No, not really. No mention of underdetermintion or realism. You're basically assuming that the OP is about something that it doesn't claim to be about, hence the ad hominem nature. The OP is about underdetermination and realism. That's the core. — Leontiskos
I would want to actually look at some of these arguments you are alluding to. For example:
1. We don't just see the object as it is
2. We frequently make mistakes
3. We frequently go about looking for reasons to justify our first beliefs
4. We have only a tentative grasp of the whole
5. Therefore, Underdetermination explains why we go through all the hoops we do in making scientific inferences — Leontiskos
Well, if extreme forms of underdetermination are successful, the scientist is wasting their time. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I didn't say they must lead that way, or even that they are designed to. I said that, historically, they absolutely have been used on both the right and the left to push such agendas. And yes, this is normally in a sort of corrupted, naive form, but some propagandists, radicals, and conspiracy theorists have a very good grasp on this stuff and have become quite adept at molding it to their causes. On the left, it's tended to be used more for things like casting doubt on all findings related to sex differences, or often the entire field of behavioral genetics. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Likewise, there are a lot of people who bemoan how scientific anti-realism and arguments for science coming down to sociology and power relations has been used to pernicious effect on public debates on vaccine safety, global warming, GMO crops, etc., and are looking for solutions to underdetermination here. — Count Timothy von Icarus
That is, there are many who see these primarily as problems to be overcome, hence, old solutions should be interesting.
Nevertheless, I still think plenty can be said with careful analysis. And note, the topic is not super broad. We can have a quite good idea about how people thought about arithmetic in the past because they both wrote about it in detail and it's not a super broad subject. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I think another ameliorating factor is that there has been an unbroken, and fairly robust/large Thomistic and Neoscholastic tradition dating all the way back to that era. And so, even if we cannot say what the medievals would have thought, we can say what people steeped in their texts have generally thought, and it has generally been that underdetermination, while interesting and relevant in some areas, shouldn't support the radical theses that have been laid on it.
• David Hume’s argument against causal inferences and explanations, as well as his hugely influential “Problem of Induction;”
• Ludwig Wittgenstein’s rule-following argument, as well as Saul Kripke’s influential reformulation of it;
• W.V.O Quine’s argument for the inscrutability of reference;
• Quine’s holist arguments for the underdetermination of theories by evidence, as well similar arguments for forms of theoretical underdetermination made by J.S. Mill and expounded upon by Pierre Duhem;
• Thomas Kuhn’s arguments about underdetermination at the level of scientific paradigms;
• As well as many others, including Feyerabend’s “epistemological anarchism,” Goodman’s “new riddle of induction,” etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus
But I'm curious if any of this makes sense to anyone else on its own terms. — Baden
Sartre was a philosophical lightweight compared to Husserl, which is why Heidegger called his work ‘dreck’ , — Joshs
You might say that my re-write is a middlebrow petit-bourgeois deradicalized version. Maybe that describes all of my posts in this group? — Jamal
To think is, already in itself and above all particular content,
negation, resistance against what is imposed on it; this is what thinking
inherited from the relationship of labor to its raw material, its Urimage. If ideology encourages thought more than ever to wax in
positivity, then it slyly registers the fact that precisely this would be
contrary to thinking and that it requires the friendly word of advice
from social authority, in order to accustom it to positivity. The effort
which is implied in the concept of thinking itself, as the counterpart to
the passive intuition, is already negative, the rejection of the
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overweening demand of bowing to everything immediate. The
judgement and the conclusion, the thought-forms whose critique
thought cannot dispense with either, contain critical sprouts in
themselves; their determination is at most simultaneously the
exclusion of what they have not achieved, and the truth which they wish
to organize, repudiating, though with doubtful justification, what is not
already molded by them. The judgement that something would be so,
is the potential rejection that the relation of its subject and its predicate
would be expressed otherwise than in the judgement. Thought-forms
want to go beyond what is merely extant, “given”. The point which
thinking directs against its material is not solely the domination of
nature turned spiritual. While thinking does violence upon that which
it exerts its syntheses, it follows at the same time a potential which
waits in what it faces, and unconsciously obeys the idea of restituting
to the pieces what it itself has done; in philosophy this unconsciousness
becomes conscious. The hope of reconciliation is conjoined to
irreconcilable thinking, because the resistance of thinking against the
merely existent, the domineering freedom of the subject, also intends
in the object what, through its preparation to the object, was lost to this
latter.
SVO/SOV and inflection, as the main problems I see. :rofl: And so it would seem that the project is severely hampered and severed from the outset. The translated material we are working with is mostly analytic and not dialectical, as it has been mediated through the english language. This poses an additional challenge, as english readers can't be helped by language, the dialectic is neither immanent nor immediate in it. But I guess this is the whole point, mediation, which even in a highly dialectical language such as german, cannot be avoided. As to our own style and presentation, tone or syntax tricks must be employed, at the peril of making one sound like Yoda. Yet another challenge we brought ourselves against, who wouldn't love a challenge anyway, what else is there? — Pussycat
Also recall that in Superman III, corrupted Superman physically expels Clarke Kent from his body, who then proceeds to strangle him to death along with the de re/de facto distinction. — sime
We can't disagree about everything...? — Banno
Yes, that's how I understand it too.Adorno and other Frankfurt School writers complain endlessly about the spirit of positivism, but they are complaining about scientism, not science. — Jamal
But whereas Davidson uses charity to reach an understanding between speaker and interpreter, Adorno delights in the uncharitable, in the failure of translation, a difference such that the interpreter can never reach a coherent account of the utterance. And Adorno sees this as worthy. — Banno
As regards this topic, I see things differently to you, and we are both English speakers.
We don't need to speak a different language to see things differently. — RussellA
I don't see the sense in a strong Whorfian hypothesis, where language determines a speaker's perception of the world. — RussellA
Could you say again what point you feel I have missed about the effect of language on perception. — RussellA
By "singular way" I only meant that although art is an end in itself, nevertheless knowing this does not enable us to distinguish art from other things that are also ends in themselves (e.g. pleasure, friendship, etc.). — Leontiskos
Are you saying that we want to be able to say what art isn't? — Leontiskos
Art has one intention, to be appreciated for itself. Sex has one intention, pleasure — hypericin
I am curious what you think about my thoughts in the OP regarding the difference between painting and drawing? Where do you agree and disagree? Do you see much of a difference? — I like sushi
It may be worth pointing out that recognizing that art is an end in itself does answer this current question of "use", but it does not provide the essence of art. After all, plenty of other things are ends in themselves, such as for example pleasure and friendship. By learning that aesthetic appreciation is not a means to an end, we have a better understanding of the phenomenon, but we have nevertheless not honed in on it in a truly singular way. — Leontiskos
The point he's leading to is that the perception and appreciation of art are not separate, that art is meaningful all the way down. — Jamal
What the eye does with light of varying wavelengths and intensities is none of our business—unless we're doing physiology or optics.
It seems that the Russians don't have one word for blue but have one word for pale blue голубой and one word for dark blue Синий. However, in English, we also have two distinct words, ultramarine for dark blue and cerulean for pale blue.
It seems that English is more extensive than Russian in that we also have a word for "blue", which the Russians don't seem to. — RussellA
I’m not keen on formalism. — Tom Storm
Kant's pure intuitions of time and space and pure concepts of understanding (the Categories) are not linguistic. The article is about linguistic discrimination. — RussellA
I flatter myself that I'm getting a good feel for it. But maybe the best way to understand how to apply it or use it is to read Minima Moralia and Dialectic of Enlightenment, as well as the “Models” section of ND.
As for who could be said to have done ND after Adorno, the closest I think would be Fredric Jameson and Zizek, though the latter is far from explicitly Adornian. — Jamal
I feel like I might want to read his Aesthetic Theory after ND. Since it was written after ND, it might actually be a conscious application, whereas MM and DoE are negative dialectics in action before Adorno had formally theorized it. And since the art and aesthetic angle is so important in ND, Aesthetic Theory seems like it might be ideal.
Until now I've been a bit put off by what I expect to be his exclusive avant garde and modernist preoccupations—where Adorno goes for Schoenberg and Berg, I go for Stravinsky and Messiaen, not to mention the dreaded jazz—but I've seen enough interesting quotations from AT recently to catch my attention. — Jamal
Woke-gang crap doesn't fly in corporate settings. A group of disgruntled employees trying to bully the boss are likely to find themselves on the sidewalk without jobs, and persona non grata. — BC
Because who practiced negative dialectics, who did put emphasis on style and content as critique, who gestured towards the non-identical, who did all this, in all, who played the game? Nay, Adorno stands alone. — Pussycat
Mass shootings aren't a real problem. Well, not compared to all the other shootings. If you wave a magic wand and end all mass shootings in the US once and for all, you will hardly make a dent in the gun death statistics. — SophistiCat
"We have sex because it feels good. We do art because we like it." In what sense is this supposed to be philosophy?
We have sex for all sorts of reasons beyond "feeling good", such as, to strengthen bonding with a partner, to affirm a claim upon a partner, for social status, to explore sexual identity, because it is socially normative to do so. But most crucially, you speak of the drive to reproduce as if it somehow stood outside of the way sex feels good, and the way we feel impelled to have sex? When in truth, these are two facets of the exact same phenomenon? — hypericin
A project supervisor holds an Armalite rifle during the 1996 Australian gun buyback. — Wayfarer
Instead I'm arguing against the idea that art somehow stands on its own, intrinsically meritorious, disconnected from human need and purpose. The very fact that so many are driven to devote their whole lives to art's creation, and the fact that we are seemingly driven to saturate our environment with art, speaks instead to its deep connection to human purpose, instead of an inexplicable obsession with useless things. Even if we are not always explicitly conscious of what that purpose is. It is our job as philosophers to make the implicit explicit, only then can we actually understand what we are investigating. — hypericin