Ah, but the Islamist's view of history is equally mythological, and especially IS's view of history. — Thorongil

Care to explain more? I don't see how this is the case, though I could certainly be wrong.

To this I must say a thousand times no. The state is the summum bonum and indeed the raison d'etre for the Islamist, militant or not. This is what IS is toiling to create right now. Not until they have created a state governing the whole world according to Shariah Law will Islamists be satisfied. — Thorongil

I'd say here is where we disagree the most, then. Governing the world isn't the goal. The apocalypse is.

This is to split hairs, it seems to me. They both reject democracy, ergo they have this in common. — Thorongil

Feudal France also rejected democracy. The parallel is in passing, though -- the reasoning why they reject democracy makes a difference, and is not merely splitting hairs.

Fascism too has a goal beyond merely glorying in violence, but I think the point is that much of the violence is gratuitous; it's often done with genuine pleasure and deliberateness, whether it's necessary to achieve said goal or not. — Thorongil

I would say that this is just human nature more than ideology. Violence against one's enemies is pleasurable, especially in the context of war. War is genuinely pleasurable in its own way, even for a society that tends to reject war-like values, for the soldiers in the war.

That isn't to say that this is a virtuous aspect of humanity -- I'd say it's the opposite -- but it's also the case. War gives people meaning and pleasure.

It seems pretty similar to me. The Nazis, for example, were trying to return to a Pagan Germanic world which existed before the advent of Christianity. — Thorongil

Except their version of history has no basis. It was pure mythology. I'd say there's a difference between anachronism and myth.

I see you making my own point for me here. Yes, the state and religion are one in the case of European fascism and Islamofascism. To speak of the state or its religion in fascism is to speak of the same thing, and it is indeed sought for its own sake. — Thorongil

But this is not the case with militant Islam. The state is a tool. No fascist worth there salt would look at the state as a mere tool to something greater.



I had this cool video pop up in my twitter feed: http://www.vox.com/2015/12/16/10240188/isis-history-background-qaeda a six minute history on ISIS.

Militant Islam doesn't reject democracy as the problem, though -- Militant Islam as practiced by IS is based in an older world idea which predates the wide acceptance of democracy. Fascism, on the other hand, does.

Militant Islam does not emphasize violence for its own sake. It practices jihad, but that has a purpose greater than the violence itself.

I agree that Militant Islam is anti-individualist. With the latter as well.


Militant Islam is medieval Sunni society attempting to be reborn in the world today. That is a kind of throwback, but not to a mythologized past as much as to a past that had existed prior to centuries of Islamic interpretation and growth (in number, spiritually, and in time). So it is a kind of anachronism, but it's not the same sort of historical myth that Fascism builds.

The biggest difference, I think, are the views on the state. Militant Islam wants to establish a Caliphate, but this is theological significance. The state, or empire, is a tool, rather than "an organic entity" which can and must be purified for its own sake. Fascism establishes the state as its religion, where imperial theologies establish states for the sake of God.

But using said criteria, I don't think you could classify militant Islam in the same category.

I'd recommend reading the article I posted a bit ago. I don't think the two are even roughly congruent. They seem to be quite at odds with one another, in fact.


The problem with totalitarian/authoritarian, at least as I see it, is that all states are totalitarian/authoritarian. They impose certain values and ways of life upon anyone within a geography. They just have different values.

Then a few years ago I emerged into a very sunny period that I am still in -- going on 4 or 5 years now. With any luck, it will last as far as the grave. This time of good feelings isn't due to any virtue or achievement on my part. I am still kind of surprised that I feel this way. — Bitter Crank

That's actually a pretty common phenomena -- there's a sort of U-shaped curve, if happiness could be plotted, when you plot happiness on the y-axis and age on the x-axis; the right end of the u goes higher than the left end, too. At least so saith the happiness studies I've read so far.

The explanation I've seen posited for this curve is two-fold: life stressors, like career and family, begin around 30, and those go away at around 50-60, and then also you start learning how to accept things as they are, rather than being disappointed by what you thought you wanted. So the little things, such as finding a dollar on the street or bumping into a friend, are more appreciated and not looked down upon, and the grand things aren't really desired -- so you end up being happier.

I suppose, in spite of my curmudgeonly attitude and somewhat generic dissatisfaction, I remain an optimist of sorts. I think the world has plenty to offer humanity, but it is humanity who hurts itself through irrational desire -- a sort of Epicurean move, if you will.

That doesn't necessarily remove existential angst, but there's still a difference between desire and existential angst, I'd wager, and different philosophies apply to both in order that one may be happy.

The question is whether making universals out to be metaphors dispenses with the issue, and what sort of implications that has for scientific theories. Is GR with it's curved spacetime metaphorical? They seemed to think so — Marchesk

Heh. Perhaps I am contradicting what I was saying before, but I wouldn't say that metaphors dispense with universals per se -- especially since what seems to be at issue is whether science implies universals. I would say that the question of scientific realism differs from the question of universals, unless one is a scientific realist.

But one could be a realist or an anti-realist of various stripes without this being at issue at all. Yes?

Can we then say that science requires the utilization of universal concepts to build its theories? — Marchesk

I don't know if we can because I don't know what a universal concept is. I would agree that scientific theories aim at what is general rather than particular. But aiming at generalities doesn't necessitate universals -- such as a really existing red to which all red particulars correspond, or a universal number "1" to which all particular uses of "1" corresponds [or whatever relation we might posit], even if said universals are merely conceptual. I don't believe that one must be committed one way or the other with said beliefs in order for science to still "hold together" coherently and rationally.

It seems to me that if we are scientific realists then, yes, science strongly suggests universals exist. But if not, then not -- but I don't think that the answer to such a question could be decided via science -- science, itself, does not suggest one or the other. Rather, we believe one or the other, and it is in light of said beliefs about scientific realism/anti-realism which strongly suggests universals existing or not existing (or, perhaps, existing, but not due to science)

Though perhaps I don't quite grasp what is meant by "universal", here -- a bit of a curious word, yes? My understanding of "universal", with respect to the distinction between universal-particular, is that universals really exist and particulars are derivative or somehow participate or are related to this universal. But one might also say "universal" to mean "always applies", but then it seems to me that we're not talking about the problem of universals as much as we're talking about the "All" operator.

Would science have to be wrong about electrons? It would seem to me that if electrons count as a universal, and universals do not exist, then electrons do not exist -- and so saying that the propositions of science are wrong about electrons isn't correct. Rather, this particular proposition isn't about an entity, but it could still be correct.


EDIT:
My inclination would be to say that science does not require universals to exist. But, perhaps, if we believe that science is a good basis for ontology, then science strongly suggests that universals do exist. But if we do not believe that science is a good basis for ontology then there isn't as much at conflict between a denial of universals and the requirements of science to be, well, science.

I came across this article today: http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2015/12/10/9886152/donald-trump-fascism

But then, on proof -- which is, I think, where you're really aiming at, I just wanted to note a danger in the generalization -- I think it might depend on what we accept as proof.

I don't know if you could prove that the universe has no intrinsic meaning in some apodeictic or mathematical sense. You can make arguments, but I don't know about proofs -- at least not without some sort of understood (if not necessarily accepted or believed) frame for working through proofs, similar to how mathematics does it by way of axioms and rules of inference.

I don't think there is a single existential metaphysics. There are some broad themes which group existentialists together, but I wouldn't say they agree on metaphysical propositions.

Heidegger, for instance, took the approach that all metaphysical philosophy prior to him had made the same "move", and that move concealed the meaning of the question of being -- that metaphysicians had all focused on the present-at-hand rather than the ready-to-hand.

Sartre focuses on consciousness, and specifically the unity of consciousness and the problems of dualisms past.

Camus, by my reading at least, doesn't seem to think that the absurd needs demonstration -- he notes early on in the myth of sisyphus how his writing may no longer make sense in some other future that differs from his time, but that his time took on the character of the absurd, and then he just tries to work out what the logical consequences of the absurd would entail (suicide, or no?)


I'm certain there are other ways to read these authors. I'm just presenting them to demonstrate the point that existentialism is not uni-vocal in this way. And since it is not uni-vocal in this way, I don't think it would be possible to pin down existentialism as a whole. I think, rather, that you'd have to take up particular theses that happen to fall into what is a broad category. Indeed, of the three, Sartre was the only one who self-identified as an existentialist! :D

We used to run Socrates Cafe-style meetings w our philosophy club in university. Very cool book too. We would also do reading groups and public debates. That, in addition to communal living, and pseudo-anarchist politics, comprised my "serious" philosophic journey. I'd like to continue in that mold, but I often feel uncertain on the how.

Yeah, I really don't mean to spark an anti-academic/academic type of dichotomy. I have good friends who are in the academy, and their work certainly shows. My interest is more along the lines of furthering non-academic philosophy than tearing down academic philosophy because I care about philosophy generally, one, and I'm fairly certain I'd find the academic life miserable just because of my political orientations, two. I clearly benefit, as one interested in philosophy, by the work academics put in. I read them all the time and their thoughts help to expand my mind. I'm interested in making non-academic philosophy work on a level that is more than popular, but is actually rigorous. I suppose that's what I mean by I fear "duping" myself -- I can see the dangers of not having an institution dedicated to high quality philosophy, and how it might be fairly easy to convince ourselves without some kind of rigor.

Maybe we need to look into building philosopher communes or something. Meh. Not sure where to go from here. — Pneumenon

Now that would be a dream come true for me.

Just to note.

In some way my friendship groups -- who I remain in contact with -- from university were like this. We lived together, we read books together, we put on philosophy talks together in public and tried to promote philosophy as a group. While we maintain contact we've hit the diaspora at this point -- to the point of living in different states. It would be nice to have that closeness over philosophy again.

Not sure if "commune" would be the preferred model. I'd prefer "collective" -- since I think anarchist spaces are healthier and more prone to longer lives. [since they do recognize individual needs in addition to collective needs]

. . . but the bar for those outside of the academy and its rules are set higher. . . — Phil

That's what interests me most. What, precisely, is that bar? Higher or no, what are the standards in the first place?

They treat people in our neighborhood differently than they treat people in other neighborhoods. There are worse places than my house, but the popo are hella corrupt in this city. I've witnessed them lie to defend each other in court -- I know they were lying because I had video evidence to the contrary. And they're an egotistical and trigger happy lot who don't go to the range as often as me. I'm also generally pretty good at de-escalating situations, where they. . . aren't.

Plus I've an anarchist streak through me, and so while I'm willing to work with the state, there's some personal disposition that just hates police in particular.

There's a difference between a society with a police force and a militarized society where everybody is primed to engage in gun violence. One difference is that the latter consistently suffers from gun massacres and their public space is eroded. Which of course is the goal of the gun fetishists. Their attack is really on the notion of democracy and a public realm. — Landru Guide Us

There are more possibilities than two, however. Most gun owners are not "militarized" -- and even those who are are no more militarized than our present day police force ;). Owning one's violence does not mean that you are militarized, either. It means that your choices to use violence are closer to home and harder to forget. I certainly don't call the police to my house.

What you present here is a false dichotomy, and not merely in some hypothetical sense. Gun ownership and usage is not an attack on public space or democracy. Many people own weapons without the fetishism you're targeting.

In any case, the proposition that a armed society (forced militarization of every citizen) is a polite society is utter and complete rubbish. It's just the opposite of course. And the opposite is the purpose.

I've agreed to your first sentence, though I don't agree with the latter.

Totally.

But what do you think about the idea in a more general sense?

The indisputable fact is, if you scratch a gun advocate, you'll find a person who really wants to kill somebody. — Landru Guide Us

That's a bit too far of an exaggeration, Landru. I'd just highlight here the point I made awhile back that you can't somehow escape violence in our society -- even if you prefer to delegate violence out. I'll note that in spite of the difficulties surrounding weapon ownership I still prefer to own weapons, and keep it that way.

Hrmm.. how does one re-up?

I checked my profile real quick to make a dig at myself, and I saw that aside "Subscription" the word "Cancelled" appeared. Understandable enough for not having done my monthly, but I had honestly forgotten -- and I don't see the same membership link that I did when I first subscribed?

I suppose this is just asking for help if it's actually quite obvious and I'm just being particularly dense. Otherwise, it might help to make the re-up option density-compatible ;).

Why choose that perspective though?

I'd say we are most certainly not machines, nor is our mind a super-advanced computer. This isn't a difference of degree, I think, but of kind. So there is no point where a program becomes a preference, because preferences are not built up of programs.

Just got home. Happy turkey day.

My sister made her pie crust with pig-lard she rendered herself. This resulted in the richest pecan pie I've ever tasted.

It was a good day.

Truth be told -- in most combat situations training doesn't do much in terms of missing, it just makes you less worse as opposed to actually good. Being shot at sucks, period -- even if you're a crack shot. Additionally there are tactics which aren't necessarily meant to connect to a target, so you have to take that into consideration -- but on the whole most discharges do not hit their target.

An annual breakdown of NYPD “Gunfight” hit-ratio data is differentiated in the table
below.

NYPD GUNFIGHT STATISTICS
Year| Hit percentage
1990 19%
1991 15%
1992 17%
1993 15%
1994 12%
1995 18%
1996 14%
1997 10%
1998 25%
1999 13%
2000 9%
MEAN SCORES 15%

That's a snippet from the report up there. It shows hit percentage in a firefight, meaning the officer believed his enemy also had a firearm (they don't necessarily have to have a weapon, belief is enough to drop the hit-percentage), with the year for the NYPD. Everything I've looked at tells a similar story. ((One of the many reasons why arming teachers in schools is one of the worst ideas to ever be broached))

http://www.deepsouthdish.com/2013/11/southern-candied-yams-sweet-potatoes.html

Here's a close approximate recipe to the yams we make every year.

Close in the sense that ours is simpler -- more butter, and only add brown sugar. ;)

Partially just by the scenario -- if I compare a world where the basic constituent of said world is a force dedicated to a pessimistic existence then, unless by some fluke or chance in the groundless world, that world will be more pessimistic.

I think the latter is true because metaphysics is simultaneously necessary [for developing any knowledge whatsoever] and impossible [to resolve]. I think that we know, so I don't discount metaphysics, but there's a fault to all metaphysical thinking when one thinks that it is knowledge when it is not. That's a theoretical way of tackling the belief, anyways. From a more personal level I would say that a great deal of phenomena aren't explicable, either -- that there is the Absurd, and we can encounter it, and that I have encountered it.

I think that this is preferable, though I might argue the other way were the pessimistic world true [why fight what you can't change? We are, after all, talking about reality], because having both good and bad is prima facie better than just having bad. Even if we make our own goodness or badness, that doesn't negate having a mixture of both.

What work of hers in particular did you find to be on the level of bullshit artistry?

It seems to me that the former is more pessimistic, but that the latter is preferable. Of course, I think the latter is true and the former false.

This year is food at the folks. In spite of my offers if I eat at the folks my offers of help are always turned down. So it's bound to be utterly delicious and decadent, with too many pies on offer, and vegan options for the vegans that are attending.

It's all pretty traditional stuff, though the folks are religious so no alcohol will be at the proceedings.

EDIT: This was the recipe used two years ago for the vegans, minus the cheese. Plenty of coconut milk on hand as well for both cooking and breakfast. Make some additional stuffing too so that it's not cooked in the turkey, plus the bread on hand, and there's plenty for non-meat folk.

Jonah Goldberg's intent is not academic -- he even says as much in the beginning of the book -- but political. Rather than elucidating fascism he is arguing against a cultural meme that the right of the USA is fascist, and that the liberal left is anti-fascist, by going back into the history of fascism, finding progressive liberals who defended fascism as a good thing, and drawing parallels between the fascist program and progressive liberals today.

What this misses is Paxton's insight -- that fascism wins adherents by using the language of the left, that they are motivated by similar ills, but:

... the methods of intellectual history become much less helpful beyond the first stage in the fascist cycle. Every fascist movement that has rooted itself successfully as a major political contender, thereby approaching power, has betrayed its initial antibourgeois and anticapitalist programs. The processes to be examined in later stages include the breakdown of democratic regimes and the success of fascist movements in assembling new, borad catch-all parties that attract a mass following across classes and hence seem attractive allies to conservatives looking for ways to perpetuate their shaken rule. At laster stages, successful fascist parties also position themselves as the most effective barriers, by persuasin or by force, to an advancing Left and prove adept at the formation, maintenence and domination of political coalitions with conservatives. But these political successes come at the cost of the first ideological programs. Demonstrating their contempt for doctrine, successfully rooted fascist parties do not annul or amend their early programs. They simply ignore them, while acting in ways quite contrary to them. The conflicts of doctrine and practice set up by successful fascist movements on the road to power not only alienate many radical fascists of the first hour; they continue to confuse many historians who assume that analysing programs is a sufficient tool for classifying fascisms. The confusion has been compounded by the persistence of many early fascisms that failed to navigate the turn from the first to the second and third stages, and remained pure and radical, though marginal, as "national syndicalisms" — Paxton, p 14 -- 15

Goldberg's interest is not in understanding fascism. It's in flipping a cultural script within the United States -- one that is partially manufactured, since his characterization of the progressive left is largely based off of memes and cultural feelings -- so that the right is not fascist, but the left's roots are, because fascism seeks to change society.

But the change of progressive politicals, the change of Marxists, the change of the Left differs markedly from the change sought by fascism. In addition, it is impossible to separate out the intellectual notions of fascism from the historical events of fascism. This is where we get to see the real impact of fascism. In particular it is noteworthy that fascists were not coherent. They were populists -- and so they would have to ally themselves with the working class at some point, just as they had to ally themselves with the conservative forces at another point. They wanted to fuse the classes into one structure, the state, and by that method overcome class divisions. This isn't even close to bread-and-butter progressive politics.

((EDIT: It's worth noting that Goldberg is a senior editor for the National Review, -- given this position it makes sense that his aims are more political than academic, so seeking to learn about the nature of fascism from his book is a poor decision. He's talking american politics more than he's talking about fascism in that book))

Mostly the people. I figured that this is why I come to a philosophy forum, and so it's sort of a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The other features are also nice. ;) But that was my main metric.

I don't think your list is conclusive. I'm not sure what a conclusive list would look like, and by what I'm trying to argue at least, I would say that such a list would have to be reformed with the passing of history. But it's a good enough start to highlight that the state isn't the only way to organize people on a large scale, and without the state all we have is nomadic tribes.

Also, there are far-right political positions which disagree with libertarianism, even, and dream of a post-state world wherein everything is organized along corporate lines. I certainly disagree with such dreams, but that doesn't negate their existence (or the fact that, at least at this point in time, corporate structure heavily relies upon states, moreso than they'd like to admit ;) )

I also obtained permission from Sally Markowitz to make a .pdf of her paper which argues in favor of abortion with respect to feminist values -- something which I find interesting because most discussions of abortion focus on the morality of the act, but she defers said discussion on the basis of her political orientation, saying that the moral discussion can't take place until this wider issue is addressed. (Reversing the hierarchy of values, in the popular sense).

I went hunting for some ethics papers last month because of the dearth of ethics papers. I didn't post them in time to be considered last month, nor this month, but seeing as I'm behind the times on both I thought I'd go ahead and post the pdf's I found online here for future consideration:

http://www.unc.edu/courses/2009spring/plcy/240/001/The_Solution_to_World_Poverty1.pdf

http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lormand/phil/teach/pp/B%20%20%20NO%20PUB/B2%20%20%20Right-Libertarianism/Hospers%20-%20What%20Libertarianism%20Is.pdf

http://businessethics.qwriting.qc.cuny.edu/files/2012/01/Nielsen.pdf

http://assets.cambridge.org/97805218/83825/excerpt/9780521883825_excerpt.pdf

http://web.ntpu.edu.tw/~language/course/research/lifeboat.pdf

http://myweb.facstaff.wwu.edu/nmarkos/Zola/Thomson.Abortion.pdf

http://faculty.polytechnic.org/gfeldmeth/45.marquis.pdf

http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/singer.pdf

http://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil3140/Taylor.pdf

But they are correct on that point, at least. The hope, from their perspective, is an abolishment of the state in favor of corporate ownership of the world. They go so far as to characterize governments as corporations. But this totalizing viewpoint is what I'm trying to shrink -- so that we can see that the state is not inevitable, or even inevitable so long as we discount nomadic societies. There are many forms of society aside from these two. I'd go along with @Bitter Crank's list above. And there can be others that have yet to exist, too.

I don't endorse right-wing abolishment of the state by any stretch. But I certainly don't think, despite their beliefs, the state is the only thing keeping us from social darwinism. Heck, we see clan v. clan type organizations develop within the state.

I would say they are unique to their time and place, rather than being states. I agree that human beings are always organized into some form of rulership. As Aristotle says, man is the political animal. I'm just questioning the state form of rulership as some kind of inevitability -- and classifying it as one of the kinds of rulership, rather than as some advanced form of rulership to which all other larger-scale organizations gravitate towards, and certainly rather than the final form of human social organization.

I wouldn't say that writing is the basis of state-hood, either. I wouldn't pin bureaucracy and records as the defining feature of states as much as I would pin geographic boundaries, cultural hegemony, and legitimated violence.

I'd call a settlement a settlement, rather than a state. Perhaps the beginning of a city. I am not familiar enough with the history of China to comment, to be honest.

Woah, cool!

$$\int_{a}^{b} x^2 dx$$

It's an interesting question, for sure. I don't know. Fascism is fascinating to myself -- it seems to cut across the left/right spectrum. It's scary as hell to see in practice, even when isolated, but I still have this intellectual curiosity about the workings of fascism. @unenlightened recommended a nice book to me some time ago http://www.whale.to/b/reich.pdf that I would like to read more of -- since you are asking the question, you may find it interesting too.

Deleuze and Guatarri's Anti-Oedipus also explores this question by asking and attempting to answer "How can people desire their own oppression?" -- but that book isn't as straightforward as the Reich book.


I agree with Umberto Eco when he states:

6) Fascism is derived from individual or social frustration — Cavacava

Frustration, humiliation, defensiveness all given easy answers which are even fun to pursue after you stop thinking of your enemies as humans: violent action that is more than mere violence but is also spiritual. In short: Fascism feels more than good, more than great, it is a realization of the beyond in our lives now. It fulfills both our base desires for violence simultaneously with our higher desires for God -- and makes God real, to boot.

EDIT: I have a bad habit of thinking of something new to say after posting. But one of the themes that emerges from both books I mentioned is that fascism is potentially appealing to all of us -- we all have it in ourselves to succumb to the appeals of fascism. Perhaps why it's scary to see someone expressing fascist politics in real life -- there's a sense in which we fear becoming them. In the U.S. the tea party serves as a good example, I think... though not obsessed with blood as much, they are obsessed with "being American", and there is an attendant mythology with that "being American". With the rise of Trump I think we're seeing them be more than a proto-fascist group, too -- since Trump clearly doesn't appeal to people because of reasoned argument or thought, but through pure emotional appeal to fictions people hold.