@StreetlightX @fdrake

That contrast between space-as-concept and space-as-experienced helped me parse out the last paragraph a lot, so thanks for that. There is something I think I'd highlight in the intro, though, from the beginning:

It is known that geometry assumes, as things given, both the notion of space and the first principles of constructions in space. She gives definitions of them which are merely nominal, while the true determinations appear in the form of axioms. The relation of these assumptions remains consequently in darkness; we neither perceive whether and how far their connection is necessary, nor a priori, whether it is possible.

From Euclid to Legendre (to name the most famous of modern reforming geometers) this darkness was cleared up neither by mathematicians nor by such philosophers as concerned themselves with it.

I think that the "darkness" referred to above is the relations between the assumptions geometry has -- I take it he means the 5 postulates of Euclids system as the primary example, though he does allude to the thought that there can be other axioms. As I read him here it seems that Reimann is motivated to understand the possible justification for just these axioms, and wants to understand the relationship they have to one another -- whether they are necessary, whether they are universal, and whether they are even possible.

Nothing to disagree with here, just highlighting something that leapt out. It does seem, as we go on, that he believes that these axioms are not necessary a priori, but have to be justified by reference to experience -- and so the project changes to ask just how far we are justified in trusting just these axioms.

In particular why this leapt out for me was because of the next sentence I sat puzzling over for awhile:

it. The reason of this is doubtless that the general notion of multiply extended magnitudes (in which space-magnitudes are included) remained entirely unworked

I pretty much just had to take this on faith to keep on going, but I didn't understand why this was even the next step in the line of reasoning - much less why it was doubtless.

I look forward to it. I already got a head start, and I'll definitely benefit from reading with others on this one. It's pretty dense for me. :D

I will say that over time I tend to think of Kuhn as orthogonally to the other two. Feyerabend shared some of Kuhn's thoughts with respect to incommensurability, but their goals in writing were very different. Kuhn kind of goes back and forth between the sociology of scientific groups to how scientific thought functions, and because of his emphasis on the social aspect of scientific work he seems to be a lot more radical than he really is. Feyerabend is responding more specifically to certain strands of the philosophy of science, and is less concerned with scientists as much as he is concerned with scientism. And, given his early work, it always struck me that his concern was born out of a kind of self-criticism. But he is really focused on thinking about science, and less about the sociology of science.

That is to say it is logically impossible for Popper's criterion of demarcation to be false? Or do you mean to say that because it plays a prescriptive role it does not make sense to say his criterion is true or false? Or what?

However, because of the Popperian influence of the sciences, these people are criticised beyond belief and noone takes their theories seriously. — Pelle

I'm not sure that it's because of Popper. I'd say it's just because of argument.

If we were to apply Feyerabend’s doctrine of science to the academies however, we would have a problem. The poor scientific performance of these pseudoscientists could be rationalized by ”pluratiy of method” and ”anything goes”. Science would infected by improductive forces. That is my primary concern — Pelle

Is it a doctrine of science? I don't think that's quite right. In a sense, yes, but also it's a description of science at the most general level. There is a sense in which Feyerabend argues science shouldn't be so constrained as it is now. And the counter is the point out some fairly uncontroversial examples of non-scientific thinking that could then be part of the academy. But my thought is just -- so what? For you, at least, your concern is about productivity. I'll respond to that below.

Also, I feel as if you’re being very uncharitable about what could be considered useful. In my opinion, anything that brings us closer to the truth is fundamentally useful, which includes philosophy, language study and the Humanities. — Pelle

It's more that "useful" is a group-relative evaluation. Useful could be construed broadly, and it can also be construed narrowly -- but it's certainly relative to whatever goal or value a group or person happens to hold. Though "use" isn't Popper's criteria, so I don't think he falls to such a criticism. For him it's simply that his prescriptions don't mimic obvious examples of productive science, so his prescriptions need to be more limited than what he sets out. But if that be the case, then he hasn't answered the question of the criterion which he set out to answer.

I suspect the question he sets out for himself is not answerable really, at least for the standards that he sets for himself. "Science" is one of those things that can't be crystalized into a method because it is a human activity which includes novelty, human emotion, and so forth. It's often more like an art than a science, except we call it science because of its dedication to clarity, precision, empiricism, and other broad values of knowledge production where art has no such commitments (and it need not to). It may not be exactly like a family resemblance term, but "science" does seem like a family resemblance term.

There is: The Criterion of Demarcation. — Inis

I take it that here you'll refer me to my copy of LSD? :D

But you can answer the question too. Suppose the criterion of demarcation does not hold, and not only that that there is no such criteria. What would be the more honest approach? To invent a more elaborate theory of science with better fidelity, or to point out that there is no such theory?

This would be against the Scientific Method, and ruled out by the criterion of demarcation. — Inis

I think this sets out a beautiful example of just how the criterion of demarcation works in practice. We have the pure and the impure, and the impure? We need not consider them.

But I would say that good old fashioned arguments are good enough to sort out the good and the bad, and we don't need some criteria to say which is worthy and which is not worthy of our consideration.

Which isn't to say we need to consider everything. We could just not be interested in it. But that's a different stance than from one on high.

well, along as universities are publicly funded I don't want my taxes to go to something that will ultimately lacks usefullness. Science is about solving problems, but Marxism nor Creationism solve problems: they merely provide explanations taken directly from their ideological framework (which is essentially a set of conclusions). Basically, their work festers in confirmation bias, which I think would be dangerous for academia and civilization as whole — Pelle

Usefulness is a dangerous cudgel. For one there are many pursuits whose fruit are only born on the wave of seemingly useless inquiries -- consider philosophy, the study of foreign language, history, art, or even many of the sciences. There are scientists who study some phenomena not because it relates to the cure for cancer, better batteries, more incredible bombs, or more efficient processes but simply because it interests them. Anything useful is appended after the fact as an act of justification to appease the masters of utility that hang their crosses around academia.

Further, usefulness is relative to a group. Marxism or creationism are useful to Marxists and creationists. And naturally, should they gain power, they wouldn't find the bourgeois or atheist sciences terribly useful. Should they be allowed to ban them on this criteria of usefulness?

I believe they'd even be able to provide arguments that their work is, in fact, falsifiable while the work of bourgeois scientists and atheist scientists is mired in the preconceptions they are unable to let go of and is really just an elaborate way to emphasize their own bias.

Then, for two, what's better is for people to simply be motivated by curiosity and to explore questions.


Science is about a lot of things aside from problem solving, and there are many other subjects that don't fall into its purview which also get funding. If research institutions are to be free then it seems to me that usefulness, and other criteria, are just cudgels to exclude said freedom. Reason, in all its fallibility, is good enough to sort out bad arguments. We don't need criteria to sort out the pure from the impure.

I realize that his intent was to multiply knowledge by multiplying metod — Pelle

Hrmm? I don't think I said anything about intent, or that he was multiplying knowledge -- only that his approach isn't anti-knowledge, but rather against some over-arching methodology which characterizes science universally. Something like Popper's project, in fact, as that's exactly who he's responding to.

, but his unwillingness to outline what science is is a huge issue.

What if there is no specific set of criteria that captures all science? Wouldn't it be more honest to not describe it if that were the case?

If Feyerabend's ideas were to be applied to the scientific enterprise, things with merely heuristical (if even that) use would appear a lot more in the academies like Marxist Science, Creation Science and Astrology. — Pelle

I guess the response here is -- so what? If someone wants to run a research program on Marxist Science, Creation Science, and Astrology, who cares? I can tell you the specific reasons why I don't believe in this or that set of beliefs. But there's no reason to have an over-arching theory of knowledge to safeguard the sanctity of academia. I can respond in kind to any sort of research program or argument.

Creation science, for instance, can be best characterized by William Dembski, I think. I can go through his paper and I understand the argument and I understand why I disagree with it, rather than simply say "well, he's a creationist, and so it is not scientific, and so it is unworthy of academia, and so it is bad" -- putting him to the side without ever engaging him. I don't really care if he has a research program. What harm could possibly come from it?

As far as I'm concerned science is about having fun exploring questions and answers. Once you lose that then it's just another day job with a little bit more math thrown in.

how could we ever know anything? — Pelle

I don't think that Feyerabend is quite so anti-knowledge as you're putting it. Rather, his stance is one that emphasizes a multiplicity of ways of knowing, rather than having some arch-method by which we can designate good from bad knowledge. His epistemic anarchy or dada-ism has more to do with a hesitation to generate a general theory of science or knowledge as a whole than it does in being against knowledge.

What he undermines is not knowledge, but universality or hierarchy of knowledges where there is a queen of all knowledge. The phrase "anything goes" is one which describes his universal theory of knowledge -- or, in a way, is just a way of saying there is no universal theory of knowledge or a queen of knowledge.

But that doesn't mean we know nothing.

To some extent -- sure. But not a universal prescription for all science. That's why I was saying that Popper's problems are one of scope and prescription.

What sort of prescriptive things do you not like? The requirement to be open to criticism, and to subject one's ideas to the harshest of tests? How a bout the requirement to not appeal to any authority, or that a scientific theory must yield testable statements about reality? — Inis

All of the above! Things should certainly be immune to criticism, and easy tests are far superior. Authority should reign supreme, and testable statements about reality are bunk.

:D

Actually, I am hesitant about "Must yield testable statements about reality", though I am responding with sarcasm here.

More seriously: generally speaking, I don't feel keen on prescriptive theories of science at all -- that science should fit a philosopher's conception of knowledge for his particular concerns about knowledge is just too a priori for me. I prefer a more historical, and therefore empirical, approach to understanding the beast called science.

There are more subtle requirements, like given the choice of two theories, one should choose the one with higher empirical content, because it will be more falsifiable. — Inis

Feyarebend uses this requirement with respect to Galileo. If you haven't read Feyerabend then I'd really recommend it. He was, after all, heavily influenced by Popper. He knew what he was talking about.

Of course, this is only a superficial account, but these ideas seem rather good to me. — Inis

They do! The only problem is that they do not resemble how science is actually done in a universal sense.

The problem with Popper isn't that he influenced some people to think differently. That is what good philosophy does, and while I disagree with Popper I certainly think he is a good philosopher -- that is, he is worth reading.

On one angle I suppose I feel frustrated with Popper not because of Popper, but because of Pop-Popper. "Falsification" is a quick and easy word which pop-science writers latch onto without context and use as a kind of universal criterion for scientific knowledge, which is just not the case.

But that is more the result of just not reading Popper, and doesn't have much to do with Popper himself.

More philosophically -- the problem with Popper is the scope of his claims, and the prescriptive nature of his project. He's making a normative project for scientists, and doing so not just for a few scientists who feel inspired but for scientific knowledge as a whole. And while Popper's method gets at some aspects of scientific thought, it does not meet the burden it sets for itself -- and yet still demands that science should be performed in accordance with his particular epistemological concerns.

Feyerabend demonstrates this by placing Popper's method alongside Galileo's Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems -- an example which surely everyone would agree is properly scientific, and even good science, yet does not follow Popper's method. So either Galileo is wrong about how to do science, or Popper has overstated the scope to which his method applies. (at least, if we agree with Feyerabend's analysis, of course -- we could set out to save Popper by trying to reframe Galileo in Popperian terms. But I'm fairly well convinced by the arguments in Against Method)

Copout.

:D

Isn't Lukács usually read through the lens of the discovery of Marx's early writings and the debate between 'early' and 'later' Marx? — John Doe

Just a quick note here -- I couldn't tell you. I was interested in reading the selection because of my ignorance of Lukács :)

Interesting! My reason for thinking that Lukács is dealing at bottom with what he takes to be a moral concern is that Kant explicitly states (if I read him correctly?) that his metaphysics is ultimately justified on moral grounds (in the First Critique). I guess it's probably impossible to come to any definite conclusion about this underdetermined aspect of Lukács's paper but I would love to pursue the point a bit.

Basically, my reasoning for thinking that Lukács finds an inherent connection between idealism and bourgeois morality (which perpetuates a politically retrogressive ideology) was that he's playing off of this connection that Kant draws between his morality and his metaphysics.

For example, from the closing sections of the first Critique: "Hence theology and morality were the two incentives, or better, the points of reference for all the abstract inquiries of reason to which we have always been de­voted" (A853/B881).

So I think you're right that since I'm not a Marxist I may be missing the fact that thinking of metaphysics and morality as in this sense more fundamental than politics and ideology is a distinctly bad way of reading a Marxist thinker.

I like your way of looking at this but wonder if you might expand a tad? Definitely curious about how to work within the Marxist framework here to think through the difference between morality and the political order, as well as whatever personal views you might have about tensions in Marx's nihilism. — John Doe

Well, I also want to say that I don't want to offer any kind of definitive way of reading Marx too. These are just my opinions I've developed after reading him, but it's not something like a how-to on thinking through a Marxist framework, and like a lot of thinkers which write interesting things; well, there's more than one way to fry an egg.

Getting that off my chest. . .

I think that morality is usually conceived in Marx as a tool of bourgeois power -- and really of all power structures. Morality is the code of conduct taught to people to ensure the order of things. If you can teach people to not just mind the police but even to police themselves then you entrench your position even more.

I think that highlighting Kant is noteworthy, but I'd use it as a foil. Whereas a liberal capitalist at the time would appeal to moral intuitions, a Marxist would appeal to one's position within the social structure. So these neo-Kantians that Lukács criticizes are sort of on the side of established power by bringing things back to moral consciousness or authenticity or idealism. Where a Kantian would point out the relationship between metaphysics and morality, a Marxist (again, according to my reading) would draw that relationship from metaphysics to the social order -- idealism being one fairly esoteric method of justifying God, morality, and a spiritual world which are all the sorts of stories those in power tell those without it to encourage them to police themselves.

The tension I see is pretty apparent in Capital -- while he is mostly drawing a descriptive picture of the mechanisms of capitalism, he also frequently cites horrid conditions of labor that he sees at the time, including child-labor. That is, rather than just making an appeal to one's social position, their historical mission to overthrow class structure, and the fetters of bourgeois morality he seems to make implicit appeals to moral intuitions. In the manifesto he lampoons bourgeois morality, but he does so by pointing out its hypocrisy with itself. Then the overall thrust of his work seems to be getting at a more humane way to live and be human -- an interpretation of Marx is to say that human essence is found in work and technology, and his appeals for a world owned by workers is based upon this essence.

At the same time, though, Marx seemed to believe that capitalism was a necessary stage in human progression, so his nihilism is also somewhat necessary. Capitalism generated both the wealth which would be required for a communist society, and it generated its own instruments of destruction through the creation of a proletarian class. So while there is a tension between his implicit claims and his outright declarations of nihilism, nihilism is sort of a part of the package too in that the evils which Marx highlights are necessary evils for human progress.

I think that for Lukács materialism is seen as an important metaphysical position for proletarian revolt because it focuses the person on what they see, here and now, and notes that what is real are the things we work upon, and not the ideas or spirits of another world or some kind of grand moral order to which they should conform to think of themselves as good persons -- a moral order which, on the whole, is something taught by churches which tend to encourage submissive behavior to authority figures, which includes the bourgeoisie. Hence the emphasis on politics and power over morality -- morality is a kind of tool, and nothing more, and to focus on it is to give up ground to the enemy.

I'm just inclined to say that this is a sort of hinge. One can make moral appeals, and one can make appeals to one's social position. I'm not sure it's actually important -- both, to me, seem more like a framing device than something with factual content. And how one effects or affects people is more of an empirical question.

Typed that kind of quickly, but those are my first thoughts! I hope I addressed some of what you're interested in.

I don't know, do you buy this reading? If so, what do you make of his attack on 19th and 20th century non-materialist philosophies as merely 'neo-Kantian'? — John Doe

I do! It's his broad treatment of thinkers that sort of allows his logic to go through, too. Though I might say that the criticism isn't bourgeois morality as much as it is that neo-Kantian thought inhibits the working class and helps the bourgeois political order to justify itself. A bit of a slight difference, but I think I'd at least try to frame things in terms of political power and not morality (though there is an interesting tension in Marx showing here between his avowed nihilism and the fairly apparent moral impulse that generates the project in the first place -- not un-resolvable, but a tension)

I don't exactly buy the argument that idealism and the bourgeois order are linked. I think even materialism can be framed to justify the bourgeois order. As you note this point is not demonstrated at all -- it's sort of an assumption of Lukács that neo-Kantian methodology justifies idealism justifies the bourgeois order, because the working class's beliefs are turning increasingly materialistic.

I mean, I can get the gist of why someone who is a materialist might be inclined to take their role in the (public, political) world more seriously, and why someone who is an idealist might be inclined to remain focused on the (private, personal) world. So I don't think it's entirely out of left field. For myself it's just a matter of reflection: if I could think of some way to link idealism to an anti-bourgeois, public, and political life then the assumption -- on the philosophical level, at least, though perhaps it might in a general way for how it motivates people -- doesn't hold.

Bit of a mouth full there, but Hegel seems like a good example of a philosophical way of linking idealism to just that. Not that Hegel was by any means a political radical, but the whole taking one's place in history towards a stateless society thing is a direct reflection of Hegel in Marx. And the step from Hegel to Marx doesn't require materialism for that to take placed, so it does seem to me that there is an example that disproves the assumption.

I have read the paper and took fairly extensive notes which I had planned to write up into a summary, so I am really sorry that I dragged my feet on posting about the paper. Was definitely unfair of me since I suggesting we go ahead and read the paper straightaway. — John Doe

No worries. :) We all have lives outside of books, and it's totally understandable -- I was late too.

(This leads him to make some eye-raising claims like Nietzsche is essentially a bourgeois working in service of the status-quo and the increasing focus on the role of embodiment is motivated by bourgeois self-absorption.) — John Doe

This is a bit astray, but something I thought about when reading his comments about Nietzsche was how Kaufmann's interpretation of Nietzsche had yet to appear when he made these comments, and even though Nietzsche as a thinker was not a fascist the German fascists did try to appropriate Nietzsche as a sort of philosophical foundation to their political program (mostly thanks to the efforts of his sister after his death).

That was a thought that occurred to me, at least, in thinking about his comments on Neitzsche -- but it's hypothetical at this point because I'm not really sure the extent to which Lukács would be influenced by Anglophone philosophy's reception of Nietzsche, which is largely what I'm basing this off of.

But I hear you about the categories -- I probably wouldn't lump everything together that Lukács is lumping together.

I think he does genuinely worry that it might define the epoch insofar as it could aid decades of bourgeois grandstanding and avoidance of taking a stand on the era's meaningful philosophical and social conflicts. — John Doe

That's true! I agree with your reading. Otherwise why would he be writing on it if he didn't think that existentialism presented a kind of wrong turn in thinking?

I thought it was really interesting in our own context to be reading this with the historical knowledge that existentialism, phenomenology and marxism will all become marginalized very quickly by both postmodern thought and an increasingly trenchant capitalist system. — John Doe

That is something that had not occurred to me, but now that you mention it that is interesting. We could take Lukács criticism of existentialism (as he conceives that term) as evidence of just how widespread the philosophy seemed at the time, even outside of strictly academic circles.

Mostly, I agree. I'm not sure the details matter because this is certainly the weakest aspect of his argument. He essentially hunts for the weakest thinkers then reads their neo-Kantianism into much stronger thinkers like Heidegger. — John Doe

Do you group Sartre in with the weakest thinkers?

I'm just curious. The other authors, to be honest, I have never read or even heard of prior to reading this paper so I have no opinion. But I never really thought of Sartre as a weak thinker, though I also didn't think he was really talking about what Heidegger was (not that we have to get caught up on this point!)

This is funny! I had the opposite reaction. That is the sort of thing I insert into an essay when I want to attack some big author or theme. I just sort of took that as short hand for "I think Sartre is b.s. but I have to acknowledge that I'm treating his arguments pretty flippantly." It would be interesting to know if he was sincere in thinking Sartre is worthy of a dissertation or not. — John Doe

This made me laugh :D. I hadn't thought of that, though you're probably right -- it makes sense of why he wouldn't want to spend the time with Sartre to detail where he fails.

One thing I was hoping he might jump onto is the relationship between Nietzsche's interest in "positive judgments" (what we would now probably call "value monism") and Sartre's focus on "negative judgments"

That'd be cool to read, I agree.

I am pretty sure that he is writing before Sartre's turn to Marxism and essentially encouraging that turn. — John Doe

Hrm! I wasn't aware of that aspect of Sartre interpretation, or my anachronistic thinking there. Thanks for the heads up

Again, a lot of this is not all that complicated or difficult to understand. But the fact that he locates all of these problems in fetishism is extremely interesting and I definitely want to re-read that section and post about that idea specifically. — John Doe

Looking forward to hear more.

I agree. In my view, I think there is a "third way" between materialism and idealism, which is best exemplified by Wittgenstein's work. To an extent I sympathize with Lukács's criticisms because I think he's right about the bad Kantianism that pops up time and again in a variety of thinkers in the early/mid twentieth century. (Hubert Dreyfus's attacks on Sartre mostly mimic Lukács here and went a long way to killing off interest in Sartre in the anglophone world.)

....

Yeah. Or, you know, perhaps we could actually just overcome the stupid materialism/idealism debate by drawing on phenomenology! Lukács merely posits the notion that this debate is necessary without offering much in the way of defense. And he attacks the 'third way' attempts to overcome this debate by dissecting and attacking inferior thinkers who, to my mind, exemplify the most feeble-minded aspects of the phenomenological tradition.
— John Doe

That definitely is the appeal I see in phenomenology -- since I don't think that a debate between materalism/idealism is really all that interesting. I think that a commitment to materialism might just be seen as important for a commitment to Marxism, which may be why it seems so important.

Really, my meta-philosophical outlook is pluralistic, too -- so I think there are fourth and fifth and so on ways. :D Materialism/Idealism is just one debate peculiar to early modern philosophy that seems to still be hanging around sometimes.

Alright I just finished the Lukács paper.

So I might say that Lukacs criticism of existentialism comes from a couple of different levels. One is that existentialism does not reflect reality, and another is that existentialism does not present any new method but rather has roots in Kantian enlightenment era thinking -- and since epoch-making philosophies are characterized by a novelty in method, existentialism is not epoch-making but rather a fad which has become popular because of the social conditions of the time in which it was written. Existentialism appeals to the feelings and needs of certain intellectuals and so escapes criticism, according to Lukács.

On a secondary level, I think, Lukács also notes how this philosophy helps bourgeois and reactionary political actors by isolating the individual from their. social relationships. But I really think the core of his argument has more to do with the above -- he isn't just saying that existentialism does not agree with Marxism, and helps the enemy, but rather that it fails on its own from proper philosophical considerations: it fails as a third-way, but is just a rehashing of transcendental idealism for the times it was written in.

There was one point in the essay that made me think I'd like to hear more from Lukács where he said ,"A very specialized philosophical dissertation would be required to show the chains of thought, sometimes quite false, sometimes obviously sophistical, by which Sartre seeks to justify his theory of negative judgment." -- but, hey, then this wouldn't be so brief either :D.

It seems that he focuses mostly on Sartre at the end because he was the philosopher at the time most associated with popularity, one, and I suspect he focuses on Sartre too because he was a communist -- so that one couldn't say "well, even one of your own is an existentialist, so surely this is not a reactionary philosophy"


One take-away that I really liked from the essay was Lukács' observation that absolute responsibility is only a shade away from a total lack of responsibility -- and similarly so for freedom -- so that one could feel that one both is responsible yet act cynically. I thought there was some truth to that.



I'm not sure I totally agree with Lukács criticism, though. While I do think of phenomenology, at least, as a kind of "third way" between idealism and materialism, I don't think it's a way between as much as it passes over such questions as not worth asking -- at least, not with respect to phenomenology. I suppose it would depend on just how serious you took phenomenology when considering questions of ontology, but it seems to me that one could easily be a phenomenologist and a materalist without tension.

Sure, I'm good to start reading. Realistically I think I could post something this Saturday.

Yeah, sounds good. :D it's pretty much all I was thinking. I guess I just feel self-conscious about suggesting stuff.

I thought that https://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/1949/existentialism.htm might make a good companion piece -- since they are both sort of "outsider" criticisms (so it appears from the first couple of paragraphs at least) of certain ways of doing philosophy, but one from (what I take to be) a pragmatist view, and this one from a Marxist perspective. Plus it's short, and Lukacs is another writer I haven't really spent time with.

Not in the circumstance of no person existing at all (but has a potential to ). In cases of potentiality of possible people, there is an absolute way to prevent all harm, with no relative trade-offs that affect a person. — schopenhauer1

Preventing all harm to whom, though?

I'd say we've reached something of an impasse here. The case for the harm to the potential of possible persons is just not a case that means much of anything to me. But I'd just be rehashing what I said and what you are responding to here.

I see by absolute you mean something different than I had thought, though. You mean something along the lines of certain, or perfect.

This doesn't make sense. It again values life itself as something that must be had in the first place. Ethics is about right course of actions. — schopenhauer1

Does it not make sense, or is it something you disagree with?

I actually disagree that ethics is about a or the right course of actions. And perhaps that could be fruitful to explore, though it would take us pretty far astray from the OP -- so another thread, another time. I'll close with the opening paragraph from Susan Wolf's Moral Saints to hint at what else I might be thinking of, though -- and say that I think ethics is about living the good life, just to give it a slogan:

I DON'T know whether there are any moral saints. But if there are, I am glad that neither I nor those about whom I care most are among them. By moral saint I mean a person whose every action is as morally good as possible, a person, that is, who is as morally worthy as can be. Though I shall in a moment acknowledge the variety of types of person that might be thought to satisfy this description, it seems to me that none of these types serve as unequivocally compelling personal ideals. In other words, I believe that moral perfection, in the sense of moral saintliness, does not constitute a model of personal well-being toward which it would be particularly rational or good or desirable for a human being to strive. — Susan Wolf

That is the asymmetry part of the argument. — schopenhauer1

I suppose I'd just say this asymmetry is false, then. Or, at least, I do not believe in the asymmetry between these. Preventing harm is only important if someone is there for harm to be prevented. And, even then, preventing harm is also a relative good -- causing harm can be the right thing to do, in certain circumstances. This is because all ethical claims rely upon there being ethical agents; there is no absolute or ultimate ethical rule which must be satisfied, come what may, even if we do not exist. Ethics are a human concern, and so eliminating the agent from which they spring sort of undercuts the very basis of any ethical claim.

Just a quick side-note -- valuing life unto itself differs from thinking that we should experience life, too. We do, after all, keep people in a vegetative state because we value life, even though they do not have experience -- certainly with some hopes that they'll come back to us, but this is just to note that the experiential angle isn't exactly what I'm getting at by saying people value life.

but what does it matter to a person not born in the first place? — schopenhauer1

Exactly! :D It does not matter until the child is born. Mattering can only happen if there is a someone. There is a cost associated with your axiology -- the cost is life. And people do, in fact, value life. For yourself this seems like no cost because life is not worth much. But for most that is just not so.

Do not "saddle" a child with the burdens of life by procreating them into existence is the argument. — schopenhauer1

Yeah, but why? This connects to what I was saying later about how people value life -- not for some end or other, but unto itself. There isn't an agenda, it's just something considered vauable -- that has currency. So it's not about a deprivation or a benefit to some non-entity. Valuing life isn't really about what we are doing to non-entities. The consideration isn't about saddling or burdening someone else with the horrrors of life.

Life itself is just valuable, so procreation is as a relative good. That's the whole of it. Just like suffering has no real why behind it, but is generally seen as something that is worthwhile to avoid, prevent, or lessen.

It doesn't address your argument at all because @schopenhauer1 is making a different argument from you. :D

Click on my highlighted name and you should be able to read my argument to you:

— Moliere

Well, if life itself didn't have suffering, then that wouldn't be a target. What is it about life itself that needs to be carried out in light of the fact that no one needs anything if there is no one there to care or be deprived in the first place? That is my question to you? Isn't it all about the projection of the parent in any of these cases you could possibly present? Why does the child have to bear out this projection? — schopenhauer1

There is nothing about life itself that needs to be carried out, because needs only happen within life -- just like suffering only happens in life. Valuing life isn't an ends-to-means kind of care, so it doesn't make sense that the child is "saddled" with the desires of some parent just by the mere fact that they are born.

Not to mention that this is kind of far astray from suffering and has more to do with valuing autonomy and individuality.

By entirety of life, I mean, you have the unique ability to prevent suffering for an entire life. — schopenhauer1

For me, then, this is reverts back to thinking of un-real persons as receiving some kind of benefit, which is just absurd. I'd say that valueing life isn't the sort of value that one is doing for the sake of which -- hence why it seems strange to me to say it's an agenda. The child is not a means to an end.

This valuing life as an end unto itself you mention as a reason, can stand in place of the "agenda" the parents have in mind when creating a child. In this case, life itself is the agenda, and the child is the bearer for this agenda. The child needs to be born in order for the agenda to be carried forward- that is life itself. Why does life itself need to be experienced by a person though?

Why does the suffering of a person matter? Why should autonomy figure in our moral reasoning?

Of course there is no why. All reasoning comes to an end, including moral reasoning -- and the sorts of appeals being made here are not being made for some other reason. Suffering is bad, life is good, autonomy should be respected. These aren't values of the ends-means variety, but are the values by which we reason about how to act. They are a kind of terminus to moral or ethical reasoning.

The big difference here is not an answer to these questions, but the degree of attachment you happen to feel to these sorts of things. You don't feel attachment to life, or at least not enough to balance out your attachment to the badness of suffering -- suffering is so bad, and a necessary part of life, that life does not have value for you to the degree it has for others.

But is there really an answer you can provide to the answer of "why?" other than that suffering is really, really bad?

One argument is that by preventing people, the injunction itself is annihilated. I just don't see the problem. If there are no people, the injunction is unnecessary. As long as there is the option for procreation, would this be an issue. This is supposed to be some sort of "tree falls in the woods" conundrum that I don't think really has any bearing because as stated, only in cases of decisions of procreation exist does the injunction matter. Otherwise, it's not an issue. — schopenhauer1

I don't know if it's an issue as much as I would say that you should rephrase your argument -- because it's not the injunction that matters to you. Suffering matters -- suffering matters so much to yourself that you believe people shouldn't even exist because their life is bound up with suffering. But that isn't really what most people mean when they say they believe that preventing suffering is good.

So saying that preventing suffering is good sort of conflates, or at least confuses, where you're coming from -- it's not a commonly held belief, but rather something that is specific to the anti-natalist. The presence of suffering is so bad that life shouldn't exist. Whereas most people see the worth in preventing harm, they also don't think that preventing all of human life from continuing is a good way to go about that - and I'd argue from these considerations that it isn't from some kind of problem of consistency, but because your belief is actually very different from what people really mean by saying that the prevention of suffering is a good.

The other argument is that it does not fulfill commonly accepted injunctions of aiming at things that do exist, but rather it aims at the feelings of people who will not exist. Again, I don't see a problem. The people that could exist will suffer, don't have make this condition an actuality. It is odd because it is about procreation which is the only instance when life as a whole can be considered rather than various decisions of someone who is already born. This is not about improving or getting a better angle on some issue in this or that situation, but situations as a whole. That does make this unique which is why I see it as THE philosophical issue, more important than other ethical matters. Should we expose new people to suffering is the issue? However, what other priorities should take place. You didn't propose anything, but if the answer is other than harm, clearly an agenda is there, unstated. The agenda could be to form a family, to watch a new person overcome the adversities of life, etc. Either way, the parent is wanting something to happen from this birth. The non-intuitive notion, that is still valid despite being non-intuitive or unfamiliar, is that anything other than preventing harm does not need to take place, if there was no actual person to need that particular agenda to take place. — schopenhauer1

The issue, at least from my perspective, is that you're treating non-existent persons as the same as persons. These are persons who will not be, given your prescription, so it's not even the same as considering people who will be -- such as responsibilities to future generations. From this post I gather that the difference between these persons and fictional persons is that you believe that procreation is the only action where the entirety of life can be considered.

If I'm right in reading you so, then that's progress! :D I did say before that you at least needed some reason to differentiate the two from each other.

But here again I think we can see why it is the anti-natalist argument tends to fall on deaf ears. Why does it matter that we are able to evalaute the entirety of life? And, in fact, don't most persons view the entirety of life as a good thing? Perhaps if they thought suffering was so bad that any amount of it is a good reason to eliminate it by any means necessary they wouldn't think so. But most people are more tolerant of the existence of suffering than this. To the point that, in spite of life being full of suffering -- and I am not at all convinced that there is more pleasure than suffering in life, so please don't mistake me as giving the usual utilitarian retort that the pleasure outweighs suffering -- we also value life as an end unto itself.

And also I really don't think I'm misrepresenting you at all in saying that your target isn't suffering as much as it is life itself. As you say -- procreation is the only instance when life as a whole can be considered. So your target is life, not suffering -- suffering, in any amount, is what makes life bad, for you, but your injunction is not "prevent suffering" as much as it is "prevent life, because any suffering at all is bad, and this is the only way to eliminate suffering".

Does that strike you as right or wrong, in terms of my depiction of your argument?

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That's a good point in that "preventing suffering" is incoherent if no one exists.People need to exist for preventing suffering to amount to anything at all. — Terrapin Station

Thanks. :)

That's what I think, at least. I'd characterize the effects of the universal anti-natalist as not so much preventing suffering, but rather preventing life -- and therefore preventing the ability to prevent suffering.

@khaled has said that he is interested in arguments, from the negative utilitarian position, that would counter the AN argument, and that he personally does not subscribe to this view.

Let's just stick to your stronger argument, then -- as I haven't justified much of anything in this thread, I've been concerning myself with the arguments for anti-natalism, and how they justify themselves.

Prevent suffering. (injunction)
Universal birth-prevents fulfills this better than anything else, because then there is no suffering.
So, we should not have children to fulfill this injunction.


That's what I pick up from what you are saying. What I'm getting at is that the injunction "prevent suffering" is developed in a world of people, people who are real, who feel suffering. So universal birth-prevention undermines the very basis on which such an injunction is formulated -- and therefore does not prevent suffering as much as it annihilates our ability to prevent suffering in the first place, and so does not fulfill the (commonly accepted) injunction. Universal birth-prevention is aimed at, given its consequences, the feelings of people who will not exist, which is absurd given that our ethical actions are not normally directed at what will not exist.

With birth comes real suffering, but without it comes nothing at all.

What agenda would you put above preventing suffering in the unique case of procreation — schopenhauer1

My line of thinking here isn't about promoting an agenda, but rather what it takes for there to be an agenda in the first place. If there is no one for whom we are preventing suffering, then we are directing our actions towards who isn't real. It's not that we're preventing suffering, it's that we're so against the world that we find ourselves in that it would be better for it to be gone. In your response, I believe, I have support for this in your language here:

it should be noted that we live in an on average mediocre average universe with a mix and range of harms, goods, and for the most part it is very neutral to mildly annoying/negative for many on a daily basis. — schopenhauer1

The prevention of suffering isn't the belief your anti-natalist position comes from, but rather your belief about the state of the world. It's that there is suffering in the first place, for you at least, that makes the world something worth anihiliating as long as we do so without causing yet even more suffering overtly.

And that's a very different argument than relying upon the belief that suffering is bad and should be prevented (to the extent possible).

Rorty is one of those philosophers I have never really touched, so for me it would just be novel and interesting to see what comes out. The particular paper I picked mostly as a requirement of what I could find that was free -- plus I don't have the "ugh" reaction to Derrida :D.

I also sort of think of Rorty as an "in-between" philosopher, from what little familiarity I have with him, between analytic and continental approaches -- and I noticed how there was a kind of mixture between these traditions in what's already been picked.

EDIT: Also, don't feel bad if it just doesn't catch you -- just say so and I'll keep digging around. I'm just sort of throwing ideas out there, and I'm fine with finding other stuff. It's more important to me that people actually would like to read what we choose.

http://faculty.georgetown.edu/irvinem/theory/Rorty-Philosophy-as-a-Kind-of-Writing-1978.pdf

What does everyone feel about that one?

However, as long as one is preventing someone from experiencing harm, it is always good — schopenhauer1

I guess I'd go along with the other line of thought I dropped with @khaled with you, then. This seems to be the central belief by which you are appealing to anti-natalism here. I'd say to you that you are directing your actions towards nothing, in the event of anti-natalism, and so it hardly counts as a good. There must be some other belief at play other than the preventing harm from someone -- maybe this is where your thinking starts, and in taking stock of the world you note that we all are suffering. But the belief changes from what is a fairly commonplace belief to something else that rejects the entirety of the world because of suffering.

Well, if I had to offer advice I'd suggest either "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" or "Crisis of the European Sciences" as a great starting point. — John Doe

Cool!

I tried to find some free versions online and so far have failed. I think I have copies of those, but I'll come back with a different suggestion once I find something that everyone can have access to without having to spend money. Also it'd be cool if everyone was excited to read it, I think, so I'll try to find something that "fits" with what's up there so far.

The final output would be classical utilitarianism. Negative utlitarianism is the sum of suffering — khaled

I'm going to drop the other part because I think it is less persuasive and somewhat obtuse.

The part I'm saying is not obvious is that the negative utilitarian should rely upon the function of a sum to characterize the negative utilitarian function. Delving into the math aspect of the negative utilitarian we could characterize the NU-function differently.

So in the setup where NU-function is a sum we have three persons with a, b, and c suffering. The negative utilitarian chimes in that a fourth person will have d suffering, and since d is non-zero (part of the agreement in our conversation) the net suffering increases.

My point here would be to say -- why is sum the obvious function to character the NU-function? It does not seem obvious at all.

Say we have our above world with three persons, and we designate that they all have a suffering of 5, respectively. If we characterize the NU-function as an average rather than as a sum, then the anti-natalist argument does not go through universally. It would depend upon the context. In fact, if we are negative utilitarians, and we have a reasonable belief that our child's suffering will be 4 -- in the above world -- then having a child will actually lower the suffering in the world, since the average was previously 5.

It's not self-evident that the sum is the best way to characterize negative utilitarianism. So the anti-natalist would have to provide some kind of reason why, even under the pretense of accepting the negative utilitarian ethic, we should characterize the NU-function as a sum.

What about Husserl? He's one of those thinkers on my "meant to get to" list.

I worry interest may wain in the group if we do just another big canonical book since there are like half a dozen threads doing the same thing. So I'm thinking maybe some essays, lectures, and very short books? E.g. Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Sellars, Deleuze, Riemann, Kant, Marx, Ranciere? (Do you have any interest in Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason?) — John Doe

That's a really good point. You convinced me! :D

I'm down for Critique of Dialectical Reason as it's another one of those I haven't gotten to but have wanted to.

Honestly the schedule you have looks great to me. Kind of a survey in interesting writers that we can explore together. I'll have to think a sec for your weeks 11 and 12 though.

Eh, at the moment I just don't have that kind of time/energy to put into leading a group. But I'd probably read along with the thread. There are others here too that'd be able to put in a good word -- I know @jamalrob and @casalisbury both have done some deep Kant reading, and I'm certain they aren't the only ones. He's kinda a big figure ;).

I know that I prefer the Pluhar translation for its consistency and readability. But potaytoe potahtoe -- I don't know if it really matters all that much.

But if you want the group I'd suggest just starting up and leading it. It doesn't take any special knowledge -- just energy, dedication, and a willingness to be wrong.

I think I'd like to participate in this. I could use a little structure to my reading schedule -- giving me that extra "umph" that seems difficult to come up with in the midst of work and work and work.

A bit off from other suggestions, and definitely not the sort of thing you read alongside -- it's too big -- but I've always been meaning to finish my copy of Being and Nothingness. Thus far I've pretty much just done selections.

Regardless I'd just be happy to participate with whatever you set out.

I'd say yes. Mostly because the very disease already compromises what would normally be a violation against said person -- namely, it compromises their autonomy. The disease itself is coercing the individual already, so coercion -- whether initiated or merely allowed to continue -- is part of every decision.

I don't mean this in a universal sense, exactly. But rather in a more general way -- more often than not it's justifiable to intervene, because more often than not the sick person's agency is compromised regardless of what we do -- and this would be the main reason why it is normally wrong to intervene on the decisions of others (again, only in a general way -- obviously there are exceptions, and obviously there are other values we have to consider besides autonomy)

Alright, cool. So I think that it would be better to focus on validity after reading your comments, then. I suppose my thought was that soundness was more appropriate because I recall with validity the truth-value of some proposition wasn't something we were after as much.

But, yes, I'm interested in how to justify whether a given form is valid. That's a cleaner statement than what I've been saying so far.