I suppose I'm fine with disappointing the middle class tinkerers-from-afar, the policy wizards and focus group addicts. For one, if Marx is right, they aren't the agents of change: their position within the social organism is such that they'd defend it, even when they see the possibility of being eaten up by it, because how else are you going to live? Democrats focus on the middle class for a reason. It's the carrot whereupon a person can finally live an individual life, now having enough access to the goods produced by the economic machine.

So why bother tailoring it to a group of people that just want things to remain the same? Obviously they'd dislike Marx.

Sure

That due to the general trend of the 20th century from the Progressive Era, post-WW2 programs, and just unfolding of the idea of protecting people's time (8 hour workday, labor laws, etc.), Marx's initial critiques, which were valid for the time have been somewhat overcome. — schopenhauer1

I'd say this is too narrow a scope. It's been somewhat overcome, for whom? Events from the New Deal to now validates Marx's description of Capital -- class bifurcation from capital expansion that through its economic power has come to revolutionize democracy itself, putting it up for sale, undermining New Deal era social programs to continue to accumulate and create an industrial reserve army. While the labor aristocracy -- the AFL-CIO -- is comfortable with the relationship and the negotiated peace, it's pretty easy to see that the reason they're comfortable is they lost faith in people power and really only believe in conciliation to keep their position in the board room. So, contra Hannah Arendt's view that labor unions bring representation to the liberal capitalist state, and so finally gives political voice to people who work, I'd say these organizations have become absorbed by capital, and most working people simply don't have representation in the United States.

tl;dr - Marx is still relevant to the events we see today, regardless of how we parse the New Deal and whether having stock-options as payment is owning the means of production.

Morning thought on Marx --

One thing I've expressed in this thread and have always found frustrating is how Marxism is for the workers, and yet it is simultaneously wed to one of the most esoteric philosophical movements, Hegelian dialectic. Not exactly the most approachable philosophy, like one might like a philosophy for the working class to be.

But, on the other side, this is a kind of double-bind frequently visited upon workers: if it's simple then the worker hasn't grasped the true complexity, and if it's too complicated then the worker is confused with themself and clearly can't grasp the true complexity.

So, in a way, this was the leading philosophical movement of Marx's training. To choose something else would be to treat the subject as if it were not worthy of philosophical thought, which would be a self-contradiction in terms of Marx's philosophical project. (and, also, one of the reasons I've always liked Marx as a philosopher -- he treated the bronze-souled subjects as worthy of philosophy!)

Now, I think, dialectic is out of fashion so it's frustrating for us to have to learn not just Marx but then this philosophical move that's largely been pushed to the side. But, really, that's just part of reading historical works. What's fascinating to me is how Marx's picture of capital, in spite of all this esoteric trapping, still rings true today.

Me, for having not posted.

My stumbling notes from where I left off last time at about 350 to...


There's a part where Marx is trying to do the step-wise thing I just did above, but I'm getting lost as he jumps around too fast for me. p 368-370, or the part right before Notebook IV.

p 376 has the most succinct sentence to drawing the distinction between surplus-value and profit:

Just now the original capital of 100 was: 50-10-40. Produced surplus gain of 10 thalers (25% surplus time) Altogether 110 thalers

There's some bits in there that I don't follow right now. Especially has Marx is bouncing around between examples -- it's going too fast for me to follow immediately. But here I can see what he's talking about -- to figure surplus-value you have to look at the working day and split it into labor's reproduction, and surplus-value, whereas profit is figured with respect to the total firm , i.e. start with 100 thalers capital, end with 110 thalers: surplus-value at a 25% increase, while profit is at a 10% increase in the set up to distinguish between the two.

p400 -- coming to understand SNLT as the costs of reproducing labor setting the price of labor.

(the production of workers becomes cheaper, more workers can be produced in the same time, in proportion as necessary labour time becomes smaller or the time required for the production of living labour capacity becomes relatively smaller. These are identical statements)

An interesting question -- how many distinct processes are there? I can draw meaning out of a passage, but I mean -- at the end of the theory. Here thinking about the phrase "realization process", "production process", "exchange process" -- etc.

Basically, what's the final process map look like? Which processes are embedded in which? is there a consistent map between theses processes at any point in time of Marx's writings, or is it more like there are fair interpretations of what's written, and a more experimental-scientific spirit would be required to pin down the best map?

In the realization process, for instance, Marx has three processes. But there are many sub-processes at work within the three processes of 1) capital has maintained its value by means of exchange of money for living labor, 2) production-process (sub-process) whereby surplus value is created and accumulated to a commodity, then 3) demonetization, the commodity as container of objectified labor time that, if mismanaged, all value could go away i.e. one man owns 130 thalers worth linen (supposing I'm doing that right. I had some questions about how to add, but it seems to fit with Marx's 140 thalers math where he's including the 10 thalers worth of equipment as total capital) that then decay because of mismanagement, that then must be re-monetized in order to become the form of value once again. ie. sold for money.



p 407:

The creation by capital of absolute surplus value -- more objectified labour -- is conditional upon an expansion, specifically a constant expansion, of the sphere of circulation. The surplus value created at one point requires the creation of surplus value at another point, for which it may be exchanged; if only, initially, the production of more gold and silver, more money, so that, if surplus value cannot directly become capital again, it may exist in the form of money as the possibility of new capital

Another process map in the next paragraph:

On the other side, the production of relative surplus value i.e. production of surplus value based on the increase and development of the productive forces, requires the production of new consumption; requires that the consuming circle within circulation expands as did the productive circle previously. Firstly, quantitative expansion of existing consumption; secondly: creation of new needs by propagating existing ones in a wide circle; thirdly: production of new needs and discovery and creation of new use values

A tripartite division of moments for a process of consumption which has to follow along the process of production -- i.e. if we decrease SNLT for a given commodity then, in order to realize exchange rather than just have even more linen, you have to expand the number of persons who are consuming that linen. Otherwise, you'll have the same profit rates from before, and some extra linen that will rot.

I like this paragraph. p 409

Thus, just as production founded on capital creates universal industriousness on one side -- i.e. surplus labour, value-creating labour -- so does it create on the other side a system of general exploitation of the natural and human qualities, a system of general utility, utilising science itself just as much as all the physical and mental qualities, while there appears nothing higher in itself, nothing legitimate for itself, outside this circle of social production and exchange. Thus capital creates the bourgeois society, and the universal appropriation of nature as well as of the social bond itself by the members of society. Hence the great civilizing influence of capital; its production of a stage of society in comparison to which all earlier ones appear as mere local developments of humanity and as nature-idolatry For the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of utility; ceases to be recognized as a power for itself; and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to subjugate it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a means or production. In accord with this tendency, capital drives beyond national barriers and prejudices as much as beyond nature worship, as well as all traditional, confined, complacent, encrusted satisfactions of present needs, and reproductions of old ways of life. it is destructive towards all of this, and constantly revolutionizes it, tearing down all the barriers which hem in the development of the forces of production, the expansion of needs, the all-sided development of production, and the exploitation and exchange of natural and mental forces

In all the side notes and thoughts, this paragraph was a great little conclusion -- that capital, in its totality, is a revolutionary force which upends all previous ways of life and values in its pursuit of growth. (next paragraph talks about its internalt contradictions which lead to self-destruction... I'm not so optimistic :P )

Reading though this notebook I'm struck by how much Marx's method resembles Aristotle's in that he's constantly responding to and summarizing previous economist's work, but then attempting to point out how they are a one-sided expression of his own general theory. "they got it right up to this point, where they disagreed with me" :D

Hrm, here's a quote that might also help with "contradiction" in Marx:

as use value it is absolutely not measured by the labour time objectified in it, but rather a measuring rod is applied to it which lies outside its nature as exchange value

use-value as any need within a social system which is actually satisfied (at least under capital, where exchange is necessary), exchange-value as realized price, rather than ideal price. Contradiction in that need is in units of number-commodity-consumed, and exchange is in units of labour-time (which has a relation to money through the system of circulation at a given time)

So there is a relation between two entities with different units -- one set of units influences the other, and so there's a kind of "contradiction" in that neither use-value is exchange-value or vice-versa, but their identity simultaneously relies upon one another. I.e. without exchange-value there'd be no general use-value, even in simple circulation (the original problem of two incommensurate goods becoming commensurate through a third good, time). But, simultaneously, without actually satisfying real needs, the use-value would not have an exchange value. It'd be unproductive labor of the sort that falls out of circulation without even being consumed.

Something like that. It's honestly still the most confusing part of Marx's system for me. There are times when I feel the move is natural and others when I don't, and still can't figure out a real rule to it. My guess is there isn't a real rule in terms of interpreting Marx, since Marx is a philosopher, but it still leaves the question there for anyone interested in Marx as a scientific system -- how to turn dialectics into something that's not just a philosophical move, but can actually be checked by others? Something that doesn't just rely upon a demonstration and a judgment call (though, that could also be the very thing that's needed, and leaving it at that unspecified level might be best!)

another contradiction at p 415:

The contradiction between production and realization -- of which capital, by its concept, is the unity -- has to be grasped more intrinsically than merely as the indifferent, seemingly reciprocally independent appearances of the individual moments of the process, or rather of the totality of processes

Though that seems to make sense from everything -- in Hegelian fashion we could say that the contradiction between production-realization is a more developed form of the contradiction between use-exchange value (or whatever the appropriate mapping would be ... as I said I'm pretty uncertain what The Big Marxist Map really looks like)

Probably stop there for today. Looks like I'll be ready for tomorrow after all! 35 pages to go.

Hrm, hrm, hrm.... thinking more about slavery...

The United States provides a pretty good example of capitalism + slavery. I'm looking at p 354, right after the section title which starts "Labour does not reproduce the value of the material in which, and of the instruments with which, it works"

Marx uses the unit of thalers in this analysis.

Capital at 100 thalers, divided for a given working day into -- 50 for cotton, 40 for wages, 10 for instrument. Supposing the wages of 40 thalers is set at 4 hours and the capitalist sets the working day at 8 hours then there are 40 thalers of necessary labor time, 40 Thalers of surplus value. The capitalist starts with 100 thalers, then through one "cycle" we'll call it (since the numbers are exaggerated) ends up with linen which started with 50 thalers of value, then absorbed 80 thalers worth of labor time.

Here at the middle section of M-C-C-M, in particular the second -C-.

At the end of third part in the cycle, then, what started as 100 Thalers ends as 130 thalers worth of linen, and 10 thalers worth of fixed capital. Insofar that the capitalist is able to successfully exchange that linen, then they can start the process again with 130 thalers where they started with 100. (hence highlighting how exchange is just as important as production for the cycle of capital -- else you just have a bunch of linen)

So, in this, the production of cotton was slave-based, and linen was worker-based. Is there an economic reason for this? Are certain modes of labor, i.e. that which exploits the natural goods we want, somehow more economically feasible under slavery than capital, and vice-versa?

There's a part of me that wonders if there's a kind of equilibrium point between slave-labor as capital and wage-labor as worker markets where the reasons for the transition from slave economies to wage economies are economic in character, i.e. profit maximizing, but the particulars of an industry are what incentivizes the economic organism between the two modes.

For instance, in the south you had to pay slave-drivers, which were wage-workers in the system of exploitation, to make sure slaves continued. In a similar vein, fast food industries have long said they'd replace workers with machines, but in fact you have to pay for those machines and the people to maintain them and it actually ends up being cheaper to just hire a person than to implement that style business -- i.e. it's a good threat, but a bad economic model.

Part of me thinks slavery is partially bad for business, but not entirely. i.e. sometimes it's cheaper to have workers who manage their own bills, and sometimes it's cheaper to pay soldiers to force people to work.

Going through some of my highlights...

This bit helps me think about productive/undproductive, because it shows how the laborer is simultaneously the origin of productive value, but not the owner of productive value -- what he gets in exchange is equal to what it takes for his physical living body to show up to work tomorrow, but what the capitalist gets for this is the ability to direct value-production and keep the products/capital/etc. due to owning it.

p 322:

What the Worker exchanges with capital is his labour itself (the capacity of disposing over it); he divests himself of it. What he obtains as price is the value of this divestiture. He exchanges value-positing activity for a pre-determined value, regardless of the result of his activity. Now how is its value determined? By the objectified labour contained in his commodity. This commodity exists in his vitality. In order to maintain this from one day to the next...he has to consume a certain quantity of food, to replace his used-up blood etc.

i.e. The body with its capacities, and especially the capacity to work. The price of a worker is that body and work-able capacities -- which itself is obviously historically situated and geographically situated as well, so changes depending upon how much objectified labor is required to have a body with work-able capacities.

This is the sort of thing I think that the "raises all ships" sorts have in mind in accepting the mechanisms of capital -- sure, it's unfair, but the price of labor in absolute terms of objectified labor time increases over time while the relative value of the classes clearly diminishes, even though the lower classes of an industrial nation will have access to more objectified labor time than the lower classes of a colonial or neo-colonial nation.

But, anyways, that's why wages are unproductive -- the purchase "drops out" of the circuit of capital, rather than remaining within that circuit to continue to increase the cycle of capital. I think that's a good rough estimate for productive/unproductive -- it's productive if it happens in a firm, because then a capitalist owns the capital and pays a wage to extract labor time and add it to the circulating whole of capital value, whereas the worker takes goods out of that circulation to live. (generally speaking)

But for our purposes here, it might be useful for folk to contemplate what it means to tell children that things can get better.

And not just children. — Banno

True. And while I'm saying there is no progress, my set-up doesn't make progress impossible -- only points out that the analysis is in the negative at the moment.

There's a balancing act in forging the myth -- between optimism and pessimism, because both actually lead to human stupidity: both doing nothing, one because it'll happen anyways and the other because it doesn't matter, when the very problem is the doing nothing part :D

I think I understand and pretty much agree with all of your points, but I've run out of steam on this topic. — Jamal

Happens to me all the time. I'll return to a topic and find I have maybe 3 new thoughts and then back to the wondering part :D

Are there Sadists or are there people who cause pain in others on the basis of a diverse variety of motives that we ignore when we slap the label of sadist on them? Do you remember when you were a kid there were a few kids who enjoyed torturing animals? Do you remember anything else about them, like what their family lives were like, whether they seemed to harbor a lot of anger towards the world, for instance? That is an example of a motive the label of sadist hides from view. When we believe we have been unfairly treated by those closest to us, we can manifest it as anger against the world. We believe the world has treated us badly and it deserves to suffer. We justify our actions as making things right. Our ‘sadism’ isn’t so much an enjoyment of the pain we inflict as the satisfaction we get from correcting an imbalance in the cosmos. — Joshs

I want to call this psychological type a paladin -- the paladin justifies the violence they inflict on the basis of the enjoyment of correcting an imbalance in the cosmos.

Suppose a social organism, like the United States, where the police and soldiers are all paladins.

The paladins really like being paladins, and there are generals who happen to benefit from having paladins at their disposal. So they push to increase their stock of paladins through an Honor Code.

In such a world, even though these people are no sadists, they are a part of a social organism which increases violence within the world. So, from the point of view of view of the increase or decrease of violence, at least, even if no one is evil -- violence increases, and regress is what I'd call that.

A morning thought -- slavery, parsed in the form of capital, is actually treating person's as capital, more or less. In a way they are living machines, and just as labor is the origin of value in capital so that holds in the general theory, but the organism is different because the mechanisms of capital are defined such that liberal free exchange is the basis of the analysis.

The laborer is the origin of value, and so is the slave -- the social position within the organism changes, though, from alienated-worker to being owned as capital. I think that's how I'd parse slavery in capital now, at least.

If I've read this right, it says that the pianist's labour is not productive, but the piano maker's is. Why? I think it makes sense to look at this in terms of the advancement of capital M-C-C-M.

Transparently, a piano making business takes money, invests it in materials and labour, produces a piano, then sells it.

A pianist's labour, on the other hand starts with a commodity (labour power), which has a price (money) which the labourer gets for their service (money), which is used to get other commodities (foodstuff, etc).

The piano making business thus has M-C-C-M as a transition of stages, the pianist however has C-M-M-C as its transition of stages, only the former is an advancement of capital. Any material resources the pianist buys to continue playing reproduces their labour, rather than their money (tools, food, fuel, electricity). — fdrake

I think that's good!

I get this mental picture that the pianist is, for whatever reason, an individual and so yeah, that's how I'd parse the music maker from the piano maker.

But I think it's interesting to raise the history of the music industry! There's a Marxist history of music to be written in there that'd be very interesting -- the proletarianization of the musician from the Concert Hall to Basement Punk Rock shows. :D

A slave isn't a wage labourer, they don't receive a wage. So they can't have the M or M steps as part of their C-M-M-C labour transition. Perhaps slaves create wealth, which is converted to value through the circulation of the commodities' values constituting that wealth. I'm wondering, however, if it makes sense to consider slaves as "wage labourers with wage 0" from the perspective of capital. All of their labour is surplus labour, every moment of their labour is uncompensated work.

In that regard, you could still have slaves in M-C-C-M. You start off with money, you buy slaves and commodities, the slaves work with the commodities to produce more commodities, which are then sold for money. Then, the next time you want to make something, you don't have to buy the slaves, you just have to buy something to reproduce their labour. If Marx is construing the M-C step to necessarily to contain an exchange of wages, then he'd be right to exclude slavery from capital advancement on that basis.

Maybe generalising it is illuminating. If all workers were slaves, there'd be no wages and selling of labour, which would mean there'd be no C-M-M-C transition. If some workers were slaves and some were wage labourers, it seems you can have C-M-M-C active in the economy at large with slaves providing a competitive advantage over those capitalists which use wage labourers.

I'm not sure what to make of this. — fdrake

I think that when slaves are the basis of labor that's a different mode of production as the theory is stated -- but then, you're right that we have these dual economies then simultaneously feeding into one another. Is it still labor-time that's being extracted in slavery, or even more? If so, not in the manner of a firm which is purchasing labor. And I'm curious about the causes of slavery and its interaction with capital, in particular, because one way to put it would be to say that it's basically the theoretical limit of exploitation of labor time, but that's sort of restating it in terms of capital when slavery is frequently said to be part of older forms prior to even feudalism, so I imagine the general theory would have to treat it somewhat differently.

But then.. there's the reality of them not being separate at all, and how the practice evolved with the economic form of capital rather than being some ancient thing. Marx's positivism showing through, it seems.

Violent: violate. Do we want to violate? Is that a motive? Can we be motivated to violate ourselves, or is that an incoherent idea? — Joshs

I'm tempted to double down, but it's more interesting to me to not. Let's say we don't want to violate others or self as a motive on pain of an incoherent notion of motive.

If we establish that want, need, motive, desire is always in service of the prevention of a loss of personal integrity, and is itself the pursuit of self-validation, — Joshs

Interesting. Can it be established?

then the question becomes how we we understand the separation between self and other. If we don’t want to destroy self but are motivated to kill others, is this not in fact our need to kill or destroy what we see as alien within the other?

I actually want to answer this one different from the next, though it feels like a chain of thought.

I think it's possible to want to violate. Wanting an action to an object is a form of fantasy: I want to climb that mountain. I want to run 6 miles. I want to punch my boss.

However, what you've brought up is that the "I want..." is not a motive, per se -- and that's a fair point too I believe.

I've been loose in using "I want" so far.

Isn’t our perception of the alienness of others relative
to ourselves directly correlated with our motives of altruism, kindness and selflessness vs desire to punish, harm and kill
others? We sacrifice ourselves for loved ones and of to war against those we demonize as the dangerously alien.

I'm going to try and clean up desire a bit here from merely stating "I want..."

I like to start from a tripartite division of desire into types, taking after an interpretation of Epicurus:

Epicurus offers a classification of desires into three types: some are natural, others are empty; and natural desires are of two sorts, those that are necessary and those that are merely natural (see Cooper 1999).

We don't have to use this terminology, I'm only sharing it as a way of saying where I'm coming from in my response.

I'd say that the sorts of motivations you are describing fall within the natural and unnecessary category: which is where it seems most of psychology actually takes place, so it's almost too convenient for us to adopt Epicurus' rough thought "these desires are OK enough until they cause too much anxiety" in our modern world sense. (it's not like people are actually looking for ataraxia, for the most part)

But, here's where I have a reason to doubt -- those sorts of desires don't follow structures as clean as "Our preception of the alienness of others in relation to our self is directly correlated with our motives of altruism, kindness and selflessness vs desire to punish, harm and kill others" suggests to my mind.

Or, at least, there's enough information going on in that sentence that I don't want to just say "Oh, yes, of course"

Motives:

Altruism/pushishment
kindness/harm
selflessness/kill

Roughly. I'm just using your sentence to structure some dyads.


I'm going a little formal here just to see if it sticks. If it doesn't then by all means skip. I'm mostly hoping to not go down a romantic hole in regards to the warrior -- yes, of course, there are self-sacrificing people. But what I'm highlighting is that there are also sadists. And it's possible to set up a social world where those who get off on kindness go to the kind spaces, and those who get off on violence go to the violent spaces.

It seems to me assuming the existence of a motive to kill misses the central issue here, which isn’t about desiring violence for its own sake but about the challenges we face in recognizing the value in others different from ourselves, and in thus avoiding the tendency to see malevolent motives (like the desire to kill) in the struggles of others to protect themselves and the community they identity with from what they perceive as harmful ideas and behavior. — Joshs

Fair. I'm fine with dropping the assumption. Maybe some of the above will progress our thoughts.

The critical issue here is the origin and nature of motive: what we want to do and why we want to do it. If we explain motive on the basis of arbitrary mechanism( evolutionarily shaped drive, reinforcement, etc) then we’ve lost the battle before it’s begun. We just throw up our hands and say motive is arbitrary and relative. If instead we make motive a function and product of sense-making , and understand sense-making to be a holistic process of erecting, testing and modifying a system of constructs designed to anticipate events with no ulterior or higher motive or purpose other than anticipation itself, then we can unite motive and intelligibility. — Joshs

And could we not be motivated to kill? Could it not even be intelligible? "We had to drop the bomb on Hiroshima because..." is the phrase I have in mind. There are many becauses. The motive is clear. And science did it. And this isn't even in one of those unintended consequences ways: it was a driving motive of many scientists on the project to win the war.

I think what I see, from the advances of science, is an increase in ability to do exactly what we want -- and what we want isn't always non violent. So, contrary to a decrease, I'd say we have an increase in violence because we're better at it. We even compartmentalize it to different functions within the state so that others don't have to deal with it.

Is that really a decrease in violence?

Thomas Kuhn said there is progress in science. What he meant wasn’t that there is a cumulative, logical or dialectical advance that for the most part includes the context of older theories within. the newer ones , but rather the ability to ‘solve more puzzles’, even as the meanings of the scientific concepts which define these puzzles change with each shift in paradigm.
What if we were to assume for the sake of argument that science is inextricably intertwined with the rest of culture, and that if Kuhn is right about scientific progress as development of puzzle solving, then cultural progress as a whole is a kind of progressive puzzle solving.

What does it mean to solve a puzzle? Let me offer the following definition. Cultural problem solving is not about accurately representing an independent world. It is about construing and reconstruing our relation to the social and natural world from our own perspective in ways that allow us to see the behavior and thinking of other people in increasingly integral ways. Progress in cultural
problem solving is about anticipating the actions and motives of others (and ourselves) in ways that transcend concepts like evil or selfish intent. It is not that we become more
moral or more rational over time (Pinker’s claim is that the formation of the scientific method made us more rational). We were always moral and rational in the sense that we have always been motivated to solve puzzles. What progress in puzzle solving allows us to do is to see others as like ourselves on more and more dimensions of similarity.
So I think Pinker is right that there is a trajectory of development that leads toward less violence and conflict, but he is wrong to define it in relation to conformity to a certain Enlightenment and Eurocentric-based notion of empirical rationality. — Joshs

Glad to find something we can debate.

While progress in puzzle solving allows us to do, it's very much up to us what we do, what counts as a puzzle, and what counts as a solution. I believe you'd agree with me this far.

How is it that this increase in puzzle solving leads to a decrease in violence? If science enables us to do, and what we want to do is kill, then we have some pretty obvious examples of science helping us to do exactly that. Is it really just a numbers game of relative population rates across time?

I'll take the position that there is no scientific progress.

I don't see it as so obvious to call it progress, though I understand why people say there is such a thing. We can see differences between time periods from the evidence available to us, and then we go and look for things we like more now that exist today that didn't exist yesterday, or we can look for things we dislike that used to exist and no longer exist. This provides a working understanding of the word "better" or "progress", regardless of whether we believe history is a real thing that can actually progress.

For me, though, I always ask: progress for whom?

And generally the person performing the analysis in favor of progress is measuring progress in terms of what's good for themself.

Progress is relative to social position. Even as we've gotten more powerful, slavery is still a part of the world economic system: And that's gotta be one of the few "bads" that people will concede is a bad that shouldn't be no matter what and we're better off today because of it's no longer around. But, really, it's just no longer around within particular nation borders (and, *really* really, human trafficking still occurs across borders into liberal, capitalist nations, sometimes for labor and sometimes for sex)

So, no -- what I see is scientific regress. We're better and more able to help the well-to-do while we use the not-so-good-off, which doesn't look that different from building pyramids to me, but now with the ability to end not just our own empire but all of human life.

No, just like -- an organization. Something which came out of it all. Networks of people who weren't in communication before now are. Something more substantive than an internet blip.

I'll attempt to defend my expressions as not-caricature.

"Atheist evangelism", as a goal, was a phrase I heard in public speeches at least. Not shared by the people gathered, necessarily, but certainly advocated for.

Long run, with my pining and wishing, I'd prefer to pursue the (A) and (B) -- from where I sit, though, the ethical secular communities that arose out of all that which fulfill the social functions of church seem to be the most lasting thing?

Or, maybe, I've gone too far astray and haven't realized what's come about.

I want to say its a popular unphilosophical reading :D -- but to be honest, I really don't know.

By which Marx meant that the point of philosophy is to change the world. — Jamal

Theses on Feuerbach is still my favorite bit of Marx to reference in understanding him as a philosopher because of how direct the 11th thesis is: can't get a shorter and more direct answer from him about the point of philosophy.

Also, I happen to agree with it. So there's that. (haven't had anything really substantive to say, but it's been interesting reading along)

Fair. And I think New Atheism's decline is pretty well explained by your expression here:

As a muddler-through, they don't really represent me. — Dawnstorm

For the most part the people in leadership positions who were prominent didn't really represent the group that's there. Where most atheists don't feel the need to evangelize, I think it's fair to say that a goal of New Atheism was to make the, in your terms, the secular state into a strictly atheist state -- so not the sort of state which allows many faiths, as you put it, but rather doesn't allow faith into the state at all.

Which, given the rationalist roots, largely consisted of a sort of a dreamy mental picture of what the Enlightenment was (as defined by the words).

But, as you say, most atheists aren't really like that, so while that anger can sell books, it didn't build anything. Anger can start an organization, but it can't feed it. And the organizations that still survive this day didn't pursue that line of thinking, but rather were more interested in building ethical communities for atheist people -- basically fulfilling the social function of a church without the classical works of faith. (though, IMO, obviously still faith based in a wider sense)

:up:

Oof.

The truth is that nothing can absolve humanity of its crimes and nothing can make up for the suffering of the past, ever. Nothing and nobody will redeem humanity. Nothing will make it okay, and we will never be morally cleansed. We certainly ought to strive for a good, free society, but it will never have been worth it. — Jamal

Preach on. :)

I'm not sure. I'm a gnat watcher. Sometimes I turn into the gnats, too, I'm afraid. But the Thought of Man isn't something I've heard or seen yet.

There are no types of experiences, only experiences. Toothache and leg pain are classified as pains only because they are similar, so it is for language purpose, but in reality they are two different things. Similar does not mean identical, so:
1. We don't need the same physical structure - multiple realization solved.
Having no categories, but simply experiences, I don't need a justification for fitting an experience into a category, so:
2. I don't need to equate an experience with a function. There is no law of nature that prevents the existence of an experience without it fulfilling a specific purpose. — Eugen

So there's a weak emergence, but none of the experiences are the same. Even within the same person, because the physical structure is always changing.

Seems a weird space to think through -- I certainly feel a lot more coherency than that. At least a before, a now, and a later: all three tenses sit within an experience.

Now, if language were to fulfill the functional aspect then totally possible. It just feels somewhat like Hume's conclusion on the skepticism of causation -- I see how we got here, but aren't we confused now?

I think with the dedicated atheists they were sort of evangelists for atheism. So the point would have been a kind of self-elimination, except there was always more to it than that in practice: it had political goals and ends (which is why I didn't pursue further).

More generally, the liberal capitalist state is an atheist organization, at least intentionally speaking. The library, too, is an atheist organization, in the sense that it's not organized around theism.

I think if we took the New Atheists seriously, they'd have liked the liberal capitalist state to be rid of all influence from God or religion in any way for . . . various reasons. "rationality" figured prominently.

So a reflection of what you've set out could be -- that theism would be nothing without atheism, and what the dedicated atheists want is a return to something before their perversions ;)

As a general recipe:

But in the world, at one time men shun death as the greatest of all evils, and at another time choose it as a respite from the evils in life. The wise man does not deprecate life nor does he fear the cessation of life. The thought of life is no offense to him, nor is the cessation of life regarded as an evil. And even as men choose of food not merely and simply the larger portion, but the more pleasant, so the wise seek to enjoy the time which is most pleasant and not merely that which is longest. And he who admonishes the young to live well and the old to make a good end speaks foolishly, not merely because of the desirability of life, but because the same exercise at once teaches to live well and to die well. Much worse is he who says that it were good not to be born, but when once one is born to pass quickly through the gates of Hades. For if he truly believes this, why does he not depart from life? It would be easy for him to do so once he were firmly convinced. If he speaks only in jest, his words are foolishness as those who hear him do not believe.

We must remember that the future is neither wholly ours nor wholly not ours, so that neither must we count upon it as quite certain to come nor despair of it as quite certain not to come.

If that's wrong, then 10 years.

At least I was able to pick a position. :D

Heh, I should have kept scrolling. Yup!

Though I still like the whole movie experience. But I'm in home-body mode mostly now

While what I call triple-A films have sort of become meh, I have to say that film as a genre has actually exploded into so many different directions now due to streaming services launching their own media -- I think television is where the past bit of time has really taken over in terms of exploring the medium.

In particular, the long form has been explored a lot by the streaming TV services. I think that at this point there are so many shows which use this form that we can likely see its downsides, but there were still some really good films that came out of this way of telling stories that was basically unheard of pre-2000. At most there were mini-series, but nothing like the sheer magnitude of shows which have connected episodes, and even seasons, across years like a book does.

Prior to streaming, due to commercials, episodic was the mode of storytelling, and long-form was something only explored by theatre nerds.

So, if you stand in the middle of the road, you're likely to get run over by cars. Now, let's say you have some cognitive impairment that doesn't let you conciously perceive cars, and you don't like admitting something's wrong with you. So you develop a worldview without cars. There's a divine taboo to stand in the middle of the road, and you still instinctively detect movement on the road (you're brain just doesn't make them into cars). So you're convinced that cars don't exist, but you still won't stand in the middle of the road, because some sort of divine taboo, and you don't cross a street when cars are about, but you edit out the actual vehicles, and in its place you have some sort of intuition which you interpret as divine guidance. (And this is where this analogy becomes to silly to continue, because how you avoid getting rides is sort of harder to explain; but luckily the point is about not dying in the road here, so it doesn't need to be plausible or coherent, just sort of illustrative - which I hope it is):

Anyway: as long as you don't get run over, it doesn't matter whether it's because of "the truth". "Truth", unlike reality, needs some system of... axioms and transformation rules? Not sure. Something. Truth conditions. And for such a "truth" to be useful, it needs to compatible with reality. How much compatibility you need? Well, reality's the judge of that. So not just anything goes (and that's why the no-car example above is ultimately silly, but to me it feels more like extreme hyperbole than a category mistake).

Of course, "truth" is always social, too, which complicates matters. — Dawnstorm

I like the example. Makes perfect sense to me.

So one way to parse the example would be to say there are two worlds, which can be represented by the set of objects within that world, and that there is a relationships between the worlds such that it's irrelevant which set we are thinking of when we make choices.

The important thing here is that there is a relation between the objects of each world (given our psychological description above, we could call these "mental worlds" or something along the lines designating how a person is experiencing). It doesn't matter that we have the truth (whatever that is), it only matters that we can relate to the world around us such that we do not die. In fact, I'm inclined to agree that it's irrelevant whether we call it a road or The Devils Deathbed: functionally, the words work the same. (and, yes, we could come up with more plausible versions, but I'm understanding I think so no need)

And so what's interesting to me, up reflection, when we suppose that our current scientific picture is not just true in the same way that The Devils Deathbed is true, but rather is the truth to which we can compare all other sentences to check for a relation to reality (rather than just using the sentence for our ends), then one must conclude that for the majority of our species' time on earth we believed in false things, or maybe relatively true things depending upon how we want to skew this relationship.

Now, you say you are a relativist, so I'd wager you'd not make this commitment. I, for one, am not a scientific realist, so the scenario is there more for explication than to state my belief: hopefully it highlights rather than confuses.

I just think some things are so high up the abstraction ladder that the meaning of this is most closely related to the one making the abstraction. And an abstraction can be so habitual, that it's just felt backgound and not accessible to introspection without difficulty. A lot of it can just be random variation that cancels out statistically: some theists survive, some atheists survive - none of it matters from a survival point of view. Is that true? Who knows?

I'm skeptical about anything that sounds like evolutionary psychology. It feels a little too much of a mix between hermeneutics and empirical pea counting to be useful. But then I have sociology degree and that discipline isn't all that different in some of its incarnations. — Dawnstorm

I'm thinking less on an individual basis here and more on a cultural basis and its relationship to our biological reality -- they aren't one and the same, and I'm equally suspicious of evolutionary psychology. (evo-psych is also annoying because it makes it more difficult to attempt teasing out the relationship between biology and human social structures)

So true in the above sense, such that there is a relationship between the sets of worlds and reality that the previous cultures from us could navigate their environment. Not the truth. (also, note how I'm looking at truth and knowledge on this social level rather than an individual level. Individual a/theists and their beliefs aren't as important as the success of general social structures)

While I'm rambling about playfully, I might as well share my hermeneutical indeterminacy principle: of a proposition you can either know whether it's true, or what it means, but never both at the same time. There you go. That's the sort of atheist I am.

Hrm! I'd say truth is part of language, and that meaning and truth have a relationship to one another such that we could -- but I suspect this is just a way of using words, and I could adopt your way.

But I couldn't say I understand it up front :)

It's not a belief. Anything I can't make sense of is nonsense to me. — Dawnstorm

Cool. I understand.

Once I try to understand a concept I sometimes make progress. With God it's a random number of steps in a random direction (I can't even tell where forward is). Since I need a worldview I made mine with placing God into the category of things that other people say but make no sense. I fear I'm old enough now that there's a crust of dust around it. I can't scale back my own worldview far enough to make sense of God and still have enough concepts left to think with. But maybe not. There's always the chance that someone says something, or something happens, that makes me suddenly experience a... shift? Maybe a change in the hardware'll do it? A stroke, maybe?

God makes sense to me from an anthropological perspective, as I said above -- while the specific claims of the various religions, some of which don't even quite have a God in the Abrahamic sense, are all over the map, there seems to be a general structure or pattern to communities of faith, and from my atheist perspective I really only see humans organizing as such -- and noticeably, from a scientific picture of the world, we didn't start with a scientific worldview (it had to be developed), yet we still survived.

That's the part that always sticks with me. I figure you have to understand truth at some level to survive -- I am a realist of some kind, though I get confused in the discussions there -- but the specific meanings and claims of various religions, while wildly different in that particular sense, seem to have some kind of general coherence that got our species this far (just assuming the scientific picture true)

Speaking for myself, I start and then stop at 'what we say about g/G', that is, 'what religious scriptures attribute to (the) deity', and assess them as claims which are either true, false or incoherent. I don't bother with addressing g/G itself. As far as I can discern it, theism – its sine qua non claims about g/G – consists of both false and incoherent claims; and an idea (e.g. theism) of a deity ascribed false or incoherent properties is a nonsensical idea, no? So theism is not true, to my mind, whether or not '(the) deity is real'. — 180 Proof

Thanks for laying this out, because it's giving me a "shard" of thought to start from.

I have an anthropological bent when it comes to understanding God. That people are brought together across cultures in similar-ish looking organizations is what sticks out. And I know that the evaluation of claims aren't the sorts of things that bring people together -- so it's not the particular claims that seem to matter at all. Especially given the diversity of those claims in comparison to how common the general frame seems to be. Claims seem to be secondary, as the sorry state of apologetics will attest to.

So coherency is a lot harder to pin down, with such a notion. Also why I'm bringing up the civic religion as a contrast point -- voting and praying being fairly close to one another. (at this level of abstraction, at least)

Yup.

Though of the sorts that I've been critical of so far, he counts.

Oh wow! I didn't realize how close to home it was for you.

For the next track, I felt this one:

:cool: I just finished that one. I'm looking for the next track.

Hell yeah. :D

It's good to have a Moliere in this forum, so I can talk about plays :) — Eros1982

Hell yeah!

That was the original reason I joined the forum way back when: I was excited to see an aesthetics section, and was really turned onto theatre at the time. (as it turns out, I've stuck around for other reasons -- but I'm a theatre lover!)

If you don't have puzzles, character development and a motive, you definitely do not have a play. I can say, for example, that Jean Racine is a poor playwright (for my taste), but he has all those three features in his works, and I do not deny that he writes plays. But for some works of Eugene Ionesco, I doubt whether those should be called plays, as I might say also that Ibsen's Peer Gynt comes closer to novels and movie scripts, than to plays. — Eros1982

Heh. I love Ionesco. It's definitely a play. And Ibsen is the basis for all modern theatre! So it sounds like you must like Shakespeare? Or what?

How do you feel about Stanislavski? Or are you strictly one who reads/watches plays?

Another great flick. (one which I'd even defend to the hoity toitys :D)

Ah, see, that's already a step too far for me. That's what I mean by flytrap: the moment I say "God doesn't exist," I get tangled up in a conversation of the type winning-losing that I can't win. I've admitted too much already, and now I'm comitted to a statement I ultimately feel is meaningless. I can argue back and forth in that groove, but I get more and more alienated by the stuff I say. And I can't get away. — Dawnstorm

I think flytraps are common among philosophical topics. What you describe here is a pattern I'm familiar with! "Saying too much" is a wonderful insight, once you know that's what you are doing.

I'm fine with taking a step back. I'm an apatheist in addition to being an atheist.

The truth is, if you ever catch me saying something like "God doesn't exist," it's most likely a bid to end the conversation. It's more a hyperbolic demonstration of my worldview in a simplified manner that my interlocutor can easily understand. The problem is, though, I project a false view of myself. I'd have to say something like "To me, the concept of God is nonsense," which would be closer to the truth, but it's about my intuition and doesn't easily lead to rational talk. And, also, people tend to miss the "to me," so I have to explain that I'm a relative of some sort (which sort I'm not even sure of myself), and... So it's just easier to say stuff like "God doesn't exist." But I use that rarely, and only as a conversation ender, and only if I feel the person I'm talking to isn't going to view this as a challange.

Well, I won't bite.

How do you get to the belief that the concept of God is nonsense?

I grew up the son of Catholic person, but my belief in God to the extent that it was there to begin with never grew up with me for some reason. I always knew who got my Christmas presents; my parents made no secret of it. But around Christmas they'd never admit to that; it's always the local equivalent of Santa around that time of the year. (Add to that me being an animal geek and never seeing the easter bunny as anything else than an amusing absurdity.) It's possible I thought believing in God was a similar game? To be honest, I don't remember. I do know I don't remember a moment when I realised I didn't believe in God. I do remember worrying about telling my mother about it (which would have had to be somewhere between 9 and 12 I think?). I don't know how that came to be.

Mormanism for lil ol me.

It's the new Catholicism. Flashier. More blatantly racist. ;)

As you can see, I have fond thoughts for the faith of my birth :D

I'm fairly relaxed about being an atheist, mostly because I'm living in a fairly secular society (Austria), and religion is mostly a private affair people don't ask about, and when they learn you're an atheist people aren't prone to argue (unless there's nothing else to do; most of my face-to-face discussions happened in trains). There are... incompatibilities. For example, when my mum's down turning to God's a source of comfort, so God talk would come naturally to her when sees me feeling down, but that's precicely the moment I have the least tolerance for God talk. I can't or don't want to spare the effort to translate.

A computer metaphor might help: I'm running the OS unLucky-relativist, and it doesn't natively run programs written for DeusVult; all that's available is a shoddily written emulator and it takes up a lot of processing power, and the programs won't run as intended anyway. So when I need to run intensive debugging routines because the OS acts up, also running the emulator could crash the system. But not running the emulator might cause background processes like Interaction to crash...

Hrmm... think I understand what you're saying. I'd say it's possible to, say, switch out not just OS's, but even hardware, and that the hardware morphs along with the OS in a weird (dialectic? no... no! it can't be! :D)

I'd say that the worldviews are likely incommensurable, up front, but that one can eventually develop a way of commensurating. (though, usually, no one is satisfied with such a language)