What is of highest good can only be defined by how you or a group of people value it, no? — Shawn

Not "What is of highest good?" -- I'm asking what would it count to be a "highest good" at all? Or, perhaps easier: Why axiology and not something else?

The thesis statement of this thread is that axiology (the study of value) is the highest good. — Shawn

That's the thesis, but where's the reason for it?

What's a highest good?

If I were to say "Happiness is the highest good, because it leads to all the others", then how might you say the philosophical study of values is higher than that?

Fair enough! However, I do not mean truth-aptness by truthity: I to the assessment of the truth of the thing or lack thereof and not its capacity for truth---it is the 'lack thereof' that disbars me from simply saying 'truth' instead of 'truthity'. I went ahead and changed the OP to use 'trueness or falseness' instead of 'truthity'. — Bob Ross

Then I don't think I understand after all.

What does "The assessment of the truth of the thing or lack thereof" mean? That it has been judged or justified, or that it can be judged or justified?

Episode 21.

Interesting parallels between McLuhan and Hegel. I've heard a lot of Novak's quotes, but I cannot remember from where (did I read McLuhan and forget that I read him, or is he just that influential?).

I agree with him in describing our society as a tribal one.

Interesting theory about how electronic communication enabled eroding national ties by making that space "shorter" or "instantaneous", so that one's identity and community can more easily become more important and different from your nation.

His continuation of the Hegelian analysis of McLuhan's tetrad reminds me of Marx in that the technology enables a new social order.

That’s fair. I could have sworn it was a technical term for it but, upon re-searching, I do not find it anywhere. All I mean by it, is the trueness or falseness of something (and not necessarily that it is true). — Bob Ross

I understood better what you meant when you explained it -- I'd have called the concept https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803105953845", which is a term I've come across in the literature that means a sentence is able to be true or false (Unlike sentences like "How are you today?")

I didn't want to interrupt the flow of things for something so minor, but since it came up I thought I'd offer a possible word to use.

So, what are your thoughts about education that even someone in poverty can afford by simply going through an online course or possibly in the future looking into AI providing some quality courses by some venture capitalist or entrepreneur via the internet? — Shawn

As boring as my original advice. ;)

I know nothing about AI venture capitalist future learning in libraries, but I know that you can't really put a price on knowledge and that going to school has benefits.

I figure if someone is motivated enough to teach themselves through the internet then they're not the person that needed all these motivations in place, like employment or grades, to learn something.

And really it just depends on too much to give any general answer besides "Go to school, it's good for your mind!"

One way to look at education is as a democratic institution because it offers equality of opportunity -- rather than being stuck with the profession your parents have there's a system in place that, for better or worse, attempts to level the playing field.

I think that in our economies that post-secondary education ought to be considered something offered for everyone -- we live in pretty advanced economies, and the more people who are knowledgeable the better we'll be able to figure out the problems that face us.

But that's not as fun as making money, so the democratic role in the US is restricted to secondary education, with some government programs in place to assist in attending post-secondary (and a somewhat attempted ameliorations for excessive debt, though not everyone agrees with even what's been done)

So the point to go is pretty much up to you: If you have a way to make money that's stable which does not require an education then there's no financial reason to go, though you may want to for personal reasons -- but, that's a pretty pricey ticket for personal reasons if you don't have the money up front.

I think it's a good bet, though, if you finish it. Also, while the above points out the democratic and financial reason for education, for me I'd say it's because you gain knowledge, it widens your perspective, you learn better ways to think, and these are valuable unto themselves as well as to society if you are willing and able so that's why I went and don't regret it (though I did have an eye on a career when I did go, too).

I don't think in a fundamental way, no, because they are both senses-- just in terms of what using the sense of sight as a metaphor for all senses suggests: when we think about sense-organs with respect to sight, generalizing from sight to all sense-organs, then the metaphor of a picture suggests that everything we see is a representation just like the picture is a representation.

They are both senses, and the metaphors change when we go to another sense -- but surely we should treat all the senses in the same logical manner. That's the point of bringing them up together: with senses other than sight I'm not sure what is representative. If I'm eating then I'm tasting what I'm eating, and incorporating it into me -- the world-becomes-me.

If taste were judgmental then we could set up a code of flavors in a meal which would inform you of a mathematical problem.

Now, I have no doubt that, given enough knowledge, we could reliably induce synesthesia such that this would be possible to read a book by eating it encoded into a complex series of flavors.

But right now I'd say the sentences like "This tastes sour" are the representations of the sour things.

I have not said that cats perceive trees as trees, but they perceive trees as some kind of affordance or other (although I am not saying they could conceive of it linguistically as an affordance or as anything else) — Janus

That's what I was thinking with the term, too -- objects with affordances make sense of a cat's or a bat's experience being different, but still about the same objects all while their experiences are probably different because human language can bring out features that I've missed upon a first listen.

Music, in particularly, is like this with me. Upon reading about a composer often I'll be able to hear and separate out more of the orchestra because of the words I've been given to organize that experience -- language enhances listening rather than cuts off the listener from the object.

Very interesting; can you elaborate? Especially the first bit. — Apustimelogist

My thought is that representationalism is tempting because we often think in terms of vision, but our bodily sensations are sense-organs too: yet we'd be more apt to say we're connected to our toe -- that consciousness extends beyond the head -- than we'd be to say we're connected to the truck across the parking lot, which I admit is where things sound weird.

With sight it's easy to interpret as if the pictures we make -- like the ones we hang on walls -- are just smaller versions of sight and so everything we see is a representation of some kind of underlying world. This is especially so because of the separation of self/world pretty much implicitly assumed in modern philosophy.

But when I stub my toe, I can't think what the analogue to "picture" would be such that my pain is a representation of something rather than just what it is. The closest thing I can think of is phantom pains -- but that doesn't seem like a representation, either, but a memory so intense that even losing the body part doesn't separate the pains remembered.

Rather than a bundle of representations, I'd say I'm a bundle of meat that's been socialized enough to have a thought or two to share. (these thoughts, these judgments, I can see as representations -- they are about something. But it seems funny to say my pain is about my toe rather than the pain being a part of the toe being a toe -- sensitive to environmental damage)

But most indirect realists do think that these explanations are directly evidencing indirect realisms. — Apustimelogist

Right.

My take is that there isn't really evidence for indirect realism as much as indirect realism is an interpretation of what we know -- so I'm providing an alternate interpretation to weaken the justification for indirect realism. Or at least that's the strategy.

No, I'm not implying it in a fundamental metaphysical sense. But some have pointed out that my actual view on mind-body metaphysics is not so dissimilar from a kind of neutral monism (maybe a very minimalist one) so maybe you would still think it the case of my view anyway. Though I don't think I see my view that way. — Apustimelogist

I'll take your view of your view over my view of it any day :) -- if I view your view differently then I'd say I'm incorrect about your view.

I think a neutral monism could go either way regarding in/direct realism -- it'd depend upon whether our perceptions are representations or presentations, I think. But cool, I can take up the notion that this isn't an issue of fundamental metaphysics.

I'm not sure to be honest. I think it depends on the angle you take. As you say below, it can be quite vague all this talk I think. I don't think indirect realists necessarily have to bring strong metaphysics into it beyond the talk of realism about representations, similar to the way you can talk about whether scientific theories (are real)*. The science I think provides quite a good description of how perceptions would be indirect so not much work is needed to be done there. Naive direct realism I'm not so sure. — Apustimelogist

Mkay, fair.

But the experiences still extend into the outside world beyond the head? — Apustimelogist

It seems so to me, yes.

I can understand the motivation for representation when it comes to sight, but I don't understand what a representation of my toe would be when I'm stubbing it or not.

Minimally I have a hard time thinking of the perception of my body as a representation: I can go as far as to say it's a bundle, and there is no "I", but I don't think my body is a bundle of representations.

Well I only use it in a weak sense as opposed to a fundamental, tangible ontology. — Apustimelogist

Cool.

Well I'm not sure since it seems you were perhaps using affordance in different sense, ha. But possibly yes, I definitely think I have preferred starting points in my reasonings that are probably not the same as yours. — Apustimelogist

Probably :)

Of course, that's why it's interesting to converse in the first place, so nothing wrong with that.

Well... there is a normal, but I agree it's not normal...

In an attempt to bring it back: that notion of normal, so it seems to me, is more of an indirect realist belief to reconcile how representations can be right or wrong, even when it comes to perception. (for me, "representations" is definitely a turn-off)

hell yeah.

It's nice to see someone with your struggles succeed.

It makes me feel like I can do it too.

yes. The person on NPR obviously is receiving help. I also receive help others don't need. These conditions can inflict a lot of pain, and as a person who medicates I'm pretty much on board with that line of thinking: do stuff to make the terrible not as terrible cuz why not?

But I also thought that the notion that the person with that disability was valuable even with it was nice to hear, and not just as a hallmark card -- but as a genuine thing. People with disabilities often have unique perspectives, and so they are worthwhile even in the economic sense (which is all we care about)

That's for sure. I could even say that one of the most nuanced philosophical thinkers of the 20th century (Heidegger) seemed to find the Nazi narrative acceptable. But that might be gauche. — Tom Storm

Yeh, but Derrida and Levinas baptized his thoughts, if not his soul. ;)

I don't think I'd be a Marxist if I thought we are stuck with our own worldview.

It's not like I started thinking these thoughts from birth, right?

This morning I heard on NPR a person who has schizophrenia who started a podcast, or something like that, to interview people at his campus about what it would feel like if they knew a person with schizoaffective disorder was on campus.

It was NPR so it was a feel good story -- he knew what he was getting into, and had a positive spin on what people said with a hope for more acceptance.

I say this by way of suggesting, at least, that it's not a malfunction so much.

One of the parts of the radio programme that touched me, with my own shit, is where the people he knew learned how to prefer him as he was, and would not want him to be otherwise.

Yes.

Right. For me this almost implies some form of idealism where the object of my toe is just the experience of my toe, without anything more. I think I would also be open though toward some kind of notion of direct awareness of information or something like that which I
think is similar to this comment here you made: — Apustimelogist

I think "information" counts as kind of idealism, if you're positing it as a kind of fundamental substance that everything is composed of.

I'm attempting to articulate a material view of direct realism, however -- along with no foundations I'd say there is no one or two substances which everything is composed of. The task then becomes: how to articulate a direct realism that is material, and yet does not rely upon a notion of substance?

For my part I'm more in favor of the naive view of the world, though I think it's hard to formulate into a proper philosophical thesis.

But to clarify I wasn't trying to necessarily imply anything about the universe being just experiences. I don't believe sufficiently clear notions of fundamental metaphysics are accessible so I don't bother with that. — Apustimelogist

Isn't that pretty much what the topic of indirect or naive realism is about? Fundamental metaphysics?

We can make the notions clear in our conversation at least, I'd say, and I'd even hazard to say that this entire conversation is a bothering about insufficiently clear notions.

But to clarify I wasn't trying to necessarily imply anything about the universe being just experiences. I don't believe sufficiently clear notions of fundamental metaphysics are accessible so I don't bother with that.

I was just saying that I am having what I call experiences and they flow and any time I recognize errors, that is just encompassed in types of experiential flow. And yes, what I would call the self is enacted in the flow too just like you said.

It might not be apt to call it direct realism though because I wouldn't say it conflicted with the idea of mediational processes and a chain of causes originating outside of what is experienced. It is more appropriately, and perhaps trivially, a direct awareness of what is going on in my head which I think is then not the same as the kind of direct realism described on wikipedia or something. It would be quite weakened and I would even push back against the notion of there being a fact of the matter about the sense that these experiences are about objective objects out in the world in the same kind of way I push back against scientific realism. As an analogy, I would say what we perceive is closer to a notion of an instrumentalist science where we construct theories that predict data, as opposed to theories being objectively real. — Apustimelogist

But what does it mean for a color itself to be an affordance? — Apustimelogist

I'm uncertain of the best way to put it, but at the very least what it means is that though direct realists directly perceive objects in the world that does not then entail that what they see is a fixed property, or that there are not other properties which a given perception is not perceiving.

It's mostly the notion of permanent objects and their essences that I'd try to avoid -- things are in constant flux.

Tbh I think the affordance/J.J.Gibson-kind of direct perception is closer to my "direct awareness of information" than it is to more literal direct realism. — Apustimelogist

I had to look up J.J. Gibson. I was using the term more locally, in our conversation -- a term of art meant to contrast with "properties", is what I was thinking.

The objects are there, I just don't think they are what the naive view might believe. Perhaps this is a way of differentiating the naive from the direct realist: I think the naive realist is seeing something real, that literal objects are a part of their experience, but that does not then mean that every judgment about that real thing which a naive realist makes is going to be true or comprehensive.

But judgment is judgment of what is directly perceived (and, of course, judgment influences perception -- but that's not the same thing as saying perceptions are judgments, or rather, must be judgments). (in a sense I'd say that every judgment has a dual-awareness -- the judgment ,and what the judgment is about)

But I suspect maybe that interpretation may be particular to me.

While I've come to discount the notion of an information ontology, you're far from alone in thinking like that.

What can I say? I'm a disagreeable sort. ;)

The idea of affordances definitely was a significant input, among others, to what led me to the idea that our experiences are fundamentally just about "what happens next?" and enacting that... which I see as pretty much just a more general view of affordances. So affordances is an important concept to me but I have gone away from the idea that the kind of qualities I directly experience are literally affordances. If sensory information arises from patterns on sensory boundaries like the retina, then the connection to affordances must come in afterwards.

Heh. Well, I've clarified, but also -- it could just be a case of dueling intuitions here. You'd prefer to start with the information, I'd prefer to start with the objects.

But how do we really differentiate which is the better way to talk?

For me, I don't think it makes sense to say the dress can be two colors without loosening realism and directness, arguably both. But again, I don't think that contradicts my "direct awareness of information" thing imo.

I think that maybe this is the sort of stuff that might differentiate naive from direct realists -- naive realists won't have a reason or address the indirect realist's objections, but direct realists attempt to do so with philosophy rather than bald assertion.

Eh, not other dimensions, no. Just the mind interacting with itself -- something the mind is trained to ignore to pay attention to the important things. (EDIT: Or, even more abstractly, it's really just a local, ontic interpretation of experience, which we have been taught to treat in a certain manner in an industrial society with a division of labor, etc.)

I am not sure I see a profound difference tbh. Disruption of normal functioning is what the indirect realist sees as disruption of normal representations. — Apustimelogist

Right -- but indirect realism has problems. These are explanations for phenomena used to support indirect realism which don't resort to the position of indirect realism to make the case for naive realism more plausible.

I don't think that undermines the point, though. Hallucinations show that the mind can create experience. Once you notice that, reality will always be taken with a grain of salt. — frank

Hallucinations show that we experience the world differently from one another -- but that doesn't mean it's the mind creating experience, I'd say.

In the case of starvation, for instance, sometimes people's experiences have been interpreted as religious visions of a truth beyond the everyday -- what is colloquially called "hallucination" can be interpreted as another layer of reality which our normal functioning has been trained to ignore (and which is why the disruption of normal functioning turns the mind on itself -- which is what I'd say hallucinations are.)

And sometimes people do see features which are not actually there from some other person's perspective, like hallucinations. Someone on an LSD trip might see motion in the carpet where another person sees none at all. (Though I guess you might say motion and non-motion are both there?) — Apustimelogist

I think hallucinations are a different case than illusions in that I wouldn't reconcile them the same way. Illusions can be covered pretty well by the duck-rabbit, but hallucinations like one experiences on hallucinogens or when they don't have enough sugar to make the brain function as it normally does don't work that way.


For hallucinations I simply note that in every case we can find some physiological reason why they are hallucinating -- usually it's a physical, chemical reaction that's taking place which disrupts our normal functioning. I like to point out starvation as a means for visions because it demonstrates that we don't need a "foreign" substance to our bodies, but even if our bodies don't get what we need then our minds don't behave like we normally expect -- that is, total hallucinations, if we do not analyze them using Cartesian assumptions, are evidence that our mind is a part of the world because the world influences it, rather than the other way about. (Still thinking over the other stuff, but I had a ready-made response for the example of total hallucinations, or dreaming too if we want to go through that :D )

Yes, when you put them side-by-side but I am still not sure what the latter really means in terms of being aquainted with the world. — Apustimelogist

Let's go with 's link and pick out a definition, such as:

We said above that what distinguishes the classical, Russellian notion of acquaintance is, minimally, that (i) it is a non-intentional form of awareness: acquaintance with something does not consist in forming any judgment or thought about it, or applying any concepts to it; and (ii) it is real relation requiring the existence of its relata; one cannot be acquainted with some thing, property or fact that does not exist.

So I'd claim that I am aware of my toe, and that awareness is not intentional, which I take "intentional" to mean the philosophical use:

In philosophy, intentionality is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs — first sentence of the SEP article on intentionality

Something that's probably confusing in the mix is that I'd be inclined to endorse this version:

...There are consistent ways to accept acquaintance theory without accepting classical foundationalism. some might agree that we do have some knowledge by acquaintance and appeal to such knowledge in the dualism debate in the philosophy of mind

I wouldn't pick up foundationalism, but in a debate between naive and indirect realism I'd be inclined to accept that there is non-inferential awareness, at least. The bit on "intentionality" I'm a little less certain about -- it seems to me that awareness can be about something without being inferential or judgmental, so there's a kind of intention I'd accept while still using some of the specifications of the SEP's article on acquaintance.

To me, there are basically just sequences of experiences and we can be erroneous about what experiences will happen next, or what experiences accompany each other. That is all. And recognizing errors itself involves some sequence of experiences. — Apustimelogist

If it's all just experience then wouldn't that be a kind of direct realism? There wouldn't even be a self as much as a local bundle of experiences which gets in the habit of calling itself "I", erroneously.

What if two people see the same object in two different ways due to an illusion, yet they are both directly aquainted with that object? — Apustimelogist

I think objects have affordances more than distinct properties.

So the black/gold/blue/white dress: The dress is all four colors, and which you see depends upon the context. It's our logic of "color" which is amiss, because we believe that an object cannot be both black and gold in the same place at the same time, but given the intersubjective nature of color I'd revise our logic on color -- it seems that objects can be both at once, given the dress -- and we're inclined to call the affordance we don't perceive an illusion.

And if one rejects this? — AmadeusD

Then I'd set aside whether we are conscious or figure out some other way to work consciousness into an account of direct, or naive, realism.

Especially since perception doesn't need to be described in phenomenological terms to understand it in a functional manner -- we can sidestep the question entirely and just focus on perception and whether or not perception is an intermediary between ourself and the world, and why.

I don't think this is true, personally. Consciousness does not extend at all.. It couldn't, on any account of it i've heard.

Even from the head, or is consciousness limited to the going-ons of the brain?

That some pretend that consciousness is something even capable of 'literally' touching the world is probably one of the more embarrassing aspects of human theorizing.

I'm not sure why.

I think it's interesting stuff.

That consciousness literally extends outside of the head and touches the world is kind of why the problem of consciousness is a big deal for some. Granting that it does, and granting what we know about perception it doesn't make sense -- but then some say it does make sense, it just doesn't get along with the science and that's the whole problem.

But I'd say that the distinction between naive and indirect realism operates at a higher level of abstraction than the problem of consciousness -- we could be consciousness-realists or anti-realists, and fall either way with respect to naive or indirect realism regarding perception and objects, just framing it in different ways when it's brought up (it's different, but understandable why the problem comes up regarding perception)

For my part I think reductios work because if the indirect realist position turns out to be absurd, or at least results in undesirable conclusions, then it seems that the indirect realist has some explaining to do -- if the naive realist position accommodates these absurdities and can explain the original problems that the indirect realist brings up, then it'd be better to believe in naive realism.

P1. We are acquainted with the phenomenal character of experience.
P2. According to the naive realist, the phenomenal character of experience is constituted of distal objects and their properties.
C1. Therefore, according to the naive realist, we are acquainted with distal objects and their properties.
P3. According to the indirect realist, the phenomenal character of experience is constituted of mental phenomena.
C2. Therefore, according to the indirect realist, we are acquainted with mental phenomena.

Note that the term "mental phenomena" is impartial to property dualism and eliminative materialism.

Note also the technical term "acquainted", as described here.

And as explained above, for the phenomenal character of experience to be constituted of distal objects and their properties it requires that perceptual experiences "literally extend beyond the subject's head, to encompass what the experience is of". — Michael

I think I've managed to rephrase in these terms in my conversation with @Apustimelogist

And I believe I accept "literally extend beyond the subject's head" -- sure.

I'm not sure how else we'd be acquainted with the world unless our experiences literally extended beyond our head. Otherwise we'd only know our head, and infer that we have a body.

I think I am acquainted with my toes in the same way I am acquainted with my head.

A lot of people take this line, but it seems plainly available to deny that there's any necessity between awareness and experience. — AmadeusD

My thinking is that we're ignorant about any relationship between awareness (or perception) and experience, so we ought not believe people who claim to know until they demonstrate more. But, ultimately, if what I'm saying is true -- that we are a part of the world -- then I can't think of a reason why we couldn't, in principle, recreate the conditions. I just think we're ignorant now to a point where we're not even sure what would count as consciousness -- so there's a good reason to remain skeptical.*

In terms of perception I'd say AI demonstrates some of the more dry and functional ways of putting "perception", but I don't believe the internet is conscious for all that.

*EDIT: Also why it's a good topic for philosophy: It's not clear enough yet to be a science.

Well alright, but then I think I would be interested in whether you would think it acceptable for an indirect realist to call you an indirect realist, since you are not necessarily contradicting their beliefs at all as far as I can tell. — Apustimelogist

The indirect realist says that we are acquainted with sense-data, and that we only infer that there are objects from that sense data.

I believe we are acquainted with the world, which happen to contain objects.

Is that not different to your mind?

I don't see the contradiction in the idea that there are things that happen beyond our immediate perceptions which we create stories to try and explain even if we cannot definitively know anything in a perfect way. — Apustimelogist

I haven't claimed there's a contradiction. Indirect realism is logically possible.

Let's grant indirect realism: There are objects which cause experiences and the objects, while real, are not what we are directly acquainted with. Rather we are directly acquainted with our experience and make judgments about objects from that experience, and the so-called naive realist is ignorant of this fact -- so the indirect realist denies naive realism.

The motivation for indirect realism comes from various phenomena of perception such as dreams, hallucinations, and variance in discriminatory ability.

My thought is -- according to the indirect realist we can be in error about perception evidenced by the belief that there is some belief called "naive realism" that is false.

So how does the indirect realist account for error about perception, if not another intermediary?

To me it seems like it's much more elegant to simply say we can be fallible, and not come up with some metaphysical explanation as to why towers which are square appear round from a distance. Which to me indicates there's no separation between myself and objects, no experiential-film or sense-data that exists between myself and the really real objects -- there's just the familiar world that we can be wrong about sometimes.

I am not sure I understand. — Apustimelogist

Eh, no worries. I was on a bit of a tangent about how there's a more extreme version of the belief which just flips the indirect realist's priorities on its head -- no subject, only objects, and from these objects we make inferences about perception.

I really don't think its as complicated as you make out. The only way information gets into our brain and cause sensory experiences is by stimulating sensory receptors. The light hitting my retina is causing patterns of excitation at any given time. If artificially exciting them in an identical way did not produce the same results it would seem inexplicable to me. Why wouldn't it? To me that is an unnecessary skepticism. — Apustimelogist

I'd believe that if we recreated the conditions for creating perception then we'd produce the same results, but I don't believe anyone really knows those conditions.

I would ask whether *anything* could ever count as *indirect* under this view. — Apustimelogist

Well, I hope not. That's the idea! :D

Notice how it parallels the claim of indirect realism -- experience or sense data is what we are directly acquainted with while objects are inferred and judged. My thought is this is a conceptual distinction rather than a scientific one. I don't think it's a matter of knowledge as much as an interpretation of what we know.

I don't know why I'd prioritize ipseity over the object. In a way I'd be more tempted to say we have an indirect knowledge of ourselves more than we have indirect knowledge of objects. We make inferences about the kind of creature we are and we do so through the direct mediation of the familiar world. At the most extreme I'd say there is no knowledge to be had about ourselves, though I know where my car keys are all the same, and that seems a bit too much to me in the same way: conceptual clarity is achieved as the sacrifice of fidelity to our intuitions.

On the othet hand, if you think of the fact that we, as parts, can be decomposed into parts then there are parts which mediate eachother's interactions with the rest of the world... visual cortical states, sensory states on the retina, photons travelling in the air. I can maybe in *some* sense interact with patterns in the outside world but not without those patterns appearing on the surface of my retina through photonic interactions and then the correlations appearing in cortical states. If that information is about something that has happened on the surface of a car 30 feet away then I do not see how there is not mediation there which leads from events at the car to what I see.

If, in this decomposition, one could name something which is not a part of the world then you might have a candidate for indirect realism.

I think it's harder to do than with internal/external, or with Cartesian assumptions. Descartes' philosophy is pretty lock tight if we want to favor it, and it even appeals to a lot of basic intuitions. It's almost like there's a reason we still talk about it! :D

A lot of where I'm coming from is in rethinking these questions at a philosophical level so it's not so much these facts that's at dispute: Rather, I can't see how we'd be able to tell the story about retina, photons, or brains without knowing -- rather than inferring -- about the world.

Else, "retina, photons, brains" are themselves just inferences about an experiential projection in a causal relationship with a reality we know nothing about, but just make guesses about.

The only problem with this view being that we do know things, so it falls in error on the other side -- on the side of certain knowledge which rejects beliefs which could be wrong, when all proper judgment takes place exactly where we could be wrong.

I am not sure I agree. Our experiences are a direct result of stimulation at sensory boundaries so I do not see an immediate biological or physical reason to suggest that artificial stimulations couldn't produce the same experiences in a brain in a vat scenario. Neuroscientists can already cause familiar experiences by artificially stimulating sensory receptors or brain cells. — Apustimelogist

There's a difference between being able to accomplish something, and knowing something.

I'd liken our neuroscientists to medieval engineers -- they can make some observations and throw together some catapults, but they do not know the mechanical laws of Newton or its extensions.

It's more because we're ignorant of how this whole thing works -- even at the conceptual level, which is why it's interesting in philosophy -- so I wouldn't believe it without more. I'd think the person was making some sort of mistake along the way, in the same way that I thought about the Google employee who thought that later iterations of ChatGPT are conscious.

I could just be cribbing from him. I read that book forever ago.

"Empirical" works for me. Mostly I just mean -- what would I believe, given what I know? A very limited case of "possible", but one we use.

Weekends and laziness put a delay on my reply, but I finally thought of something.

See, for me I do not see why it would not be the case for the brain to have the same experiences if the sensory inputs were the same. I don't think a body would matter either as long as the sensory inputs mimicked those it would have had from a body. — Apustimelogist

There's three kinds of possibility I want to distinguish: Logical, metaphysical, and a third kind that I'm having a hard time naming but "actual" works.

I have no argument for the logical possibility of the BiV.

But metaphysically it seems that the argument for indirect realism requires a distinction between an internal and an external world, or something similar. Every articulation seems to posit at least three metaphysical kinds: ipseity, mediation, and world. Somehow ipseity is given priority to world in the articulating of indirect realism.

Keeping with the notion that direct realism is the negation of indirect realism, the argument need only deny ipseity, mediation, or world. "Mediation" is what I choose to target. In a direct world "mediation" is covered by "activity" -- it's only by acting within a world that mediation can occur at all. In place of internal/external I'd put forward part/whole. We are a part of the world, and there is no thing which mediates between ipseity and world, or between part and whole. Rather, we directly interact with the world as a part of it -- the world interacting with itself, in the broad view.

In terms of actual possibility, though, that only requires us to take a survey of our knowledge at the moment, and our ignorance of the brain and experience and all that seems to justify doubt that were some scientist of consciousness to claim they have a brain in a vat which is experiencing I'd simply doubt it without more justification. It's entirely implausible that we'd stumble upon how to do that given the depth of our ignorance.

If you're familiar with Disco Elysium then I think this is a good album which Sad FM mimicked well.

I guess the main arguments against this is illusions and misperception. — Apustimelogist

Ah, sorry. (EDIT: just for missing this last question, I mean -- I looked over what I wrote and saw I posted before I responded here)

Yes, I think that's right.

Dreams, illusions, misperceptions -- why do those happen? If perception is direct then how can we be wrong about perception?

I think I'd say perception is an activity, and just like any activity -- like nailing boards or riding a bike -- we can make mistakes. These mistakes do not imply we are separate from the world, though, but rather that we are part of a world that interacts with us (disappoints us)

if you artificially stimulate sensory receptors of a brain with identical DNA to you in a way which is identical to the history of organic sensory stimulations you have personally encountered in your life, it will have the same experiences as you have had. — Apustimelogist

I don't think so, no. Maybe? but also maybe the only way to do so is to envat the brain in a body that lives a life.

I see it as a logical possibility, and possibly a metaphysical possibility, but not a real possibility.

What is your alternative? Through an extended mind framework where the mind encompasses the body and environment, etc? — Apustimelogist

Still thinking on it. :)

No alternative, yet. At this point I'm only convinced that something is real; hence, realism.

@Banno puts realism as the belief that bivalent logic is the proper logic to use for the subject at hand -- so if it is real then we ought to believe that the various rules of logic we use are at least bi-valent. There is a true and false and nothing in-between. Contradiction is forbidden.

In a plain language sense -- the keys are either in the car, or they are not in the car. So the keys are real because the affirmation and the negation are a tautology.

The implication being that the things that are not-real can use other logics. Such as a painting being both beautiful and horrifying. In a bi-valent we'd be tempted to say these annul one another, but that's not the appropriate way to put things. We can see the painting is beautiful yet horrifying, and so express that in a different logic from the logic of realism.

I mention this because it's a contender for realism that I'm still wrapping my head around, but it's definitely different from the old in/direct debate.

It dependa what you mean by object here. My instinct is to interpret object here as in some hypothetical object in the outside world. From my point of view, perception and myself are essentially not distinguishable. What you commonsensicallg would call your self are just sensory experiences pretty much imo. — Apustimelogist

"outside world" is the part I'd question. There is no "outside" world -- the old external world of philosophy -- just as there is no "internal" world, at least metaphysically. I think these are turns of expression meaning something other than the ontological implications -- that I exist, that I interact with my perceptions and only my perceptions, and these perceptions interact with objects outside of me that I make inferences about.

I don't make inferences that much about the things in the world.

Which, at least by my reading, means we'd get along -- I originally started by saying "What if we just are our perceptions?" to argue for direct realism, because then there'd be a 1-step relation -- I am my perceptions, and my perceptions are of objects, and therefore there's a direct realtionship between myself (perceptions) and objects.

I think the self is more than this, but I don't believe the self is homuncular, which I think indirect realism can easily fall into.

To be honest I am not entirely sure what direct realism means. — Apustimelogist

I started with something substantive, but the reason I put smilies on my answer was because it was a minimalist position which seemed to be similar to how @Michael framed indirect realism.

I would kind of agree with both but I don't have a strong opinion because I am disinclined against realism. I think the notion of indirect realism is kind of a functionally useful way of talking about the brain though. I feel like it is implied by models in neuroscience, even if minimally or if one doesn't want to attach too much metaphysical implication to it. — Apustimelogist

I think indirect realism is soft anti-realism, or at least the gateway to it.

I think you're right about the implications of neuroscience -- if all we take as our truths are neuroscientific truths then indirect realism is not a bad inference.

It's more upon the inspection of what indirect realism entails that doubt creeps in.

So you don't believe the brain in a vat could have the same experiences? — Apustimelogist

I think the BiV is a thought experiment that updates Descartes' Evil Demon to a scientific world. Descartes used theology because it was popular then, and I'm not familiar enough with the history of BiV's to say who, but it's basically an update to the Evil Demon since culturally scientific justifications are thought to be better than theological ones, unlike the time Descartes wrote in. Philosophically it's the same.

In that thought experiment the BiV has to have the same experiences. That's the whole idea.

But that does not mean that metaphysically perception exists in the head.

For my part I'm mostly criticizing indirect realism on the basis of what I see as its implications. The argument that started me on this path was the infinite regress argument against indirect realism: if perception is an intermediary between myself and the object, and all experience is perception rather than the object, then I'm not sure why there couldn't be another intermediary between myself and my perception -- a perception of perception.

And so on. It's not that we need to posit more intermediaries, but if not, then why are we positing the original intermediary? How many intermediaries are there? Is there a way to distinguish between them?

If so, then there could also be a way to distinguish between our "intermediate" perceptions and the object.

My thought is that the object is always more than what we perceive, but that doesn't mean that what we perceive is not real -- it could just be a direct link between me and the world that partially reveals the world.

On the more continental side I'd call it being-in-the-world. The object and subject come together as a pair.

(a couple of edits after the fact, sorry)

I've taken up the "direct" side, but only lightly. Others have been doing the heavy lifting.

All this affordance stuff is still going on inside our heads. We could be brains in vats artificially having our sensory receptors stimulated and experience the same things as if outside of the vat. — Apustimelogist

It seems to me that this is a primary point of contention.

I'd prefer "realism" over "direct realism" -- the "direct" part is more defined by the "indirect" explanation. It's a response to indirect realism rather than a naive assumption.

The indirect realist believes that experience is "in the head", and that if we were sufficiently knowledgeable then the brain in the vat is a possibility.

The direct realist denies this.

:D

A minimalist version of the thesis to ensure nothing can be attacked but the negation :D.

Well, what is the example you have in mind? Presumably you have an example that parallels the "wind"? — Leontiskos

The aesthetic might parallel wind here: there are gradients within the aesthetic. The beautiful and the sublime come to mind; and here these gradients need not have opposites but rather can be more or less relative to itself. And if you establish some kind of standard to judge more and less then you'd establish a gradient.

Though I had meant the example you presented.

I can think of more plausible examples that mimic the arbitrary nature of your example. The choice between regular M&M's and M&M's with peanuts seems morally arbitrary or amoral (not sure which phrase I prefer). We can have arbitrary rules that we follow and even though they mimic or can be interpreted within a moral dimension I'd say they're amoral actions -- outside the scope of moral thinking.

Yes, and the finger-crossing example was risky in that it is easily misunderstood. I was only trying to illustrate the role of susceptibility and negligence. It is (intentionally) artificial because no one holds that rule. Of course, there is a sense in which it is important to consider subjective moral evaluations (in part because conscience is always a moral factor), but I think we can leave that to the side for the moment. — Leontiskos

Ah ok. Hopefully the above example does a better job, then. It did strike the thought in me, at least!

Great OP.

I would have said your example of the person with the rule to not cross their fingers while urinating is a good example of a non-moral act in the wider sense you're talking about. It's not morally evaluable because it's not morally significant. So that leads me to objection 5.

Objection 5: Morality correlates to importance

Moral acts are important acts
Not all human acts are important acts
Therefore, not all human acts are moral acts

This is similar to Objection 2. I would respond by saying that everything someone does is something they consider worthwhile or worth doing. The simple fact that time is scarce leads us to try to use our time wisely and do things that are worthwhile.

On the other hand, not everything is equally worthwhile, and someone might use the idea of morality to denote those things or rules that are worth taking especially seriously. This is fine so long as we do not forget that there is no qualitative difference between more important things and less important things, for all things that are worth doing have a minimum level of importance. — Leontiskos

Along with objection 2 -- I'd say there are moral acts as you use the term, and non-moral acts -- or, rather, I think I'd prefer "activity" so as to encompass more than a singular act, but rather the patterns within a world.

But rather than saying "this one falls in the middle and so is neither good nor bad", I'm thinking that some acts simply don't fall on the spectrum. To use the light/dark spectrum as analogy, "wind" is real but has no brightness because it's a pressure gradient, rather than a light gradient.

But then when it comes to "What makes activity moral?", in the wider sense, I haven't an answer there. All I have is an example that seems troublesome, but you seem to bite the bullet with your example of the rule to not cross your fingers while urinating as morally evaluable.

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Part of me wonders here, though: Surely we can evaluate any action on a subjective basis of an arbitrary rule -- but that ability doesn't indicate something about moral life, just as your finger-crossing example doesn't really seem to, though it can be evaluated along a subjective rule.

I'm having a hard time articulating the difference into a proper theory though.