Well, I like being agreed with ;)

That sounds about right to me. I will say that it's possible to change these sorts of beliefs, too, but yes -- to do so is like pulling yourself apart.

I think philosophy *can* help in this endeavor, but it doesn't necessarily lead to self-criticism of this sort. One has to have the right sorts of inclinations to be able to suspend and entertain other brute beliefs.

In a way, yeah. Though in another, I don't have that faith. So while I can understand where someone is coming from by seeing that I do have brute beliefs myself, they're just different, at the same time I couldn't accept an argument built on the premise of faith (at least with respect to creationism) just by the fact that I don't have that belief.

Also, I'd note that "creationist" can be construed pretty broadly. So depending on said creationist I'd be more or less willing to say that we're on par. So, for example, if someone is a Christian and takes the bible to be a literal document about the way the world was formed, for instance, I'd say that this isn't on par with some sort of deist conception of God, which isn't something I believe in but is also something which seems more akin (and thereby more difficult to decide between) to my beliefs.

First, I want to own up to the fact that I've rephrased your question here. I'd prefer to talk about brute beliefs to brute facts. Hopefully that doesn't skew your focus too far astray, but let me know if it does and I'll try to reformulate my initial thoughts..


I guess I'd wonder how it is one builds explanations without there being some belief which is brute. There may be a problem of adjudicating which beliefs are better as brute beliefs, but I fail to see how reason gets off the ground without brute beliefs.



Brute beliefs can be arbitrarily selected because of their function within a set of rules for deliberating whether some statement is true. If you question the brute belief then it is no longer a brute belief. But just because a brute belief can be selected arbitrarily doesn't mean that all brute beliefs are selected arbitrarily. First, there can be more compulsions to accept a belief than reason alone -- so while a brute belief may not have a reason, i.e. it is not the product of rationality, it may still be grounded by extra-rational means.

Agreement is sort of an extra-rational means, at least with respect to deliberating on truth. Agreement clearly doesn't yield truth, yet it is a rule by which we can select brute beliefs which operate within a particular discussion. Faith is another -- by faith we accept such and such statements as true, even without demonstration. Certain kinds of emotional attachment or compulsion come to mind as well -- meaning, the sorts of emotions which aren't part of our rational process.


Also, it's worth noting that a belief can be brute in one conversation, but since questioning a belief turns it non-brute, that no belief is permanently brute. We'd just have to be compelled -- by other, extra-rational means -- to question said belief, and it would no longer function as a brute belief.

That being said, however, I do believe science should be more integrated into the philosophy departments (and not necessarily vice-versa). Philosophers need to be knowledgeable about science, but scientists do not necessarily need to be knowledgeable about philosophy (it's more like it's optional, or perhaps a one-semester class). — darthbarracuda

What justification would you have for this belief?

For one kind of depression I use a motor for an analogy. It seems to me that there is a kind of emotional emergency-clutch in place for when what normally motivates us to act actually becomes too painful to function. We can disconnect from our emotions and do disconnect from our emotions in particular circumstances because our emotions can be overwhelming at a particular moment. Depression, in this case, is a malfunction of said emergency-clutch -- it's unable to re-engage the engine (our emotions) and is stuck in the disengaged position.

I'm uncertain when taking the analogy literally though. For one, I don't think that we're quite as mechanical as a literal interpretation of an engine-to-wheels metaphor suggests. It's just an approximation for attempting to understand the mechanism (or the lack of mechanism) and where it seems to be located in relation to the rest of the mind -- I'd say it's between the emotions and the body, and has something to do with transitioning to new environments or dealing with overwhelming environments. (edit: and the malady could be such that no such environment is needed to trigger such responses, or that no such environment is still around but the workings in-between are still acting as if there is)

An illness is a medical condition, depression is a mental disorder, mental disorders are not medical conditions. Clear enough? Maybe I should be straightforward: depression is neither an illness, a sickness nor a disease. — Noblosh

It's not more clear to me because I already understood you were drawing a distinction between medical condition and mental disorder. What I do not understand is what said distinction consists of. How would I be able to determine one from the other? What makes them different?

I'll try to demonstrate how I see these as the same:

The way I see it -- "depression", as a term we use to describe someone's mental disorder, comes straight out of the medical model. There is an underlying problem which has symptoms for determining that such and such is the problem and also connecting said symptoms to a cure -- the underlying problem, the malady of health, explains both the symptoms and the cure, or is meant to lead to a successful cure if one is not yet known. If said cure attached to the malady does not cure it, then we're wrong about our description of the underlying malady, even if we know the symptoms.

That is fair. I don't mean to say depression is just something we say, but I am trying to distance it from a notion of a distinct and well understood disorder at the same time. I'm doing a messy job of trying to understand depression as within a particular frame -- not to say that there isn't something real underpinning what we call depression, but only to say that whatever understanding of reality is there is not quite as definite as our understanding of, say, type 2 diabetes, given the diversity of experience with and cures for depression.


And, true, I hadn't thought of that transition from having to being. That certainly does tie in the transition that I saw as being a bit divergent from the opening. Though if that be the case, I'd note that I prefer the frame of "having" to "being" -- I don't know if that's good for everyone, but I know i prefer such a framing for myself.

I'm afraid you're going to have to draw out the difference for me. I'm not understanding what you're saying I'm wrong about.

I actually don't go so far as to think a dislike of philosophy is a reflection of an ability to reason -- just that the usual expressions against philosophy are themselves not very well thought out. They may very well know how to reason about other subjects, but simply saying philosophy is useless and leaving it at that is a clear indication to me that the speaker hasn't given much thought to the matter.

As for reasoned refutations of philosophy -- I like to read them. But if that's a person's ending point, my thinking goes back to art and science (in a similar way as before) -- when practitioners are dissatisfied with a discipline, they change the way they do it. And new and cool and innovative art, science, and philosophy springs from such dissatisfaction. So maybe the person is doing it wrong (for them, in a relativized way)?

I think it depends on where one wants to draw the line on language, really. We could draw it so strictly that only English or German is the truly sophisticated language, for instance, or loosely enough that dogs barking to us is itself an example of full-fledged language, "for all intents and purposes", or some such qualification to indicate that we're not just barmy.

But, then, I suppose I don't feel entranced by linguistic usage as some indicator of our humanity. At least no more than many of the other things we fart around with.

Depression is a diagnosis -- meaning that it is a term for an illness, with which there is at least the desire for a cure and a set of symptoms which indicate that this description of the illness is true and this cure is what is needed to extirpate said illness.

One thing about depression, though, is that while its symptoms are well defined, it seems that the personal experiences of the afflicted have varying degrees of difference. Perhaps this is just mis-diagnosis in some cases, but I'd wager that the way we understand "depression", and our lack of understanding of mental workings and health, is also partly at work in the variation of experiences and cures with depression. It seems to me to be a bit of a catch-all term which works better than no term, but which is likely identifying a larger set of intermingling parts which aren't well understood.



I think you're kind of straying off the topic of depression in talking about impotence, or the im/potence of the will. Depression can have an effect on willpower, but this is something which is more particular and isn't really a meta-logical observation about depression or mental illness, and one can experience impotence without depression. It seems to me that one experiences impotence when they desire something which is outside of their ability or power to obtain. So, sure, depression can lead to feelings of impotence as it hinders one's ability to do even little things in life, but the two are still quite distinct.

Which topic is it you were wanting to talk about? Impotence or depression?

Sounds interesting. The last game which reminded me of the old Zelda games was Titan Souls, which was unbelievably difficult, frustrating and repetitive, but so worth it for the sense of relief and accomplishment when you complete the game. The whole game consists of those classic boss fights. — Sapientia

I finally picked this one up the other day. I'm so glad I did. I really like the 1-hit mechanic since it feels like killing the monster is just out of reach, and they still manage to make the fights feel epic. (haven't beaten it yet, but it's tons of fun).

I pretty much just say "Nuh uh". If asked for proof, I say "No".

But, then, I'm not interested in persuading them, and am giving just about as much thought to my replies as I tend to feel they're giving.

Why respond at all? It's sort of like shitting on art or science. It's just like. . . uhhh, OK. Good luck with that, buddy.

I think you're approaching the problem from the wrong end.

Rather than defining ideals, choosing identities, and judging which methods of judgment might lead you to an objective set of beliefs on the matter I'd say you learn politics -- including what you find to be more acceptable and less acceptable, the "practical reason" or values that you find to be correct, and not merely know-how -- simply by doing political things.

This is not to say that political philosophy is neutered or irrelevant. It's very relevant -- just as relevant as actually getting your hands dirty. Without either you won't be able to answer which political philosophy you find to be closest to the truth.

Ingmar Bergman is one of my favorite directors, and that's probably his most famous flick. I don't want to spoil too much, but if you happen to give it a try you should post your thoughts afterwords. (negative or positive -- I've heard both kinds of reactions to it)

7th Seal is the first one that popped to mind for me.

Emotions are what is felt on the inside. And I don't think this necessarily has to resort to a Cartesian subject who feels the feeling. Aren't feelings actually shared, after all? Aren't they even infectious? When someone I know is scared I will often feel worry, when someone is laughing I will often feel humor even without knowing the joke. This is why comedy is best in the theater or in person -- one person's laughter builds another persons, and everyone slowly feels the humor more deeply as the infection spreads.

Emotions are relatively basic to our lives. They are similar to object-kinds, in this way. "What are objects?" or "What are chairs?" we might ask. "What is doing the sitting?" or "What is doing the seeing of these objects?". And so many other variations. But is there any more of an answer, here, than there is with emotions? If we believe we see because light hits objects and reflects off into our eye which sends a signal to our brain to give us an image, won't we believe similarly so with emotions? "The brain is at work" -- "the chemicals are released"


Or, is the question more akin to asking how it is possible to perceive an inside? "We grant objects and all that, but what do we make of our internal lives? Why do we have internal lives at all? What is an internal life?"
??

I answered in the negative. I sort of feel like I've ridden that pony and know what it has to offer. In an abstract sense I can acknowledge that, certainly, I don't know my beliefs to be correct, and so could be open to it -- but emotionally speaking, it's just not a thing that's even on my radar. I know what I find of interest and I know what aspects I enjoy and dislike. As such, it wouldn't be fair of me to say that I'm open to conversion, since I'm basically decided at this point. It seems to me a natural sort of place to land, regardless if one is religious or irreligious. I wouldn't expect a religious person to feel differently from myself, I mean.

I don't know what the word "gnostic" means in your diagram.



As for your question: Do you believe there are not two moons that revolve around the earth? Do you believe there are not three moons that revolve around the earth? And so on?

It seems to me that we do not walk about carrying beliefs about what is not the case, at least if its the sort of thing which we haven't given much thought. So I could be an atheist if I were the sort of person who came across this category "atheist" and said, well, yes, that is something I do not have a belief in.

It also seems to me that a person could actively form a disbelief, or a belief that God does not exist, and so could be an atheist.

Both seem to fit the category to me. Which kind of atheist a person is is just a psychological fact about their state of belief. And maybe a person could even slide from one kind to the other, too.

My thoughts are always drawn back to time when it comes to understanding causality. It's the explanation which makes sense of change over time. We have events, encounters, and actions, all of which imply a variety of entities. In making sense of these we create stories. And some of these stories -- we might say the more reliable kind, perhaps, or the de-personified stories -- are causal stories, where the plot is fixed.

So I think, rather than defining causality in a metaphysical way I'd take a stab at saying it is more a feature of our knowledge, how we create knowledge, and what counts as a satisfying explanation of change over time. I think, then, that the question of understanding causality becomes one of characterizing time.

hahah. Maybe. Though I'd say my principles are the same. I know I don't like really-existing-democracy, but also believe the evils of really-existing-socialism aren't worth fighting for. It's hard to judge which is better or worse without living it. It probably depends on where in the hierarchy of each society one falls that would make it better or worse for them, as well as the time period.

I value what are often termed "bourgeois freedoms", such as freedom of speech, if not property. So I suppose I would just say that Marxism has this double-edge to it -- it strives for liberation, but there are authoritarian seeds in the thought as well. And, if one is not libertarian in their orientation, then these wouldn't even be seen as a negative. But if we are, then perhaps we should view Marxism in a partially negative light after all. Not one born out of ignorance of this possibility for greater liberty in Marxist thought, but rather out of familiarity and reflection -- being able to qualify which aspect of Marxist thought is preferable and which isn't.

Also, while I do not like authoritarian politics, I will say that the reason they work is because people are more comfortable with authority than they'd like to admit. People express the desire for liberty, but authoritarian tactics work to organize people precisely because they bring comfort and stability. There's something about us, as humans, that is susceptible to this way of doing things. I'm not sure what, precisely. But this is just to say that even if Marxism is authoritarian, this isn't something that qualifies it as particularly evil. Authoritarian tactics are used the world over, regardless of ideology.

So you think that based on these movements of capital to global East and West, and mechanization of production will produce some sort of communist state- one described by Marx in whichever stage of his writing you prefer to draw from? — schopenhauer1

I think that capital moving from the west to the east is a reasonable prediction of Marx's work, yes. The production of a communist state, no. I don't believe in historical necessity, and certainly not one which will produce communism. I see it as a possibility, but not a necessity resulting from capital.

I do not consider the Soviet Union or China a successful example of Marxism, Communism, or the like. I see it as dictators and or cadres of dictators (politburo, etc.) taking control of a country and running it like a police state and then easing up on restrictions when it became economically necessary to allow for more free trade elements and accumulation of wealth. It was all top down. Dictatorship of the Proletariat not being a metaphor but literally a dictatorship. People "needed" to programmed to be Marxist through gulags, workforce programs, and stifling of free speech. If man was supposed to be free and self-actualized because they weren't exploited or worried about accumulation of wealth, that never really worked out. They may not have accumulated much wealth, bu they were certainly exploited by whatever the state mechanisms dictated to them. There was never a good way to implement the transition of the modes of production and accumulation of wealth without mass death and total control of people's movements and lives. More democratic socialism is just capitalism with safety nets. I do not think that as Marxist or Communist. — schopenhauer1

I do. I'd say that both the Soviet Union and China, along with other states, are reasonable end-points for Marxist thought. I'd highlight here that I don't believe they are necessary, but they fit the program.

They weren't utopian communist societies, but they were reasonable extrapolations of Marxist thought. And they accomplished good things as well as bad, just like most states. Literal dictatorship isn't opposed to Marxist thought -- the seeds for authoritarian politics are certainly in even Marx's work. You don't need to follow him on these points in your own political practice, but that doesn't mean that the Soviet Union or China weren't actual or real examples of Marxist politics, either. They certainly were.

And you can even judge just how good Marxist thought is or isn't based upon what they brought to the world.

I wouldn't believe the depictions of the Soviet Union casually on offer. They tend to highlight what is evil, because it's propaganda. The Soviet Union, and other communist states, do this to the west as well. They create propaganda which focuses on our evils to persuade others that their state is the better one.

But in reality, it was a mixed bag, just like western Democracy. Both good and evil.

I don't disagree with your first sentence, and I know one reading of Marx is that the revolution was supposed to happen in Germany. One reading, too, states that economies follow a historical progression from feudalism to capitalism to socialism to communism.

Both @jamalrob and @Benkei have anticipated what I would say in response. It's a varied body of work. So while Marx is wrong about x, y, and z when we interpret it as a, b, or c, I don't think it's damning of Marx's body of work. (I'd note that insofar that we read Marx like this then I'd agree with anyone who believes it to be false, too)

Also Marxism is broader than Marx too -- you can't just ignore the various revolutions which put the theoretical ideas into practice. Consider the Theses on Feurbach (it's short! no worries :D ) -- I'd say it points that the practical, in-the-world action is just as if not more important than the understanding of ideas.

It's the document where the famous statement of Marx's comes from:

The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.

Anyway, I'd say that Marx's work predicts the way capital moved and has moved up to today -- by global expansion. I don't think that nationalist petit bourgeois people are objectively motivated to enact communist revolution. I'm not arguing that point. Only that what you cite as things against Marxism could also reasonably be read as predictions of Marxism, given the characterization of capital.

Eh.

I kinda feel like this is focused on European countries + USA. If you widen the scope of your evidence, which Marxist analysis would require given its global perspective (due to capital's global aims), then I'd say you're off the mark. The office space class rose in industrial nations which exploit 3rd world nations -- but that doesn't mean the proletariat has been annihilated, only broadened (as one would predict from the global nature of capital).

2 fits into my reply above. Capital is global, and the proletariat is a global class, not a national one. Communism, at least, is anti-nationalist. Marxism can be pro-nationalist in various circumstances, but the end-goal qua Marx is the elimination of nations. Even where nations exist, the proletariat is international regardless.

3 is questionable. if you mean that people lower on the rung of income in the United States can afford DVD players, then sure. But that's not really a strike against Marx, I'd say. Who gives a fuck about DVD players vs. healthcare, for instance? As you mention... I am most sure that the majority of people would be happy to trade in their Sony-whatever for regular and reliable healtchare when needed. Basic needs trump luxury goods -- and all capital has to offer are luxury goods, because this is what generates profits.


I'm not against luxury, by any means., but it's just silly to say that Marx got this wrong. It ignores the international character of communism, and it ignores why lower-class peeps in rich countries would buy luxury goods (both socially speaking, i.e. capital, and personally speaking, i.e. looking for a reason to live)

Actually -- it's worth noting:

James had a health condition wherein insulin would not be produced, and he was a participant in political organizations which promoted the white race. Today he walked around at his apartment reading the most famous fantasy book ever written, with its cover torn off. He had the unusual ability by which he couldn't be known by words, as well.


The verbal imagination can differ from itself, as well. There are various ways to say similar things. And the verbal imagination can craft sentences which negate our ability to understand said sentences too.

What's the visual property of being a diabetic racist? — Michael

There is no property for being a diabetic racist. It's not a singular aspect like red or square. It's more like a cultural archetype -- it's not necessary, unique, or fixed, but all the same a visual picture came to me which fit.

How could you see that the cover-less book was the Lord of the Rings? — Michael

I think my response here is similar to my previous response. Visual imagery doesn't have to be unique and differentiated from other books. But an image which fit the words involuntarily still appeared.

Actually, my copy of Lord of the Rings is what came to me, because it is now cover-less, and images from Lord of the Rings too.

What about the image of the location showed it to be that person's home? — Michael

Sitting on a porch.

Or as another example, what about imagining an invisible man reading an invisible book and imagining an invisible cat sitting on an invisible mat. Surely we can do both, but that in neither case is there any visual imagery. — Michael

Honestly, I saw an outline of each of those things -- the visual representation of invisibility.

So what, exactly, does this imagining consist of if not have some inner visual imagery? I can certainly understand where Dennett is coming from in saying that this imagining is verbal in nature, that really just involves considering and understanding certain words and phrases.

And if we can imagine invisible cats sitting on invisible mats in a verbal manner then surely we can imagine a visible zebra in a verbal manner. — Michael

I don't think I'd say there's no such thing as a verbal imagination. I don't think the imagination is strictly visual. I was just noting that the particularity of things doesn't restrict proper visual imagery. The visual imagination doesn't need to map perfectly to the verbal imagination in order for one to have a visual imagin-thing (not sure what to call it) of particularities.

a priori, I would say we have none. But, then, I do think the hard problem is a real problem, and at the same time I don't think the proposed solutions are satisfactory except insofar that they are intentionally vague and admit of their own ignorance.

I certainly agree that our internal lives differ -- not so radically that it's impossible to discuss, but still different. And that language usage of a certain type seems to mask these differences -- in particular, functionalist-oriented discourse.

But I rather doubt I'm the target of your example, here. I'm the low fruit. ;)

Well, what does imagining a diabetic racist sitting at home reading a cover-less copy of the Lord of the Rings consist of? I can understand having a quasi-visual image of a person reading a book, but the rest isn't so clear. — Michael

I have a pretty vivid visual imagination.

I actually had a specific picture pop up to your question. Clearly it could be different, but I saw something particular.

It seems to me that there is no the first rule -- but rather, there are first rules. And depending on which first rule you state first that has a kind of guiding force on what follows.


The first rule of philosophy club is "know yourself" -- followed hastily by "but not just yourself"

Meh. Put it in a lab. What do you do?

You use a clock.

Is time an aspect of an object, even?

Scientifically speaking, time is that which a chronometer measures. There is such and such a tension placed upon a visual apparatus with a slightly lesser tension, and the first tension changes the apparatus at what appears to us to be regular intervals.

I do not understand time at all, except in common parlance. I know that I must clock in 2 days from now 5 minutes prior to 7 am (central standard). But to define what seems to be something wider and more general in terms of my life now doesn't seem quite right.

I rather like Heidegger's take when he says that we are time. But, at the same time, I am not certain what it means. It just strikes me "right", in comparison to the alternatives.

It doesn't help that there are so many horrible people who deny the holocaust, but even so, does that mean that I am not allowed to say that there are also many Israelis that deny anything bad going on in Palestine too, unless I am a holocaust-denier, anti-semite? — TimeLine

I don't think this is disallowed. I think, here, it's all in the timing.

An appropriate response to the Holocaust is deferential reverence.

Similarly so to slavery and the effects of white supremacy.

Now, there are flaws we could point out about African American communities. I am uncertain to what extent they are generalizable, but I am familiar. However, the time to discuss them is not in the same conversation as one about the horrors of slavery. Not only is it off topic, but it would be an insult, and the interlocutor would be right to wonder if I am trying to downplay their suffering, even if that is not what I am trying to do, because it's something that happens so often.

I think it is, only because of the above mentioned complexity and sensitivity, but certainly it must be carefully explored. — TimeLine

We can empathize with the suffering of others. I think we should do so, actually. And that this is a good thing. But in so doing it still makes sense to be considered an outsider. People who go through experiences will often see and hear more than those who don't. It can be transferred through communication, but only that way.

It makes sense to be treated as an outsider.

As horrible as these events are I will always be outside in one very salient point: it did not target me or mine. It is appropriate to treat me like an outsider for this fact.

The reaction to the Emmet Till painting makes sense for these reasons. She is an outsider. She should be treated as one. And, what's more, often times the suffering of African American's is used as a sick form of entertainment more than a bridge -- a kind of cathartic entertainment which is meant to alleviate guilt and help us feel pure and free of racism at last.

That may not be what's going on here, but it happens often enough that the reaction makes sense. Since that is the case it really does make sense to treat people like outsiders rather than members. Our coming from different backgrounds makes it so that I am not the target of these persecutions nor do I feel their ramifications -- as such, I just won't ever be a member of the group.

I can feel compassion and empathy for people. But in so doing, at least for myself, I'd think that I'd basically have the same attitude were I in their position.

I have to admit that the remark on Palestine did seem to come out of the blue, to me.

And I am not a-political or neutral on that topic :D.

There is very much a difference between the state of Israel, and Jewish ethnicity. And it doesn't seem to respond to @Hanover 's point -- that he would welcome anyone who wishes to express compassion towards Jewish people regardless of there ethnicity by making art about the Holocaust. So it should be viewed as a good thing, at least in a moral dimension even if the art fails at what it intends.

Whether someone is consistent or not with respect to other political topics is a bit off the beaten path, no?

I mean, I don't even know @Hanover 's stance on that issue -- but I do know that we can't blame the Jews for the actions of Israel, or even equate the two (many Jews are anti-apartheid, after all), and that whatever faults Israel may have it doesn't make sense to, immediately in response to the Holocaust, to bring up those faults. And I have to admit that though I do not think you intended this, that one fair interpretation was that Jews are to blame for the suffering of Palestinians and therefore we shouldn't have compassion for the Holocaust. I don't think you believe this -- but as you note, it's a sensitive topic. And with sensitive topics we tend to jump to the worst in others (sadly, with respect to race relations, because the worst is so often right).

While that is one fair interpretation I thought this is what you basically were saying: If we believe minorities, in general, shouldn't be persecuted for their minority status then as Palestinians are a minority then we should also believe, and stand with, them for the persecutions they suffer under the state of Israel. But, when visiting Israel, you were viewed as an outsider who shouldn't express these sorts of things or have an opinion on the matter because you are an outsider. So, while some jews might welcome people who express compassion for our pain, it seemed that some jews didn't want that same interaction when it came to their faults. So you would question Hanover on whether he is consistent on this point -- does he welcome outsider's only with respect to the past, or are outsiders always welcome?


But that's just a rough guess on my part. I'd welcome clarification or remonstration if I am wrong.

I do think that the ethics of insider/outsider is worth exploring. But maybe the Palestinian-Israeli conflict isn't the best ground in which to explore it?

I found myself agreeing with that Lisa Whittington interview you posted. I think she said it right.

Why not just the terms you used?

The

placing the interests safety and welfare of the citizens of a country above all else. — Question

taken to its logical extreme?


It would have the merit of not alluding to already well-used terms which have relatively entrenched meanings just because of historical and academic usage. Plus, it seems you're taking something of a theoretical approach anyways, so it would avoid referencing actual states which will run counter to what it is you want to say in the first place (as you already noted).

I don't believe that the logical form of socialism, taken to its extreme, is a fascist society. I'm not sure what lead you to believe that, @Question.

It's all just words, I suppose, so if that's what socialism means for you --

I understand socialism to be placing the interests safety and welfare of the citizens of a country above all else. That's as concise as I can present the concept without idiotizing it. — Question

, then I can keep track in this discussion. But it wouldn't be how I'd put things, and it's a pretty confusing way of talking, considering that it excludes what we usually term fascist Germany.



But then. . . I don't know what's wrong with that. I don't think it's in the interests of the citizenry to be murdered for belonging to unclean categories, or for those in the clean categories to be mobilized into war machines for the domination of other countries. I don't think that the trenches of the losing side of World War I are in the interests of anyone to replicate within a bureaucratic machine. I don't believe that the suspension of democratic practices and the suppression of the press and the usage of propaganda are in the interests, safety, or welfare of the citizens -- even as the final and ultimate value.


But these are features of actual states that at least claimed to be fascist.

It would be useful to use different words, I think.

Your question reminds me of the Ignmar Berman flick Winter Light. The main character seems to fit the bill -- though granted, this is fiction.

Fair. I wasn't sure which way you were saying.

How so?

Frustration is understandable. And even if frustration is expressed it doesn't draw away from the point -- that in order to criticize a text or group of texts it is fair to ask the critic to read them, or at least to not have an opinion on them until they do -- or, even if one has an opinion, it is fair to say that said opinion is not an informed one which is going to hit its mark.

This sort of requirement looks like a pretty standard, run-of-the-mill norm for rational understanding, discussion, critique, and debate. So I'd say no one here, at least, has rejected either truth or logic as tools of Western oppression.

On space for certain I agree with you, though I'd express uncertainty on my part about saying Kant was in line with Leibniz -- though maybe you're just saying it's similar, not the same. I think he takes a position in-between the two -- which is kind of his "move", if you think about it.

What I had more in mind were the laws of motion and our ability to predict the motion of matter with them, which we know and carries a kind of mathematical necessity with it which goes against the assertion that we can never know some effect through a cause but are merely habituated by repetition. Given such and such conditions, I can tell you where some bit of stuff will be in so much time, and I know this will be so -- I am not merely habituated to it.

But I think that was a bit of my own reading into the opening, there, to make sense of it. Natural science certainly doesn't have to be Newtonian -- it just seemed to make sense given its mathematical certainty and its relation to cause-and-effect. (and, of course, the frequent references to the three laws of motion, or at least formulations really similar to them)