Let's take the tetrapharmakos:

The Gods do not care about your life (so do not try and appease them with your actions)
There is no afterlife (so live the life you have, and not for a life hereafter)
What is good is easy to get (all you need are the basics to be happy)
What is painful is easy to endure (so you need not worry about the diseases you might experience later)

A simple enough set of beliefs meant to target what Epicurus saw as sources of anxiety in people's lives.

But one that only makes sense if you want to be happy, first and foremost. You have to care about living a tranquil and happy life in order for it to matter at all.

And it may sound strange, but not everyone seems to care about that. The choice remains, and people frequently choose unhappiness over happiness. I think Epicurus points out some of the ways in which we can hedge that choice off -- and, if we're dedicated Epicureans, the cure is more important than what some other person wants or wills.

But surely you see how people make choices other than an Epicurean life. Seems to me the diversity of choices, of ethics, makes the question make sense: you can say this will bring you happiness, but is that happiness good?

Sometimes, yes. Actually, almost always yes, given my perspective.

But one can be lulled by sweets and feel good while living badly, I think. What else to make of a person who owns people and lives blissfully, for instance?

I think it shows itself to be relevant, but I'm fine with dropping it for now.

Explain how is the following not an instance of moral realism (i.e. ethical naturalism)
What you find [harmful], do not do to anyone.
— Hillel the Elder — 180 Proof

I'm fine with this counting as moral realism and ethical naturalism. My charge is that moral realism nor ethical naturalism are ultimately helpful in making decisions -- Moore's open question argument still works, even dropping fact/value.

It wouldn't be the first time on this forum, or for myself. :)

I'll give a direct response instead.

I don't know what you mean. What "fact/value distinction"? There aren't any value-free facts for a naturalist (of my persuasion). For instance, suffering (e.g. harm, deprivation, bereavement, etc) is a functionally disvalued fact, no? — 180 Proof

It is.

“Can we actually 'know' the universe? My God, it's hard enough finding your way around in Chinatown. The point, however, is: Is there anything out there? And why? And must they be so noisy? Finally, there can be no doubt that the one characteristic of 'reality' is that it lacks essence. That is not to say it has no essence, but merely lacks it. (The reality I speak of here is the same one Hobbes described, but a little smaller.)” — Joshs

What is this from? I want to know more! :D

I don't know what you mean. What "fact/value distinction"? There aren't any value-free facts for a naturalist (of my persuasion). — 180 Proof

This is what I mean -- dithering the distinction between fact and value means there aren't value-free facts. Where Hume states the logic between the copula and "ought" creates a non sequiter, the ethical naturalist will say it creates a condition of satisfaction, or something like that -- a natural, ethical fact.

For instance, suffering (e.g. harm, deprivation, bereavement, etc) is a functionally disvalued fact, no?

Yes, I agree.

As for Hillel's maxim: "what you find hateful" – whatever is harmful to your kind – "do not do to anyone" – your kind. It's not a "command", it's a normative observation. — 180 Proof

I just mean the form of the sentence -- it's in the form of an imperative, rather than in the form of a statement.

"If you and yours functionally avoid harm, then you ought to avoid harm"

So the first part of this conditional is a statement, and the second part is also a statement that switches out "is" for "ought" - what Hume calls into question. One response to Hume is to point out that this is exactly how one would "derive" an ought from an is within our logic, and point out that a conditional is in the form of a statement -- that is, it's functionally truth-apt, regardless of how we might feel about "ought" being spooky.

And, as you note, there is certainly regularity in nature -- a regularity that, as long as we're not obsessed with universality, is still pretty dang regular: human beings, on the whole, seem to want remarkably similar things when we consider the formal possibility within existential ethics, whereby master can smash the old table of values and posit new ones in their place.

***

It sounds funny to our ears which have been trained on Christian ethics, but I'd say one thing in favor of Epicurus' ethics is that it's actually hard to be happy. It takes effort. We have an irrational aspect to ourselves which allows us to attack our natural desires, or create desires which run away with themselves.

As scientists these divergences are as important as the convergences: there's nothing ethical or good about any one path except insofar that a path helps that person become happier.

But if that's the case, then we're back at the problem Hume pointed out: just because there are many humans who are happy by being married, with children -- not all humans want to be married, with children. It may be the case that Man, as posited by modernity, is the master of his destiny, but should he be?


Basically Moore's open question argument still punches, for me, in spite of all the attempts at making a natural ethics.

I mean, obviously I have a particular interpretation of Kant, but in that interpretation at least -- our experiencing something does not make it real. Kant briefly mentions how it's necessary for reason to believe things are permanent in spite of our experience being the only means by which we know them. Like, it literally makes no sense to say our mind makes the world, so we believe it does not. and with that belief making sense, we may eventually come to the conclusion that -- oh goodness. Given Hume's criticism of causality, maybe our cognitive apparatus has a say after all.

The question is: is talking about the location of the Moon "in space" when no one is watching as silly talking about the smell of Mars when no one is around to sniff it.

These all occuring within space-and-time, they are a part of the form of intuition -- part of the given. Anything empirical -- thereby subject to the categories -- is real, ala Kant.

But if reality were nothing like what we experience, no kind of observation would be telling us anything that we could justifiably base any theory on. For example the idea of evolution is based on the fossil record; and observation of plants and animals and their similarities and differences, and also on studying DNA profiles but according to his theory all that could tell us nothing about how species evolved, and indeed the very idea of species evolving and sharing traits and DNA would be groundless.How do you think he could address this problem? — Janus

This is a good question to me because Kant's biology is explicitly anti-Darwinian, while his physics are pro-Newtonian. (he's actually skeptical of chemistry, too, which made me laugh given my job)

I have no idea how he'd resolve these problems, in fact, but from a charitable perspective I'd imagine he'd try to integrate new scientific discoveries. After all, his attack on Hume is based on what he takes to be undeniable: Science says shit about causation, and what it says is true. Hume makes a good argument against that belief. So how to counter the argument while preserving the science?

The science always mattered to Kant, though. I mean, the dude tried to invent terms to turn metaphysics into a science -- but then argued against it. But it was at least an interest of his.

It's fairly speculative to think what Kant might think of our modern scientific world, ultimately. Especially given the diversity of opinions on Kant's thoughts on teleological judgment and how that sort of offers a way for reasonable individuals to still be, well... spiritual. Or whatever.

Well... I mean, ethical naturalism already dithers the fact/value distinction. Right? That's why MacIntyre went back to Aristotle to demonstrate that ethics can be done without the distinction... at least, I'll admit here, this is purely memory.

Casebeer is the person I sort of use as the best modern representative of ethical naturalism, but I'll admit that's probably outdated at this point. He had a real sense for what mattered though -- he used Quine's attack on synthetic/analytic as a means for undermining Moore's naturalistic fallacy/open-question argument and establishing that factual matters... well, matter.

With the Hillel quote, it's a boring explanation -- since the quote is in the form of a demand, it does not fit the criteria for a fact. But you could reformulate the sentence to say something like:

"What any person finds harmful, if that person does the harmful thing, then they are bad" or something like that.

It relativizes morality to the individual, but it's at least in the form of a fact.

But that relativity... well... for many it doesn't matter: for us, for example, I think we're mostly interested in this stuff because we'd like to be happy, and happy with others too.

That relativity is seen as a threat is worth mentioning.

********


More in the spirit of what I wrote on modern/post-modern, the natural facts about our desires aren't really bad things. After all, I immediately went to desire as a frame for talking with one another. I am pretty close to epicurus in my way of looking at the world, in terms of ethics. However, post-modern ethics only ask you realize that your desire is yours -- there is no good, even of a natural kind, there is simply you and me and everyone who has these feelings to navigate. And, on top of that, there is no me per se -- there is, but I'm connected to others. So the others I'm connected to matter, in spite of our phenomenal disconnection.

Eh, I'm not either. If I opposed non-expert thinking then I'd always have to remain silent.

In general I think historical thinking is better for-us, insofar that we understand it to be something a little less potent than scientific thinking in terms of its rigor, but it cares very much about truth. Even moreso than scientific thinking, in my opinion -- it cares about the specific truth of the situation more than even the logical rules. Contradiction? Bring it on! We saw what we saw.

But it's also a sort of more humble knowledge that can't be proclaimed.

And there: it seems you and I agree that the state doesn't really do anything. We do. And that's where value comes from.

Heh. Well, OK. But now you have many reasons -- not a reason. You're moving from science to history -- a move I'm fully in favor of. But it's not usually what economists like because their assertions no longer apply, given that they mostly only apply ceteris paribus

In spite of the opinions of economists, I don't think it's an accident that the United States inherited the earth and squandered it, and then China has come on the rise because it has an industrial base.

In that case, you're contradicting your point here:

The state has no real mechanism to earn wealth of its own so it must take it from those who are productive. — NOS4A2

And you're left with the question -- why is this or that state more wealthy than another?

Yup. That's exactly what Marx says -- people aren't given the number of tickets that are actually equal to the amount of value they produced. So the nation -- through capital -- benefits.

Well...

I mean.

That's the labor theory of value. Badda-bing.

Yeah, I agree -- especially in our world, with our particular history, primitive accumulation explains why capital rose where it did first: capital requires a seed, and feudal/mercantile/colonial organizations provided that seed in our world.

Tickets are worth things because people work—I’m not so sure what that means. As far as I know currency is usually valued according to what, if any, commodity backs it, or on the faith in the issuer of it, in many cases governments and their central banks. — NOS4A2

I agree with this. Currency has worth because governments establish social worlds where said currency counts -- you either pay the man for the bread, or it's theft, and the state has a thing to say about theft.

So we are at least operating at the same scope, here -- which is important, because I think that's frequently missed. Normally people begin to talk about supply/demand and firms and such -- things that happen within a market established by states.

Now, why do states back such things? What's going on between states? Which state is richer? And how did it become richer?

Things worth explaining.

And one such explanation puts the genesis of the wealth of nations with an organized work force which exchanges its labor for tickets to exchange for goods or services.

Eh. This looks like a perspective which thinks these tickets (what else is a dollar?) are worth something.

If you follow back the reality of our world, however, I think you'll see -- tickets are worth things because people work.

We live in a world where that's not acknowledged. So I understand the confusion.

But it's a world only upheld by The State.

These are great questions. I haven't read the thread, but I am a recovering Kant-thusiast. So take my answers for what you will....

Can Kant’s noumenal world to be understood to potentially have any kind of physical form (waves, for instance) which we cannot apprehend directly? Or is the use of the word ‘physical’ here entirely superfluous? — Tom Storm

I would say that Kant's noumenal world cannot have any kind of physical form, on pain of contradiction.

On that, though, I think Kant thinks action is the bridge between phenomenal reality and noumenal.

But what his actual philosophy says -- no. It's not possible.

Following Kant, we obviously construct the phenomenal world we know out of the noumenal world in some way - presumably from the sensations which present themselves to our consciousness. Is there any simple way of describing how this is might be understood to actually work?

If we follow Kant I don't think this is obvious -- I think it's an easy inference which makes sense of his writings, but it's not obvious. And I say it's not obvious because you're tripping across a conceptual bump Kant kind of didn't address, or at least tried to address and didn't satisfy.

If we are consistent with Kant's words, then we have no role in constructing a world out of the noumena. We construct phenomena.

In the phenomenal world we are always operating from some kind of sense making schema. We make sense of the world we apprehend and choices based on this - which may have impact upon our very survival (don’t jump off that cliff, don't smoke, etc). Could dying then be taken as an example of receiving direct feedback from the noumenal world?

Here I'd say yes, funnily enough. Mostly because Kant puts immortality (the soul) as one of the Ideas which are permanently sought after by Reason. A way of expressing Kant's thoughts on the soul are -- well, you won't know until you die. And then -- you'll either really really know in the same way you know you have a hand. Or won't exist at all. (basically saying the question is worthless to explore, on a scientific level of knowledge)

Finally managed to bring it back around. Not sure if it's acceptable, but -- there it is. Some thoughts on post-modern philosophy and morality.

Honestly, this post is still relevant to the thread's topic...

Ethics, at its core, is how we interact with others.

There we are in agreement. And I may be tripping over words here so excuse me if that's the case: I feel that post-modernism has no normative ethic. And I think that's a *feature*, rather than a bug.

Post-modern philosophy questions truth, in my analysis -- so I think we agree there.

And I think I agree that truth is important for the left. Especially now -- truth, coherence, communication... these things are becoming more than threats. I often find myself feeling alienated, even in day to day life.

I suppose, given all that, I wonder -- what's the use of moral realism? I am uncertain that a statement of my convictions is really any different from a statement of fact... but only because both are words spoken to some end.

"Moral realism" is another philosopher's dream. A dream people who are not philosophers use to feel good about living in bad situations.

So, to bring it back to post-modern ethics (at least as I have outlined it thus far) -- whilst we lose truth, we gain responsibility. We are the ones who are responsible for the world we live in, fascism and all.

What post-modern philosophy does is refuse its readers the excuses we come across, in bad faith. It demands the reader accept their role.

Here we agree.

So far the court's ruling on Citizens United v. FEC has turned what was once hyperbole into fact: we now live in an oligarchy, since propaganda is efficacious and money buys propaganda.

Put it in his obituary that he cared -- more than most.

Oh shit, I was right!

Well... if that's where we're at, I'm sad. But then no amount of charity will matter.

So... an answer for an answer.

Do you believe me in saying I was not trying to attack you?

Nope. Not a one worth sharing.

I have ideas about what people know on this forum, though.

Well, I wouldn't say it like that -- rather, I'd say I made a personal attack, but I was trying to build bridges.

But I take your word for it.

Do you believe me in saying I was not trying to attack you?

For me, I just know Fooloso4 has read the PI. Like... that's a pretty basic document around these forums. Most of us have.

But I see I don't have that relationship to say such things.

Sorry.

Heh. You're welcome.

I was trying to build bridges... but I failed here. Maybe another time.

Why? To prove to you that I'm worthy of talking?

I'm ok with being unworthy.

I'm not sure why what I said was interpreted in that way...


but I accept responsibility for it. If there are amends I can make then please say them.

I only meant to suggest that Fooloso4 has certainly read the PI.

And, in the back of my mind, my motivation came from finally having an opinion on the relationships between the two, and I decided that they are different from one another.

I certainly didn't wish to attack you. I'm sorry to have done so.

The Wittgenstein chops on this forum are way beyond my ken.

I'd count @Fooloso4 in that group of people who I'd listen to.


....


IDK if you'd listen to more than that. :D

We live in sad times.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weimar_Republic#Elections_of_July_1932

Fascism wins not just by democracy -- it organizes -- but there's precedent for fascists winning power through some democratic measures: by using the tolerance of republican rule, fascists organize.

Even so -- I still don't believe the answer is be better at hierarchy. That's a compromised position that I'm willing to work with, but for me I still think the answer is to be better at organizing without hierarchy.

But how to do that in our world? well... I already failed a few times at it, so I'm not sure.

Of course not. I have seen my other friends here express opposite opinions.

I just had to say what I felt.

Heh. But the problem we have here is that everyone wants to be the teacher! :D So I have to find another kind of way to talk through the problems -- else, incoherence, meaningless, nothing (or ego, back-and-forth, gridlock). We don't even have thoughts to share!

We are all students, but of no one in particular.

And as the anarchist in my would say: no gods, no masters -- including me.

A good scene for reflecting upon truth and Truth -- the kind of Truth Paul seeks in this scene has nothing to do with truth, in the small sense.

An ubermensch, or a slave? Hard to say.

Ah, fair enough.

I suppose part of what I'm trying to do in the above, as well, is not rely upon myself. I'm not trying to argue for my distinction, because then what I'd have to say would only be as interesting as me -- which, while I have my moments, I'll have you know I'm an unbelievably boring fuck ;)

And, as I said, I grant you the truth on Nietzsche the man. What Nietzsche meant by isn't quite as important to the thread as what we mean by modern/post-modern, and we can only mean something by those terms if we have some coherence of belief, some textual reference, some kind of background -- well, something besides the little thoughts in my head, at least.

I grant you the truth over Nietzsche -- or, at least, I'm not using Nietzsche to understand Nietzsche, the man -- I'm using Nietzsche's writings to build a collective understanding of modern/post-modern.

Here you're proposing using Plato's dialogues to understand modern/post-modern -- would you say Nietzsche is somehow modern in this sense? Seems a bit odd, on its face.

My own political commitments and experiences keep me from really feeling offended even by that -- for me, Street's invective was always justified by the moral atrocities of the world. It wasn't his contributions, for myself, as much as feeling the anger and expressing it in other venues from here.

But I understand we are not islands, and this is a social space.

I consider Street a friend, and a positive influence on my own thinking, and it made me sad to see so I felt the need to say something.