality.

I take 20th century philosophy of science has having demonstrated the failure of a science of science: without an answer to the problem of the criterion there can be no way to ascertain if what we're talking about is scientific proper, and thereby we can never classify a knowledge which is the knowledge of knowledge: science is more a thematic unity than a methodological unity which leads one closer to truth.

It forces agreement, but it smothers out difference in the process -- and this is a good thing for what it's doing.

History allows more differences than science to count as significant in the construction of a history.

The Marxist would be leaving out a lot of important sociological variables in that case, and the progressive historian would be arriving at a somewhat simplistic conclusion when he tries to formulate "the moral of the story". — Arcane Sandwich

Exactly! And yet, in order to bring any sort of coherence to an odd collection of records, one must have some idea of the structure of history before writing a particular monograph.

So the historiographical move is to allow this multiplicity since to rely upon only one would necessarily ignore very important things.

Do I need to just say my slogan in here as well? : ) — Arcane Sandwich

Yes lol.

If it's not story-telling, then what is it? What else is research than the telling of stories?

Seems to me that they're just different forms of literature that go towards different purposes. I know history isn't story-telling in the sense that Tolkien is a storyteller, and I know that the storytelling parameters of history are different from the storytelling parameters of science, but even in science, when you communicate your findings, the important part -- and the part that often gets fought over -- is how the story gets told.

So even this storytelling isn't what excludes science from history. I think it's really just that they aren't doing the same thing.

Why not? There's a lot of quantitative content in history, already. We have numbers for the centuries, for the years, even days and the minutes and seconds of each day. Not that you'll take all of those into account when you write or read about, I don't know, the French Revolution, but it's like, there are some numbers here already, about a ton of stuff. What was the price of bread in the months leading up to the French Revolution? How many people lived in France at that time? How many in Paris, specifically? How many guards were at the Bastille? Etc. And then you can study larger phenomena, like, the first World War. How many countries were involved in that conflict? When did it start? When did it end? How many combatants, on each side? What was the death toll? Etc. All of this is quantifiable. Why wouldn't you then look for statistics, trends, correlations, etc.? — Arcane Sandwich

"Shouldn't" because the phenomena isn't a scientific one, but historical. So while we can draw up statistics and trends and correlations this won't be what decides how a history is told, or at least we'll be missing out on a huge part of the history of all we do is look at measurables and ignore stories.

There's even a whole theory of writing history dedicated to exactly that -- it's the multiplicity of stories and causes and perspectives on an event which fills out an understanding of the event, rather than a unifying theory or the necessity for agreement or universality, though. I think both disciplines look at time and causation in different ways such that you can do a history of science or a science of history, but when you try to do a science of history you don't really get any unifying theory whereas if you do a history of science you get a multi-faceted narrative that doesn't give you a Method or Theory of Science, but gives you some ideas about how to go about doing science some of the time.

Quantitation is acceptable, of course. Numbers of people, hectares of agriculture, year Franz Ferdinand is shot are part of history.

But that doesn't make it a science. (Shop keeping requires mathematics, but running a shop is not doing science)

Probably both. Why not? It's "a human thing" that has numbers, isn't it? — Arcane Sandwich

Because it's a political entity and so all statements about it will themselves be political statements rather than statements of fact that can be assessed from some intersubjective objectivity.

Unlike biology economics will have a class-character.

So do some physicists, when they quote Borges in one of their papers, for example. — Arcane Sandwich

That's different, though -- the physicist can't quote Emily Dickenson as a record of physics, whereas the historian can.

That's because they're doing different things entirely. I think of them as orthogonal to one another, and it's only because history is more permissive -- rather than superior to science -- that there can be a history of science but no science of history.

They have different goals in mind, though, so this isn't a problem.

It is, but historians aren't doing poetry when they're working, just as mathematicians are not playing chess when they're working. — Arcane Sandwich

Well, they aren't doing poetry as the poets do poetry, though in the sense of the difference I'd keep between science and history -- they are in a sense doing two different kinds of poetry with different rules and thereby different outcomes. The poetry is more rigid than what we usually associate with "poetry", but the narrative character of both history and science is what I mean by the "poetics".

Consider the difference between the Big Bang and World War 1, to use your example. (other historical sciences, like geology and biology etc. will likewise count here as a point of comparison):

And it's not reproducible. — Arcane Sandwich

What's reproducible with the Big Bang are the results of the experiments which the scientists generated using such-and-such methods, rather than the Big Bang itself. Likewise I don't need to witness the entire evolution from RNA to homo sapiens re-occur to still have reproducible results.

However, such reproducibility is not the point of delving into the causes of World War 1. Everyone will acknowledge that there are many causes, and there will often be a handful of causes that all historians agree upon. What will differ is which causes get more emphasis and "what it all means" -- the marxist historian will emphasize material conditions and internal conflicts, the progressive historian will situate world war 1 as a terrible lesson we can grow from, etc.

And even within a particular theory individual historians will disagree on the exact narrative.

Do yo usee the difference?

Is there a particularly important reason why non-Orthodox Marxism can't support scientism? — Arcane Sandwich

Can't? No. But this is the very point that I begin to question Marx on -- whether history even can be treated scientifically, or more to the point, whether it should be done.

In some cases, sure -- I see a lot of advantage to being able to predict the flows of the economy, for instance, but I wonder if the economy is more a historical rather than a scientific entity. In which case the notion of models and empirical evidence and all that kind of goes out the window -- it's too close to home for us to make predictions about because we care too much about it. As soon as we have a model which works people will adapt to that model and the model will have to change in order to be true.

Whereas science emphasizes reproducibility and explanatory power history emphasizes the moment and the narrative.

Sure. But you wouldn't approach the invention of the cannon or World War 1 as academic topics just from the point of view of poetry. That history isn't physics doesn't necessarily entail that it's non-scientific tout court. — Arcane Sandwich

I think that treating history like science is overly broad on the part of science.

And also, historians do reference poems and novels from time periods they're interested in. This is because they are historical records unto themselves if they were produced at that time and capture something of the era.

With respect to human experience I think poetry is an important record.

Well, in my honest opinion, this is because the social sciences in general are not as scientific as the natural sciences, at least not currently. If we wanna bring up the social sciences so that they are on a par with the natural sciences, then we kinda need to place our bets on scientism, right? Anti-scientism won't get that particular job done. See where I'm commin' from, partner? — Arcane Sandwich

As always it depends upon how we understand the terms in the first place.

To my understanding I don't think we need to place bets either way. If neither literature nor social science nor physical science are in some sense superior to each other then there's no need to argue which one is going to win. We can engage in each at our whim.

Well, then, what you're alluding to right there is the following question: "Is historiography a social science?" "Is it a science to begin with, or is it one of the "Humanities" or "Humanistic studies"? And I just don't think that it's a productive discussion at the end of the day, even though people love to discuss it. Like, let's just all come out of the scientism closet: we all believe in scientism at the end of the day, let's not fool ourselves about that. Right? Or do you disagree? — Arcane Sandwich

I certainly don't believe in scientism -- I don't see science as superior to other forms of knowledge. I see it as one of the ways we can go about our world. And sometimes it's a foolish way to go about our world.

With respect to history in particular I think this is true. This would be where I begin to part ways with Orthodox Marxism.

Generally speaking I don't think all phenomena fit the same methodological bill -- and which is better at a time has much to do with what we're talking about in the first place. I wouldn't want the historical record of a particular cannon ball in figuring out where it will land when given such and such an amount of energy. I also would not break out thermodynamical models to explain the causes of World War 1.

These are just different ways of knowing.

Oh, also, I tried to track down access to the particular paper you linked and failed. I found some papers by Bunge, but not that.

Or would you disagree with me (on something specific or on everything in general)? — Arcane Sandwich

Nope! I agree with this.

I rarely use the word "insane", because it doesn't have any real referent. But if someone really and actually wanted to become bee or ant like I'd say they are out of their mind.

I'd feel like I'm being misunderstood if people began to wonder if they ought be like bees or ants.


Also, thanks for teaching me about eusociality.

It seems to me (and I could be wrong here) that you are mixing them up (here, in this conversation) at the level of the concepts themselves, like, you're mixing them in an almost "mathematical", purely formal way. Metaphorically, it's like you're mixing up Geometry with Algebra in some sense. — Arcane Sandwich

Cool, thanks. I'll think about it, but obviously if I'm mixing them up now it's not the time to disentangle.

Ok, but could there be one? It's just math, at the end of the day, in that sense. For example, you can use Goolge Ngram to look for statistical trends on this and that. For example, right now it has the following three search terms: Albert Einstein,Sherlock Holmes,Frankenstein. Right now, the trend is 1) Frankenstein, 2) Sherlock Holmes, 3) Albert Einstein. So what would we say about that, from the POV of Theory? I would say something like the following: currently, people seem to pay more attention to fictional characters than to real people, though that was not always the case in the past.

Agree or disagree? And to what percentage? Don't just say "Agree, 100%"

: ) — Arcane Sandwich

There could be one, but I think it's so far out there that any suggestion will probably be false.

Someone could trip across the right answer, as we've done before. I don't like to cut off ideas in principle -- and really, if I'm a marxist, there ought be a way to do this scientifically.

I just doubt that there is at the moment, and through my experience with doing union politics, at least, I've sort of come around to thinking there is no scientific analysis of political power -- it's a historical, rather than scientific, phenomena.

I don't know what to say here, my friend, so I'll just blurt out an intellectually reckless claim that I'm willing to argue for, even if I'm just shooting from the hip here: Marxism, by the epistemological standards of the 21st Century, is less scientific than contemporary physics. That's just a fact. — Arcane Sandwich

I agree!

It's something that bugs me, actually -- but building the science is a lot harder than being bugged by it.

Yeah but I do that with a lot of philosophers and you seem to do the same thing, that's what I'm saying. Everyone seems to do that. No one sticks to "just one philosopher". I mean, everyone has their favorite, or their favorites, but it's not like we're ignorant of the fact that other philosophers exist. — Arcane Sandwich

True.

I think that bees are fascist in that sense. They seem awful to me. The workers are running the show in a bee colony, all of them are females, there is only one reproductive female (the so-called "Queen"), and there is a caste of lazy, non-working males whose only function is to reproduce with the Queen. If anyone steps out of line, the female worker bees kill that individual. They've been known to kill Queens, males, and other female worker bees. And there are records of this. In short, bee society sucks. Fuck them. I'd rather be a human. And I have the "ontological-political right" to say that because I'm just as much of a living being as them. — Arcane Sandwich

Oh yes I have no desire to live in bee-society. For human beings, at least, bees are too collectivist -- we'd suffocate in that society.

I'm a collectivist, but it's not like I want to emulate the ants or bees. That's insane.

Right, but, look at the point I'm making here, for a sec. It seems to me (and I could be wrong here) that you're mixing up the topic of politics with the topic of power. Political power is not the only kind of power. There is such a thing as physical power. That is what we study and apply in Brazilian Jiu Jitsu as a martial art, not a sport (thought it's both, really). The notion here is, if you choke me, for example, and I can't escape the choke, and you don't let go, then I go unconscious. And if you don't release the choke after I become unconscious, I will die. That, is some sort of power, and yet it is not a political power. And, to learn those powers, in the context of a BJJ academy, a clear hierarchy is needed, which is belts exist in the first place. A belt is just a symbol, you could use some other criteria, such as how many medals have you won at tournaments, or how many trophies, which is what happens in the world of sports. — Arcane Sandwich

Please tell me if I'm missing something in this response because I feel like I'm repeating myself -- so I must be missing something. But I'll write more in an effort to see if something else snags.

I could be mixing up topics -- I do it all the time, and would be appreciative if I can see how I'm doing it now (not your job, of course, but mine -- just would be appreciative)

"Power" is a funny word -- Bertrand Russell tried to write a science of power by listing the various categories of power and suggesting it could be measured somehow. I think this is a common misconception of power -- that it's something like Kinetic or Potential Energy, and the greater force wins.

That's a simplification that works, but is basically false. There is no unit of "Power" in terms of political power.

By "craft" I meant the sort of thing you're talking about here -- one can become better at something, and a school can use a hierarchy to indicate to students the path they are meant to take. I can see the conflict with what I'm saying, and I'm not sure how to resolve it.

I think in the ideal ideal world I'd prefer it if somehow persons could meaningfully choose to participate in such hierarchies. It's not like learning is bad, and human beings can benefit from that.

It's that human nature is such that even those benevolent hierarchies are abused -- in various dark ways that we need not go into.

Ok, let me see if the following analogy holds up, then. When looking at a bee colony, we usually point to a very large individual bee, which is clearly different from the rest just in purely morphological terms, and we say "that's the Queen". But that's an inaccurate thing to say. There is a hierarchy in a bee colony, but the Queen isn't the one running the show. The Queen bee is something like the "reproducer" of the colony, that is her function. She exists only to create the next generation of bees. She does not tell the other bees what to do, the other bees do their tasks without the Queen telling them to do those tasks (i.e., find nectar, bring it back, make honey, construct more wax cells for the colony, etc.). There is no hierarchical oppression in this scenario, even though there is a hierarchy. Or would you like to challenge the idea that there is a hierarchy in a bee colony?

You can also say "bees are not human beings". Ok. In that case, let me mention, as an example, the sport of Bazilian Jiu Jitsu. In BJJ, there is a hierarchy of belts. That doesn't mean that the black belts are oppressing the white, blue, purple and brown bets. Or would you like to challenge the idea that BJJ black belts are not oppressing the lower ranked belts? — Arcane Sandwich

I'm not sure that I'm even challenging these ideas as much as using "hierarchy" differently. That's kind of what I was getting at with the notion that this is a more political than metaphysical statement -- I'm not talking about bees or the mastery of a craft, but power relations between human beings (which are largely defined by decision-making-power, in my mind)

I agree that calling the Queen Bee the Queen is a misnomer since bees are much more collectivist than human beings are. At least, from the outside -- it's not like I know how to read bee poetry.

But it's not the only real thing. Biological sex is a real thing, sexual orientation is a real thing, racial discrimination is a real thing, etc. — Arcane Sandwich

I agree here. I'm not a reductionist marxist type person -- just a marxist in the sense that I read him and respect his ideas and utilize his ideas in understanding the world around me because it's mostly worked so far.

But that's my point. In a classical Marxist analysis of society, for example, or a classical Webberian analysis of society (or just pick whichever sociological theory you happen to agree with), where do you place King Charles? Where do you place Lady Di? Where do you place the Pope? Where would one place the Rolling Stones, or Lionel Messi? Are they oppressing the poor in any meaningful way, if any? — Arcane Sandwich

I'd say that a Marxist analysis of society doesn't look to place individuals within the hierarchy in a general sense -- it depends upon the "concrete conditions", and so the truth of placing people in a hierarchy isn't something decided in a conversation of contemplation at all. It's more "scientific", but less scientific in terms of norms -- in a marxist analysis it's class oppression, and not individual oppression, that matters. The concrete conditions could be likened to when we have to actually do something in the now -- who has the decision-making power? who has the money? what do we do to accomplish.....? -- rather than some criteria which will always hold such that we can say "King Charles does 78 oppressions per day", or anything so specific or general as that.

I don't know much about Sartre and I won't participate in the discussion beyond this post. The study of genetics did not begin with the discovery of DNA in the 1950s. — T Clark

This makes more sense of the quote to me. Especially with....

Similarly, Sartre seems to say, how can we bridge the gap between present elements, such as artifacts, or memories encoded in neurons, to the past as such? We can no more arrive at the past by accumulating present artifacts than we can arrive at physical traits by accumulating or manipulating non-physical genes. — hypericin

The only thing I'm really wondering now is what does "elements" refer to?

Wow, never expected to delve into the history of biology while reading Sartre! :D

If humans are arranged hierarchically, will the top group always oppress the bottom group? — Arcane Sandwich

Yup. Not intentionally, of course.

But human nature is to seek out what you want, and even if not everyone does it some people will take advantage of people who have less power in order to further their own ends such that it effects our social arrangements -- i.e. class is a real thing, and I do not think it ought be a real thing.

But this is much more political than metaphysical on my part. If you're talking about hierarchy in a mathematical sense, for instance, I'm not really talking about concepts here -- concepts can be organized hierarchically just fine because concepts aren't human beings.

Is it correct to consider B&N to be a sort of Heidegger-lite? — Tom Storm

I wouldn't call it Heidegger-lite, no. It reads more clearly than Heidegger to me (at least in translation to English), but it's just as hard in the sense that he's using words in an original way while making original arguments about metaphysics.

I've heard it said that you can just skip to Sartre without reading Heidegger before, though I see a huge influence from Heidegger there -- I've also heard it said that Sartre misread Heidegger so you can dismiss B&N and go straight to B&T as the real deal.

So far I think what it amounts to is one camp didn't want to have to read two huge books that use similar concepts but with different vocabularies -- they already knew Heideggerese and didn't want to learn Sartre-ese :D Totally understandable, but ultimately I think they're both valuable and difficult, only different.

It doesn't really tell me how we should "go about it" in any meaningful way. Should there be an academic democracy in the sense that the two slots are next to each other, horizontally, instead of hierarchically? — Arcane Sandwich

That's basically what I think about all social structures, but I'll admit I'm an odd-ball here. (EDIT: I mean, we should be horizontal, always)

Or should literature dethrone science, so to speak, so as to preserve the hierarchy, but inverting the terms occupying those slots?

I don't think so.

Sometimes science, sometimes poems -- unfortunately we have to decide ourselves when is what.

Should there be slots to begin with?

No.

Is there an academic continuum, so to speak, between literature and science, or is there an exact cut-off that marks the difference between science and non-science, or between poetry and non-poetry?

Presently in the United States, at least, I believe there is -- my own mentor has been fighting for his tenure after being "let go" due to forces which basically prefer STEM, because they believe it relates more to industry, over humanities, because they believe it makes poor people dissatisfied with work and would prefer people to just learn how to do their jobs.{

But intellectually? No, no way. It's political, not conceptual.

Do people still read Sartre and take him seriously? I recall Camus and Sartre being fashionable in Australia just after the war; mixed into a kind of beatnik, socialist sensibility. By the 1980's, people were still reading Camus (perhaps because he is easier to follow) but existentialism became a bit of an embarrassment for a while - if you were an enthusiast, you were seen as a throwback to your parent's generation. Any thoughts from you side of the globe? — Tom Storm

That tracks with my experiences, though cuz I did theatre stuff I ran into Sartre and Camus much earlier than becoming interested -- and much much before beginning to understand -- their philosophy.

When I was 20-ish I got to play the part of Joseph Garcin, which was my introduction to Sartre -- I had already known about Camus from other friends and, funnily enough and without any reason, hated him at the time :D

I imagine the embarrassment over existentialism has to do with the feeling that the world's problems had finally been solved and all that was left was grouching -- but that idea is born from ignorance.


EDIT: I didn't answer your original question. I don't think people still read Sartre and take him seriously in the general sense, but his shorter works are commonly referenced in my experience.

You don't need to read Being and Nothingness to be taken seriously, at least.

IMX I've heard people reference things like No Exit and Existentialism is a Humanism, as well as general notions of what he's going on about in B&N -- so I've read selections before but only recently become re-interested in pursuing a full understanding of B&N

Looks like I have more to learn.

Good!

Access to the paper you linked will be restored upon going back to work ;)

I use it in the pejorative way with respect to what I said:

that because a scientist wrote it in their scientific capacity it ought be treated as superior to other forms or expressions of writing.

Crudely: there's an academic hierarchy of two slots, and the sciences are on top. — Moliere

Like, why is there is stereotype that scientists wear a lab coat 24/7? — Arcane Sandwich

Hah! Movies, probably. I agree that scientists are human beings, and I don't mean to target scientists in saying "scientism"

"Scientism" is a pejorative -- no one actually calls themselves that way unless they want to challenge some notion that people who use it as a pejorative have.

Everyone can, in their off hours, investigate something else.

I think "scientism" has more to do with a particular appeal or argument -- that because a scientist wrote it in their scientific capacity it ought be treated as superior to other forms or expressions of writing.

Crudely: there's an academic hierarchy of two slots, and the sciences are on top.

heh, fair.

I'm just surprised to see someone express a continuity between Epicurus and Sartre. I mean I see that continuity but I'm not used to others expressing it, so I find it pleasing because it feels like independent confirmation.

I'm not sure if I understand the idea here. What's the underlying concept in this case? I'm struggling just to understand it. — Arcane Sandwich

Thanks to you for asking -- I don't know what the underlying concept is! I have some ideas upon you asking, but I didn't mean to invoke a whole ass concept as much as make a quip.

Though that's my fault since I said "idea of a record" -- I ought to have said "scientific record", in the physical sense, to distinguish between the actual records we have of science from literature. Scientism, in this case, would prefer the literature of the people we call scientists over the literature of the people we call writers, novelists, philosophers, playwrights, poets, historians, or journalists. (EDIT: or activists, preachers, clerks, janitors, teachers, fast-food workers....)

Heh. Wow. I never thought I'd meet such a kindred spirit!

Is there some reason to believe this is so? A reason that isn't about Heidegger? — frank

I'd say that Heidegger's philosophy is one which attempts to overcome the Cartesian subject, and so anyone who would reject Descartes ought be familiar* with Heidegger.

*EDIT: Well, really all I mean is can't be dismissive. I'm aware that lots of people here are familiar, but it didn't seem that Hinton was, or at least didn't really address that philosophical perspective as much as assume mind-brain identity (EDIT2: Well, for human beings at least. But he is at least equating the mind to computation, which is as false as the idea he criticizes)

There's the part which I agree with -- LLM's are dangerous -- but the part I disagree with is his philosophical move.

Rejecting the Cartesian theatre is harder to do than what he's indicating. For instance, he says that his perceptual system tells him -- so we have two minds talking within the mind to explain the mind. f

Most people who get into phil-o-mind reject Descartes. It's sort of the first move -- to realize that Descartes exploits a common prejudice in building his philosophy, that there is a thinking-thing. And here we have the professor still relying upon a thinking-thing: the brain doing its computations.

But what if the mind is not the brain at all? Well, then LLM's are dangerous, and everything the professor said is irrelevant. As it so happens that's what I tend to believe -- that the mind is socially enacted and passed on, rather than computed within a brain. So there's no Cartesian theatre, but there's also no comparison to computers.

Oh yes it's definitely weird. I don't know exactly what to make of the notion that there is more than analogy here.

The best I can come up with is that a person listening to a vinyl record and a person reading a poem are both experiencing the record of human experience.

So while I understand the OP to be asking after something like a sci-fi version where I could plug a USB into my neck and re-experience the world at some point before exactly as I did then -- I want to suggest we already have the means of accomplishing exactly that, only not in the fantastical way which might tempt us.

Rather, we only need read and think about books, and they transport us to other worlds.

And the scientistic idea of a record is the only reason we'd dismiss the whole of human literature as evidence of a record.

Here is where I got completely lost. Can you explain this last part if you have the time, please? — Arcane Sandwich

Sure!

I mean like https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phonograph_record

When growing up the vinyl discs were literally called "Records" and the disc-spinner a "Record player", which was distinguished between cassette tapes, and CD's.

I'm trying to point out that there's more than an analogy between the literal grooves in a vinyl record and the ink marks a writer makes with a pen on paper.

Heh, probably not years. Kudos to you for saying you don't know.

The basic idea is that when you look at a paper map of an area you ought be able to distinguish between the map you're holding in your hand from the land you're trying to figure out.

I don't know if there even are map-territory relations. I think it's mostly just a basic idea that there's a difference between our representations and what they represent, however we end up parsing that.

So, to bring it back to the OP, there's certainly a difference between poems and human experience, and even poems which record human experience. "Record" being a vinyl scratching from sound, poems are an ink scratching from pressure to represent sound to represent experience.

Would you also agree with

...the recording is not the recorded. — jorndoe

?

That's what I'm thinking, anyways. I write poems as a record of feeling, and when I go back to them I can re-experience those moments -- but surely I recognize the difference between the real event and my re-experience for all that.

And if that's so then it seems we can record human experience, even if it wasn't in the way the people who want our brains to be programmable like a computer would like.

:)

She's great.



Nice. :)

Would you agree that this poetic expression records human experience?

Yes.

Essentially, you will be able to step-in your past, re-experience those moments. — Ayush Jain

Consider:

X.

IN A LIBRARY.

A precious, mouldering pleasure 't is
To meet an antique book,
In just the dress his century wore;
A privilege, I think,

His venerable hand to take,
And warming in our own,
A passage back, or two, to make
To times when he was young.

His quaint opinions to inspect,
His knowledge to unfold
On what concerns our mutual mind,
The literature of old;

What interested scholars most,
What competitions ran
When Plato was a certainty.
And Sophocles a man;

When Sappho was a living girl,
And Beatrice wore
The gown that Dante deified.
Facts, centuries before,

He traverses familiar,
As one should come to town
And tell you all your dreams were true;
He lived where dreams were sown.

His presence is enchantment,
You beg him not to go;
Old volumes shake their vellum heads
And tantalize, just so. — Emily Dickenson

Which demonstrates that the record of human experience is deeper than re-experiencing my own experiences -- with the old volumes we can even conjure up the experiences of those before us.

Okiedokie. Sounds good. It was just a thought I had to be accommodating. Then people can choose the topic that most interests them.

The difference being between a post and this is an essay, so I'd expect some kind of complete thought or argument. Whereas with a post I only expect enough of a topic to get a conversation going, I'd think that an essay actually completes a thought or presents a whole argument or tells a story or is in some sense a self-contained peice of writing meant to be presented as a whole for a reader.

Whereas a thread can do that, it's really just about having a conversation at all and needn't conclude or be self-contained and can wander more.

Sure! Tho I'd probably only count the ones who care enough since presumably the third optioners are fine with either outcome.

:up:

Either is good by me. 15th or 30th. It sounded like you wanted it later?

Ahhh ok. Sure that's fine. So guidelines Feb 1, then essays June 1st, and discussion topic posted when? When' is "the end" ?

It's an idea but not sure how it would work. Would it be anonymous?
If authors are identified, then that might give the game away. I think we should stick to the decision. People can either pick up the topic of 'Imagination' or do their own thing. — Amity

I was thinking to use the poll option which the forum has and then going with whatever side gets more votes -- so option 1 is "Open topic" and option 2 is "Imagination", and whichever category gets more votes on the forum poll is the one we'd decide upon.

Or we can just stick to option 1. I'm just trying to be accommodating, and acknowledging that I'm not really sure which option would garner more participation, which seems to me the more important thing.

OK. :up:
So, does that mean we are having 2 extra threads? 1.Guess the Author 2. Favourites?

The jury is still out on the latter. Only about 50% of the authors participated. No readers.

I suggested a single 'Meet the Authors' thread . It would incorporate both. Baden is mulling it over. It's all a bit experimental at this stage. — Amity

A single thread incorporating both is good by me -- more crossover communication usually results in more participation.

So we'd have the announcement thread largely tailored from the literary activity's guidelines (with or without a poll -- either way), then the actual threads themselves posted on July 1st along with a "Discussion/Guess the author" overall thread, the way I'm thinking it.

Thoughts?

I agree. But the consensus was that people would participate more if the topic was left open. *shrugs* — Amity

I'm fine with switching it up. I said my bit, but I'm not committed to it.

Perhaps with the guidelines we could also submit a poll for preferences? "Open topic/Single topic: Imagination"? Since that's the topic that's been proposed I think it'd be a good one, and makes it so we don't have to do two polls :D -- one poll with two clearly defined outcomes.

What do you think @Amity?

I read over the Literary Activity guidelines and I think I'd pretty much copy them verbatim with a changes in dates (and the topic of course), and maybe add in a mini-tutorial for pastebin for those that need the walk through.

I think Quine is just massively overthinking it. — Darkneos

Probably.

But perhaps overthinking it leads to insights.

"Overthinking it", in philosophy, is far from a bad thing ;)

:up:

So my understanding, I guess, is that because we have different words that we use for the same thing that there is no one referent for a specific thing and that therefor translation in speech wouldn’t be possible? — Darkneos

You read the reference from the wiki yet?

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/quine/#IndeTran

You say you have criticisms — Joshs

Another thought --

I have not but would like to distinguish between critique and criticism. I'd say what I'm presenting here of Nietzsche is more of a critique -- an evaluation of the limits, strengths, and qualities of a philosophy -- from the perspective of my own reading of Nietzsche. So I'm not saying something like "Nietzsche should have said this because he's wrong here for...", but instead responding to his work in the now, while using his work to read it.

The ubermensch is not a higher man, it is a critique and overcoming of humanism. — Joshs

And I agree with this higher reading of Nietzsche. A commonsense way of putting it -- if we're "Human, all too human", and nihilism is overcome, then post-humanity is the healthier approach.

Another thought that comes to mind is that I don't believe Nietzsche thought himself the overman.

That is what self-overcoming means, not a substantive subject accumulating points, enjoying witnessing the progress in the direction of its increase in health, nobility and mastery. — Joshs

Here I believe we agree. The meaning is there -- but meaning and potency aren't always the same.

Who is this subjective ‘we’ that freely chooses in a Sartrean way to follow or not to follow the normative structures of intelligibility? Does a subject exist first and then choose to participate in normative epistemological or ethical systems? Or are subjects formed as an effect of social practices of subjectivation? Do we follow normative structures or do normative structures undergird, constrain and define the criteria of the ethical good and bad for us prior to our choosing as individual ‘subjects’? That is to say, do we choose the ethical norms that bind us or do we choose WITHIN the ethical norms that produce us? — Joshs

It seems to me that we are the producers of value, and yet because of our thrownness we aren't blank slates in that production, per se -- but also I think there's a creative element to life such that new norms can be created ex nihilo, and frequently are created (and let go).

Who the subjective we that freely chooses is is pretty much the topic of my recent thread -- tl;dr, I don't know, but you're right to pinpoint Sartre as a beginning point (tho there's something in there that I don't like, I'm still working that out too -- it has to do with the emphasis on lack) -- and ultimately I'm tempted to include it in the list of fantasias.

Materially speaking we're individuated with government numbers and names which carry responsibilities and rights as well as by our passions.

But what gets synthesized unto this choosing subject changes with historical circumstance. In our case the capitalist-liberal bearer of responsibility and property. So, properly speaking, this cogito does not exist until it turns of age.

You say you have criticisms, and point out that Nietzsche can be interpreted in many ways. I’m sure you would agree that in order to be fair (and accurate) in your critique, you ned to be acquainted with the way he is read by poststructuralists like Klossowski, Focault, Deleuze, Heidegger and Derrida, who have produced some of the
most influential interpretations of him. — Joshs

I don't think that follows. I think that if I wanted post-structuralists to listen to me then that's certainly the case. And if I wanted to somehow displace Nietzsche in my critique then that'd also be wise to attend to these interpretations.

And, really, I wouldn't mind reading more anyways because that's kind of the whole thing -- just for my own edification and thinking. But for my purposes here the little interpretation is good enough for me. It's basically just Nietzsche on Nietzsche -- don't judge him on the basis of fairness and accuracy, but potency. And in particular I'm interested in popular potency amongst the herd, outside of the academy -- Nietzsche's cultural influence rather than his ideational meanings.

Basically the whole post-subject turn in philosophy is good and interesting for the academy and for people seeking a deeper Nietzsche, but that's not the Nietzsche that takes hold amongst the herd; and probably will never be in a society which emphasizes the individual.

. How, for instance. can one critique identity politics from a Nietzschean point of view? — Joshs

Is it important to do so?

It seems that identity politics would fall to the same criticism of slave morality as Christianity and Socialism, though, yes? That seems to me the most obvious move.

How can one put into question distinctions between the individual and the social, the self and the Other, as reflected in your Levinasian statement that ethics begins with others rather than the state of being or the choices of an individual?

Easy -- "What's up with that distinction? What are you saying?"

Or note how the individual is predicated by the social, or the self is born in the face-to-face of the Other. The distinctions aren't truth-apt or metaphysical, from what I can tell, but phenomenological -- temporary historically actuated concepts that make one able to speak about truth or metaphysics in the first place.

Noting how philosophy can begin anywhere we'd then proceed to drop the distinction and proceed to something else.

BUT -- and this is the important part -- not everyone would come along with us. Some would take another path, and that's what I'm more interested in.

One of the things that's missing in Nietzsche and the virtue-theoretic account in general is its focus on the soul.

What I think is easy to miss in both accounts is where I think goodness actually comes about as a topic in the first place -- ethics begins with others rather than the state of being or the choices of an individual.