I won't dwell on donuts any more (never liked them anyway, or bagels for that matter), but I am a bit puzzled by this. Why not 2-dimensional holes? A hole in a plane, for example, would be 2D (or even 1D if it's just one point). Or did I misunderstand you? — SophistiCat

You understood me fine.

Is it fair to call a gap in a number line a hole?

I think it has some similar problems to holes we see in the ground, except that it has the disadvantage of being yet even more abstract. At the very least with holes I can plant trees into them, fall into them, and so forth -- there's a causal interactive network. I'm not as confident when it comes to describing two-dimensional holes because it seems that for any series or function, if there is a hole in it, then that section is simply not defined or is said to not exist.

But perhaps we don't mean all the rest when we say "hole" and simply just mean this gap -- so that the natural number line is filled with holes (and if we can say the space between numbers exists, there would even be more hole than there are numbers)

Well, one way out of the predication argument, for someone who doesn't want to admit holes into their ontology, would be to claim that any talk about a hole can be translated into talk about stuff (similarly to how, according to Russell, names can be eliminated by replacing them with definite descriptions). — SophistiCat

Definitely! That was what my attempt was at saying the hole in Kimberley is Kimberley arranged hole-wise (so that the relationship is not named, but is instead a predicate, and of course we can also get rid of names if we wish and then even Quine the description so that the hole is not a hole but is holing and existing ;)) -- I think that's what the materialist would have to do, is translate the sentence into something more philosophically rigorous.

(This is where you came in with your flat torus counterexample, but I don't think it works.) — SophistiCat

No worries. I'm fine with dropping it if it's not persuasive.

This isn't wrong, but as I alluded to above, I take a looser, more pluralistic stance on ontology and am willing to go along with your/Quinean reasoning. Things exist by virtue of playing a role in our conceptual schemes. Or to put it a slightly different way, each thing exists within the context of those schemes in which it has a role to play - and that's good enough, as far as being and non-being are concerned. — SophistiCat

How would you answer @creativesoul's charge of things not existing prior to conceptual schemes, then?

(Interestingly, in solid state physics holes can be very active players indeed: they can pop in and out, move around, attract, repel, scatter and be scattered...)

Cool.

For me I'm not trying to delve into scientific descriptions here because I think such descriptions assumes too much.

Rather, I would like to build up to things like scientific knowledge than take scientific knowledge as my ontology.

I don't mean where are the horns, but where are the unicorns.

That's clearly just a representation of a unicorn, and not a unicorn.

:D

I've already dropped the point. Do you want me to give you a button that says "winner"?

If so, then here it is: You are the winner. I was wrong and you were right.

What is the secret to being happy in a foxhole? — baker

I don't think there is one. We are vulnerable, weak, and even pathetic creatures -- invulnerability, happiness in spite of circumstances, is a myth. When life is miserable then it makes sense that we are too.

No you can't. Unicorns have horns is true but I can't infer they exist from that fact. — Benkei

I've thought such things before, too, but now i'm going to ask you:

If Unicorns have horns, where are they?



The other thought I had was simply to accept their truth but translate the sentence, but it's not as interesting I don't think -- and I think the above response gets at a strength to the approach I'm using.

C'est la vie! :D

We can repeat ourselves if you want.

"All donuts have holes" is false because there exists a donut without a hole. Where? Right there! Pacman's world is donut shaped, unless the surface of a donut is somehow not the shape of a donut, or unless we assume that donuts must have holes simply because that's how we define them.

Now perhaps you're just not convinced -- you're like, hey, no, this is definitely a rectangle. OK, no problem. I disagree that "donut" is analytic or a priori -- it's a word that denotes a shape, denotes a pastry, denotes tires, denotes the motion that things move in. . . and even the denotation of a shape need not be analytic. We can, upon coming to see some other feature of the world -- such as 2-dimensional space which behaves like the surface of a donut -- think that it might be OK to call this thing a donut cuz it's close enough.

But I gather you don't want to. I'm alright with that. It's not really a logical point -- it's just the way we're looking at the problem. To you "All donuts have holes" is true, because that's what it means to be a donut, which means that it'd be impossible -- by the very criteria you're spelling out -- to give you an example. But only because there are specific criteria -- that is asserting "All donuts have holes" is true because of a definition is simply stipulating the boundaries that you're willing to accept when using the word "donut".

No worries. We can agree to disagree. It's not going to collapse the foundations of logic as we know it.

So let's go ahead and skip to the argument from predicates.

The hole in Kimberley is 0.17 km2
Kimberley is 164.3 km2

Both denoted entities have different predicates, so they are distinct from one another. And the hole has true predicates, so we are justified in inferring that the hole exists.

I am aware of these things, Benkei. It could just be that we disagree, you know?

Is there no difference between being taken account of and existing prior to that account?

Seems Quine doesn't honor/accept that distinction. — creativesoul

Just to make sure we're not delving into exegesis, as I also refused to with @180 Proof , let's just drop the name Quine and say "this account", if that's ok with you.

However, I certainly did not introduce anything like that. To exist is to be the value of a variable -- which is to say that first order predicate logic's existential operator is in use. So insofar that an entity is able to truthfully have something predicated of it, then we are justified in believing that it exists. And, I imagine we'd agree, that whether we speak about something doesn't influence its existence either, so sure things exist before we give accounts of them. I'm just not making a distinction really.

Not to be rude, but it seems we're at that point of repeating ourselves, no? I'm not sure what else to say than what I've already said, at least...

Haha I'm still figuring it out!

And maybe it's not the right way of putting it, but I've noticed I'm entertaining beliefs I would not have before, at least.

Holes provide a good example -- in another life I would have made a division between ordinary and philosophical speech (as I have here, but different), but would have favored a more scientific ontology that probably doesn't look at holes as really existing things but rather as artifacts of our cognitive apparatus -- so that statements like "The hole in Kimberley is 0.17 km2" would be true, but the background in which they were true is more like the Manifest Image rather than the Scientific Image.

Something along those lines. This is all very much an exploration for me still, even if I'm beginning to have some opinions on the matter.

(EDIT: A sort of naturalized Kantianism that I find myself no longer believing)

The premise being begged is in the first conditional: "all donuts have holes"

How do we know that?

By the definition of what a donut is.

Hence the charge.

I understand that you're not convinced by the example, so I won't continue on with it with you. But this charge doesn't change from dropping the example with you.

Likely this is a naive materialist response, but for the example in the OP, the word "hole" identifies a collection of physical objects occupying a particular space. What are the objects? Air molecules, dust, perhaps the odd bird that happens to fly by, etc. So this particular "hole" has mass and occupies a reasonably well defined space. To my naive way of thinking that's sufficient to say that it exists.

What about if this hole is on an airless asteroid in outer space - in a vacuum? There's no air. But there are still countless atomic and subatomic particles flying through, not to mention the quantum foam and energy fields that permeate even the deepest vacuum in space.

So I have no problem saying that holes exists. Not sure about shadows, tho. Will have to think about that some more. — EricH

If you happen to come up with a conclusion, please share it with me.

Honestly I find myself becoming more and more a naive realist, but being surprised at what that really entails...

Sure.

But if it's analytic, then I'd say my charge of begging the question still holds: it's a knowledge of self-definition.

A torus in 3D is not topologically equivalent to a rectangle — SophistiCat

The story is there to help understand why I'd say such a thing. Strictly speaking the torus is not in 3D, but rather space itself is a torus in Pacman's world, and in our perspective we represent that space as a rectangle that teleports to the other side -- it's the surface of a torus which is the shape of the space, not the whole donut itself.

Now, I'll fully grant that this, mathematically, is a bit beyond my ken and I'm making some guesswork. The topology of pacman's world was pointed out to me in an unrelated conversation I had some time ago, and it just occurred to me here. I believe they are correct, but I couldn't demonstrate it or prove it in a manner more rigorous than the story I've told.

(EDIT: Also this leads to the deliciousiously abstract and totally silly but still interesting question: Are there such things as 2-dimensional holes? lol)

In any case, finding one way to fail to detect a hole as a topological feature does not establish your general thesis, which I take to be that a hole cannot be conceptualized solely as a property of the entity that encompasses it — SophistiCat

At first I was uncertain about whether I'd posit that holes exist, but now I'm leaning towards the belief that holes exist. So, mostly, I think my thesis is just that holes exist, and I'm asking how you countenance that -- also, it's a question that gets at some of the popular topics 'round here without invoking the usual suspects ;)

I don't know if I'd say that it cannot be conceptualized that way... that's a bit more a priori than my approach has been so far. If the pacman example is wrong, consider the argument from predicates that I put towards Benkie here.

So my thesis is this: There exists a hole such that the hole is 0.17 km2, and it is in Kimberley.

And the question is: How's that work, on your view?

I pulled up some notional thoughts on Quine to jump from. What would you say about the existence of the hole?

The question is not whether you can conceptualize holes that way, but whether you must, as a matter of principle. — SophistiCat

I believe my question is a little broader -- upon accepting that holes exist, how do we then countenance our beliefs about inferring what exists?

I only needed one example because it was a direct response to @Benkei'sinquiry of a donut without a hole, which he seemed to believe was impossible.

Btw, that Feyerabend quote in your profile recall the pleasure I've had reading that book. Maybe time for another reread. :smirk: — 180 Proof

Hell yeah. :D

Still my favorite philosopher of science.

Or I'm not expressing what I mean intelligibly. — 180 Proof

Do you think you could give it another go?

*shrugs* Ok. I guess I just don't understand it, then.

Ahhhh, OK. Sorry for misunderstanding.

So the aspect you're referencing is void -- there is stuff and void, though void is more present than stuff.

So you agree that holes exist because materiality has void, and there's nothing unusual in admitting that void has being? Does that sound like a fair inference of your take?

I don't think it works like that. Consider that you can make a doughnut from the plane in two ways; make a horizontal cylinder and bend it round, or make a vertical cylinder and bend it round.

So I make a horizontal cylinder, but standing at the back of flat Pac-world, and the 'corners are now left and right middle facing me. Now I bend the cylinder around, and the corners are on the inside of the hole facing away from me. Or I can do the same thing with the vertical cylinder. So is the hole N-S or E-W? Or to put it another way, one pair of edges forms the inner ring around the hole, and the other pair goes through the hole. But which is which? — unenlightened

Ok, I got a piece of paper out to simulate these movements and I think I'm following, now. Please correct me if I'm not :D.

I think I would agree with you if Pac-man's world were a Taurus within our space. So if we pulled pac-man's world off the screen and bent it into a donut in our space then yes, I agree.

However I think I'd say that Pac-man's world's space is shaped like a Taurus, in the same way our space resembles Euclidean geometry at the scales we're used to. So there isn't a hole at all or edges at all, and if Pac-man stands at the origin of our screen, where he'd be in four places at once, this is just because we are projecting the Taurus shape onto a 2-dimensional representation so that we, in the empirical space we're used to operating within, can see it easily.

After all, it's donut shape isn't obvious -- I got this from somebody else, I didn't make it up :D.

So for Pacman, at least, there is no through the hole or outside the hole -- rather, it is a Taurus without a hole.

It was the best interpretation I could give your assertion.

But apparently it was wrong.

I don't think I'd say that any void is a hole, then -- as you appear to be saying. Or perhaps you're just saying that there are no holes?

Hmm. Unicorns have a single horn. Harry Potter has a scar. ??? This seems a dangerous way round to put things, even if there is some way it makes sense. The danger is that one might think one can talk things into existence, and that is the essence of magic. I'd be much happier if you turned it around - 'if there is such a subject, then we are justified in inferring we can truthfully predicate.' Make the truth depend on the world rather than the world depend on truth. — unenlightened

I'm comfortable with that. Still thinking on your first paragraph.

My own view of the matter is that 'analytic philosophy' ended around 1979 or so, with its last major work being Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. It ended not because it was criticized or replaced – and the latter work is well within the tradition, just at its tail-end, rather than a repudiation of it – but rather because a new generation of philosophers simply replaced the old. There were some people, like say Dummett or Evans, that sort of continued the tradition after that point, but they're remnants lost in the general swarm of change that happened after that. — Snakes Alive

What, in your view, unites the standard story up to Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature?

I take the position that holes do not exist. There is no difference between the Grand Canyon and the Great Plains other than location, although I am not committed to location existing because, while we all talk about it, no one can tell me where it is. — Hanover

:D

It's right there, of course.

Materiality' is full of holes (wholly holey). Atomic structures are 99.99% empty. Some ancients say 'atoms swerving in void'. Yes, :ok: is an aspect of reality. — 180 Proof

I think that we're assuming a lot in making an assertion about atomic structure. Also, even granting their reality, I'm a little uncertain about calling the particle in a box a hole -- quantum stuff is weird, and doesn't really match up with things like chairs and holes and stars.

If a hole is an aspect of reality, then what is that aspect? What are the other aspects? Wouldn't everything that is real share in this aspect?

hat which is is that which stands out as a whole, and thereby stands out as an entirety which is other than its context, else other relating to that which is in relation to it, such as its parts. A hole stands out as an entirety which is other than its ground, and thereby is. There are parts to a hole (e.g. its left or right boundary or quadrant) but it nevertheless is cognized as an entirety and thereby stands out. Fairly confident there will be drawbacks to this approach - which, acknowledged, assimilates being with existence - but its an idea. — javra

Sounds good to me. Reading the SEP article the cognitive aspect of holes is part of why people think they exist -- as you say, they stand out as a whole.

A hole is the surroundingness of a doughnut; a row is the alignment of ducks; a marriage is the joining of two matched parts. If you treat the doughnut as single material object, then the hole is the way the nut relates to itself. Or the way Pacman's world joins up. Or the way the ground of Kimberly relates to itself. — unenlightened

So you would say that there is a hole in pacman's world, because the hole is a relation -- one which changes description depending on the donut. Do I understand you correctly?

I don't know where predicates and variables sit though they seem like linguistic affairs...

They are! But the approach I'm using puts emphasis on linguistic affairs :D

If we can truthfully predicate of some subject, then we are justified in inferring that there is such a subject. So the form of the statement is very important. Now, clearly we understand that there are things like gerunds and such, so we have to have a way of understanding subjects that aren't actually existent things. For that we analyze ordinary expressions into a clear statement.

Hence why I was asking about the relation you'd posit specifically -- but I think you're using a different idiom.

Also, I think it's important to note here that there are some statements which do not predicate of a subject -- statements that deal with relationship between entities are often like this. So the hole is in Kimberley. I know I started out like that, but I was being sloppy. I should have dealt with a property of the hole, i.e., its surface area, rather than its relationship -- though its curiosity is just that it is, as @fishfry pointed out from the SEP, a parasitic entity that does not exist unless there is something like "Kimberley" to be a hole within.

So it is quantification which indicates existence. We quantify over a predicate, and if said quantification produces a true statement, then we can say the subject of said sentence exists.

Also, this is why I tried to translate sentences into philosophically clear ones. That's all I mean by analysis here.

Incidentally, the topology of Pacman's world is rather odd, the corners all join together as if they were all bent round as in a sphere, but the way they join up is backwards, as if one were on the inside of the sphere. Hence the hole/no hole that doesn't know whether it runs one way or the other.

I think that might just be an artifact of it being a donut designed for 2-dimenional space. Like, if you imagine pulling pac-man's world into our space where the edges of the screen are are where they reconnect -- and that corner is just the place where we opened up the donut in two direction -- but we could have chosen to cut in the middle of the screen, so the speak -- it just would be very confusing for the player to play then :D

Except of course that's not a donut. It's a picture of a representation of one in two-dimensional space, while we know a donut is a three-dimensional object with a hole — Benkei

Do we? How's that?

If we know it by definition, then we're simply defining what we mean -- it's a stipulation. Which can work if we have something else we're arguing about, but when that's the very assertion under dispute I dare say we are begging the question.

Ahh, here we go -- an example of a donut without a hole that is less abstract:

Imagine you're in the middle of the page of this graph paper. Choose any direction to go in, and go straight. When you reach the edge of the paper, place yourself on the opposite side of the page. Continue walking.

This, topologically, is identical to a donut. It's not too hard to imagine either -- just think about what a donut looks like, and then mentally cut through exactly once so that you don't split it in half -- you'll have a cylindrical shape. Then cut down one edge of the cylinder and spread out the cylinder -- you'll have a plane.


A donut is a plane which is connected in the manner I'm describing. Were space donut shaped, rather than what we happen to experience, then this would just be common sense -- to get back to where you started all you need to do is keep walking.

In a way our Earth isn't so far off, it's just so large that we don't notice that it's actually spherical.

Now, if we lived on a donut within the space with which we were familiar -- empirical space as we know it -- we'd be able to look up, sometimes, and see the other side of the donut. But that's a donut in space as we know it, rather than a donut shaped space without a hole.


(EDIT: Just to avoid confusion, the holes in the paper are not what I'm talking about here)

Is Africa yellow just because the sand in the Sahara is? I really have trouble finding what your argument is so far. The immediate matter surrounding a hole is clearly not a hole. — Benkei

Hrrm, probably just misreading you. I'll try and restate in a different way to see if it clicks:


The hole is in Kimberley, South Africa.

Kimberley is 164.3 km2

The big hole is 0.17 km2


Let's just say that "Kimberley" designates the matter surrounding the hole. So Kimberley is clearly not the hole. And we can truthfully predicate of Kimberley that it is 164.3 km square, whereas we can truthfully predicate of the big hole -- its surface -- that it is 0.17 km2.

So, there are two different properties between the surrounding matter and the hole. We might go so far as to say that Kimberley is enholed, thereby indicating that there is a property of Kimberley, but that wouldn't change the fact that we can truthfully predicate of the hole a size different from Kimberley -- thereby indicating that they have different properties, and are separate from one another.

This all follows from the notion of "to be" I opened with.

If we can quantify over a predicate and create a true statement from said quantification, then whatever said statement uses to bound the variable exists -- in this case, the hole.

I think the question is, do properties exist? If so, then holes exist. I'm not committed one way or another because it depends on language use and definitions. Holes are a specific topographic feature such that an area without solid matter is surrounded by solid matter. If defined that way, the question arises do circles and squares exist? It's not particular to holes unless you insist holes ought to be defined by the absence of something. I don't like such a definition though, because I can't take a hole out of the context of the matter defining it because if I remove that matter I'm left with nothing. And this is the same with a square, if you take away the matter, I'm not left with a square but if I remove the square, I still have (amorphous) matter. — Benkei

I agree that if you take away the matter the hole does not exist -- were an asteroid to smash the Earth apart then, within the reference frame of the sun, the hole in Kimberley, South Africa will not be floating there in space without Kimberley being there.

I am not defining holes or arguing from definition in the sense of providing necessary and sufficient conditions -- I am using an ostensive definition, instead. This is a hole! So in your case we'll have to talk about pipes and 3/4" holes, or indentations in place of holes ;).

I am skeptical of holes being a typographic feature, however, given the ability to represent a donut on a plane without a hole in a topologically identical manner.

Cool.

I think we're closer in belief, then, actually -- and I misgrouped you.

I am of the belief that holes exist. It seems less queer to me than the alternative.

Keeping with my idiom, you'd simply agree that the hole exists, and that relations have a reality.

One thing that's queer about relations is that I wonder what can be predicated of them?

At least, this is where I'd be stuck in how I started...

Also, I want to know -- what is the relationship involved?


The difference between us, right now at least, is that I think there is a hole and some background material, and there is a relationship between these two entities -- and I posit an entity because shape is not adequate to address the hole in a donut, as a donut shape can be represented without a hole.

So I would say "The hole is in the ground", where the relationship is indicated by "in" -- not that this indicates being, since we're talking about relationships here, and I am not quantifying over a predicate here.


EDIT: Also, I want to note that I'm open to other approaches with respect to "to be" -- while I'm using a notion of Quine, I'd like other notions put forward and used to analyze or have a better understanding of holes. If you have such a notion aside from quantification I'm all ears.

This seems like a non-issue. Materialists are willing to accept that there is such a thing as space between two objects. It's an uncharitable interpretation of materialism to argue that they must commit to the space between two objects itself being some third material object. — Michael

Whoops! I missed you in my responses.

I don't think I'm arguing that. What I'm arguing is that the materialist is committed to the hole not existing -- it's the ground that exists arranged hole-wise.

Well, obviously different properties will be measured differently. Maybe I should've been clearer: why should we not treat the shape of an object as a property as we do for colour and texture? — Benkei

Well, because we can see the hole, and the hole has properties such as depth, width, and location -- and those properties differ from the properties of the ground, since the ground spreads out, and is certainly not shaped like a hole anywhere else. Would we call Africa a hole just because this one hole exists?

It's bloody ducks in a row all over again. 3 ducks exist and when you get them lined up, there's a row. Ducks in a row, not ducks and a row. Stuff exists and arrangements of stuff exist. a hole or a row is an arrangement. Or a relation, rather like a punch is a relation between a fist and a chin. If you're not sure that punches exist, get your wife or friend to do the experiment with their fist and your chin.

It might turn out that stuff is an arrangement of weirdness (another arrangement). Try not to panic. — unenlightened

I think there's a difference here... I agree that relation is important, but I'd say the relation is between the donut (a shape) and the hole. A donut can be represented, topologically, in a two dimensional space that wraps around -- if you imagine walking on a piece of paper, as you get to the top you immediately appear on the bottom. Were you in such a space -- which we don't empirically witness in our world, but is easily imaginable -- there would be no hole, but the shape would remain the same -- at least from a topological perspective.

But there be a hole I see, and I certainly don't deny its existence -- only noting that its existence is curious.

This Quinean criterion for
'ontological commitment' only refers to objects that 'exist' within given discourses (e.g. geometry, topology, etc) and does not refer to matters of fact (e.g. donut & sphincters) — 180 Proof

Now you're tempting me with my true bait -- exegesis.

But I'm going to use all of my willpower and not debate the meaning of Quine -- and just note that I'm using some of his words as a conceptual jumping off point, not exploring a consequence or a reductio of his philosophy.

To my understanding, at least, "to be is to be the value of a variable" is in reference to objects and predicates. Insofar that you can truthfully predicate of some object therein will you find what it means to exist.

So if "The hole is 3/4 of an inch in diameter" is true, then we can certainly conclude that there exists such a hole.

No Heidegger yet? Cf "The Thing" and his discussion of just what a jug is. — tim wood

Welllll... did he ever really propose what it means to be? He kind of got stuck in his own interpretative circle looking for how one could possibly understand the very question "what is the meaning of being?" -- how on Earth would he know if a hole exists? ;)

But by all means, you can be the one to bring in the ontology of Heidegger, rather than Quine, and bring us illumination on the topic. I'd love to read it! That is why I started the thread.

I think I can group @hypericin , @Benkei , @unenlightened together a little with this one response, though I'll give some direct responses below too.

I would interpret you, within the idiom I'm attempting to phrase this in at the moment, as believing that there is no real hole in the ground. Rather, there is the ground, and we predicate of the ground a shape -- in this case a hole. So in ordinary language we say "the hole is deep", but through analysis we'd translate this as "the ground is shaped hole-wise" or something like that. It's clunky to read, but it fits within the framework between subject and predicate.

So in the first we'd formalize as ∃xL(x) ^ (x = "hole"), I think.
And in the second we'd formalize as ~∃(x)L(x) ^ (x = "hole"), and H(x) ^ (x = "ground")

Hopefully I'm doing that right. The important thing, from my perspective, is that you are asserting that there is no such thing as a hole unto itself, but rather, there are material things (the ground) which are placed into a hole-wise relation.


I'll follow up with individual responses, but I want to keep this post general for now just to share where my mind is moving.

Well, color we could say is electromagnetic waves.

Texture strikes me as a little funny, but it's not so in the same way. If I say that a pipe feels smooth, then that is in the predicate position -- thus linguistically indicating that there is something predicated of an object, the pipe.

Hence why I thought you were making an argument about natural language meaning -- that when we say "hole", in the subject position of the sentence, we actually are referring to a property of the pipe, rather than saying the hole itself has a property.

But a hill is made of something -- dirt and rock and such. That's the strange part about holes. (or shadows, too, as has been mentioned -- similar sort of thing going on).


It's not space itself in question, though. It's not a space that's there -- it's a hole!

Would it matter either way?

For what it's worth, I just woke up early.

If language is fine as it is, then "this hole is 3/4 inch in diameter" is true.


Which would indicate, linguistically at least, that "hole" is not a predicate -- but a subject.

So we'd be in the queer position of believing true sentences that refer to things that don't exist if that were the case.

So, as you would have it, when we say something like

"The hole is five feet wide"

if we wanted to be literally rather than metaphorically true we should instead say

"The ground is holey"

?

The creation of analytic/continental philosophy as a historical category definitely escaped me -- I basically had the standard history in my head before reading this, though I would use that history to attempt to demonstrate that there is not a meaningful distinction if the topic happened to come up. This is definitely a new take on that!

I would still say I agree with him, though -- that there should be something driving a philosophy, be it political or moral or something, that isn't just "pure inquiry", given the inability to step out of our political lives. And I would encourage a reorientation to such an approach -- it seems to me that many would see this as giving up on some kind of ideal of the philosopher. But the best philosophers in history were those engaging in contemporary issues. Even Kant had contemporary issues in mind while writing what appears to be a Pure Critical Inquiry that seems entirely a-political.



I wonder how Heidegger fairs, on this account? :D

I guess there is something of this idealization of the philosopher in my own mind, still, since I do enjoy Heidegger even though I find myself nodding along to this article.

Let's go a step further.

If holes exist, then there exists at least one entity which does not have a material basis -- rather, a hole is something of a relational entity that exists because of the shape of material things. Therefore, not everything that exists is material.

So, if we admit holes exist, we must reject materialism.

EDIT: And so the sciences fall to the humble hole, and not the grandiose plans of the religious ;)

True! But surely that's different :D

Or no?