Though then that's a Some Protestants are Calvinists. Calvinists are Protestants (flipped it about in my head, I always do that)

Must an ethic obtain for all sub-sets, or can the set of sets have properties separate from the sets it contains?

That'd disqualify it from strict Calvinists (although, funnily enough, I'm reading a book going over some of this history right now -- has to do with Locke and the history of the work ethic -- and the reaction to the strict Calvinist doctrine actually took off because they somehow monkey-logicked their way into believing in both the importance of good choices and predeterminism -- the work ethic was very much still part of their culture. (it basically amounted to evidence that you were among the elect -- you're predestined, but if you're not even good then surely you're not elect!)

But one would conflict with the other, without sufficiently critical examination of the differences in the conceptions and principles by which each obtains its respective truth.

“…. it is only in this way that the doctrine of morality and the doctrine of nature are confined within their proper limits. For this result, then, we are indebted to a criticism which (…) establishes the necessary limitation of our theoretical cognition to mere phenomena….”

…and to be confined to its own limits just indicates, by extension, our own cognitive limits, relative to the possibility of experience of any of the objects of one or the other, science or morality. Experience being, of course, the final arbiter of empirical knowledge, all else being merely logical inference. — Mww

I agree with respect to theoretical knowledge. And you're right that this is the sort of conflict Kant mitigates with his philosophy: theoretical knowledge of science, practical knowledge for ethics (which surely must assume Christianity, he indicates at times).

But I think there's more to the use of practical reason -- and then more confusingly, later, the powers of judgment -- than inference alone. That's what the first CI is about, right? And I think the first CI is complemented by the 2nd CI, even though Kant claims they are equivalent.

The part I'm questioning at the moment is whether or not it's correct to call it protestant, after all. The connection and similarity to Pietism is surely there, so it's fair to say there's a Lutheran influence but it might generalize enough -- to say Buddhism, which I'm much less familiar with -- to not just be protestant, and obviously there are inward-facing Catholics too it might be unfair to get that specific -- perhaps I'm relying too much on Kant's particular religion to classify the ethics, even when it's filled out.

Is Pietism rational? From online: "... is a movement within Lutheranism that combines its emphasis on biblical doctrine with an emphasis on individual piety and living a holy Christian life." Depends maybe at first on what you believe, but later on what you grant and presuppose to be true, and how and in what way. Thus the rationality contingent on what the ground is and how it is determined. Nourishing? To whom, in what way, for what purpose? — tim wood

I'd say that, at least by way of my understanding of Kant, that Pietism could be rational in Kant's system insofar that one doesn't claim to have a scientific knowledge of it, but rather employs the practical power of reason which is at least a legitimate use of reason if not the same as scientific knowledge.

This a short answer. Is it enough? — tim wood

I'm more thinking on the 2nd critique than the first -- not that they are separable, but their topics are different. The questions of reason that reason cannot but help to ask about are all with respect to theoretical knowledge. With respect to practical knowledge they take on a different . . . uh.. . role? It's hard to generalize when already talking at such a level of generality.

So no -- the short answer is not enough! :D

sharing this bit from ye olde SEP:

The postulate of immortality is typically found alongside Kant’s discussions of the postulate of God. He regards both as necessary conditions for the realization of the highest good, though the function of this postulate undergoes a number of revisions through the Critical period.

(Also, that article opens with life details and highlights some concepts which come from Pietist influence)

Still plan on responding, but that's what I have time for this morning.

My own five-cent analysis is that Kant, whom we're told was brought up Pietist, at some point found it no-longer nourishing; yet finding some of it compelling, tried to reason out why it should be compelling. It being helpful to remember that he is among humanity's strongest thinkers, as well as a professional grade mathematician and world class in physics. — tim wood

Does being among humanity's strongest thinkers, professional grade mathematician, and a world class physicist indicate that Pietism is no-longer nourishing or rational?

And if that were so, why would Kant claim that it's important for practical reason, in general, to believe in God or the immortality of the soul, for instance? (the focus on the intent of an actor is also something important here -- something that fleshes out the choosing of maxims in the formal system)

If Kant doesn’t implicate his own religious background for the a priori pure metaphysics of his moral philosophy, why do we need to pay heed to it? — Mww

I'm thinking the Critique of Practical Reason here where he talks about the three ideas which cannot be known theoretically, but which -- for the summum bunnum -- must be assumed for a practical reason at all. Immortality, Freedom, and God seem to fit with the overturning of an authority in a church to put the authority in the person who wills. (which is the bit I got from thinking that Kant is protestant -- the centering of the subject over an authority)

Take this passage from the Critique of PurePractical Reason, where we can see some obvious Christian lineage in his ideas:

Now, this endless progress is only possible on the supposition of an endless duration of the existence and personality of the same rational being (which is called the immortality of the soul). The summum bonum, then, practically is only possible on the supposition of the immortality of the soul; consequently this immortality, being inseparably connected with the moral law, is a postulate of pure practical reason (by which I mean a theoretical proposition, not demonstrable as such, but which is an inseparable result of an unconditional a priori practical law.

It also makes sense of his insistence on truth-telling as a universal rule, I think: Whereas most would say sometimes expediency justifies lying, the universal nature of prescriptions gets along well with the Christian faith. (one of the reasons the "specificity" argument doesn't hit too hard for Kant's deontology, to me -- the one where you can make a maxim so specific that it can always be generalized. It makes sense according to the metaphysic -- but it goes against the spirit)

I think Kant writing Kant wanted Kant to be understood as a pure rational being, “….worthy to be a legislative member in the kingdom of ends….”, rather than a religious man. — Mww

Oh he certainly wants, and even demonstrates, that he is a rational person -- though I'm not so keen on pure rational being. But I think most importantly to Kant is that he'd assert that being a religious man is not in conflict with being a rational, scientific man. It seems to me that's almost a "in a nutshell" explanation of Kant: How to believe in both science and religion without destroying either. (OR, for thems who want to fight, while destroying both :D )

OK this was nice to read because it's giving me better words to what was kind of just a feeling that seemed to work for making sense of theoretical/practical belief, though kind of roughly parellel to what I was thinking.

I think recognizing its formal expression is important too though because I think Kant's deontology sets up existential thinking: to understand Kant as Kant writing Kant, we should pay heed to his religious background (and this "fills out" the formal ethic quite a bit), but looking at it as a formal system if all one needs to do is be consistent and wish everyone else would follow the maxim you can justify a bit more than Kant seemed to believe possible.

Oh, I posted it here because it was something of a half-baked thought, but I thought it interesting enough to still talk about.

I’d say this is pretty close to a Kantian ethical perspective, but I’d hesitate to call it Protestant. — Mww

Fair. Maybe it'd be better to say -- as I read Kant it seems his motivation for writing the ethic comes from that religious perspective, but he is, of course, attempting to universalize beyond his own perspective.

The thought came from a casual conversation I was having with someone who is not really into philosophy, but the analogy seemed to work to make sense of some of the ideas -- the person seemed to be struggling with the idea that one should believe in God but cannot know that God exists (talking Kant here -- the practical vs. the theoretical reason). My thinking on Kant is that while it's intended to be universal, it's still sort of the old Protestantism at heart -- while it's all rationalism and duty you are still free to pick your maxims. So, in a sense, it's the conscience that's the guide, though morality only comes from following our maxims that are in accord with the categorical imperative out of a sense of respect for the moral law itself.

It's like an inward-facing version of Rousseau's social contract: the necessary conditions for forming a moral society from the perspective of a rational agent choosing.

(though posting it here to see if it's a bad analogy after all)

I'd be hesitant to go that far, but you're right about him being a Pietist.

He believed in faith, but wanted it to also be limited by reason, at least by my understanding.

It's his belief, which he doesn't claim is knowledge or necessary but just how he sees things, that we must believe in those three things -- god, immortality, free will -- that makes me think he's a protestant.

Maybe Christian is better. It's more the focus on interiority and belief that made me think protestant.

Yes, there can be mistakes when copying genes — Truth Seeker

If so then @unenlightened's point stands: there can be no mistakes when copying genes since we are not intelligently designed by a God or a team of Gods.

:up: :flower:

British barbers regularly cut their clients throats instead and dispose of their bodies in meat pies, to avoid this sort of difficulty. — unenlightened

The USians contract it out and sell the meat pies to various NGO's funded by grants who distribute it to those "in need"

I second Tom.

I still read you, though often can't respond.

I know we disagree on much, but that, to me, is the point of being here: to hear others.

Such behavior would never be tolerated by Kant scholars!

;) :D


Honestly I think it comes with the territory of reading "the greats" -- they are great because they inspire thought, and you don't really have much of a choice on how much charity or skepticism you want to apply to the greats on a first reading, especially when their idiom isn't easy to comprehend. It's enough of a feat to make it explicitly coherent that criticism of the idea becomes less interesting than what the writing can inspire or which interpretation is better.

Anyway, connections, connections, and I'm planning on coming back to this thread properly shortly - when the planting season and decorating season is past its peak. — unenlightened

Hegel has been here for a couple centuries, give or take, so I'm sure he'll be around after the more important things.

I look forward to reading your posts and talking Hegel.

(Sticking here to the bits where I have sincere commitments)

Have you given examples? I searched for "wants to be" on the first five pages on the thread and didn't find any occurrences. — Leontiskos

Not with those words, no -- to be fair to you I'm trying to make a position mostly to understand the idea, so I'm changing my position as I go along; I'm engaged in a creative endeavor. I don't have some firmly worked out idea here, though through the game we have managed to touch upon some possible interesting avenues of conversation.

The examples I have in mind are the angry man with his friend who he pushes aside, the guilty man apologizing, and the penitent man.

a person who is surrounded by people who shame them can feel guilt for that particular thing and want to change, or they can feel anger and define themselves against that group, and perhaps they can feel both at the same time in roughly similar proportion (and this is where the sense of free will comes from). Each leads to a kind of articulatable ethic that justifies the choice

at least in the sense of using "wants to be". In the scenario where he acts on anger "X wants to be alpha", or perhaps something more personal like the person insulted his wife: "X wants to be defender"

Where he backs down "X wants to be friend" -- he's promised, and friends keep promises.

Where he's guilty "X wants to be accepted"

Either the choice leads to the ethic or attachment to the ethic leads to the choice. It can't be both, because two things cannot simultaneously cause each other. — Leontiskos

Why not?

Gravitation works that way. The earth pulls on the apple, and the apple pulls on the earth -- it's just the earth is bigger so it's a more noticeable pull, but they simultaneously cause each other to meet.

But you aren't appealing to his anger, you are appealing to the justification of his anger, like I said <here>. This is not appeal to emotion; it is appeal to something which justifies an emotion. — Leontiskos

I'm appealing to his anger. It's the right kind of anger. The words we make up after the fact notice the distinction between the right kind and the wrong kind, but the words aren't the appeal.

But this might be back to philosophy of emotions.

So you agree with me that your theory of emotion-subjectivism is not a (cognitive) science? — Leontiskos

Yes. I'd say that one can be a cognitivist without thinking that ethics is a cognitive science. I don't think ethics is a science.

To lay my cards on the table, I don't really want to argue over a thesis that you don't hold, especially when that thesis has no authorities to legitimate it. It doesn't seem to me that it will be fruitful. I would rather talk about a thesis that you actually hold, such as error theory or a theory of emotion or a theory of moral 'oughts', etc. It would be different if the thesis had philosophical authorities behind it, but I don't see that moral subjectivism does. — Leontiskos

Heh, fair. I'll stick to that then. Though it started to feel like I'd be veering off too far from the OP, so now I have ideas for threads. (being a lazy sort, we'll see how long it takes before one gets posted ;) )

I am basically arguing:

P1: Ss relate to Ps in manner R.
P2: All Bs are Ss.
C: Bs relate to Ps in manner R.

Although, this isn’t completely accurate...but the accurate version is what I gave.

If there cannot exist a relation between Ss & Ps and every B is an S, then it plainly follows that the same relation cannot exist between Bs & Ps. — Bob Ross

Mkay, that makes sense to me now.

But then it seems to go back to whether or not the subjectivist would accept P1, or your rendition of P2. While P1 is uncontroversial in a common-sense way, a philosopher may have a reason to endorse truth-coherentism, or a difference in domain between stances and beliefs to claim that P2 is false, and yet All B's are still cognitive for all that.

It seems that if the subjectivist is a correspondence theorist, and they accept P2, then they have an inconsistency. But is that inconsistency fatal to the overall idea?

In my experience, usually not. Though it seems this idea is eluding me.

It seems incomplete: independent...of what? — Bob Ross

I was thinking we can stuff all those details into the name "Independent" -- but I'm mostly just after the basic form because I've been missing it, which you provided in your follow up.

P1: ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ p) && ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ ¬p)
{ There does not exist any s and p, such that s is a stance about p and s entails that p is true; and there does not exist any s and p, such that s is a stance about p and s entails that p is false }

P2: ∀bp ( Belief<b, p> → Stance<b, p> )
{ For every b and p such that b is a belief about p, b is a stance about p. }

C1: ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ p) && ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ ¬p)
{ There does not exist any b and p, such that b is a belief about p and b entails that p is true; and there does not exist any b and p, such that b is a belief about p and b entails that p is false }

The rule of inference is from the existential and universal quantifiers: in short, if there cannot exist some relation for Xs and Ys and all Bs are Xs, then the same relation cannot exist for Bs and Ys. — Bob Ross

OK so...

P1: All B's are X's
P2: X's ~Relate-to Y's
C: B's ~Relate-to Y's

So rather than

All P
All Q

it's

All P
Some Q

(with a middle term relating them)

That work?

(And yes, the sentential form helped a lot -- I was struggling from the plain-language to the logic, and then I was struggling with the predicates because that's all beyond my actual education and only "gleaned" at this point -- usually I just translate predicates into single-variables or bound sentences so it's still propositional just not predicate. And I wasn't see the All/Some or the All/there-exists-a structure until you explicitly pointed it out)

P1: A stance taken on the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of that something.
P2: A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition.
C1: Therefore, a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false.


P1: ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ p) && ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ ¬p)
P2: ∀bp ( Belief<b, p> → Stance<b, p> )
C1: ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ p) && ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ ¬p)

Couple things to note:
1. The only part that isn’t just standard predicate logic, is that I am representing the predicate ‘stance’ with two typename arguments: position 1 is what is the stance and position 2 is what the stance is about (e.g., if s is a stance about p, then it is true that Stance<s, p>).

2. The transition, in sentential form, from a ‘something’ to a ‘proposition’ is implicit. As can be seen in the logic, it doesn’t matter if one sticks with ‘something’ or refers to specifically a ‘proposition’.

P2 is a definition; P1 is an assertion about the nature of a stance and how it relates to what it is about. — Bob Ross

How do you feel about this rendition:

All stances are independent
All beliefs are stances
All beliefs are independent

?

That makes sense to me.

I'm not sure what the rule of inference you're using in the formalization. It doesn't appear to follow to me.

The notes help though.

EDIT: Another thought I have is with respect to the domain. P1 seems generally uncontroversial -- our stances towards some proposition don't imply whether that proposition is true or false (although I think I'd carve out the weird sentences for other topics, like the Liar's). So a subjectivist could deny 2 on the basis that beliefs don't imply stances with respect to P -- the belief could be "Everyone deserves q", and the stance could be "As a member of Everyone, John deserves q"

The belief, in this case, while being clearly related to the stance, is different from the stance and so would not fall to the criticism that there's a contradiction.

It is not supposed to: 1 matches P2. P1 is more general: it is the major premise. — Bob Ross

OK, then maybe I'm back to saying it's an instance of begging the question, after all. :rofl: @Lionino

P1: A stance taken on the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of that something.
P2: A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition.
C1: Therefore, a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false. — Bob Ross

I'm (clearly) finding the argument hard to understand.

P1 reads like a definition to me. It defines that a stance-taken within the domain of true/false somethings has the property of independence with respect to that same something (be it propositions or objects, it doesn't matter -- just some true something and stance-taken)

P2 also reads like a definition to me. So in some sense it seems that the concepts, by definition, and through an informal logic, leads to C1. But what if we formalized a bit? How would it read? Syllogistically starting with "A" in P1 and "A" in P2 suggests that the major premise is "Some P" and the minor "Some Q", which is an invalid form.

How would you render it formally? Any logic works for me.

I'll keep it to this because it seems I'm not understanding so I don't want to go off on yet another tangent before I understand.

P1: A stance taken on the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of that something.
P2: A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition.
C1: Therefore, a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false. — Bob Ross

Rereading this argument -- your P1 doesn't match 1 from above it:

1. A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition; and
2. Beliefs make moral propositions true or false. — Bob Ross

"Cognitive" doesn't necessitate truth-independence. The Liar's sentence, for instance: we can think "This sentence is false", meaning we can cognize it, but the truth, or falsity, of the Liar's sentence is wholly dependent upon how we interpret the sentence.

That we can cognize fantasy and falsity is part of the difficulty with realism.

Also, another thought: What if the MS was a coherentist on truth? In that case beliefs fit within an inferential web, and that web just is what truth is, so they'd claim to be a cognitivist while stating that they do believe that beliefs depend upon one another for their truth or falsity.

Well I tend to agree, but you are the one claiming that feelings are truth-makers for moral propositions. :wink: — Leontiskos

I'm claiming that MS is consistent, at least, and making a steel-man attempt at making it plausible to its detractors. My pet theory is error theory just to put my cards out there, but I'm trying to think through the position and see if there's some way to render it coherent, and palatable to those on the other side as an example of the meta-ethic.

Capital-F Feelings are the truth-makers in this hypothetical meta-ethic. The sorts of examples I've given here are "X wants to be Y" -- the emotions arise because of the Feelings, to think of "emotions" as you do here:

Colloquially we have phrases to represent this, such as, "Do not be carried away by your emotions!" When we become pure patients, at the whim of our emotions, something has gone wrong. E-motions are moving forces which are meant to coordinate with our agency, not to override and destroy our agency. — Leontiskos

Feelings are attachments to people, things, ideals, propositions, states of mind, patterns, and, in some cases, morals. And I've also allowed that "Feelings" may be collective, in some sense, to accommodate things like legal and collective -- not just individual -- moral rules. It seems to me that this must be the motivation for the MS position because they want to retain that some moral propositions are true in the way that it's intuitively felt, but don't believe there is an objective science or something along those lines.

Mostly I'll be content with finding a coherent rendition, if there is one, that is accepted as an example by the OP.

If emotions are the things by which we are to know what to do, then what is the thing that tells us to not act on an emotion? — Leontiskos

Another emotion. Anger can arise from an attachment to a self-image as one who doesn't take any guff and being insulted. When a friend intervenes it can remind you of times you've felt guilt when losing your temper and help one to regain control.

Far from being separate from rationality I'd say emotions are part of rationality, so MS doesn't strike me as apparently incoherent. I'd claim that when Jesus expels the money-changers from the temple that he is enacting a rationality because his anger is justified.

Seems like an explicit thread on meta-ethics or the philosophy of emotion might be fun.

It's not an emotion, because emotions don't persuade, they overpower or incline. What I am assuming here is that the experience of the emotion is what constitutes the truth-maker. Of course the emotion-subjectivist could draw up an extrinsic map about which truths are "made" by which emotions, and that map might include, "Anger →
→
do not strike," but this is pretty weird given the fact that the experience of anger tells us to strike. Such a map apparently cannot be emotion-based if it is telling us to act contrary to emotion. (Anger is relevant because I do not think an emotion-based ethic would be able to restrain anger nearly as much as our common, rational ethics do.)

The point here is that whatever it is that establishes the hierarchy, it isn't emotion. Emotion does not do calculus. I am convinced that reason establishes the hierarchy, but I am content with the claim that whatever it is, it isn't emotion. This reduced claim seems sufficient to overcome emotion-subjectivism. — Leontiskos

We've identified a point of explicit divergence! :D

I see no problem in emotions establishing hierarchies on the basis of their intensity.

"Calculus" is confusing on my part -- I just meant in the generic sense where logical symbol manipulation or the operations of a computer are also calculus -- so it need not even be numeric, and can even be a philosophical calculus rather than something truly mathematical. Spinoza's Ethics comes to mind here.

I think this misses the point I have already made about emotion-as-sign vs. emotion-as-cause. To claim that ethics is just emotion-conditioning would be to reject ethics as a cognitive science. — Leontiskos

Isn't the MS doing that?

Though I wouldn't do it for the MS position, I don't think ethics is a cognitive science either. Another reason a meta-ethics thread might be interesting.

"I act this way because my emotions determine me, and my emotions are determined by the conditioning that my parents and society imposed, and their emotions were determined by the conditioning that was imposed upon them, ad infinitum." This is more a theory of emotional determinism than a theory of ethics, and as such it destroys the agency of the human being (as already noted). Ethics involves making choices, not just being pulled around by emotions. — Leontiskos

And another reason for a thread on the philosophy of emotion.

I don't believe emotion eliminates choice, for instance, so that'd be another reason I don't see the MS position as necessarily wrong.

There is causal confusion at play, here. Does the choice lead to the ethic, or does attachment to the ethic lead to the choice? I think the cognitive aspect of ethics is again being trampled, especially if the attachment leads to the choice. Plato would say that reason (choice, deliberation) can be subordinated to the passions, but that this is a form of passion-tyranny. — Leontiskos

Couldn't it be both? Even for Plato -- if one is ruled by Passion then one would choose a Passionate ethic, just as the one who is ruled by Reason chooses the rational ethic, yes?

But what is the "utterance" which can be reduced to, "One ought not lose their temper"? On your theory of emotion-subjectivism an emotion is supposedly translated into moral propositions of this sort, but I'm still waiting for you to cash out this claim that the emotion is the truth-maker for the moral proposition. Prima facie, the claim doesn't make any sense. What is the emotion that translates into the moral proposition, "One ought not lose their temper"? — Leontiskos

"I'm sorry, I won't do it again" or something like that works. The emotion would be guilt. The Feeling would be "I want to be accepted by my friends".

You worried that I am divorcing reason from emotion, but here it seems that you are the one doing that. You contrast four things with philosophy/the cognitive part and assume that they are devoid of reason: recognition, shame, anger, and relief. I don't think emotions are separable from reason in this way. See for example my analysis of fear <here>. — Leontiskos

If they aren't separable, which I agree with, then in speaking about the emotions I am also speaking about reason. They come as a pair.

Recognition requires reason -- I have to see myself, and I have to know what sort of person I want to be, and I have to see that I am not that.

Shame requires reason -- I have to want to please someone(even if that someone is only myself), I have to be able to perceive "good" and "bad" actions

Anger -- I have to be able to recognize a before-and-after of myself. The anger arises because you no longer feel the shame due to forgiveness, but it's a conflict between the old and the new self. One must be able to determine what that old and new self is, which requires a fairly robust set of moral beliefs with emotional attachments.

Relief -- The trial is over and I'll remember the guilt so as to not have to go through it again. This requires memory, a knowledge of narrative, and the idea that one can undergo some kind of change from the act to a person who is forgiven.


The reason all that requires reason is that a person can also, in the same situation, see themselves as justified in their anger, and the person who gets in the way is only an obstacle in the way of what's fair. That's not a friend anymore, that's a pesky and ignorant person getting in the way of what's fair!

Do you see how this isn't a divorce of reason from emotion?

Also... another thread here lol.

I think a shift is occurring here. Instead of trying to support moral propositions in the way that standard ethics does, the moral subjectivist turns to abductive ethical reasoning and combines it with the assumption that whatever best supports moral propositions, sufficiently supports moral propositions. I think the reason moral subjectivism is basically non-existent in professional philosophy is because it is recognized that even if nothing supports moral propositions better than attitudes, it remains the case that attitudes are insufficient to support moral propositions. In that case one turns away from moral cognitivism and classical ethics. — Leontiskos

Oh, it could also just be the hot new thing. You never know.

I just like to explore ideas, be they professional or not, though.

That would no longer be MS, would it? — Lionino

That could be, and @Bob Ross would be a better adjudicator since I clearly didn't understand the distinction up front -- I've tried to make the case to him that this would still count on the basis of the wiki articles criteria for MS since the truth of these propositions is still dependent upon the person's attitude in some necessary way while maintaining some cognitive component. Here thinking "feelings/world" is that our feelings being a part of us, and us being a part of the world makes the feelings, in some sense, a world-reference, though not in the usual straightforward way.

Reducing "oughts" to an is-statement about the speakers moral feelings, however their genuine ethic would define it, and an imperative, so that there is a "binding" part seems to cover the basis of true moral statements, cognitive, and subjective in that it depends upon attitudes (personal, legal, tribal...)

What establishes the hierarchy? What determines when the level of disgust is too high to be tolerated? — Leontiskos

I don't think we know that -- if so the statements would belike Hume's passions which come across as a sort of calculus.

But we don't have the calculus of attachment just yet. Your question is like asking people before Newton "What makes the planets turn like that?", where I'd be totally unqualified to even guess at it :D


Some people want to be better, some don't, some ethics don't even talk in terms of these hierarchies of disgust. In terms of meta-ethics I think that the particular articulation of an ethic is what will determine the hierarchy, though in reality I think the hierarchies are established by the clash of attachments, however that cashes out.

As a kind of story-example to get a gist across:

a person who is surrounded by people who shame them can feel guilt for that particular thing and want to change, or they can feel anger and define themselves against that group, and perhaps they can feel both at the same time in roughly similar proportion (and this is where the sense of free will comes from). Each leads to a kind of articulatable ethic that justifies the choice, so it really would depend upon whether or not the person is attached to this or that ethic if they speak the truth (under the rendition that ought-statements are nothing more than this reduction to an is-statement of attachment, and an imperative, which is what my next chunk is on) -- the MS would only have to find some way to attach any ethical statement's truth or false value necessarily to the attitudes of people.

If what are at stake are truly cognitive truths, then emotion itself cannot establish hierarchies or determine thresholds.

That depends upon what truly cognitive truths are.

If the truth of all moral language just is the day-to-day operations of living, though, then I think emotions are exactly how hierarchies are established. Fear, guilt, and shame are powerful motivators in moral codes, and they are reinforced by social hierarchies established by emotional attachments.

In our example the man wouldn't say "One ought not lose their temper" -- that's goofy as hell for someone to say when they are contrite or angry or whatever genuine expression towards an ethic, and a real person's utterance would express this proposition differently. "One ought not lose their temper" is the proposition which the utterance can be reduced to, for the purposes of making the MS position philosophically palatable, "I feel disgust when I lose my temper and I want to be a better person and everyone else shouldn't either" -- the creed after this can include things like "Because anger hurts others, and we are commanded to love others"

The redemption story is one of recognition, shame, anger, and relief. The cognitive part is all the philosophy, but the reason people seek redemption isn't because of the cognitive part.

It is reason which does all of this, and therefore reason is implicitly assumed in the background. The person who has a hierarchy of emotions has already gone beyond appeal to emotions.

How do you know?

I don't really know what a sentence like this means, and because of that I dislike the word "just." :razz: — Leontiskos

Sorry.

Looking at the wiki definition ---

Ethical subjectivism (also known as moral subjectivism and moral non-objectivism)[1] is the meta-ethical view which claims that:

(1) Ethical sentences express propositions.
(2) Some such propositions are true.
(3) The truth or falsity of such propositions is ineliminably dependent on the (actual or hypothetical) attitudes of people.[2][3]



3's the proposition under dispute for you, I believe.

So for any true ethical proposition the MS would try to demonstrate that its truth is dependent upon the attitudes of people, and the same with any false ethical proposition.

I think that the dependency could even include communal dependency -- resolving conflict would be an interesting place to explore for counter-examples of 3. I think the plausible part of the meta-ethic is that statements of ethics have practical, relational components when they are being followed so there is a sense, if all ethical statements are social creeds and nothing else, then the truth of them, if ethical statements are cognitive, would have to depend upon the attitudes of people because what else is there?

More simply, I don't think feelings are truth-makers for moral propositions. "I should smash this guy across the face." "Why?" "Because I have a feeling of anger." This is incomplete. The feeling of anger does not in itself make the moral proposition true. It may be true, and the anger may signal its truth, but it may also be false, and the anger may be a consequence of stupidity or error. The anger itself is not a truthmaker. — Leontiskos

I think any particular ethic can parse attachments into the good ones and the bad ones, and can parse any emotion into the positive and the negative. So in order for "Because I have a feeling of anger" to be judged as incomplete we have to have some basis of evaluation (which could be a system, or a creed, or a vague desire to be something else, or...)

But most ethics don't justify violence on the basis of anger at an individual. The attachments preached are love, loyalty, and so forth. Striking out of anger is usually shamed, unless there is some justification for the anger, so of course -- due to our attachment to "One ought not strike out of anger" we will follow that to its logical implication and also say to our risible friend "That's not a good reason, let's go cool off outside"

"P2: A feeling is a non-cognitive stance taken towards the trueness or falseness of a proposition." Again, I don't see how feelings have any more power to make moral propositions true or false than beliefs have. — Leontiskos

A feeling isn't a non-cognitive stance taken towards the trueness or falseness of a proposition. I think the concrete example I gave showed that -- since we're speaking in terms of meta-ethics "Feelings" can take on many interpretations within a particular ethic.

So an attachment to duty, for instance, may cultivate a desire to restrain oneself, or an attachment to family may cultivate a desire to be loyal and fulfill your family role. In each of these scenarios feelings will come into conflict with these moral feelings, but that doesn't change the meta-ethical frame -- any meta-ethical frame worth considering should be able to consider persons who are less inclined to be dutiful and persons who are more inclined to be dutiful, and everything else that's out there in the wild world of humanity.

The Moral Subjectivist would just claim that the truth of the moral statements will come from those who speak those statements and their truth or falsity of their various commitments: you can spot rational inconsistencies in any creed (the cognitive part), but the reason people enact them is due to some attachment, which can include a moral attachment like the example of the person who wants to get over his anger to become better. These sorts of feelings are just as much feelings as the ones which are more commonly named, in this broad use of "Feelings"

I don't hold that reason and emotion map to the objective and the subjective. — Leontiskos

Cool. I should have said that I don't think of reason and emotion in opposition -- I don't see reason or emotion as primary with the other secondary, although where you end that seems like we might agree there.

One way to access Plato's point is to note that an agent can marshal and include emotions within their agency, but someone who is dominated by their emotions is to that extent not an agent at all. They are a patient (hence, "passions"). To grant emotions autonomy in themselves is to have cut oneself off from the ability to distinguish a proper relation to emotion from an improper relation to emotion, and it strikes me as self-evident that there are proper and improper ways to relate to emotion.

I would think that the Moral Subjectivist could agree that being dominated by emotions is a bad thing, though.

Rendering Plato's point in MS for someone who struggles with temper, say: The MS beleives "One ought not act on anger" which means "I feel disgust with myself when I act angry, and I want to be a better person", and if they do, in fact, feel disgust with themselves in that moment and want to be a better person then "One ought not act on anger" is true when that speaker says it.

Given that it's an ought-statement usually the implication is that the speaker holds this advice for others as well, though I don't think that part is truth-apt since it seems to be more of an imperitive than a statement; but I see the rendition of ought-statements as statements about one's feelings about oneself and what they like to be as being plausible interpretations of moral statements, so it seems like I can see a plausible version of MS.
(EDIT: Comically, this reducing ought-statements to the conjunction of an is-statement of a specific domain and an imperative means that while we cannot get an ought from an is, we can get an is from an ought)

More generally: we are simultaneously agents and patients; the emotivist excludes the former and the rationalist excludes the latter.

I like your general statement. It seems to get along with the notion that reason and emotion aren't at odds, except you'd say that agents and patients aren't at odds.

I think we only become patients upon seeking a cure. Before that we may be sick, but we're not patients -- and I think that desire for a cure is an important part of any rational path to self-improvement. At the very least in terms of actually being successful in changing rather than listing things that we should be doing (but won't).

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P2 would be "A belief is a cognitive stance taken..."

and P3 would be "Feelings make moral propositions true or false"

The feeling is the non-cognitive truth-maker of the cognitive belief.

I'll try to be clearer and shorter.

Under moral subjectivism, the following is true:

1. A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition; and
2. Beliefs make moral propositions true or false.

These two statements are inconsistent with each other, and here’s a quick syllogistic demonstration of why:

P1: A stance taken on the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of that something.
P2: A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition.
C1: Therefore, a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false.

P3: Beliefs make moral propositions true or false.
P4: C1 and P3 being true are logically contradictory.
C2: Therefore, moral subjectivism is internally inconsistent. — Bob Ross

P1 isn't begging the question as much as it's how MS is being rendered -- the MS under attack believes that beliefs are true or false, and the value of T/F is not dependent upon another belief (or itself).

It's 2 that's inconsistent with 1, by the setup. The MS holds that beliefs can and cannot make moral propositions true. But it can be modified pretty easily by noting that 2 can be changed to "feelings/the world make moral propositions true or false", and then there's no contradiction -- at least as I'm seeing it now.

I think it's mistaken but not necessarily inconsistent. — Leontiskos

I'm less certain about it being mistaken, though that does not in turn mean I'm attracted to it either.

I'm still in the "playing around" phase.

I would want to say that emotion often reinforces duty, but does not cause duty. For example, a friendship implies duties to the friend, and there will be an emotional reinforcement of this reality, but it does not follow that the duty derives from the emotion. In this case you have a rational emotion, because it is reinforcing a true duty. But given that there are also irrational emotions, emotion is not the per se thing that informs practical reason. We legitimately act from emotion-as-a-sign, but not from emotion-as-a-cause. We should say, "This emotion probably signifies that I have a good reason to do such-and-such," not, "This emotion proves that I should do such-and-such." A key problem with emotion-based moral theories is that they fail to make sense of the fact that moral obligations sometimes require us to ignore the emotions at play. Going back to Plato, the passions are not primary; they should not constitute the charioteer. They are secondary, and as such can be well-formed or malformed. — Leontiskos

I don't like to separate reason from emotion in such a hard-and-fast manner. There's a difference, but it's more of a difference because we've marked it in English -- the Subjective and the Objective -- but I think there's too much philosophical hay made out of the distinction.

Neither the passions nor the mind are primary -- they form a unity that is the judger.

I took the tone of the thread to be serious — Fooloso4

Fair, I could be the one being too insulting here -- I like these exercizes, but I don't think the categorization of ethical stances is really too serious. Just kind of fun to think through.

Though every once and again I think the categorical exercise can help you trip across something you didn't think of. In a sense the "lightness" allows one to look at what we tend to think of in too serious a manner and look for its flaws more easily.

The original question you are supposed to be addressing is whether or not moral judgements are propositional, true, and objective; and not whether or not people treat moral judgments as if they are propositional based off of their desires. — Bob Ross

I'd say the position I'm forging here believes that moral judgments are propositional, true, and subjective.

"One ought X" means "I feel commitment to Y" (be it due to disgust or love, it doesn't matter, it only matters that there's an attachment).

So "One ought X" can be true or false on the basis of whether or not the speaker feels commitment to Y because that's all that "One ought X" means -- it may look like it's talking about these objective oughts, and due to being in the form of a statement it's true or false, but the statement is actually about feelings of commitment, and it also acts as a sort of imperative: Not only I feel, but because "One ought..." I also feel others should too.

The feeling isn't a proposition, but neither are red cups propositions -- red cups make "The cup is red" true, and likewise, under this rendition, feelings make "One ought X" true, so it fulfills the requirements of being propositional and true, just not being objective -- hence Subjectivism.

I am not following, I guess. Are you saying that moral judgments are propositional, but that they are made true by desires? E.g., "one ought not X" is true or false relative to whether or not "I desire one ought not X"? — Bob Ross

Yes.

If so, then that is plagued by the same issue: a desire about a proposition cannot make it true; and that's why emotivists reject that moral judgments are propositional---they have to.

I don't think the desire is about the proposition, though. In the abstract it's just a desire -- but the object of desire is not the proposition, but rather what the proposition is about. What justifies "One ought X" is that the speaker is sincerely committed to what the proposition is about -- it's the emotional commitment that makes it true, under this rendition.

So what say you?

What you described, is that a belief about a proposition can make that proposition true or false. — Bob Ross

The proposition is "One ought X"

The feeling is not a proposition, and since all beliefs are propositional, the proposition is not being justified by a belief -- the justification is non-cognitive, but the belief, that one ought X, is cognitive.

I think valence of value is confounded by many factors, such as, whether one 'likes' or 'dislikes' something to be valued. Otherwise, it may also depend on the inherentness of a quality or attribute to the ascription of value. Hope that doesn't sound too vague — Shawn

Nope! That helps. To summarize what I'm understanding:

Valence of value is known by liking or disliking or perception of intrinsic value or willing some value

Yes, well I don't have all the answers to your question; but, I can attempt to say that the study of value would lead a person to believe that what they value is in fact a good "thing."
On the contrary I'm hesitant to say that there's a direct correspondence between X and Y. So, what do you think about the association between X and whether it is intrinsically related to Y, as I'm getting hung up on intrinsic goods which have a strict relationship, and instrumental or extrinsic goods with a weaker relationship... — Shawn

I want to reformulate with the above now. I was confused and so wrote some confusing things.

Yet, I find it hard to believe that without knowledge of valence of value, how would anyone know how to appreciate or cherish the good? — Shawn

What if the good is different from knowing value?

That seems to be Petrarch's point.

The good layperson without that knowledge still cherishes good even without that understanding because they just are good -- it's a different sort of knowing from axiological knowing, even in the monastic sense.

If you take a glance at how transient happiness is, then the very notion of what one values would serve as a compass in the fleeting moments of cherishing and loving the good.

I think it does, but the question is -- do these values, or commitments, equate to a knowledge? Or are they just convictions?

I don't know that you deviated from cognitivism. You spoke of "a cognitive expression of feeling," which is a bit opaque but still prima facie cognitive. — Leontiskos

True, but I could see how I slipped from cognitivism at the beginning into emotivism at the end when going back and re-reading, so it was muddled and confusing. I think I'm being clear now.

My point was that whether we are talking about subjectivism (cognitivism) or emotivism (non-cognitivism), they both seem to fail for the same reason. — Leontiskos

I don't think they are truth-makers either. I just don't see how feelings confer moral obligations. I think the burden of proof is on the person who claims that their mere feelings establish moral obligations of some kind. — Leontiskos

Are you just playing devil's advocate, or do you actually believe that feelings can make moral propositions true? I mean, I don't usually say, "I wonder if I have an obligation to do such-and-such? Let me check in with Moliere's feelings to know for sure..." :razz: — Leontiskos

I'm playing with the idea, yeah, but I also genuinely doubt that the position must be internally inconsistent -- usually there's a way to accommodate criticism.

I think people take up duties out of emotional commitments to something or someone, and if they cease to have that emotional tie then the duty loses its appeal and what was a commitment becomes an ideal.

So, in a practical sense at least, our feelings are very important when it comes to moral propositions and maintaining duty.

I think the problem is that those who attempt to reduce moral deliberation to some set of self consistent propositions forget that what is at issue is not an abstracted analysis of the truth of moral propositions, but how our lives and those of others are benefited and harmed by what we say and do and think. — Fooloso4

How our lives and those of others are benefited and harmed by what we say and do and think is certainly more important to my mind than these exercises in categorization.

But we don't need to be too serious all the time, and there's something fun in the exercise, I think