My initial thought was that, supposing this true, it would fit snugly into the category of facts which morality is concerned about, but wouldn't fit the category of moral fact -- because it wouldn't prove that I should do this or that.

Maybe that's some of my hesitancy with the tautological approach that mars is aiming at, too. Even if true, it leaves much to be desired because it doesn't get at (what seems to me, at least) to be the point.



But maybe you had a further thought that I'm not really hearing? Or perhaps my initial thought strikes you as being too dismissive?

I tend to think that the various ethical theories are good for pondering situations and trying to make good decisions, but I don't think any one of them is the best. I would say that the best is somewhat situational-dependent, and even actor-dependent -- so that the best-for-you may be different from the best-for-her, and the best-for-now may differ from the best-for-then, and that even if there are some situations where it may make sense to say that this is the best answer, I wouldn't commit to say that all situations are likewise so straightforward.

In short: We should think with normative theories, but not be ruled by them. At the end of the day you just have to judge what's the right course of action in the moment, and no ethical theory will remove the weight of choice.

I was just using the terminology that was evoked by anon66 using the word "strange" -- the argument from queerness is the name of one of the arguments for moral anti-realism

OK, cool. Then I'll just keep that as a side-note then.

I think you said something like: assuming that moral statements are truth-apt, how do we know if any of them are true? — Mongrel

Not exactly.

Using mathematics is the basis of comparison, since that was brought up prior as a point of comparison for queerness, I maintain that it is reasonable for a person to maintain that mathematical facts are not queer, while rejecting moral facts because they are queer. One need not accept the existence of moral facts simply because they accept mathematical facts, and they can still be rational while both believing this to be the case, and believing this to be the case because of the argument from queerness of moral facts.

Doesn't this presuppose that everyone is convinced by mathematical statements? And even if convinced, what's to prevent someone from refusing to understand, or even being contrary and spiteful in math? You may laugh, but I have seen examples of both. — anonymous66

Of course not. It would only have to be the case most of the time to show how one could simultaneously believe that mathematics is factual, while morality is not. It would be reasonable to maintain.

I don't know where you got the idea that if objective morality, and if people know what is moral, then they WILL act morally. What gave you that idea? — anonymous66

I'm not talking about, in your case, how people behave, but what they believe. Also, just to note again, I'm more attacking moral facts than I am attacking objective morality.

I'm not sure that's a tautology to be honest. You've got two different uses of the copula going on there, by my lights. "it is moral" and then that sentences embedded in "to be moral"

What is the "it"?

Morality is morality is a tautology, sure.

Even so, I'd have to say -- even though mathematics can be argued to be tautological -- that I'm not sure I'd find a tautology very convincing on the point that morality as the same persuasive force as mathematics, given the argument I gave to anon earlier.

It's common to treat them as if they're truth apt. This argument is basically from common sense. — Mongrel

Is it common sense to treat moral statements as if they are truth-apt, or is it common to perceive people to be treating moral statements as truth-apt when we believe they are truth-apt?

At the very least I wouldn't claim that common sense would use the term "truth-apt".

But even supposing they are truth-apt, I disagree with this:

The structure of the argument (which isn't mine, btw) is that we treat moral statements as if they're truth apt. Concerns over whether there are true moral statements falls into the same batch of skepticism about whether there are true statements of any kind. — Mongrel

Surely not. Suppose astrology. A reasonable person could simultaneously believe that there are, say, statements about plumbing, some of which are true and some of which are not, while simultaneously believing that all statements about astrology (or, perhaps, within astrology, just to be careful about self-reference) are all false without falling into global skepticism.

We can treat whole classes of statements as false without thereby being a global skeptic.

It comes down to your theory of truth, basically. As long as you aren't a truth skeptic, you allow that at least one statement is true and this requires no demonstration. Its just logic. Beyond that... put forward your theory of truth and we can go from there.

As for treatment of the word fact: a slippery factor is that statement can mean proposition. So there's all sorts of hidden goodness there.

I don't have a position on truth. I find that conversation hard to follow. Also, I'm not trying to summon up propositions. I don't mean statement in any specific way.

How do these relate to the question of moral anti-realism/realism? I just don't see it.

I'm not sure what you mean by this. The same force? If math statements (essentially facts about math= facts about morality) are the same types of facts as moral facts, then they would, by definition, have the same force. — anonymous66

I mean that when we justify a mathematical statement that it is more persuasive than when we justify a moral statement, and I also mean that when we justify a mathematical statement that people change their beliefs about math whereas when we justify a moral statement people do not change their beliefs about morality. They continue to believe what they thought before.

I'm sure there are instances where you can find a counter-example, so take that to mean "on the whole", rather than as some kind of universal. Usually argument suffices to change a person's beliefs about math, but argument usually does not suffice to change a person's belief about morals.

Now, that does not mean there are no moral facts, mind. But since you were mentioning mathematics, and saying that mathematical facts are just as strange as moral facts, I was trying to argue that it's consistent to believe in mathematical facts while disbelieving in moral facts because of the argument from queerness -- that they are not "just as strange", from certain (not horribly uncommon or abstruse) perspectives.

So, if this is right it would seem that morality must be seen in functional, which is really the same as to say instrumental, terms. What plausible alternative conception of the good is there? — John

There is good, simpliciter, and then there's also moral good in terms of a moral agent's proper motivation, just off the top of my head.

I don't think morality must be seen as functional. There's a great deal more opinions on good and evil than instrumentalism.

But to the broader point about empirical psychology -- I think that disagreements about good will come about precisely in designating what is "fucked up", psychologically. These are very broad strokes to be talking in, and I don't think I'd attribute the desire to live in harmony with others as a universal desire, even though it is a plausible desire for some people to have. Exploitation is just too common to believe that this is an underlying, universal desire of human beings.

Which isn't to speak against goodness, per se -- only the formulation that goodness should rest on empirical psychology. This is to confuse what is the case with what ought to be the case, I would say. People should want to live in harmony with others, but they do not as we can see from their behavior. While I sometimes wonder if the fact/value distinction holds water at the ontological level, I believe that we should not lose sight of its strengths (namely, to guard against the belief that because things are the way they are, they are also the way they should be) -- which, perhaps there is a way I'm just not seeing, but it seems to me that if we ground morality in empirical psychology that we are at least in danger of committing the naturalistic fallacy.

I think this is just the right kind of approach. The moral or ethical fact or facts is/ are based on the psychological or empirical fact or facts about individuals or people in genera — John

I'd say that there's something important missing from such an account -- namely, that this is just not what "good", in the moral or ethical sense, means. The empirical desires of individuals or people in general are not always good. It's not just the extreme cases that you bring up later. Even in milder cases, people's desires are not always good.

To say that empirical desires predicates moral truths is to miss what we mean by moral obligation, exhortation, and even desire (something we can desire unto itself). So we can say that someone's desires is the sort of truth which morality is concerned with, but it would not make sense to say that this is a truth about morality, much less some kind of moral fact which differs from any other kind of fact.

How else would we know that the example "She intends to live in harmony with others" was itself the right example to use? And what if

"She intends to get revenge"

?

"She intends to break up their relationship"
"She intends to get them fired"

etc.

In some situations we may say the darker side of desire is itself good. But then, that would be right to the point too: We would only say that desire can be good if we first understood, even at a pre-conceptual level, what good is separate from the desires anyone might hold. And we do seem to believe that certain desires are good and certain desires bad, which may vary with circumstances and certainly varies between groups and individuals.

Facts are true statements. Moral statements are treated as if they are truth apt.

For all practical purposes, true moral statements are facts — Mongrel

I'd say there's a difference between moral statements being truth-apt, and the assertion that there are true moral statements. It's possible for all moral statements to be false, for instance, even if they are truth-apt.

I can go with "facts are true statements"

I'm uncertain that moral statements are truth-apt, but it's not the point I wish to contend here.

It's the demonstration that there are true moral statements that seems to be lacking -- at least if we're using mathematics as our basis of comparison. No moral calculus has the same force as actual mathematical statements when it comes to accepting their truth. So it's at least reasonable to believe in facts while not believing in moral facts, and it's fair to ask the moral realist for some sort of demonstration that there are true moral statements which is at least comparable to the amount of force other, already accepted facts.

Hrmm. I don't know. But that would be an interpretive question more than the problem you pose, I'd say. He's a good spring-board (and a genius to boot), but we don't need to be confined to what Hume said, per se.

Fair enough.

It was a good opportunity to try to make my point clearer :D.

Immediately what sprang to mind was the passage from A Treatise of Human Nature (which I have marked so it was easy to pop to):

From "3.1.1.27"

I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings on observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason shou'd be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the reader; and am perswaded, that this small attention wou'd subvert all the vulgar system of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason.

Ought from is:

She is a firefighter.
Therefore she ought to do whatever a firefighter ought to do.

This works because a firefighter is defined functionally. There is a function characteristic of a firefighter, and this is what it is to be a firefighter (telos and nature are one).

Or does it work? Discuss... — jamalrob

Even defined functionally it would seem to me that we can only get from the first to the second proposition by means of the conditional.

If she is a firefighter then she ought to do whatever a firefighter ought to do.

At least here we're following a logical form commonly accepted. But here the Humean point isn't against plugging in words or definitions as much as it is saying that the relation of the verb "ought" is of an entirely different kind from the relation of the copula -- and specifically that the latter is settled by means of founding the relations of objects or perceiving it by reason. (and said conditional's acceptance, pace Hume, is "derived" from the passions)


Saying that I would also say that moral realism could still be argued for using your approach. But I think that by pursuing the ought/is distinction you'd also be handicapping your account. Working from memory here I thought that was exactly what was so strong about After Virtue; he was calling into question the whole distinction by means of going back to Aristotle and pointing out that our concepts don't need to have this distinction, that it is, after all, a distinction (as opposed to a reality).

One could almost say that we understand "fact" in relation to our understanding of "value" -- that the latter defines the former, and the former the latter. So to speak of moral facts is to smash these together, but by using the language of the very distinction which is being put into question.

The point of my thread is to suggest that the claim, "you can't get an ought from an is" may not actually be binding. I don't think we can say much without resorting to ought claims. — anonymous66

I think this is an odd way of talking, at least.

I would separate the argument for moral realism from the argument for moral facts. The former is a more general belief where the argument for moral facts is a particular kind of moral realism, but we need not accept the existence of moral facts while still arguing that morality is somehow real.

I would also separate the argument for moral realism from the argument for objective morality. This I would do mostly because "objective" is a slippery word.

Further, I would say there's a difference between "there are moral facts" and "we can not say much without resorting to ought claims" -- since we can dispute the existence of moral facts while still claiming that one ought to do something. Error-theory seems to account for this possibility fairly well; at least, it explains how we can both talk about and make claims about ought-sentences, or with them, while at the same time there not being any kind of entity to back up such talk.

And I wanted to point out that facts are odd things. I'm not convinced that moral facts would be any more odd than "just plain old regular facts".

Washington D.C. is the capital of the United States.

What ought-statement has the same quality and force as this statement?

Whether it be odd or not would just depend on our expectations. So if we live in a universe which has moral facts, but believe that there are no moral facts, then it would be odd to find a moral fact.

Similarly so for the reverse.

So it's quite possible to accept mathematical facts without oddity while finding moral facts odd. One might say that in the former case we are all already familiar with facts. Facts are known to us. But in the latter case, with moral facts, we can't say the same thing. People dispute even the most basic precepts and prescriptions -- and not just to be an odd duck, but on a regular basis. Where I can settle how many bottles of beer I have in the fridge by opening the fridge and counting the number of bottles of beer that I have, and similarly so with many other actions which I perform on a daily basis with others, I can do no such thing with moral principles. There are those who will agree with my moral principles, but it would not be strange to find those who disagree with them.

What would be strange would be if there was something we could all point to to settle this dispute. One might even say that we would have to have another perceptive power to perceive such things, and so it's like positing the possibility of a demon or other such extra-real entities; in some sense possible but in no sense worth taking seriously until some sort of demonstration has been performed, ala mathematics.

At least, in the world we happen to live in.

Even math can at least be demonstrated. Though I would agree that mathematics is an ontological oddity, at least with respect to some metaphysical presuppositions (and in the sense that I don't quite know how to place it), it would still differ in that math can be demonstrated -- where moral principles can't. There is no calculus where we can prove this or that moral precept as of yet, at least, which holds the same force as mathematics.

So even by that analogy it seems like one could consistently hold that mathematical facts are not odd, while moral facts are odd, since the force of demonstration of math is stronger than the force of demonstration for morals -- at least, while that still remains to be the case.

Party loyalty is definitely an important part of how the Democratic party functions. It is second only to winning seats. Ruling in good faith might be something that individual activists or even, at times, a politician will pursue. But the purpose of the party is to ensure the electorate votes for it. Like a for-profit company is a profit-machine, the party is a vote-machine and all of its activities can be understood with this motive in mind. Part of that is in selling values (and, when forced, living up to them). But part of that is in tearing down your contender, organizing whisper/smear campaigns to ensure discipline, bombarding your message both through official advertisements and through relationships with media (both traditional and social), and co-opting as many leaders as possible that have the power to divert your electorate -- and getting the money so you can do all of that better than your opponent. The result is a rather grody stew of self-righteousness, favoritism, opportunism, narcissism, apathy, and the occasional genuine good which allows things to clug along. Even in such an unhealthy grouping you still have quite a few people who are genuine and doing good work, but there's no use in denying these tendencies are somehow local to one party or the other. These are the downsides you accept when you decide to go ahead and work within the party system.

I will note that you sometimes do get a crumb for such work for the people you represent so it can be easy to convince yourself that the trade is worth it. Also, I don't think it's just the party system that allows things to be like this. If you got rid of official parties then you'd see a lot of the same activity just organized along different lines -- like companies, churches, and so forth that are already functionaries of the official party system. I say this because if you look at the non-partisan elections in municipalities things aren't much different -- you just appeal to the various local chambers of commerce and clubs who actually turn the vote out within their groups, as well as the people who put money into those elections, rather than to an organized party. You become your own vote-garnering machine and are beholden to the organized interests if you want to win a seat, even if you don't declare a party.

In fact your phrase "governing the US in good fatih" becomes synonymous with winning seats. (who better than our team, our values) It's the prerequisite to governing well.


But, I have a knack for painting things in a negative light. So there's that to keep in mind.

I follow a journalist on Twitter that covers the Syrian conflict on the regular. This includes inspiring stories as well as horrible stories. One of the reasons I follow him is because he does a good job of displaying this mixture, and his photography doesn't hold back. It's really horrible sometimes especially, as you mention, when it comes to the killing of children. It happens fairly frequently.

I do not have children, but that doesn't make it less disgusting to me. I usually have the urge to puke whenever something like that is shown.

What frustrates me is exactly what you site here:

I'm just amazed at how good we (people in general) are at abstracting away "little" incidents like this. — Benkei

On the other hand I can understand wanting an explanation which removes culpability so you can get on with your life without much emotional drain when society already taxes you with so much. I also understand that events like this are a part of militant conflict, and that militant conflict was unavoidable in Syria (the government opened fire on those who were peacably assembling). But even though it's understandable it still breaks my heart when it seems like so many people just accept things like the killing of children as if they are part of the natural order of things -- it's like, the one thing that seems to me we should all be able to agree upon regardless of other beliefs.

Hrrmm. I don't think I know enough to answer. It's better for me to say I am uncertain on what the results would be if more people had followed Malcolm X. I can say that, on the whole, I enjoy reading Malcolm X's speeches. They make a good deal of sense to me. But I read it from the position of being white, and also of not having lived through his times but more in the aftermath of that era of civil rights.

My kinship tends to be more towards the BPP, but they were socialists so that's only natural. Also, Black nationalism -- from my perspective, again, and more talking locally now too -- seems to have morphed into a mixture between black representation and the ownership of black businesses. Maybe it'll work, I'm uncertain, but I have my doubts because what I've noticed is that there's the black representatives who are then co-opted by white institutions and capitalism. But you still have all the results of hundreds of years of exploitation affecting black communities, and you still have black workers who don't benefit from these sorts of reforms.

But is that what would have happened if more people followed Malcolm X? I really don't know. I was more just using him as a reference since you posted one of his speeches that I admire to try and demonstrate what "speech" can mean, when it is not empty

Failed because they couldn't defend themselves. How do you assess it? — Mongrel

I see it more as a proof of concept, and something to learn from.

This is probably where we diverge. Sometimes speeches and other forms of communication are potent. The opposite can also be true. Talk is cheap — Mongrel

Well, it's important to imbed her notion of action in the wider philosophy as well. Speech as action only happens with others in the public. A military conflict she explicitly designates as work as opposed to action because of the thing-character which the enemy takes on (thereby eliminating the public world between people).

I'd note that I think that it's fair to say many (though I could not say with what relative frequency, only that it's many) political expressions within the framework of representationalism take a similar role.

Talk can be cheap. But it's also fair to say that the denigration of talk can destroy what is worth pursuing. Malcolm X, above, for instance -- that is a wonderful speech happening with people.

OK. Where I'll put my foot down is this: anarchists absolutely can not engage in military action. Ever. That can't happen. It's impossible. It's a contradiction. No. — Mongrel

What do you make of the Spanish revolution, then?

Other than that... I'm willing to concede that militant action is varied and complex. Really, the core of the question that prompted the OP is: isn't it true that there comes a time when action is necessary and any further attempts to talk things through is merely covertly accepting the status quo? — Mongrel

OK. Yeah. I have no problem agreeing with that.

Though it's worth noting that "action" can cover a lot. Like, a lot. It's hard to over-emphasize this, IMO. There's a handy book called From Dictatorships to Democracy which I don't mean to endorse, but if you flip to pdf-page 87 there's a nice list of actions people can take just to begin stimulating the imagination on what "action" can entail.

Also, I think Arendt is pertinent here. Marcuse was a believer in deliberation, so I've been lead to believe by my betters. And so his emphasis on the difference between speech and action in that essay makes sense because he wanted an eternal discussion (at least, if I understand my betters with respect to Marcuse). But Arendt (who I am more familiar with) includes speech as action. And the debate over what action is, followed by what good action is, is a worthwhile, intricate, and interesting topic in its own right (another reason I was sort of mentally bogged down in the complexities).

Hrmm, I don't think it's that. I'm trying to use your definition that you posited -- the one about desiring cleanliness of society and protection from vermin (thereby motivating them to either dictate or, more likely, be dictated to).

The U.S. military, for example, is not built out of conscription but is voluntary. Like, it's as close to a voluntary social contract that you get in the U.S. -- signing your agreement in pentuplets. I wouldn't say that this is the only way to have a voluntary force I'm just using the example to demonstrate the principle.

Or the Black Panther's use of armed self-defense -- clearly a use of militant force, but not an authoritarian one but the opposite.


This isn't to say that you won't find authoritarian streaks in various real-life scenarios, even in these particular examples I'm giving. These were huge movements and organizations involving lots of people across large time spans, and there is no doubt in my mind that people have authoritarian attitudes. But we need not endorse these attitudes or ask for more of them -- and even in acting in a militant organization you can work against authoritarian attitudes. (In fact ever since William Caley, in the U.S. Army, each soldier is held accountable for their individual actions -- it is your duty to disobey an illegal order)

No. I'm saying that even by militant means (what we might call the extreme case) we are not thereby endorsing authoritarian attitudes or asking for more authoritarian personalities.

Wouldn't Berkeley count?

Not to mention various proposals brought up on these forums.

So I read the Marcuse essay you linked.

I'm still inclined to say what I said before. I don't think the essay is promoting authoritarianism -- and I think there are other ways of pursuing political aims than by authoritarian means. That's why I was introducing the term "conviction"; so I could agree with you that tolerance is not a panacea of political goodness, but I could differentiate this from proposing that we should have more authoritarian personalities in the world.

I don't think that authoritarian personalities help. And I don't think that liberation requires authoritarianism. Even by militant means. I wouldn't endorse fighting for a clean society, or for protection from the undesirable. I'd say it's very much the opposite -- that authoritarian sentiments are quite prevalent, and it is this prevalence which inhibits emancipatory politics.

Cool. But, uh, I don't follow your thread of thinking -- unless you mean that I should read the essay before commenting.

EDIT: Not that that is a bad thing. It just would've been nice to know that ahead of time. I'm reading it now. Will post more later.

I think that's a bit of a side issue.

The example is meant to elucidate what I mean by conviction, not to go into the ins-and-outs of white supremacy -- conviction as the opposite of tolerance, rather than authoritarianism as the opposite of tolerance. Namely, there are some beliefs, when we have conviction, that rules out tolerance.

Are there beliefs you do not tolerate? Or do you tolerate everything?

Heh. Sorry. I hope that is not a damper to conversation. I'll try to explain myself better.

On one hand I have thoughts about authoritarianism, which I tend to think of as the negative of libertarianism -- not in the sense of the American libertarian party, but in the historical view where the term originated within anarchist circles (who, to put that into perspective, are explicitly anti-capitalist).

Then there's the notion of tolerance, which doesn't necessarily go along with libertarianism even if we take it to be the only value that matters (who are intolerant when the values of libertarianism are violeted). But that might just be because I think of Authoritarianism along a spectrum and as the opposite of libertarianism.

Even so -- it seems to me that there's a difference between authoritarianism and conviction, which I would say is the counter to tolerance. We should be tolerant of any form of art, even if it seems "obscene", but we should not be tolerant of white supremacy -- we should have a conviction that white supremacy is wrong, and to oppose it is right, even if we happen to be in the minority, just as we should have a conviction that art should be open to all kinds of expression.

So I would say that, rather than praising authoritarianism because this is what people who know what is right do, that there's a negotiation which takes place between competing values, but in having conviction we can't abandon either one. We have to negotiate within particular circumstances.If we were to act out of tolerance when we're talking about some core values of our political outlook then, yes, that would be a political failing. It may be easier to say that this or that value takes precedence now, but it wouldn't be a conviction in that case.



Also, to talk about revolutionary minorities -- is it authoritarian to be in the minority? If so then every political persuasion, including libertarian, is authoritarian, because whether you be revolutionary or middle-of-the-road, the number of active people in a political group is always vastly smaller than the number of people within a country. We can talk about the situation of a small group of people, but revolutionaries-- like any political group -- don't have a lever to pull. They have to be appealing to people in some measure whatever methods they might use to overturn who is in power. Democratic forces like popular appeal are a factor even in formally non-democratic countries. So I suppose I'd just question both 1. how a minority is figured, and 2. the scenario of a vanguard forcing their way of life on everyone through an army. Not that it couldn't happen, mind, but I'm wondering how much of the scenario is just built out of self-doubt when, if we were actually building a revolution, we'd have to consider much more about how the people around us feel and believe than the scenario seems to indicate.


Also, lastly -- I don't know if I'd agree that knowledge of how we should live is innate. I don't know that I'd call this relativism, either. But it seems a different topic than either the topic of authoritarianism-libertarianism, or the revolutionary minority.

It seems like you're thinking through a lot of questions and I find it hard to reply even though the topic interests me.

I can say I agree to these two separately:

1. Tolerance can be wrong -- it is circumstantially good, not universally good.
2. Revolutionary minorities can be right to act.


I don't know the relation between these, though ,or how one follows from the other, or what-not.

I look at reductionism more along the lines of the phrase "reduces to..."

I don't know if there is any single treatment of reductionism, or if it's at all possible since it seems to me to be a bit of a squishy term, but it's not the materialist alone which wishes to "reduce to..." -- such as certain idealisms -- so even if you don't accept the moral theory example then there still remains certain reductions which are not materialist alone. Hence, some of the arguments would apply equally to them because they, too, are "reducing to" such and such.

I don't disagree with the arguments, it should be noted. Only that certain materialists are the only culprit.

It seems to me that any ontology where it is fair to formulate it as "Everything is X" is reductionist. Depending on how you splice it it seems some idealist ontologies fit that description.

Not sure if that's the right way of putting it. Another thought is that any given reductionist would agree to a sentence of the form, "This appears like A, but it is really B" - but that wouldn't necessitate a reductionism in the sense of the arguments put forward up above, I wouldn't think. In some sense this is just a way of explaining a phenomena and isn't necessarily reductionism in that everything is reduced to one thing, but a reduction does take place.

To use one of @Thorongil's examples: One of the first theories of morality was what is now called Divine Command Theory -- What God says is good is what is good. Full-stop, end of story. This would be a strong version of reductionism in the field of morality.

One might even be able to posit that any answer to the question "What is Good?" is, in some sense, reductionist (perhaps reductionism can come on a scale, though). Which might cut to what I would say is the main problem with reductionism, in general -- is that it overgeneralizes, and details which are important to the particularities are often lost with such overgeneralizations.

It seems to me that most of your arguments would apply equally well to any kind of reductionist project. No?

I suppose it's just our different positions in life when it comes to pain. I can say that the worst physical pain I've experienced is not on the level you're describing, even. So it just seems like an incredible claim -- that one can remain tranquil even while being tortured, for instance.

I think it's easier for me, too, to accept that death is nothing to us, but I think that's probably because I was an atheist first for a long long time (having been raised to believe in an afterlife, first) -- so perhaps it's also just a matter of having dealt with different aspects of life which cause people anxiety.


If you are interested in Epicurean psychological pain you may want to try and find:

Some Aspects of Epicurean Psychology., David Konstan, in Philosophia antiqua (a series of monographs of ancient phgilosophy), isbn 90 04 03653 9

Which I think confirms your statement, but fleshes it out :).

It really helped clear some things up for me on the differences between Epicureanism and Stoicism and Buddhism; something which, at the time, was not so clear. (Actually, @apatheticynic -- you may also be interested in reading https://www.amazon.com/Stoics-Epicureans-Sceptics-Introduction-Hellenistic/dp/0415110351 for more on those differences. Just remembered that book when I wrote the above reference)

Cool. Don't know how you'd deal with the rack, but I'm not terribly keen on making it into an experiment either. Seems that, for yourself at least, you just don't find the claim implausible due to your experience. It'd be interesting to know what, if anything, could be done to make pain easy to endure just through an attitude adjustment.

On emotional pain -- I'd think it depends on what you'd count as "conquering". Just to never feel emotional pain, when it comes to panic and heartbreak, the Epicurean philosophy is meant to deal with the former, and Epicurus' stance on erotic love is meant to avoid the latter. There's a hillarious passage in Lucretius which gives advice for those who find themselves infatuated with someone by way of erotic love (at least, hillarious to me) such as reciting the flaws of the one you are infatuated with anytime you want to draw close to them or sleeping with random people until your infatuation subsides.

It probably depends on what you mean by "could" or "possible". I said earlier in the thread that I don't think it's even possible to be an Epicurean today, just because of the disconnect with the ancient practice. We simply do not know what many of those practices were in the garden and have to infer a great deal, and so even if we were to rebuild the garden it would be to overstep our bounds to claim that we are following the same ancient practices -- heck, we have to do that even with doctrine with the state of the evidence. But that clearly differs from what you're saying which seems to me to imply that you are inspired by one philosophy but don't mind grabbing from other's too in your approach to life.

But could you do it consistently, or while still adhering to the epicurean philosophy as presented in the ancient texts? I don't know. The stoics and the epicureans seemed to have disagreed with one another enough to criticize one another and form different schools and compete over disciples/students.

It's certainly possible to be inspired by both or many other lines of philosophical thinking. I wouldn't deny that. I just don't know if I'd call it Epicureanism, in that case. The philosophy is supposed to stand on its own, at least -- not grab from other schools. Otherwise why would they form different schools? It seems to me that since the practioners at the time believed there were differences divergent enough to argue over them that it is better to try to look for what it was those differences were and keep the schools conceptually separate. But I'm looking at it from the point of view of someone who likes to reconstruct arguments in order to understand how said thinker was thinking.

Those look like a good selection to vote between to me. Let's do a poll.

I think I can grant the assumption, at least on the basis that a pre-narrative self is possible. Sure. But granting the assumption -- would a pre-narrative self amount to an identity?

Something of a recap:

I see a number of different kinds or parts of identity being presented by the fine folks of the forum:

There's the personal identity vs. a social identity. There is one's moral identity, and tied to that but distinct from it the identity of continuity. There is an identity based on differences from others. There is the self (perhaps distinct from identity?) being posited as a possible undergirding to the social-construct identity I've largely put forward. I see an identity based on our core, a values-based identity. And then there's the identity of memory, where we are who we are based on what we our (collective?) memories recall. And also, the notion that identity isn't amenable to a philosophical or psychological analyses, but is something found through other activities like art. (I think I caught everything on offer)

It seems to me that, overall, people are much more in favor of an identity which is unchanging :D. But perhaps to put the question of identity in terms of change is to evade the question of identity. Some change, some don't -- but how does it get there in the first place, whether it changes or no? Or perhaps that's just an evasion, too, or a misstep into a genealogy of identity. Maybe a better question is: What are we doing when we identify?

I think talk of identity is so embedded in language that things start becoming circular when we try to discuss it (or just dead-end in ontology which is apt to be no more than posturing). — Mongrel

What do you mean by "identity is so embedded in language", and how does that relate to circularity?

It's better to aim at it with fiction or poetry. Or some other strange artform like the movie Synecdoche, New York. Anybody see that?

I saw it, but it's been awhile. I remember liking it. By recollection I seem to remember it being mostly about mortality.

Two particular aspects are particularly significant for questions of identity: (1) the dimensionality of one's schema, and (2) the 'distance' between oneself and one's ideal.

I can say a bit more if anyone is interested — unenlightened

Please do. :)

, but it is the 'meta' aspect that I want to draw immediate attention to. To identify is to differentiate; to have an identity is to identify and distinguish others also. It is, therefore, to already have a theory of mind.

Interesting.

Yeah, I do hope they manage to get it back up. There were a number of posters I liked reading that didn't make the cross over.