I think so too -- but I think there is something to a physical relationship as well. And what you are asking after I would be more comfortable having a physical relationship with you. (as awful as that sounds -- I know the implications -- I just mean meeting you for a beer vs. reading you words here)

There had to be a topic somewhere that @Hanover and I agreed upon. :D

Without knowing you in the flesh it's just hard to say. We all can edit our text here and choose what we say. There's not enough information to give good advice.

That being said I will say that if you are content then there's nothing to address. @Baden said it best to me.

I agree, more or less. I'm not so certain about Hume, but whatever. Presentation matters. Aesthetics are a part of theoretical concerns, explanations, and explorations. And there are times when aesthetics can override the purported theoretical concerns -- the aim at truth.

As far as I'm concerned that means that people who are interested in theory should pay attention to aesthetics. It matters. Sometimes more than mere true statements.

There is simply enduring and coping. Again, troubling. — schopenhauer1

I don't view this as troubling. For one it does seem there are people who do not feel this way. All the better for them.

But for those of us who view life as full of suffering, I don't see that as a troubling conclusion.

It's just the way it is.

We would need to care about suffering in order for us to believe that it were important.

But if life is absurd then we need not be attached to such notions. We can grow from enduring, to coping, to non-attachment, to joy. Where once we were a Donkey attached to the notion of life, and then we were a lion rebelling with declarations of the absurd, we can become a baby -- innocent and creative.

On philosophy:

Philosophy pushes the boundaries of sense. With new philosophy new concepts or ways of thinking are explored. If it were always bound by teleology then philosophy would almost just be the engineering of the mind, trying to make better inferences, clearer explications, or more certain truths.

Simultaneously if philosophy were not bound to reason then it begins to look too much like other activities -- like writing poetry or prose, politics, proselytizing, self expression, or simply writing a journal. It loses what has been an enduring quality of philosophical writing -- appeals that, in principle, are evaluable on the basis that they are made rationally or for reason to consider.

Or, in the case of medical philosophies, reason was being put to use in the service of said medical desires or needs.


So I'm tempted to call philosophy proper the art of reasoning, where the teleological structure of reason is temporarily suspended and concepts are created out of the principles of reasoning itself. So we can follow an argument or make an argument or some such, just as a painter can paint a representation of a street or a person. It's still art to do so. But the suspension of goals or representation (for reason and painting, respectively) creates a kind of play with the principles themselves -- hence the art of reason, or the art of painting. There's even a play in just putting the principles to use, in setting up a picture just so, or coming up with a story or example that fits just right to some general principle or argument being made.

but the key thing I'm trying to resolve here is the claim that reason is teleologically structured, philosophy is entirely useless (but valuable), and philosophy is inextricable from reason.

Actually that does set off my thinking a bit -- thinking of reasoning as an art. Exactly like learning to make art -- Doesn't reasoning sort of work in the same way? To be susceptible to a justification one would have to care about reasoning, and to care about it one would have to be able to do it. We can all doodle a stick-man, but we cannot all paint a landscape. We are all quite able to remain rooted in our upbringing, and cling to beliefs. We can supply reasons for our beliefs. But we are not all able to think through our beliefs, find inconsistencies, let go of beliefs, and entertain new thoughts without commitment while building arguments that would support said beliefs.

(There's something of the imagination at work in this.)

For a justification to work we would have to have some kind of familiarity with the art of reasoning, to trust that reasoning can help, to be able to sort good reasons from bad ones, and have some sort of practice in making judgments of this sort.

I'm not sure what you intend with your quotes. I'm just noting that.

I view reasoning as an activity that humans can do. So rather than looking at it as a tool, it's really more of a power -- we don't use reason like we use a hammer. We use reason like we use seeing -- it can be put to multiple functions, some of which aren't exactly bound to desire in an ends-means relationship. Rather, we are motivated to do something -- reasoning comes out of or flows forth from emotion or motivation. It is something of an art, really. It can be taught and developed, as one develops one's ability to paint or act.

So the when, from my perspective at least, comes about when reason ceases to be the best art to practice. Sometimes we should be poets, and sometimes we should be reasoners. But when is it best to reason? And when does it get in the way?

A quick summation of necessary conditions thus far:


Emotional attachment or motivation (know-why)

Shared beliefs or commitments to which appeals can be made or made from.

The belief that a speaker is someone who is worth listening to.

The explanation must satisfy both the spoken-to and the speaker.

Experience in the area under consideration (like riding a bike -- you wouldin't listen to the Mary of bike-riding, studious though she is, you would be more likely to listen to the person who has ridden a bike quite often)

If the steps are accepted, what *matters* to the person appealed to has to be found and invoked, otherwise the superficially rational argument falls on stony ground. (As someone who has spent many hours as a Green candidate or advocate failing to persuade voters of the merits of my case, I believe I have some experience of this stony ground) — mcdoodle

Heh. That strikes a chord with me. I've experienced the stony ground before, too.

This kind of reminds me of the parable of the sower.

We have to find at least a mutually-common premiss to get anywhere. This zone is where many rational-seeming people trying to appeal to what they regard as practical reason get stuck. They get frustrated or angry that others don't get their argument. They are apt to think others are being 'irrational' when it may be that they are coming at it from different presuppositions.

Phronetic explanations seem to need to satisfy both explainer and the explained-to.

That's a good point. One of the things in the back of my mind while reading your reply was the thought of organizing. There's a school of organizing which treats the organizer as a kind of enlightened individual who knows what people want better than they do. What's more is that, doing enough organizing, sometimes it's even true that you know what people want more than what they do given certain practical circumstances that the people you organize are usually unaware of.

So you can easily convince yourself of your enlightened cred.

But this sort of relationship usually omits the organizer from being satisfied by some explanation. The organizer acts in a professional capacity to serve the people explicitly and only. And explanations no longer really act like appeals at that stage -- they are what people want to hear, and they move them to the best outcome given the circumstances, but there is a hard asymmetry between the organizer and the organized. Similar to the patient and the analyst, actually. (not sure about doctor, though. Maybe at one point, but the medical field seems to have incorporated patient input into their practice, from my cursory glance)

That is, there are no explanations or appeals, they are tools to move people thus and so.

But having that double requirement sort of gives a golden mean between two points -- on the one hand, the problem of rational people that you highlight. And then on the other hand, the problem of assymetric knowledge or status. Both, in a sense, are a deficiency in being able to listen, just from different reasons -- one is too wrapped up in their own reasoning, and the other is too wrapped up in an "objective" theoretical construct of the Other's reasoning. But the mean would have us listen to an Other, and find common ground in order to build what could reasonably count as rational phronetic explanations or reasons.

I'm interested in medical diagnosis in this context. Doctors/nurses need a conclusion as much as a patient does. Sometimes then a the invocation of a so-called 'syndrome', or some other way of just summarising symptoms, masquerades as a diagnosis when in honesty it falls short. To name symptoms well is an important step, but it isn't a diagnosis that can lead to a prognosis. It is however somehow satisfying in lieu of the meaningful.

Taking the medical "analogy" to the next step, eh? :D

That's cool. Maybe I should delve more deeply into that area.

In my mind I'm sort of trying to work out what it would be to make an appeal as equals, though clearly there are always going to be asymmetries of some sort too just through natural ability.

Just to use language, though, as an example, is an example of rule-following. Our carers teach us over and over again until we get it. Then we become so habituated to it that we forget we once learnt to follow rules to do all this saying and hearing. We are rule-following animals. The authoritarians use this fact about us to inculcate their ways into us. But left to myself I learn, say, a route to a place, and then I take that same route over and over, sometimes in defiance of people who tell me about rationally better routes: I know my route, I trust it, I'm safe along it. — mcdoodle

I think you have the better way of putting it. Good point with language-learning, something which is certainly prior to authoritarian structures.

I think this notion of safety and trust is close to habit. So we might change our route if we care about something more than our familiar and safe and trustworthy patterns have thus far proven comfortable -- perhaps there's a new shop along another route, or we find the standard route becoming congested with traffic. In a sense this is perfectly rational -- I have in mind, if someone were to tell you a shorter way of getting somewhere, that while if you cared about saving time then it would make sense to try it, but given that you care about familiarity you're being more rational by following the same route than by adhering to some other standard that falls outside of your care.

I only meant the steps in some sort of process of inference. — mcdoodle

Got it.

I do think that in say bike-riding we learn a series of steps, until by repetition we don't even think about the steps, we 'just do it'. So knowing-how is built up from knowing-why. Our reasoning is built into things we have learnt to do automatically, like making tea or feeding the cat. It's hidden in familiar acts.

Reason is "baked in", so to speak. There's a series of events or lessons or steps that are reflected upon, but then through repetition the awareness of those steps sinks into the body and stops being something
reflected upon.

This is interesting too -- rather than looking at reason as a series of rules or norms for thinking, this seems to cast reasoning as whatever takes place in the process of learning, and the motivation (know-why) for such learning to take place.

Glad to hear from you @mcdoodle

I am interested in this question. One interesting factor to me is the relation between ancient and modern. Aristotle considers an ethical education to involve inculcating the right 'habits'. Wittgenstein worries and worries over what it is to 'follow a rule'. It feels to me that 'habits' and 'rule-following' are similar if not identical phenomena. We arrive at rules/habits - we reflect on them, reason about them, perhaps try to change them - we have a new set of rules/habits. (Ari considers this ethical, though in a broader sense than the modern; Witt is unclear) — mcdoodle

I agree that the relation between the ancient and the modern is really interesting. And, as my thinking goes anyway, I have a tendency to synthesize between the two. For one it seems to me futile to propose ancient ethical philosophy as a serious contender if we take it to the letter -- those were different times.

For two, we have to be able to speak to people. And modern thought on ethics is necessary to proceed in this manner.

I had never thought about the relationship between Witti's rule-following and Aristotle's habits. I think you're on to something there. Especially through habituation -- we don't come to question a habit without some kind of force. And with rule-following we simply follow the rule as a necessary part of playing the game -- to question the rule is similar to questioning a habit. (though with Witti we get no guidance on the ethical either).

This is one approach towards practical reason or phronesis. It seems there is some process behind such analysis as encapsulated in the Aristotelian syllogism: there will be a series of steps from an initial set of presuppositions that make sense to us. We will have reasons-for. (Looked at in two ways: the post hoc reasoning, and the actual why-one-did-it) — mcdoodle

I'd be interested in hearing more about this series of steps. I can kind of see it with respect to the syllogism, and it certainly fits Aristotle's patterns of thought, but I'm wondering how you relate that back to habituation and rule-following. Like, there's a series of habits which build good character and develops phronesis?

The next and wierdest question is: How does a being make a decision? How is all this reasoning related to decision-making? Much writing on the subject just assumes some sort of relation. Yet much of the time it's like riding a bike: we practice over and over until we do an action without having to analyse how we're doing it. Even with intellectually complex decisions, how we act can boil down to such shortcuts, rules. — mcdoodle

Definitely. For now I think it might help to just look at how we might change our decisions rather than trying to find a base for making any decision. At least our acts are always in play, and we can see that we do, in fact, change course -- and sometimes that change of course is because of reason. "Because" not in a causal sense here. The causal mechanism, I think, is a purely theoretic way of coming to understanding human action. So we get Freud's unconscious, and a dollop of post-hoc rationalizations after the fact. But in what way is that even useful to thinking through a decision, or deliberating on the right way to become, or making a decision in the face of an event that calls into question a previous habit?

None. It would almost be laughable if someone were to tell me that they did something because they had to resolve some unconscious drive. It would be like they stepped outside of themselves and pictured themselves as a sort of machine, realizing they only had one lever and pulled it. Like, who thinks like that? And, if so, how does it actually help in thinking through our actions?

I think you're right to say that it's like riding a bike, and that there are certainly "short cuts" involved -- I don't think that syllogistic reasoning or reflective reasoning plays the primary role in our daily actions. I think habit has a lot to say here (though, side note: I am interested in habit, too. What lies under the hood of habit? And what does the explanation of habit actually explain?). Only that it plays some role some of the time (and, possibly, could even be made to play more of a role, though I don't know if that's even desirable)

I've been reading about the tragic fire in a high-rise block, Grenfell Tower in London. Quite apart from the longer-term issues of how the building was refurbished, the decision-making on the night of the fire is a lesson in how we employ practical reasoning. Many people died by obeying fire officers' advice to stay in their flats, even turning back when they were escaping when so advised, turning back against their own self-wisdom to their deaths. The fire officers themselves were following their superiors' orders and their training. Deference to authority, and fidelity to rules for which the particular situation was inappropriate, got in the way of practical reasoning from first principles. We are highly intelligent animals but we are rule-followers, and the rule-following is part of what we think of as our intelligence. — mcdoodle

Sometimes I think the rule-following bit is a bit more a convenience of the world we live in and a product of our educational systems. It's easier to govern large swathes of people who are accustomed to hierarchy and authority.

That's a terribly sad story, though. Instead of trusting what was right in front of their face they trusted the words of authority. That's kind of crazy.

I have this image that comes to me when I deal with this issue. I don't intend this to be taken literally. It's just my way of thinking about it. It's an amoeba flowing around and moving away from something harmful or toward food based on chemical signals. There is an obviously very simple mechanism which tells the amoeba what to do. I see our nervous system as analogous to that. The whole thing is just a mechanism to tell us what to do next. Over billions of years, the mechanism has gotten a lot more complicated, but it's goal is still the same, to keep us alive by directing our behavior. Thought and consciousness are just manifestations of that mechanism. Knowledge and reason are just processes within that manifestation. Truth is just a possible feature of that process.

For me, looking at things through the lens of truth is misleading. To believe in truth you have to believe in the existence of objective reality, which I think is questionable. Actually, it's not a belief in truth or objective reality I reject, it's the belief that a view of reality including those concepts is somehow privileged over other ways of seeing things. — T Clark

I might have a broader notion of theoretical reasoning here that I'm not making clear -- because everything you say here, from my perspective, is purely theoretical. Concerns about objective reality, whether reason is rooted in our biological capacities, a world cast as a mechanism, and ways of perceiving reality that may be just as good as those concerned with spelling out the truth of things in a correspondent fashion where the word and world resonate with one another --- all of these are theoretical uses of reason. I say that in contrast to a practical reason which would actually tell me what is worth valuing, or give me some kind of consideration on how to act appropriately, or would orient persons to develop their characters in a good way.

In preserving notions of theoretical thought I don't mean to denigrate other ways of seeing things -- in fact I'd say that theoretical thought, broadly construed, would admit of a multitude of ways of seeing things. "Ways of seeing" seems to me to be a subset of theoretical thinking since we use such ways to perceive, believe, and think about the world.

I'd just say that it is true that there are other ways of seeing things. ;)

Although, hey! I did just identify a contradiction in my thinking. Generally I think of philosophy as thoroughly useless, but here I am saying that philosophy is bound up with reason -- while characterizing reason as teleological. Hrm. Gotta think through that one.

Sure, me calling it political truth is probably a misnomer, but it's a purposeful one. I have written in a number of discussions that, to me, truth is really only a tool to help us achieve the real goal of philosophy, which is to figure out what we should do next. — T Clark

I want to preserve this notion of theoretical thought. It makes more sense of much of philosophy -- rather than casting Plato's theory of the Forms in terms of a tool, it makes sense to say that Plato believed Truth to be a form which we could reach for. He seemed to also believe that knowing truth was enough to make good people -- in a way he collapses practical concerns into theoretical concerns. What the pragmatist does is the opposite -- truth is a tool to be put towards human ends, and nothing more. But this misses the meaning of truth, and also makes the practical concerns of life difficult to understand. (are we saying what we are saying about philosophy because it is a tool being used towards some end? Or are we implicitly assuming a theoretical notion of truth in setting things out thus and so?)

But with some kind of theoretical notion of truth as being somehow related to knowledge -- without a theory, it does seem we have a pre-theoretic understanding of truth, despite the problems with all theories of truth (including deflationary ones) -- it's easy to be able to say that what we are doing here, in producing knowledge, we can also use these abilities in the pursuit of other goals. One of which is the good life.

I don't want to commit myself to the notion that my normative claim on philosophy is the real goal of philosophy. Rather I think of it is a commitment on my part to what I think is interesting in philosophy for myself and possibly others like me. But it's wholly possible for someone to abandon that precept and engage in philosophy in a purely theoretical manner. In fact, many philosophers do exactly that. If they didn't share my precept, there would be no appeal I could make to them though. And while I think practical concerns are primary, in the sense that I want to intentionally make ethics my first philosophy, I can't deny that there are those with a thirst for truth and knowledge instead.

Perhaps I should note that I don't think of reason as some cold set of rules of inference or Spock-like mentality, too. Reason is wholly motivated towards goals -- it is teleologically structured, and in human beings at least, this means motivation and emotion is part and parcel to reasoning. "Disinterested" takes on a new meaning here -- instead of being some pure archon of truth, a disinterested person is one who is motivated in the appropriate way given their profession or goal. It becomes a project of character building through education to create disinterested individuals who, though we are all motivated by emotion and goals, comes to what we consider to be generally agreeable and reasonable conclusions.

I thought you and I were talking about the same thing. In what way is what you call "practical truth" different from what I call "political truth." I'm not talking about politics as in creating, enforcing, and judging laws, I'm talking about making group decisions about what to do next. — T Clark

I just wouldn't call it truth. I'd say that we're aiming at proper action, rather than true actions. So there is what is true, and then there is what is good (unqualified, but not simpliciter -- just meaning I know that "good" can mean multiple things).

So theoretical reason is the use of reasoning in the pursuit of the goal of truth or knowledge. Whereas practical reason is the use of reason in the pursuit of the goal of the good or proper conduct (be it collective or otherwise).

Truth-as-consensus seems to miss what truth is. Just because a group of people come to an agreement that something is true that does not then mean that what they believe is true. And in politics, where we are making decisions, is it really truth that's being aimed at? In what sense?

I'd say that consensus is a process of justification rather than a defining feature of truth. Actually this is interesting because consensus can play a role in both justifying belief to build knowledge as well as in justifying collective action -- though would it still be proper collective action? Or is the nature of collective action such that it is merely necessary to build consensus in order for it to take place?

The TLP almost reads like a lament to me. I agree with your reading in that it is a treatise on ethics, primarily, and logic secondarily -- there are only a few hints that the treatise is about ethics, mainly when he's talking about the mystical or when a man sees the world right. It's like Wittgenstein wanted to find meaningful ethical content in philosophy but thought that it was impossible, and in fact could only be found outside of philosophy. So the very draw of philosophy ends itself by proving that philosphy cannot settle or expound upon the ethical life, and if one is logical, one should actually believe that ethical statements are not strictly meaningful.

So the 7th proposition, as an ending, reads to me like all the previous explorations of truth, logic, facts, and world are not worth speaking of. We have "climbed the ladder", and now may throw it away.

Some other condition:

In order for an appeal to work it would seem that we would already have to consider the speaker as somehow someone worth listening to. Emotional appeals to shared precepts are not enough, as we can see there are many people who share a tradition but who simply do not listen to one another -- they view others in the light of someone who never says anything worth listening to. Consider, for instance, political parties in a democracy at odds with one another -- there comes a point where appeals are no longer being made. What use words are being put to is as tools of manipulation, as weapons to win, because there is an enemy to defeat. These are not appeals to reason, but strategies of war. All the same the two parties at least claim to have similar precepts.

So mere agreement is not enough. We need to hear another -- an Other? -- in order for an appeal to work. There is something about listening that must be incorporated.

What are they? — Posty McPostface

The slingshot argument, introduced to me on these forums (or the last?), persuaded me of the limitations of the correspondence theory of truth. I found what look to be lecture notes on it here which explains the argument pretty well step by step with examples.

You mean utilitarianism? — Posty McPostface

Not necessarily. Though I don't mean to rule out any normative theory either. I'm more interested in the conditions under which an appeal to act thus and so, rather than otherwise, would work -- and the extent to which reason can influence action, and when it should or shouldn't.

Here I'm just trying to justify the distinction between theoretical and practical reason -- with theoretical reason appeals to emotion don't influence the truth of some proposition so it doesn't make a difference to justification. But in action emotion, pleasure, and so forth, do make a difference to how we actually act. They are important considerations in considering what it means to live the good life.

Interesting. I wonder what kind of eclectic philosophy you have compiled. Let us know so we may benefit too. — Posty McPostface

Heh. Thanks for the encouragement.

I think there's definitely similarity, but I think there's some important differences too. I'm sympathetic to the notion that truth is correspondence, though aware of its limitations. I think that theoretical problems are meaningful. I think there's a distinction to be had between these different appeals to reason -- so, for instance, just because it may make me feel good to believe something is true that does not have any influence upon whether it is true or not. But in the case of practical reason if somethings makes me or others feel good that's pretty darn important to consider.

I'm also drawing my inspiration from different thinkers, which is likely to bring up differences I think. So Aristotle and Kant make hey with this notion of practical reason vs. theoretical reason. And Epicurus sort of calls into question the importance of theoretical reason in his philosophy, as does Levinas, and places more importance on the practical, the ethical side of thinking. These are the thinkers that are on my mind in formulating things this way.

Some remarks:

I think that the question is really too broad to be fairly answered. I'm more than happy to hear input, of course, but I'm also partially using this as a public scratch pad -- if something sparks, then great, but I'm sort of just thinking through things with the hope that input might be received.

Why the question is important: meta-philosophically I've come to believe two things. One, that philosophy and reason are inextricable. And two, that philosophy should address the needs of people. So philosophy is the pursuit of a good life through the path of reason. Or, in a more limited sense, philosophy is the pursuit of a good life when reason is called for.

While there are theoretical concerns in philosophy, as well, I think that from my side of things -- outside of academia -- that such concerns are not the main organizing principle of philosophy. I simply do not have the time necessary to deliberate such things (I also suspect that such debate is interminable and indeterminable, but I'd rather set that aside for now). But, regardless of the time allotted me, I and we all must do things. So in a sense this practical side of philosophy is more important merely by the fact that it is inescapable -- we all do things in the world. And insofar that truth matters to our doing we care about truth, but we can also ignore it to the extent that it does not impact upon our cares. But we cannot ignore waking up and having things to do. (I say "things to do" rather than "make choices" or some such formulation to avoid notions of choice, control, and will which are related but not of interest to me here.)

I phrase the question in terms of of the how of justification and when it's appropriate or working to avoid questions about what. I don't care what it is. I care how it works, how to phrase things more clearly, when reason should be used. Given my meta-philosophical beliefs these questions are similar to asking about the limits of philosophy, though I'd rather not go the meta-route. For me those answers are fixed at the moment. What is in flux, and uncertain, are my thoughts on reason.

Oh, I don't know if it's better that way or whatever. After work I find it hard to concentrate, so it was nice to have it read to me. Plus the translation used in the video I linked had a lyrical quality to it which did make it nice to hear out loud.

Haha. Well, to be fair I don't think I would have liked it at another point in my life. Like a lot of spiritual literature you have to already sort of be in the right frame of mind or at least thirsty for it before it can work its magic. There was one verse that described me well --

When a superior man hears of the Tao,
he immediately begins to embody it.
When an average man hears of the Tao,
he half believes it, half doubts it.
When a foolish man hears of the Tao,
he laughs out loud.

Immediately upon hearing it I was like "Well, I was a foolish man, and now I'd say I'm an average man"

I can kind of see it, but there's a difference too. It's not quite a heap, but there are criteria in play. I think the Sorites paradox would apply only if you were able to fashion objective-subjective as a kind of continuum -- where at one end you had the most objective knowledge and at the other you had the most subjective knowledge, and everything else somehow fell in-between. But what would define the poles in such a way that it would apply to all knowledge?

And then wouldn't we actually be using the dichotomy as opposed to dropping it?

How would you parse Tiff's example, in that case? OR do you mean just to restrict yourself to discussions of objective knowledge only?

I'd have to say that if that be the criteria for subjective and objective truths that you're using the words differently from the scenario with a patient and a doctor. First the domain of discourse has already changed from symptoms to truths. And secondly the mind wasn't really part of the definition of objective or subjective in the case of a patient and a doctor -- rather, it was who was reporting what which determined if a symptom was objective or subjective. The roles determined the meaning of the terms, not whether something depended upon a mind or not.

I think the words are quite squirrelly. So, yes, they can be used, but they have a tendency to shift meaning without notice.

You were talking about criteria for evaluating knowledge though, right?

It seems to me, re-reading your OP, your saying that you can replace all talk of objective or subjective knowledge with talk of criteria for knowledge. Though without the categories objective/subjective.

So you just mean that there are criteria for counting something as knowledge, and we can argue about those rather than argue over whether or not something is objective or subjective..

I think Tiff gave a good response. I'll add a bit more. As Tiff pointed out, if I give you a report of what happening internally, it's clearly subjective, i.e., it originates with the subject. If I give a piece of knowledge that is dependent on me, then it's also subjective. For example, it's true that I like orange juice, and someone can claim that they know that I like orange juice, but this kind of knowledge is dependent on the subject (me). Objective knowledge is not dependent of the how I feel or think, it's independent of how I feel or think. Thus, the fact that the Earth has one moon is an objective fact, i.e., it's not dependent on how anyone feels or thinks. Objective facts can exist apart from minds, subjective facts cannot. This is not that difficult to comprehend. I love the way people want to throw out words that they find difficult, or that they cannot fit into their world view. — Sam26

I think Tiff's response was good, too. What it gave was a very clear context of usage. I would say, however, that the context of usage for objective/subjective is not always so clear as that.

For one, I wasn't sure if the OP was even talking about knowledge per se (I see un brought up this point too). We could be talking about beliefs, facts, knowledge, or even entities. Any given philosopher has some project in mind which might help to understand the terms, but in speaking together, here, I'd say it is hard to pin down the exact meaning of the terms without a little leg-work. With Tiff's example we knew what was under consideration -- symptoms. So a patient gave a subjective symptom, whereas a doctor -- playing the role of an analyst -- gives an objective one. Makes perfect sense.

But using the words objective and subjective does not always play out so smoothly, nor is it clear what domain is under consideration even.

Also, words don't get their meaning from other words, words primarily get their meaning from how they're used. — Sam26

I am more inclined to agree with you, but I didn't want to raise the point. I mostly wanted to understand what the implication was, regardless of whatever theory of meaning we might subscribe to.

So, the issue seems to be, when does one know they are being objective, correct? — Posty McPostface

Well, for myself at least, I just began to think that the use of the terms added more confusion than clarity. But in not using them their importance seemed to drop out with them, and you could get on with thinking about the topic at hand.

Yes, words are circular, they derive their meaning from other words. What do you think this says about the objective/subjective dichotomy? I'm trying to point at a third alternative. — Posty McPostface

I'm open to a third way. I still don't think that the terms are terribly important, merely that they are tolerable as long as we remain clear about what we mean - hardly a passionate defense of an old dichotomy :D.

I am uncertain what the derivation of meaning from other words might say about objective/subjective. I'd have to have it spelled out for me more.

Well, thanks to this thread I listened to the Tao te Ching -- it was my first exposure to it. There was a reasonably decent reading on youtube, and the speaker also gives a preface.

I never really had the inclination before and I don't know why. I really enjoyed it.

I had thought, for awhile, that it was preferable to reject the distinction between what is objective and subjective. Now I'm tentatively of the opinion that as long as we set out what we mean then the terms can be used, while keeping an eye on the fact that they are ambiguous and often change meaning depending on the speaker. But aside from the fact that people use the words I don't know I'd go so far as to say there is some advantage to using them -- they are ambiguous and often seem to result in more misunderstanding than understanding.

Asking "Do they deserve it?" is another way of asking "Is the punishment just?". If we unpack the question, we get "Does the punishment prevent further injustice?" and "Is justice restored?". The objectively correct punishment is the one that answers "yes" to both questions (if possible). But I only see a matter of facts here. Why do you say this is a matter of values? — Samuel Lacrampe

Because the question I offered is not asking, "Does the punishment prevent further injustice?" and "Is justice restored?", but rather "Does the person who is deserving of punishment deserve this punishment?" -- It's a question of how we interpret justice, and what we mean by justice. In the case of the death penalty it is thought of as just when the person in question has done something so wrong that the worst punishment we have is the only possible way to rectify what they have done. Justice, in this sense, is seen as a kind of balance. One person kills, and so is killed in return.

Another sort of justice would just be restorative justice. Killing a murderer only creates more death, rather than rectify the wrong. Seeing as we can do nothing to bring back the dead the debt owed by the murderer is unpayable, and so they are given some sort of life sentence.

Another sort of justice would be rehabilitative justice. Killing a murderer not only fails to rectify a wrong, it also misses out on what the truly just act would be: turning the murderer into a productive member of society. Justice, in this sense, is more about the health of a community than rectifying wrongs.

Given that we agree that morality is objective, this question becomes virtually irrelevant; because objective truth is found by reason and not opinions — Samuel Lacrampe

I'd say this confuses truth with justification. So while we agree that moral statements are truth-apt, in that they seem to be describing things which are or are not the case invariant of one's point of view, what I am asking is how you determine whether such a statement is true or false. Agreement seems to be the metric on hand, so we'd have to ask how it is we determine that people agree.

I'd say that this is not enough:

Moral systems on the other hand are very similar in different places and times. The Golden Rule is called such because it is universal. It occurs in some form in nearly every religion and ethical tradition — Samuel Lacrampe

For the reasons against the golden rule I already mentioned, one, and also because "moral systems" could just be read as synonymous with "systems with the golden rule". So any system with the golden rule is a system with the golden rule, meaning that definition-ally they'd all be similar. But this just begs the question.

I'd say that, for instance, the Nazi system you propose contra moral systems is another example of people acting on moral impulses. These were moral impulses of disgust and a fascination with human unity in the state. There is a certain desire for purity in Nazi emotions, as well as a desire to be rid of a previous embarassment and rectify wrongs done to the people. But I would call it an immoral system, in the evaluative sense -- but in the descriptive sense, just like capitalism, communism, or feudalism, I'd say that it counts as a system of prescripts for society, and so is in that sense at least a normative system. It would count when looking at whether or not people agree on goodness.

Power -- Bertrand Russell. It's written as a survey of types with the hopes of making a science of power. I don't think it succeeds, but it fits what you're asking after, and still provides a nice little set of kinds of power.

I suppose a direct response to your titular question is: It's not as tedious as discussing philosophy with definitions. Also, it keeps the discussion from becoming about what a word really means, as if such usage could be settled by appealing to Meriam Webster.

Rather than argue over the meaning of "animal", we can just argue over whether animals have rights -- just to use your example you opened with. And we can clarify exactly what we mean by said terms as we go along, just as we would have to even when setting out our terms from the start.

In a sense it doesn't matter what the definition of a word is as long as it is understood. The only point in providing or asking for meaning is to clarify usage, and once that is understood then the other possible uses a word can be put to are not relevant.

Or, perhaps, if your style of communication is somewhat more mathematical -- as if you were providing a proof, maybe. But said proofs can be just as arbitrary as vague word usage, too, where it appears we have proven something we haven't just because of a queer way of using a word, rather than talking about the issue at hand. So, for example, we could use the word "vertebrates", as you say, and get long just as well as if we used the word "animal" as long as we understand what we're talking about. But in the end it's not the biological characteristics of certain beasties at play there, but the capacity of suffering that some beasties have. And even here "beasties", made up as it is, serves just as well because you understand what I mean by the term.

(1) Subjectivity is not necessarily entailed; inasmuch as people disagree on religions even though it is clearly an objective topic (E.g., if the Christian God exists, then He exists for everyone; and if not, then not). — Samuel Lacrampe

That's a good analogy actually. By your terms I agree that morality is objective. The notion that I'm proposing is that every moral statement is false.

Similarly with religion -- every religion has truth-apt statements. And that makes them objective. And they are false statements, i.e., there is not one true religion.

(2) I dispute the claim that the disagreements are strong; even for the case of the death penalty. People do not argue on the death penalty when it comes to simple cases like children jaywalking; they do only when it comes to complex cases like dealing with terrorists. E.g., if only put in jail, will they escape? Will they do it again once released? Will their buddies continue to terrorize because jail time is not a strong enough incentive to stop? etc. If we know the answer to these questions with certainty, then there would be very few disagreements; and these are matters of facts, not values. — Samuel Lacrampe

I think there's one important question that you're missing there. Do they deserve it? And that is not a question of fact, but of values.

I agree that there is agreement for absurdly simple cases, but I don't know if there is agreement even for most cases. First, how would we determine such a thing? It would seem we'd have to know the opinion not only of everyone who exists now, but even people who have existed -- since moral difference is most clear when viewed historically, and not just by asking your neighbor. And that just isn't possible to know down to every detail. We have to make assumptions of some kind to determine what everyone ever has believed.

Given the changes in laws over time and the differences between even current countries, and persons within countries, I'd say that it is at least reasonable to believe that there is more disagreement than agreement with respect to all persons. I mean, we used to have a feudal society ruled by a single church. And now we have a democratic capitalist society with a plurality of religions. In what ways would all the people of the past agree with our current world? And wouldn't they actually disagree with it on what they consider to be moral grounds?

Would it really be for others? Maybe family and friends. But the same things that motivate people now -- desires for comfort, food, water, and so forth. Material comforts.

If they are correct, then yes, I am the one in error in this case. But the very fact that there can be an error proves the objectivity of the topic. There cannot be any error on subjective topics, for it is by definition only a matter of opinion. — Samuel Lacrampe

Sure. But it's sensible to ask, then, how it is you know what you claim? Why is it that some people believe in the death penalty, and some do not, and both call it justice -- how do you adjudicate between these two possibilities, and justify your belief?

I have granted the possibility of error. But given the diversity of opinion on the topic it seems reasonable to also say that not only is error possible, but we are all actually in error -- because there is no fact to the matter.

There's a nice book by Ian Hacking titled The Social Construction of What?. I think it's great reading for anyone interested in the notion of social construction.

It is not a weakness that Philosophy appeals to reason. It is the weakness of the reasoner that requires Philosophy to remain on her knees and continue to appeal.

The weakness of Philosophy is that it must genuflect before the reason of the reasoner. Art does not appeal. it stands like a God and simply declares. Art, is the liberated soul of Man. — Marcus de Brun

Isn't that what makes it better than philosophy, in some respects?

I think so.I think they're both important aspects of human activity. And actually work better together than the traditional dichotomy between reason and feeling might suggest -- but only if we understand them to be doing different things and to be good at what they do.

I was hoping to get that point across by saying what I feel and think when I watch the video you linked -- trying to do philosophy on art. Now, what I wrote was very far from moving. It wasn't an expression of my liberation, or anything so deep and profound as what many an artwork can express. But it still provided something valuable -- by telling you what was going on in my head, in my thinking, by my reasoning. Rather than just make declarations it gave you, and others, something to pick on from the standpoint of reason.

Asking the easy questions today? :D

There's a funny thing about the question "What does that mean to you?" There's a couple of senses of "mean" that come out, when I read it -- in one way you are asking me the simple linguistic meaning, or the meaning of the concept of freedom in a descriptive sense. In the other sense you are asking me what freedom means to me as in why is it meaningful or important to me. And maybe you are really asking both questions. If you meant anything besides that then you'll have to explicate a bit.

Freedom is a negative condition -- in the sense that you only lose it because you are being coerced. But there is nothing specific to the condition of freedom just by virtue that you could be doing any number of things while being free, and you could even being doing those same things while being unfree. Freedom isn't an action, but a mode of action. And in a simple sense it just means a lack of coercion. But what counts as coercion? That's where you'll have people disagree. I'd say that a fantasy-land of realistic feeling pleasures is coercion -- a coercion I'd take over fear and pain as tools of coercion, by all means, but coercion all the same.

What comes of freedom is up to the actor. That's the whole point. So it can't be specified, really. But there is something worthwhile in owning your own actions, rather than doing them because someone is enticing you to do them. From my perspective, at least, I'll take a world of pain where I am not being coerced over a world of pleasure where I am. Because the pain coming from the world is something you can contend with, you have the ability to act and learn how to deal with it. But in a world where you are the object to be controlled you have no such recourse. You're alienated even from yourself.

Plus, in a more practical manner, it's not like the world the Matrix created was all that great to begin with :D. Pain and suffering are just part of life. There's no eliminating that. But if you are free you can learn to be at peace with it.