I'd call it "equivocation" -- because you both mean different things by "selfish"

How else would you draw a line between creatures and machines other than subjectivity?

Seems to me that they go hand-in-hand

Cool! And kudos to it -- I mean I linked a paper using this interpretation! :D For other reasons too, but I want to keep that interpretation in the conversation to make sure there's a possibility of a shared dialectic, in the end.

I'm meandering about, but my own madness has an eventual method when I allow me to get there.

Also, I thought he was a good pick, from the broader category of postmodernism, for TPF given that it seems he's widely read around here.

I'd be interested in trying to find something to read against this, in comparison.

Because I think that the interpretation offered by this paper is basically modernist, in its outlook: Nietzsche as naturalist, which I'm not sure I'd agree with that statement. At the very least it's not apparent that he's a naturalist, and there it seems reasonable to have other readings of Nietzsche -- and it seems this particular interpretation is what the paper I linked is working through and with.


But in the wider sense of postmodern philosophy, we probably wouldn't read him this way. It was just a free and accessible source that could be shared amongst those still interested - something that could be shared other than impressions and opinions.

I'm having a gander at this. I thought maybe, given the breadth of postmodernism so far agreed to, and the other conversation, Nietzsche might be fruitful.

https://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/761/1/K_Gemes_Truth.pdf

EDIT: I should be quick to point out that I'm not endorsing the reading of Nietzsche, but using Gemes thoughts to springboard into the OP. Through all this meandering, I am trying to bring it back around

If people mistreat life-like robots or AI they are (to an extent) toying with doing so to real humans. There's several parts of the brain involved in moral decision-making which do not consult much with anywhere capable of distinguishing a clever AI from a real person. We ought not be training our systems how to ignore that output. — Isaac

What this discussion shows is that as soon as an observable criteria for consciousness is set out a clever programer will be able to "simulate" it.

It follows that no observable criteria will ever be sufficient.

But of course "phenomenal experience" can only be observed by the observer, and so cannot serve as a criteria for attributing consciousness.

So this line of thought does not get anywhere.

Whether some piece of software is conscious is not a technical question. — Banno

These two go along nicely together, and also stimulate some of my thinking on underlying issues with respect to the relationship between knowledge and ethics (which is super cool! But I'm going to stay on topic)

I agree that, at bottom, there is no scientific matter at stake. A trained producer of scientific knowledge wouldn't be able run a process, interpret it, and issue a reasonable inference on every being in some kind of Bureau of Moral Inspection to whether or not we will be treating this one as if it is a moral being or not.

In fact, while comical to think on at a distance, it would, in truth, be horrific to adjudicate moral reasoning to a bureaucratic establishment dedicated to producing knowledge, issuing certificates of analysis on each robot, alien, or person that they qualify. Not even in an exaggerated sense, but just imagine a Brave New World scenario where, instead of a science of procreation being run by the state to institute natural hierarchies to create order, you'd have a state scientific bureau determining what those natural hierarchies already are --

Functionally speaking, not much different.


Also, naturally we are hearing this for a reason -- the news is literature! And Google wants to make sure it still looks good in the eyes of the public in spite of firing this guy, especially because the public will be more credulous when it comes to A.I. being sentient.

Another reason to be hesitant to immediately agree. After all -- what about the time the guy is right? Will Alphabet corporation have our moral worth at the heart of their thinking when they want to keep a sentient A.I. because it's more useful to own something sentient?


No, I'd say it's far more sensible to err on the side of caution, because of who we will become if we do not.

Derrida's goal/s with "deconstruction" is one thing, the implications and applicability of what he proposes are quite another thing; and it's the self-refuting nature of the latter – in effect, reducing 'all' truth-making discourses to 'nothing but' tendentious rhetoric – which many critics like me take issue with. — 180 Proof

The term ‘self-refuting’ tips me off to the root of the issue here, which is less about Derrida in particular than about every one of the numerous philosophical discourses thar have appeared over the past 100 year which take their leave from Nietzsche’s
critique of truth — Joshs

I suspect most philosophical discourses in the last twenty-four centuries since Pyrrho of Elis refute themselves either partially or, the case of sophists, completely. — 180 Proof

Going back to this exchange - I've decided I was wrong at the outset of this thread. Given that this is TPF, I think there's probably enough coherence of belief, here, that one could reasonably begin to speak about post-modern philosophy. My original position was merely instinctive and reactive, but unfair and not really based on considered judgment.

And, even more so -- given that this is where we landed after trying to discuss names -- well, then my proposed solution simply didn't work.

EDIT: Was hoping to be able to say more but -- can't! :D Nothing useful anyways. But it's a pondering silence...

Derrida's goal/s with "deconstruction" is one thing, the implications and applicability of what he proposes are quite another thing; and it's the self-refuting nature of the latter – in effect, reducing 'all' truth-making discourses to 'nothing but' tendentious rhetoric – which many critics like me take issue with. — 180 Proof

The term ‘self-refuting’ tips me off to the root of the issue here, which is less about Derrida in particular than about every one of the numerous philosophical discourses thar have appeared over the past 100 year which take their leave from Nietzsche’s
critique of truth — Joshs

I suspect most philosophical discourses in the last twenty-four centuries since Pyrrho of Elis refute themselves either partially or, the case of sophists, completely. — 180 Proof

Might be a good place to call it -- seems we're back around to post-modernism, considered generally.

OK, fair. I just glanced over it, and started to wonder. I'll give it a look. My bad.

I mean, I read the Gorgias some time ago, tho re-reading and re-re-reading isn't bad. I feel like your take on Derrida is unfair, so far, though. But it's only a feeling, and as I've said before I'm in the halfway house. I'm going to wait to see what @Joshs has to say because I feel they're in a better position than I to respond -- but we'll see. As always, I hope to bring some amount of agreement between participants in a thread.

I feel you're making assertions I cannot evaluate, because I'm only responding to some of the takes on Derrida that I feel confident enough to refute. How do you feel about 180 Proof's statement @Joshs ?

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/570551 — 180 Proof

I believe I answered this charge here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/707330

I just mean before Derrida.

But then it would seem that Hume wouldn't undermine Derrida, but get along with him?

That's why I asked, because I'm not sure if your reading of Hume is in some sense undermining Derrida, or if it's just that Derrida is not original due to Hume.

OK -- so are you contesting that Hume basically did it first, more or less?

@180 Proof

I guess what I really see in Derrida -- my interest in him -- is what I often see in philosophers. There's a unique perspective there that I don't see anyone else really doing or trying to do within philosophy.

The broadening of philosophical activity is a natural goal and interest of mine, given that I'm not within the institutions of academia but this stuff still floats about my head, and Derrida's project naturally lends itself to broadening the notion of philosophy.

And I see it as a continuation of -- in line with -- the philosophical project. If Derrida is no skeptic -- and at this point in the thread it seems we're pretty much in agreement on that, minus Jackson due to Hume -- then his is a response to the problem of skepticism, ye olde classic question that marks the traditional history of the modern era of philosophy.

Not at all. I just don't understand your "preference" re: Derrida. That's not my "preference" versus yours, only intellectual honesty on my part. :,point: — 180 Proof

Ahhh -- ok. That's fair. Plus, it keeps things interesting when we find places to dispute rather than simply dismiss.

I guess I just don't feel challenged because it seems to me to be a matter of preference, but then when I say so it seems like you don't acknowledge it's a matter of preference. It seems you still want to say that your preference is right.

Alright, @Jackson -- if you're willing to spit it out I'm willing to hear it. How does Hume undermine all of this? I believe that's basically last we left off.

Heh, you say that -- but from my perspective it seems you keep coming back! :D

OK, this is interesting.

So, it is safe to say deconstruction is not a way of proceeding in the world. And it's larger than what I was imputing -- a way of reading a philosophical work.

I'm honestly at a stage where I cannot tell if deconstruction is algorithmic or not, though I do see it as a method. In the same way that analysis is a method, though not algorithmic (you can begin an analysis anywhere, and an analysis relies upon the interpretive machinery being brought to the material, which varies depending on the analyzer)

I see patterns, though -- something is going on. And, much to my relief, it seems some others here are able to corroborate, and disentangle, some of my impressions and wonderings

However, in line with what I've been saying about how one reads a text, I was only able to begin to tease out what was going on by doing a soft reading, and reading what others who had read were saying. And I was intrinsically motivated to do so just because I like philosophy on the whole -- like a nerd who just likes things and starts to learn about them on his own because the nerd likes them.

So for me the whole idea of defending a philosopher is already something I'm not really doing. It's easy to refute philosophy -- all you need to do is say "Nope!" , and insofar that you or your audience are satisfied your refutation is complete. I've long ago given up on proselytizing philosophy to others -- if they have the interest then great! And if not, then I don't know how to impart the bug. It's just a matter of preference, as far as I can tell. Or maybe accident.

Heh, I, for one, never think there's anything useful in philosophy -- so asking me, well... I'm the wrong source. :)

But there is something beautiful in it, at times. And seeing that beauty requires me to put aside my own projects and try to understand why someone would go on the way they did.

In the most general sense, for understanding deconstruction! :D But also clearing grime off old memories.

One of the questions I'm coming to right now is this notion the thread started with -- of deconstruction deconstructing itself -- and trying to draw out a communicable distinction between refutation and deconstruction. Because if Derrida had wanted to refute Husserl or Saussure, then I don't think he'd have to develop deconstruction -- it would be straightforward, right?

In Streetlight's quote the beginnings of an answer:

Deconstruction starts with an interrogation of a variety of contradictions and aporias in the discourse of philosophy. These are not contradictions and aporias proper, however, since the discourse of philosophy accommodates them without difficulty

Somehow the problems Derrida are interested -- or the question driving his writing -- will easily be swept away in this old style.

But reflecting back onto deconstruction -- it would mean that refutation isn't the goal of deconstruction. And that perhaps deconstruction deconstructing itself would actually be an affirmation?

After all, that's just good old self-consistency, yes?

Really? I actually found it helpful.

I was just responding to what you said -- you prefer Tristan Tzara.

Thanks for all these. This is good stuff to work with. One of the problems I was having in thinking through what to quote is there was always these two layers of interpretation in quoting Derrida -- the text he's deconstructing, and his own moves with the text: but these are great bits for fusing those two nicely in a neat package.

We all have our preferences -- surely you can see how there's more value to deconstruction than what the original article stated though, yes?

This is good. Then I think I'm on the right track.

You may ask! However, there are others in the thread who'd do better than I -- and, in truth, the whole thread is basically asking this question :D What, after all, is deconstruction? Surely we should have read some Derrida before pondering this -- and I'll admit to simply feeling a little lazy -- but it would only be a pondering worth having if you've read something, I think. Else, you'd just repeat what I said.

Heh. It's a good role to play. One I'm appreciating, given where my understanding is at.

I have no quote on his skepticism. One of the reasons I've said he's the opposite of his cartoon is it always seemed like he cared a great deal about the philosophical project -- just in his own particular way that seemed hard to enunciate.

Heh. Funnily enough, at least with where I'm at now with Derrida, I'd still agree that he's a skeptic here :D -- at least, because of my understanding of having knowledge.

I sometimes read philosophy in that mode, and sometimes I read philosophy in another mode. With respect to Derrida I'd say that I'm attempting to maximize the meaning of the text -- basically when I'm attempting to understanding something I'm trying to be as charitable as I can be, hence my introducing the hard/soft distinction earlier for interpretation (which obviously could go by other names too).

I don't think there's a correct reading of a text, there are just correct readings. There are erroneous readings of various degrees or kinds, and then there's some good readings -- some more creative than others, but mostly good and within bounds of the texts I read.

I think this is a different sort of reading than what I'm giving. Can you see the difference? Or is there a real reading to which you're referring, a reading of Hume that is the right reading of Hume?

Perhaps for Hume there isn't really that necessity (I mean, if I were to talk strictly of Kant, I wouldn't call him a skeptic -- since he squarely denies being a skeptic! -- but for the purposes of this conversation, I can see him being included, when thinking on Derrida). If we start to zoom in on Hume I'm sure I'd have more to say -- but it does seem to make sense of the quote to me, which is all I was going for. This bit of Hume made sense of that bit of Husserl -- and so a pattern of sorts is established between us, some points of reference for beginning to talk among one another.

But I'm willing to hear another interpretation, or perhaps Husserl's sentence is so off that it really should be dismissed out of hand? However, given that this is at least something we've shared together, I'd rather not do that. I'm hoping to come up with some kind of shared understanding.

Cool.

"skepticism insists on the validity of the factually experienced world, that of actual experience,
and finds in it nothing of reason or its ideas."

So, moving over to "and finds in it nothing of reason or its ideas" -- for me, necessity -- in Hume -- is the concept that makes the most sense of the quote, because necessity is the concept that definitely isn't part of our experience: our experience is the constant correspondence of events, and through habit we assign said necessity, but it is nowhere to be found in experience, ala Hume's argument.

Is it not a fact that you experience? A little simpler than The World of Facts or something phenomenological, just the world I experience, and "I experience the world" is a fact.

I read it as "the world experienced" -- as in, the world I experience, in fact.

“Unremittingly, skepticism insists on the validity of the factually experienced world, that of actual experience,
and finds in it nothing of reason or its ideas.”( Crisis of European Sciences) — Joshs

No worries. Cross-posting between different posters is all. This is where it's from.

What for? At this point I'm only parsing theories from one another, making distinctions, that sort of thing -- attempting to come up with something of a shared usage of language, given the many places we all come from and the way categorical nouns tend to make us misunderstand one another.