P1. We are acquainted with the phenomenal character of experience.
P2. According to the naive realist, the phenomenal character of experience is constituted of distal objects and their properties.
C1. Therefore, according to the naive realist, we are acquainted with distal objects and their properties.
P3. According to the indirect realist, the phenomenal character of experience is constituted of mental phenomena.
C2. Therefore, according to the indirect realist, we are acquainted with mental phenomena.

Note that the term "mental phenomena" is impartial to property dualism and eliminative materialism.

Note also the technical term "acquainted", as described here.

And as explained above, for the phenomenal character of experience to be constituted of distal objects and their properties it requires that perceptual experiences "literally extend beyond the subject's head, to encompass what the experience is of". — Michael

I think I've managed to rephrase in these terms in my conversation with @Apustimelogist

And I believe I accept "literally extend beyond the subject's head" -- sure.

I'm not sure how else we'd be acquainted with the world unless our experiences literally extended beyond our head. Otherwise we'd only know our head, and infer that we have a body.

I think I am acquainted with my toes in the same way I am acquainted with my head.

A lot of people take this line, but it seems plainly available to deny that there's any necessity between awareness and experience. — AmadeusD

My thinking is that we're ignorant about any relationship between awareness (or perception) and experience, so we ought not believe people who claim to know until they demonstrate more. But, ultimately, if what I'm saying is true -- that we are a part of the world -- then I can't think of a reason why we couldn't, in principle, recreate the conditions. I just think we're ignorant now to a point where we're not even sure what would count as consciousness -- so there's a good reason to remain skeptical.*

In terms of perception I'd say AI demonstrates some of the more dry and functional ways of putting "perception", but I don't believe the internet is conscious for all that.

*EDIT: Also why it's a good topic for philosophy: It's not clear enough yet to be a science.

Well alright, but then I think I would be interested in whether you would think it acceptable for an indirect realist to call you an indirect realist, since you are not necessarily contradicting their beliefs at all as far as I can tell. — Apustimelogist

The indirect realist says that we are acquainted with sense-data, and that we only infer that there are objects from that sense data.

I believe we are acquainted with the world, which happen to contain objects.

Is that not different to your mind?

I don't see the contradiction in the idea that there are things that happen beyond our immediate perceptions which we create stories to try and explain even if we cannot definitively know anything in a perfect way. — Apustimelogist

I haven't claimed there's a contradiction. Indirect realism is logically possible.

Let's grant indirect realism: There are objects which cause experiences and the objects, while real, are not what we are directly acquainted with. Rather we are directly acquainted with our experience and make judgments about objects from that experience, and the so-called naive realist is ignorant of this fact -- so the indirect realist denies naive realism.

The motivation for indirect realism comes from various phenomena of perception such as dreams, hallucinations, and variance in discriminatory ability.

My thought is -- according to the indirect realist we can be in error about perception evidenced by the belief that there is some belief called "naive realism" that is false.

So how does the indirect realist account for error about perception, if not another intermediary?

To me it seems like it's much more elegant to simply say we can be fallible, and not come up with some metaphysical explanation as to why towers which are square appear round from a distance. Which to me indicates there's no separation between myself and objects, no experiential-film or sense-data that exists between myself and the really real objects -- there's just the familiar world that we can be wrong about sometimes.

I am not sure I understand. — Apustimelogist

Eh, no worries. I was on a bit of a tangent about how there's a more extreme version of the belief which just flips the indirect realist's priorities on its head -- no subject, only objects, and from these objects we make inferences about perception.

I really don't think its as complicated as you make out. The only way information gets into our brain and cause sensory experiences is by stimulating sensory receptors. The light hitting my retina is causing patterns of excitation at any given time. If artificially exciting them in an identical way did not produce the same results it would seem inexplicable to me. Why wouldn't it? To me that is an unnecessary skepticism. — Apustimelogist

I'd believe that if we recreated the conditions for creating perception then we'd produce the same results, but I don't believe anyone really knows those conditions.

I would ask whether *anything* could ever count as *indirect* under this view. — Apustimelogist

Well, I hope not. That's the idea! :D

Notice how it parallels the claim of indirect realism -- experience or sense data is what we are directly acquainted with while objects are inferred and judged. My thought is this is a conceptual distinction rather than a scientific one. I don't think it's a matter of knowledge as much as an interpretation of what we know.

I don't know why I'd prioritize ipseity over the object. In a way I'd be more tempted to say we have an indirect knowledge of ourselves more than we have indirect knowledge of objects. We make inferences about the kind of creature we are and we do so through the direct mediation of the familiar world. At the most extreme I'd say there is no knowledge to be had about ourselves, though I know where my car keys are all the same, and that seems a bit too much to me in the same way: conceptual clarity is achieved as the sacrifice of fidelity to our intuitions.

On the othet hand, if you think of the fact that we, as parts, can be decomposed into parts then there are parts which mediate eachother's interactions with the rest of the world... visual cortical states, sensory states on the retina, photons travelling in the air. I can maybe in *some* sense interact with patterns in the outside world but not without those patterns appearing on the surface of my retina through photonic interactions and then the correlations appearing in cortical states. If that information is about something that has happened on the surface of a car 30 feet away then I do not see how there is not mediation there which leads from events at the car to what I see.

If, in this decomposition, one could name something which is not a part of the world then you might have a candidate for indirect realism.

I think it's harder to do than with internal/external, or with Cartesian assumptions. Descartes' philosophy is pretty lock tight if we want to favor it, and it even appeals to a lot of basic intuitions. It's almost like there's a reason we still talk about it! :D

A lot of where I'm coming from is in rethinking these questions at a philosophical level so it's not so much these facts that's at dispute: Rather, I can't see how we'd be able to tell the story about retina, photons, or brains without knowing -- rather than inferring -- about the world.

Else, "retina, photons, brains" are themselves just inferences about an experiential projection in a causal relationship with a reality we know nothing about, but just make guesses about.

The only problem with this view being that we do know things, so it falls in error on the other side -- on the side of certain knowledge which rejects beliefs which could be wrong, when all proper judgment takes place exactly where we could be wrong.

I am not sure I agree. Our experiences are a direct result of stimulation at sensory boundaries so I do not see an immediate biological or physical reason to suggest that artificial stimulations couldn't produce the same experiences in a brain in a vat scenario. Neuroscientists can already cause familiar experiences by artificially stimulating sensory receptors or brain cells. — Apustimelogist

There's a difference between being able to accomplish something, and knowing something.

I'd liken our neuroscientists to medieval engineers -- they can make some observations and throw together some catapults, but they do not know the mechanical laws of Newton or its extensions.

It's more because we're ignorant of how this whole thing works -- even at the conceptual level, which is why it's interesting in philosophy -- so I wouldn't believe it without more. I'd think the person was making some sort of mistake along the way, in the same way that I thought about the Google employee who thought that later iterations of ChatGPT are conscious.

I could just be cribbing from him. I read that book forever ago.

"Empirical" works for me. Mostly I just mean -- what would I believe, given what I know? A very limited case of "possible", but one we use.

Weekends and laziness put a delay on my reply, but I finally thought of something.

See, for me I do not see why it would not be the case for the brain to have the same experiences if the sensory inputs were the same. I don't think a body would matter either as long as the sensory inputs mimicked those it would have had from a body. — Apustimelogist

There's three kinds of possibility I want to distinguish: Logical, metaphysical, and a third kind that I'm having a hard time naming but "actual" works.

I have no argument for the logical possibility of the BiV.

But metaphysically it seems that the argument for indirect realism requires a distinction between an internal and an external world, or something similar. Every articulation seems to posit at least three metaphysical kinds: ipseity, mediation, and world. Somehow ipseity is given priority to world in the articulating of indirect realism.

Keeping with the notion that direct realism is the negation of indirect realism, the argument need only deny ipseity, mediation, or world. "Mediation" is what I choose to target. In a direct world "mediation" is covered by "activity" -- it's only by acting within a world that mediation can occur at all. In place of internal/external I'd put forward part/whole. We are a part of the world, and there is no thing which mediates between ipseity and world, or between part and whole. Rather, we directly interact with the world as a part of it -- the world interacting with itself, in the broad view.

In terms of actual possibility, though, that only requires us to take a survey of our knowledge at the moment, and our ignorance of the brain and experience and all that seems to justify doubt that were some scientist of consciousness to claim they have a brain in a vat which is experiencing I'd simply doubt it without more justification. It's entirely implausible that we'd stumble upon how to do that given the depth of our ignorance.

If you're familiar with Disco Elysium then I think this is a good album which Sad FM mimicked well.

I guess the main arguments against this is illusions and misperception. — Apustimelogist

Ah, sorry. (EDIT: just for missing this last question, I mean -- I looked over what I wrote and saw I posted before I responded here)

Yes, I think that's right.

Dreams, illusions, misperceptions -- why do those happen? If perception is direct then how can we be wrong about perception?

I think I'd say perception is an activity, and just like any activity -- like nailing boards or riding a bike -- we can make mistakes. These mistakes do not imply we are separate from the world, though, but rather that we are part of a world that interacts with us (disappoints us)

if you artificially stimulate sensory receptors of a brain with identical DNA to you in a way which is identical to the history of organic sensory stimulations you have personally encountered in your life, it will have the same experiences as you have had. — Apustimelogist

I don't think so, no. Maybe? but also maybe the only way to do so is to envat the brain in a body that lives a life.

I see it as a logical possibility, and possibly a metaphysical possibility, but not a real possibility.

What is your alternative? Through an extended mind framework where the mind encompasses the body and environment, etc? — Apustimelogist

Still thinking on it. :)

No alternative, yet. At this point I'm only convinced that something is real; hence, realism.

@Banno puts realism as the belief that bivalent logic is the proper logic to use for the subject at hand -- so if it is real then we ought to believe that the various rules of logic we use are at least bi-valent. There is a true and false and nothing in-between. Contradiction is forbidden.

In a plain language sense -- the keys are either in the car, or they are not in the car. So the keys are real because the affirmation and the negation are a tautology.

The implication being that the things that are not-real can use other logics. Such as a painting being both beautiful and horrifying. In a bi-valent we'd be tempted to say these annul one another, but that's not the appropriate way to put things. We can see the painting is beautiful yet horrifying, and so express that in a different logic from the logic of realism.

I mention this because it's a contender for realism that I'm still wrapping my head around, but it's definitely different from the old in/direct debate.

It dependa what you mean by object here. My instinct is to interpret object here as in some hypothetical object in the outside world. From my point of view, perception and myself are essentially not distinguishable. What you commonsensicallg would call your self are just sensory experiences pretty much imo. — Apustimelogist

"outside world" is the part I'd question. There is no "outside" world -- the old external world of philosophy -- just as there is no "internal" world, at least metaphysically. I think these are turns of expression meaning something other than the ontological implications -- that I exist, that I interact with my perceptions and only my perceptions, and these perceptions interact with objects outside of me that I make inferences about.

I don't make inferences that much about the things in the world.

Which, at least by my reading, means we'd get along -- I originally started by saying "What if we just are our perceptions?" to argue for direct realism, because then there'd be a 1-step relation -- I am my perceptions, and my perceptions are of objects, and therefore there's a direct realtionship between myself (perceptions) and objects.

I think the self is more than this, but I don't believe the self is homuncular, which I think indirect realism can easily fall into.

To be honest I am not entirely sure what direct realism means. — Apustimelogist

I started with something substantive, but the reason I put smilies on my answer was because it was a minimalist position which seemed to be similar to how @Michael framed indirect realism.

I would kind of agree with both but I don't have a strong opinion because I am disinclined against realism. I think the notion of indirect realism is kind of a functionally useful way of talking about the brain though. I feel like it is implied by models in neuroscience, even if minimally or if one doesn't want to attach too much metaphysical implication to it. — Apustimelogist

I think indirect realism is soft anti-realism, or at least the gateway to it.

I think you're right about the implications of neuroscience -- if all we take as our truths are neuroscientific truths then indirect realism is not a bad inference.

It's more upon the inspection of what indirect realism entails that doubt creeps in.

So you don't believe the brain in a vat could have the same experiences? — Apustimelogist

I think the BiV is a thought experiment that updates Descartes' Evil Demon to a scientific world. Descartes used theology because it was popular then, and I'm not familiar enough with the history of BiV's to say who, but it's basically an update to the Evil Demon since culturally scientific justifications are thought to be better than theological ones, unlike the time Descartes wrote in. Philosophically it's the same.

In that thought experiment the BiV has to have the same experiences. That's the whole idea.

But that does not mean that metaphysically perception exists in the head.

For my part I'm mostly criticizing indirect realism on the basis of what I see as its implications. The argument that started me on this path was the infinite regress argument against indirect realism: if perception is an intermediary between myself and the object, and all experience is perception rather than the object, then I'm not sure why there couldn't be another intermediary between myself and my perception -- a perception of perception.

And so on. It's not that we need to posit more intermediaries, but if not, then why are we positing the original intermediary? How many intermediaries are there? Is there a way to distinguish between them?

If so, then there could also be a way to distinguish between our "intermediate" perceptions and the object.

My thought is that the object is always more than what we perceive, but that doesn't mean that what we perceive is not real -- it could just be a direct link between me and the world that partially reveals the world.

On the more continental side I'd call it being-in-the-world. The object and subject come together as a pair.

(a couple of edits after the fact, sorry)

I've taken up the "direct" side, but only lightly. Others have been doing the heavy lifting.

All this affordance stuff is still going on inside our heads. We could be brains in vats artificially having our sensory receptors stimulated and experience the same things as if outside of the vat. — Apustimelogist

It seems to me that this is a primary point of contention.

I'd prefer "realism" over "direct realism" -- the "direct" part is more defined by the "indirect" explanation. It's a response to indirect realism rather than a naive assumption.

The indirect realist believes that experience is "in the head", and that if we were sufficiently knowledgeable then the brain in the vat is a possibility.

The direct realist denies this.

:D

A minimalist version of the thesis to ensure nothing can be attacked but the negation :D.

Well, what is the example you have in mind? Presumably you have an example that parallels the "wind"? — Leontiskos

The aesthetic might parallel wind here: there are gradients within the aesthetic. The beautiful and the sublime come to mind; and here these gradients need not have opposites but rather can be more or less relative to itself. And if you establish some kind of standard to judge more and less then you'd establish a gradient.

Though I had meant the example you presented.

I can think of more plausible examples that mimic the arbitrary nature of your example. The choice between regular M&M's and M&M's with peanuts seems morally arbitrary or amoral (not sure which phrase I prefer). We can have arbitrary rules that we follow and even though they mimic or can be interpreted within a moral dimension I'd say they're amoral actions -- outside the scope of moral thinking.

Yes, and the finger-crossing example was risky in that it is easily misunderstood. I was only trying to illustrate the role of susceptibility and negligence. It is (intentionally) artificial because no one holds that rule. Of course, there is a sense in which it is important to consider subjective moral evaluations (in part because conscience is always a moral factor), but I think we can leave that to the side for the moment. — Leontiskos

Ah ok. Hopefully the above example does a better job, then. It did strike the thought in me, at least!

Great OP.

I would have said your example of the person with the rule to not cross their fingers while urinating is a good example of a non-moral act in the wider sense you're talking about. It's not morally evaluable because it's not morally significant. So that leads me to objection 5.

Objection 5: Morality correlates to importance

Moral acts are important acts
Not all human acts are important acts
Therefore, not all human acts are moral acts

This is similar to Objection 2. I would respond by saying that everything someone does is something they consider worthwhile or worth doing. The simple fact that time is scarce leads us to try to use our time wisely and do things that are worthwhile.

On the other hand, not everything is equally worthwhile, and someone might use the idea of morality to denote those things or rules that are worth taking especially seriously. This is fine so long as we do not forget that there is no qualitative difference between more important things and less important things, for all things that are worth doing have a minimum level of importance. — Leontiskos

Along with objection 2 -- I'd say there are moral acts as you use the term, and non-moral acts -- or, rather, I think I'd prefer "activity" so as to encompass more than a singular act, but rather the patterns within a world.

But rather than saying "this one falls in the middle and so is neither good nor bad", I'm thinking that some acts simply don't fall on the spectrum. To use the light/dark spectrum as analogy, "wind" is real but has no brightness because it's a pressure gradient, rather than a light gradient.

But then when it comes to "What makes activity moral?", in the wider sense, I haven't an answer there. All I have is an example that seems troublesome, but you seem to bite the bullet with your example of the rule to not cross your fingers while urinating as morally evaluable.

***

Part of me wonders here, though: Surely we can evaluate any action on a subjective basis of an arbitrary rule -- but that ability doesn't indicate something about moral life, just as your finger-crossing example doesn't really seem to, though it can be evaluated along a subjective rule.

I'm having a hard time articulating the difference into a proper theory though.

I'll push against the notion that Paul only spent so many years, tho maybe you could find a bit in the movie that proves it :) -- the movie felt more "thematic" and so didn't give details like that to my first watching. I just mean i didn't notice and liked how Stilgar was convinced because of the prophecy -- it wasn't the appearance as much as the neotenic boyish-man who refused the prophecy still fullfilled everything. Stilgar didn't care about the looks. He only cared about the truth-conditions of the prophecy, and even this nonbeliever met the conditions.

I only used the word "access" because it's the term Moliere used. He said "in terms of the epistemological problem of perception we have direct access to some kind of object". Given that he referenced the epistemological problem of perception I assumed by "access" he was referring to knowledge. — Michael

That works for me. I'd claim that we have knowledge of perception and we have knowledge of objects.

It seems, right now, that the difference might be more on the other side of the problem -- rather than "the world", what is it that is in/directly related to perception which gives knowledge of the world through inference?

My attempt to phrase your indirect realism:

I/we:Percepts:the world

Where ":" is "gives knowledge" "is knowledge giving"? might be better -- or "is related in a knowledge-like way"

Whereas the direct realist claim might be, and I'd be sympathetic to this:

I/we=percepts, which in turn know the world (and which we are a part of, and so can come to know ourselves and our percepts).

We have access to percepts. Percepts are often the consequence of the body responding to some proximal stimulus (dreams and hallucinations being the notable exceptions). The proximal stimulus often originates from some distal object.

The nature of our percepts is determined by the structure and behaviour of our sense organs and brain such that different distal objects can cause the same percept and that the same distal object can cause different percepts (e.g. the dress that some see as white and gold and others as white and blue).

This is indirect realism. Any direct realist who claims that this is direct realism has simply redefined the meaning of "direct" into meaninglessness. — Michael

We have access to percepts. And we have access to the world. It is through this access that we are able to determine when we are hallucinating or dreaming and when we are not.

So, direct realism. Both percepts and world are accessible.

Which means what? — Michael

The same as it means to perceive causes and effects -- one has to start somewhere. We can call that starting point "blotches of color", "cause-and-effect", "the cup", or any other such things. In terms of the epistemological problem of perception we have direct access to some kind of object, be it causes, cups, or color-blotches.

does experience provide us with direct knowledge of the external world? — Michael

Both direct and indirect realists are realists rather than subjective idealists because they believe that the existence and regularity and predictability of experience is best explained by the existence of a distal world which behaves according to regular and predictable laws. — Michael

Both the direct and indirect realist infers the existence of some entity from some effect it is claimed to have caused — Michael

I don't infer the existence of some entity -- I infer that there are causes and effects because I directly perceive the entity.

I'd also say there is no external world as much as a world.

I'd also say there's no "distal object" -- that this is a conceit of indirect realism.

***
I think internal/external has been already mentioned as a point we could drop, but you're insistent upon it when you say "external world", so I can't approach that angle.

Inference is the basis of your understanding of direct realism, so it seems we're just saying "yes/no" to one another there -- not exactly fruitful.

"Distal object" is a term of art that was invented for this discussion, but I'd say "distal" poisons the well in favor of indirect realism.
****

So I feel like there's a web of thoughts that are very different from mine, which are likely informed by philosophy, but I remain uncertain how to proceed.

Is direct realism a contention with inference, a contention with internal/external, or a contention with "distal object"?

You are one of these indirect realists, but are there others? Who ought I read to get a better picture?

:up:

Philosophically speaking I believe the desire to save the afterlife is more against the notion of philosophy -- living a good life with respect to the facts such that more of us can be happy, or some such thing.

And you're right to note that nonbelievers have sacrificed their life for an idea -- philosophically speaking: maybe we, as a species, could do better. No afterlife imaginaries there, simply the acknowledgement that you'll be over soon and you hope it matters eventually for the people you know.

Maybe, instead of a general "let's see who shows up" we could do something more limited and focused.

That'd actually be someting like Socrates' Cafe as we used to run it -- we'd try to come up with a question beforehand that seemed philosophical-ish but attractive, and then use that as a means to teach people philosophy through doing it together.

That's probably more fun than just saying "uhhh OK So what's up, huh?"

Here I think we're small enough, especially in terms of willing participants, we could probably even broach some fairly controversial topics just to generate interest. Existence of God, personhood, just war.... not sure exactly.

Finding the right topic would be the key, though, to having people actually participate.

. . .

Maybe even . . . in/direct realism. *gulp*

I liked it too. I just can't get into the main cast. Thimotee and Zendaya for main characters in a movie like this is just... — Lionino

Is there an actor or actress you would have preferred?

I'm not sure what I mean by "the first to capture the mood", but I did have a deeper emotional connection to the new film than the old miniseries, tho of course that's predicated upon being familiar with the books, the miniseries, and then coming upon this movie.

I really liked it a lot. The fist one more than the 2nd, but that's only cuz I had a few nitpicks on 2 -- overall it ought be watched together, like Kill Bill 1&2.

I will probably watch the miniseries eventually — Lionino

If you mean the Sci-Fi Channel miniseries I like it a lot. It's what inspired me to read Dune in the first place because I liked the miniseries so much.

It's a solid bit of storytelling.

This is a great intro to historiography. I especially like that he's using a narrative we USians are familiar with, but is not controversial in the political landscape to demonstrate his point.

:D

I thought it was great. I bought a popcorn so big I didn't finish it in spite of the length of the movie, and had a great time.

I think the new Dunes are the first to really capture my experience of the first novel. The focus on the emotive aspects through the creation of mood worked for me in 1, and it worked for me in 2 as well.

it should be comforting to know that one's beliefs and guesses about a potentially comfortable, earth-like afterlife are more likely to be correct than any given guess a magical supercomputer could make about a correct hell. If people know that, then there is less to worry about concerning what might happen when we die, and we can all focus on the important stuff. — ToothyMaw

One part of knowledge is belief. In order for someone to know something they also have to believe it, at least with respect to propositional knowledge.

That's what the "persuasion" part is about -- it justifies the belief such that a person is persuaded to believe it for such-and-such a reason.

But if a Christian believes in an eternal hell because this is what they learned at Church, and that's where you go to learn truths about the afterlife, and your argument is not persuasive, then they'll continue to believe in an afterlife that's not-earthlike, and thereby would not claim to know that earth-like afterlife guesses are more likely than non-earthlike ones. They'd claim to know, instead, that hell is an eternal torture, and you ought not do the bad things else you'll go there. (Basically, the magic supercomputer won't come into their reasoning at all -- it seems like a diversion from the truth)

Is it not the case that Camus and Nietzsche, start with nihilism, more or less as foundational - there is no inherent meaning, value or purpose - and then devise a response to this, which is essentially subjective or personal? Maybe I'm the only one who thinks this, but no matter what one does to rehabilitate the implications of nihilism, it remains in some way a nihilist project. — Tom Storm

I don't think they start there as much as reject nihilism -- but I'd still interpret them, personally, as meta-ethical nihilists. But I'm kind of mix-and-matching here -- meta-ethical antirealism is a very analytic position, and in analytic philosophy you often try to strip terms of their emotional valences in order to set out a clear set of logical relations between propositions so they can be evaluated.

Neither Camus or Nietzsche wrote in this style, so I'm kind of introducing an interpretive device to their works in calling them meta-ethical nihilists -- I think it's the appropriate categorization, but it's not the categories which Camus or Nietzsche are using.

For Nietzsche it's Christianity and its attendant slave-morality, in light of the death of God, that brings about the most decadent kind of nihilism. Even though his project is descriptive here I can't really read Nietzsche other than preferring master-morality over slave-morality, given his general criticisms of all the examples of slave-morality he puts forward.

That master-morality preceded slave-morality, and so in a way you can read Nietzsche as restoring the good, old religion in the face of the decadent religion of the last man: Though what he calls "good" isn't what Christian's call "Good", obviously, and has more to do with aristocratic self-overcoming in their pursuit of power to a point of overcoming even the overman -- the overman overcomes himself.

So meta-ethically I'd still classify him as a moral antirealist because he's not really the sort to propose true moral propositions -- but that's not the sort of nihilism he's rejecting either.
****

With Camus I think he considers the possibility of nihilism because of the absurd encounter, and begins with the only question that one need answer in light of the absurd: to kill oneself or not. But then through the process of thinking that question he arrives at a position where that even if there are no values (or God) suicide is not permitted at a logical level -- which seems to me to count as a pretty strong ethical belief.

For him there's the possibility of nihilism, the absurd encounter, but then heroic rebellion and acceptance of the absurd is the logical conclusion one should follow rather than the path of suicide -- a kind of ultimate nihilism where nothing matters, even subjectively, and so one kills oneself to escape the inescapable nothing.

****

So given all that I'd say yes, you're right, but there's more, and thanks for the prodding because it's helping me to think through these authors and try to make some distinctions in drawing out a "map"

I agree with you. However, Fooloso4's points about the way she makes her point are also important. The issue crops up all the time in reading texts from the past - and the present. Her ideas about marriage, family, maturity were pretty much conventional, though not uncontested, at the time and still exist. We need to be able to acknowledge both sides of this, though I haven't worked out how to do so properly. — Ludwig V

Nice.

I feel the same.

Including how to work out these points properly. The "meat" of the sandwich-article, to interpret the speech that way, was what I mostly skipped over and @Fooloso4 has criticized well.

Yes, they are linked to each other. Well, those approaches have a common concern and the latter is life. I also have my problems with discerning each of them. Sometimes, they feel closer than separated. Nonetheless, I still remain with the same thought that existentialism cares more about life than nihilism or other types of absurdism. If we compare different texts, I guess the differences are apparent. — javi2541997

Cool.

I have more positive feelings towards absurdism than the thread has so far expressed. I'm a lover of Camus -- at least what I've read, and I think he's the only one I'd say is an absurdist as opposed to an existentialist (though I'd classify him as an existentialist, in a historical sense)

This is very interesting! :smile: And we could spend hours and hours debating on this topic. Yet I think it is plausible how a text by an existentialist suffers from despair about doubting what is the right way to act. While a nihilistic jokes about this. — javi2541997

That's insightful! Though Nietzsche, with The Gay Science, would be an obvious example to bring up in terms of how you parse him into those categories. He can be read as both at once, or neither: he's no nihilist as much as an anti-nihilist, and is joyful in the meta-ethical anti-realist sense that @Tom Storm expressed (at least as I understand him), and uses that joy to counter the sad and somber nihilism that he associates with Christianity(socialism, etc.)

The notion of "suffering" makes sense as a uniting theme, even if there are more joyful existentialists (or, if we prefer, post-existentialists -- thinking Derrida and Levinas now more than categorical classifications)

Both K and N explicated some kind of doubt about what we believe we're doing and why, and the latter existentialists -- so I interpret them -- attempted answers to those questions. In this sentence I mean "existentialists" in the historical sense, rather than philosophical sense (the group of people we usually associate with the word, and the interpretations of their works)


Well -- that's enough rambling for now.

Yup. This speak to my doubts, though I'm trying to be as charitable as I can.

Oftentimes beliefs in an afterlife are harmful to this life; if you believe your kid will go to hell for sinning then you'll not care so much about the happiness of the kid in the here-and-now, but the long-term afterlife future -- and so they'll need to be taught, even if they are made unhappy by the teaching, how to behave properly. (Justification for all sorts of emotional manipulations that will yield the correct beliefs and behaviors)

And oftentimes a belief in an afterlife causes anxiety more than it helps anxiety -- especially because the belief does nothing to alleviate the fear of death. Most fear death regardless of their beliefs, yet people will also go against what makes them happy in order to appease the afterlife (and so they get both the anxiety of death and the anxiety of not doing the right things to alleviate death).

Though I think I'm preaching to the choir here.

You presume that I am trying to persuade people to believe in a certain account of what the afterlife is. What I might try to persuade people of is more specific, such as: you are more likely to be correct in guessing at whatever earth-like afterlife you might believe in than believing that there is a correct unknowable hell that might ever be guessed. People who believe in unknown hells might reconsider their beliefs with this knowledge - or so I hope. — ToothyMaw

Yes, I presume so.

I suppose I'm not the target, then, and I'm sorry for causing you frustration. I was just stuck on that point.

Honestly, I do not know what comes first. I think ethics is a very relevant element in existentialism, but I don't know which is the proper approach, whether ethics, metaphysics, or meta-ethics. — javi2541997

I think these interlink.

A metaphysic often implies an ethic, and vice-versa.

I've been chewing on how to write out a "map" of existentialism/nihilism/absurdism, at least for myself -- because I believe I have a grasp of these intuitively but I don't know how to make that grasp explicit.

I think said map would probably include all three when we make it explicit, though. And probably changes a bit depending on which authors we are considering, or emphasizing (or the readings of authors we are emphasizing, in the case of some)

Would you agree that if an earth-like afterlife exists, we could indeed make guesses at its contents? — ToothyMaw

Yes.

Your issue with my assertions about useful, relevant predictive models existing is that I am presuming that earthly events that can be logically connected have no particular reason to occur in the afterlife. — ToothyMaw

Yup, that's pretty much my contention.

If I grant the premise then sure I see a basic modus ponens and the logic works fine.

I suppose my thought now is -- OK, so what?

And what I meant was that my argument would hold if it were the case - and if it weren't the case, I grant that my argument would be faulty or incoherent. This is clearly a red herring. — ToothyMaw

M'kay. Then I think I've been misunderstanding you and just stuck on the part after -- let's grant the logic. Why would I believe it to be the case at all? If there's no reason then sure the argument works, but only at the level of a modus ponens rather than at a level that would persuade people who believe the afterlife to be different.

M'kay. And my bad on calling The Rebel a novel. You're better read than I in that case.

I have read The Myth of Sisyphus a lot though.

I suppose that's why I'd say he's more than a metaphysical thinker -- based on that reading.

I did not say "infinite" but rather "potentially infinite", which is different insofar as I when I use that term, I am denoting a set of unique events that are effectively unbounded in number, while if I said "infinite unique events" that would clearly correspond to the concept you are right to be wary of. I do not believe I have set up any antinomies, as I have made no references to anything actually being infinite apart from the potential different ways to be made to feel pain in an unknowable hell - but that is definitional and, thus, essential to any considerations of unknowable hells. — ToothyMaw

No I don't think you've set up antinomies -- I just mean any use of "infinite" in a philosophical argument -- "potentially infinite" would count from my perspective. Outside of mathematics it's a pretty fuzzy term. (EDIT: I ought say that I don't believe this means we should never use it outside of mathematics. Levinas uses "infinite" at times, and I think it works. But it's not like he's making analogies to calculus with it either)

The part where you seem to be relying upon the mathematical notion is where you say:

a perfect selector is selecting from a potentially infinite number of unique events to form guesses at an UH (unknowable hell), and the chances of guessing the right combination from this potentially infinite set of unique events approaches zero. — ToothyMaw

We can take the limit of a function as it's variable approaches some number, and sometimes we can take the limit of a function as it approaches infinite.

But how is that applicable to guesses being right? Are guesses a function?

The way I see it we either say something true, false, or nonsensical when making assertions about the likelihood of things.

So we can truthfully say "If I push the boulder it will likely roll down the hill" -- that's a true sentence. "Likely" here is not the "likely" of probability, but an assertion that, as long as we understand the situation correctly, then this is what is going to happen. It could be the case, perhaps, that the boulder is too heavy for me to push it and it does not roll down the hill. But we could still retain the belief that "If I push the boulder it will likely roll down the hill" as true, perhaps because we've pushed many boulders down the hill before and we just didn't realize that this one was particularly heavy (or, perhaps, not even a boulder -- but a boulder-looking jut)

A good guess isn't about evaluating the chances of being right. I'd say it's based upon what we know.

When we know about stuff we can make predictive models -- no problem. But when we don't I have a hard time judging one or another prediction as better or worse. On what basis? Why?

While the afterlife is essentially noumenal by virtue of us not being able to directly ascertain its details with our senses, that doesn't mean that what we can ascertain could never occur in the afterlife, or that phenomenal attributes perceivable in this life could not correspond to it. In fact, I argue that it is possible that we can predict some of these attributes, and I'll address your contentions about it further on in this post. But you are, at this point, making an argument against predictive models, not just predictable afterlives; just because we don't, or can't, know for sure, what is actually correct, doesn't mean no good guesses at what might be correct exist. — ToothyMaw

I'm more arguing for when a predictive model is appropriate. Sometimes they are appropriate, and sometimes they aren't. One of the times they aren't is when we know nothing on a subject. It's not so much that there's an infinite amount of possibilities here as we are simply unable to adequately create a predictive model.

It could be the case that an afterlife exists, that said afterlife is earthlike -- but that "could" is also true of an afterlife that is not-earthlike. Here I'd de-emphasize the "hell" aspect and focus more on the "afterlife" aspect. Since we are ignorant about the afterlife we cannot say which guesses are better. What we believe could be true, but we lack justification, and so cannot claim to know.

At least, this is my perspective.

***

If there is an event in this life that is logically related via its content to other events, and the content of that event does not change if it happens in an earth-like afterlife, then we know that the logical connections between that event and others that are similar in this regard are the same as they would be on earth, and we have no reason to think otherwise; therefore, if certain events on earth can be predicted via these kinds of logical connections, they can be predicted similarly in an earth-like afterlife — ToothyMaw

I can grant all of this.

I'd be a little picky in other contexts with respect to "logic", but right now I'm just trying to wrap my head around what you're saying and I understand and have little problem here.

That leads to my conclusion that, given these kinds of earthly events occur in the afterlife, certain combinations, based on the transcendent logic according to which the events are related, are more likely than others. — ToothyMaw

It's the "given these kinds of earthly events occur in the afterlife" that's snagging me, though now I think it doesn't matter to you whether or not they do?

I suppose I'd say a good guess has a chance at being true -- that is, if we make a good guess about the afterlife, and that good guess happens to be correct, then we'd also be saying what happens in the afterlife.

But I would not agree with the supposition "these kinds of earthly events occur in the afterlife".

We can make that claim because a perfect selector is selecting from a potentially infinite number of unique events to form guesses at an UH (unknowable hell), and the chances of guessing the right combination from this potentially infinite set of unique events approaches zero. — ToothyMaw

How do we know that?

Using "infinite" in a philosophical argument is always a red flag to me: it's easy to set up antinomies with respect to infinite space and time, for instance, as Kant explored.

It's his exploration of the question of the afterlife, in particular, that I'm drawing inspiration from.

He persuades me that such things are unknowable, and so we're free to say anything we like for as long as we like about the afterlife -- we will never know anything about the afterlife while alive in any sense. It is noumenal. We can believe in it for practical purposes, and a reality is, thereby, created by people living together in a community with similar beliefs about the afterlife, but that's not the same thing as to make claims on what makes a good guess on what the afterlife is like.

For instance, while I believe there is no such thing, I'm being careful in my replies here to claim I know there is no afterlife. (Though, surely, because I believe there is no afterlife, I'd contend that all guesses at an afterlife are simply false -- no probability involved).

***
That is all by way of trying to explain where I'm coming from for communication purposes.

I reread your OP, and thanks for pointing out the relevant paragraph so I can focus in on something.

when certain events occur on Earth, they are often followed by other events as reflected by consistent logic determined by the content of those events. For instance: if we mandate a vaccine for everyone in the US, we can expect a reactionary response characterized by vast protests and a general denigration of the medical apparatuses in place. This is because many people view it as a challenge to their autonomy, which is a consistent gripe. There is a clear logic to what might trigger that kind of complaint - in this case being injected against one’s will - and I can only imagine that the logic behind it would apply to a similar schema in an earth-like afterlife. If it would, then we know that certain combinations of certain types of events in the afterlife are more likely than others. I hope that isn't too reductive; I’m not saying we can extrapolate indefinitely far or even far at all from a given event, but rather that they might be able to be connected locally according to some inherent logic. Think something like Marxist critiques but in areas other than history. — ToothyMaw

Let's try to break this paragraph out into a syllogism or at least an informal listing of propositions which imply one another in some informal fashion.

1. when certain events occur on Earth, they are often followed by other events as reflected by consistent logic determined by the content of those events.

(Example to support 1)

2. There is a clear logic to what might trigger that kind of complaint - in this case being injected against one’s will - and I can only imagine that the logic behind it would apply to a similar schema in an earth-like afterlife.

When you say "the logic behind it", I read "the logic behind that kind of complaint", so it reads "There is a clear logic to what might trigger that kind of complaint, and I can only imagine that the logic behind that kind of complaint would apply to a similar schema in an earth-like afterlife"

3. If it would, then we know that certain combinations of certain types of events in the afterlife are more likely than others.

Which I'm reading as an enthymeme, so the implied premise is "it would", and therefore by modus ponens: we know that certain combinations of certain types of events in the afterlife are more likely than others.



Can you justify "it would" in premise 3?

Also, can you justify the analogy between government policy and potential afterlives? Why should the logic between those be the same? The logic for the afterlife that I'd choose is the logic of fiction: Bilbo Baggins is a Hobbit, and it's true because that's what the story says.

I think I'd put Camus' answer differently. Though perhaps this is part of the disconnect in the conversation between nihilism, existentialism, and ethical or metaphysical thinking.

I'd say Camus answers the absurd with heroism. It doesn't matter which role you take on, but this is still a deeply ethical thought about the world we live in: what do we choose in the absurd world?

The opening of The Myth of Sisyphus...

There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that
is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to
answering the fundamental question of philosophy. All the rest—
whether or not the world has three dimensions, whether the mind
has nine or twelve categories—comes afterwards. — Camus

And -- here's a quote from Camus in the preface to The Myth of Sisyphus to back up where I'm coming from:

For me “The Myth of Sisyphus” marks the beginning of an idea
which I was to pursue in The Rebel. It attempts to resolve the
problem of suicide, as The Rebel attempts to resolve that of
murder, in both cases without the aid of eternal values which,
temporarily perhaps, are absent or distorted in contemporary
Europe. The fundamental subject of “The Myth of Sisyphus” is
this: it is legitimate and necessary to wonder whether life has a
meaning; therefore it is legitimate to meet the problem of suicide
face to face. The answer, underlying and appearing through the
paradoxes which cover it, is this: even if one does not believe in
God, suicide is not legitimate. — Camus

Which also backs up your account -- that these writers are using an old philosophical conceit to write philosophy which is for the times and in response to their times.

Cool.

You list the novels. But have you read the essay The Myth of Sisyphus? That's where I'd draw from to point out his ethical thinking.

Are you referring to an unknowable hell or a hellish, earth-like afterlife here? If we are talking about an earth-like afterlife: I totally concede that an earth-like afterlife could be hellish, so that might be a misunderstanding. If we are instead discussing an unknowable hell in which cause and effect doesn't break down, then you are wrong: my argument is about guessing, and it doesn't say that the afterlife is not, or could not be, an unknowable hell just because the right one is virtually impossible to guess, but rather that we are much more likely to be right when we guess at an earth-like afterlife. — ToothyMaw

I'm referring to any hell at all, earth-like or otherwise. It's the part where you say "We are much more likely to be right..." that gets me. I just don't understand how we could make that claim.

I'm not sure what your position is, really, so I don't know what it would mean if you did move. Is it just that since there is no evidence for any afterlife we can't have better or worse guesses at it? — ToothyMaw

More or less, yup.

Only experience justifies knowledge, we don't experience after-life, and so we have not justification to claim knowledge about the afterlife. For less esoteric topics I'd be more willing to give leeway, but for claims about the afterlife I'm less inclined to grant charity because there are so many divergent accounts of the afterlife that cannot all be true, and people tend to insist that their version of the afterlife must be true in spite of this.

I'd extend this skepticism to guesses about the afterlife: it seems to me that the only way to find out is by dying. So since I am not dead I cannot say much about it. And if I were dead I couldn't say much about it either. So there's just not a good guess either way.

Did you read the OP? I specifically say that we could form predictive models for what could be the case in the afterlife from observing the relations between events in this life. — ToothyMaw

I did, though there are parts I scratched my head at :D -- it's pretty long.

You say we can form predictive models about the afterlife from this life, yes. But that's the claim I'm questioning. It doesn't seem to me that we can because we'd have to die in order to do so, and after we die we couldn't make many claims.

This is interesting. Existentialism comes in various forms, including Christian existentialism. But isn't existentialism of the secular variety built upon similar notions as nihilism? The absence of meaning. Nihilism holds that life, existence and reality itself are devoid of inherent meaning, purpose, or value. It rejects the notion of any objective significance or ultimate truth. Existentialism tends to identify same lack of meaning and then moves in to fill the void. — Tom Storm

Yes, I think there's a dialogue there, but a distinction.

I would often consider myself to be a nihilist. But I don't tend to see this approach as one of destructive apathy, or assertive repudiation, rather a more cheerful springboard to make decisions about what choices you will make and what you will do. I would not consider myself to be an existentialist.

Heh OK fair. I'll eat my words, then, because now that you say this I feel like I know what you mean, but I'd also say this isn't the position I had in mind. I was thinking more along the lines that nihilism is the end of value, and value is desired -- a kind of negative nihilism? Basically an extreme position that people wouldn't find attractive, but can serve as a conceptual benchmark.

EDIT: Though I'd still stand by my comment that Camus is no nihilist, I think, even of the sort you put here. I don't think a joyful springboard is what comes to mind when I think of Camus, but more of a resolute hero.