I think it's usually muddled by different understandings of what "knowledge" and "belief" entail.

Personally I've had to "unlearn" atheistic arguments. My current position is that I don't know what I can know about (1) what God is like, or (2)what the appropriate attitude towards God is. It's the perfect position to piss off both atheists who insist I must therefore be an atheist since I must be rejecting the usual theistic conceptions of God, and the people of the faith I was born into, since it doesn't take much to be declared an apostate under it.

The answer to your bottom line question is precisely subjective reasons. If you're instead asking, how can one both be glad they were born, and also believe life is not worth starting for any reason, well: starting life and continuing life are separate issues. It's possible to draw some kind of distinction I suppose.

Not that I think any of this means much. Even if this world is complete garbage, unless you actually think that all actions are morally equivalent there's still going to be good stuff to do.

I never understood the insistence that there must be some objective meaning or value in life in order for it to be worth living. What, exactly, is wrong if I think that there is some meaning to my life, and that therefore I think my life is worth living? I'm not making any claims on anyone else's life, I can freely admit that other people might not see any value in their lives. In what way must these facts necessarily inform how I value my life? (or you, yours).

So I would think from this, I could hold that life is necessarily objectively meaningless and crappy, but still be able to rationally assert that I do have a subjective reason for living (possible reasons might include preaching the gospel of suffering, enlightening the foolish, happy optimists, hastening the arrival of the end times, or maybe just being a decent person to other persons trapped in the same hell-hole as I am)

Some fundamental beliefs are indeed intuitive. For instance, the intuition that other minds exists and that I am currently interacting with other minds doesn't seem rationally refutable, so long as I am genuinely arguing with another person. So, in some sense it seems like it is necessary, at least in the instance when I take myself to be arguing with another person, to hold that it is true that other minds exists. But the intuition about pleasure and pain isn't quite the same as that, nor the intuition that morality is about consequences. They aren't built into the definition of morality, nor are they necessary intuitions to hold for me to argue with you.

So I'm not sure how you can be so certain about the intrinsic goodness of pleasure and pain, or that morality is fundamentally about consequences.

1) Why do you think morality is (at least partly) about consequences?
2) Why do you think pleasure is good and pain is bad?
3) In what sense is the problem with life "structural", given your responses to (1) and (2)?

I don't think I'm disagreeing all too much, but I need to ask: When you say there are independent philosophical studies, do you just mean that they are independent of any extant disciplines, or that some philosophical topics necessarily cannot resolve into a separate discipline?

I think you'll find that looking past the media fuelled controversy over "playing God" , there are other, less media-friendly bioethical issues to discuss. When it comes to enhancement in general, there's a question of the tension between the haves and have nots. Whether it implies that enhancement (genetic or otherwise) should therefore be made publicly available. If you do make enhancements publicly available, and given our highly competitive society, will that in turn infringe upon a person's choice not to enhance? Is there a relevant distinction between treating a disease vs improving upon what's natural; and how does that affect the duties doctors have, if we grant that doctors have a duty to treat illnesses?

To be honest the whole playing God argument is a tired one, which I personally think is obstructing more nuanced, public discussion about genetic enhancement and it's implications (which is not to say that there is no nuanced discussion)

But... Are we inflicting suffering on animals when we raise them in a humane manner, and then at some point, end their lives humanely? — Bitter Crank

This is one of those instances where I think the only appropriate answer is "I don't know." I don't know if it's possible for a chicken to prefer not having its life ended prematurely, or if a cow prefers not to be milked. I certainly don't know if all chickens prefer not having their lives ended prematurely etc. The problem I have with a lot of discussion about animal cruelty is the presumption that we do know what animals want, and that we can generalize about animals in a way that would be shouted down immediately if we were to apply that to humans.

Granted, there are ghastly ways of treating animals. Factory farming fits the definition of ghastly. Animals raised in these conditions most likely suffer stress, if not physical pain. Factory farming is used for no other purpose than to maximize profit with a minimum of expense. Somebody (the animals first) pays the price.

In a less intense regime of farming, where animals are not subjected to the conditions of factory farming, suffering can be minimized if not eliminated. Of course, traditional farming methods use more land, but it is used less intensively. Traditional farming can probably not produce the same quantity of meat as intense farming.

It's a trade off similar to what happens to workers in factories: Intense pursuit of profit, minimal expense, speed-up--all that--produces more suffering, and greater suffering. The solution to produce less suffering is to consume less production--buy fewer goods, eat less meat.

OR, we can automate the factory using robots to make things, or produce meat in tanks. — Bitter Crank

I don't think I'm disagreeing too much with any of that. I do think it's easier to infer that animals suffer in factory farms from behavioural cues, though I'm sure Nagel would have a thing or ten to say about that. Really, when it comes to questions about what beings that are not human want, that also have no clear way of communicating their desires to us, I maintain agnosticism. Intuitively I would be kind of behaviourist but I don't think this position is strictly tenable (I have no good justification for behaviourism).

BTW, texturized vegetable protein extruded into a bin is not appealing. It has to be seasoned and combined with flavorful ingredients to taste good. I agree, at the point of production some of the vegetable protein substances are disgusting. Mock Duck, used in vegetarian asian dishes, is (I think) a wheat based product that is very chewy and tasty -- because of the sauce and seasoning. It doesn't taste like duck, exactly, but certainly not bad. Tofu is just untexturized vegetable protein. — Bitter Crank

I'm aware of those options. I'm living in Asia. But like I said, I must not know how to cook "mock meat" because the few times I tried, it turned out awful. Though when I do buy food from dedicated vegetarian stalls, I'm generally not disappointed. Tofu was never a meat substitute for me, just another vegetable.

I'm interested in what, if anything, constitutes a good, non-moral reason. But I think I will make a separate thread on this eventually.

sure, I can grant that animal suffering is a given. Your argument seems to be something like:
Since animals necessarily suffer, regardless of whether humans interact with them or not, it is morally permissible to inflict suffering on animals.

There's a disconnect. On the one hand animals necessarily suffering is what happens, and I don't see how you've gotten to your conclusion that therefore it is ok for humans to cause their suffering.

I can't comment extensively on the environmental outcomes of lab grown meat that turns out commercially viable. But i dont see what's wrong with entertaining the possibility that it turns out to be at least better for the environment than factory farmed meat.

I've tried the meat substitutes that are readily available in my country. Either I must not know how to prepare them or they just taste horrible.

Not everyone values personal health above other other things. Like smoking, drinking, and eating meat. Given that someone chooses not to prioritise health over the enjoyment of meat, and given that the *only* issue with meat eating is a health detriment, at a level that's not comparable to smoking or drinking, is there any good reason to compel that person to give up meat eating?

This issue raises the question of what kinds of obligations states have towards non-citizens. When it comes to refugees, given that they are non-citizens, and given that the interests of refugees necessarily will conflict with at least some of the interests of some citizens, in what sense would a state be obligated to act counter to the interests of some percentage of its citizens? Even if the percentage is small, does it follow that a state must ignore the interests of this minority? If so, does that have implications for minority interests? What if the percentage is large? Does it then follow that a state must abide by the "will of the people"? Is there some sense in which some interests are necessarily prior to others?

I don't see where you're going with this. Animals suffering without human intervention doesn't justify us inflicting additional suffering on animals.

Whether we consume more meat than we *need* is a separate issue. The OP only asks if meat eating is ethically permissible, I argue there is a possible scenario where it is. I don't dispute that as things stand now, meat eating is likely to be morally wrong, with the caveat that you could possible justify eating meat on some anthropocentric grounds (which I personally don't find convincing).

I've already stipulated for environmental arguments, lab grown meat should (though I can't say for certain) be able to do away with factory farming, which should also defuse most of the environmentalist argument.

Regarding your last point, it's a controversial stand to take either way if you believe that the health of the individual trumps his free will or that his free will trumps his health. However given the emphasis bioethics tends to place on autonomy, I'm more inclined to think autonomy would hold. (i.e. In the general case, individuals should have the choice to pursue a healthy lifestyle or not)

of course there's a *reason* which is simply that it tastes good, and S wants to eat that which tastes good.

It doesn't justify inflicting harm towards animals or the environmental damage the industry is said to cause, but it's a reason. It's also the reason why I personally am hoping lab grown meat becomes commercially viable sooner rather than later.

Regarding OP, if there was a way to eat meat without contributing to the suffering of animals I think most of the weight of the argument against meat eating dissipates. There's still the question of environmental sustainability but lab-grown meat is still in such an early stage of development it's rather difficult to predict the environmental impact it will have when produced on a large scale.

With regard to arguments about health, an argument about respecting the individual's autonomy likely takes precedence, even if it's proven that meat eating necessarily is detrimental to health (in all possible scenarios of meat-eating)

I'll have to respectfully disagree with Socrates then, in particular with the point that "everyone wants the good and the right". I might concede that it is a moral requirement not to eat meat, but I still choose to eat meat because it's delicious. Humans aren't hard-wired to be moral.

In addition, moral disagreement isn't proof of moral subjectivity.

Regarding truth and rationality, we make decisions based on emotions at times. Love is a good example of something that tends to override reason. Eating too much when you're trying to lose weight is another. We don't have to be, nor are we always rational.

Even so, what is it about the proper understanding of morality, or truth, or rationality necessarily compels anyone to be moral or rational? What is that founded on? Furthermore, even if there were some psychological explanation as to why we find certain things compelling, so what? How is that indicative of a way that we ought to be, as opposed to it simply being the case that these things are compelling, and we are simply compelled to be in a particular way?

Neither am I suggesting that any given individual impose any form of morality on anyone else, at least in this current state of affairs. I can imagine a few hypotheticals where I'd definitely subscribe to said imposition, but those would require some far-out assumptions.

Since this forum is a philosophy forum, I'd expect that the discussions would tend to the grandiose. I also don't see why anyone ought to be moral, unless they are already motivated to be moral in the first place. Also, the question of whether any individual can have access to an objective morality and whether there is an objective morality are distinct questions. You say whether there is one or not doesn't matter, I contend that at this stage, whether we can access that objective morality doesn't matter. Yes, moral philosophy is still in its infancy when compared to other academic fields, and moral disagreement exists- but moral disagreement isn't the problem, it's the symptom of the problem. In addition, if you're right and I'm more likely to be wrong, why would you encourage anyone to live morally? Advising someone to act morally implies that you think a person can have some form of access to an objective morality, else you think that person's subjective morality tends to accord with your own- and how would you know that?

Furthermore, to dismiss all discussion on moral philosophy since none of us will have access to it/ it is an impractical exercise is to miss the point entirely. Given the range of impractical things we could be discussing on this forum (metaphysics, epistemology, logic, philosophy of art/science/math), in what way is discussing moral philosophy somehow inferior to any of those discussions? In addition, how many of these discussions aim to settle, once and for all the questions in their fields?

I think most of us here are primarily here because we enjoy discussing philosophy, and not because we are out to be moral saints (myself included). It goes without saying there are likely many other things we could be doing instead of arguing with one another on a forum or in real life.

However, I'm inclined to agree that for most of us, we're really only capable of minor actions and we can only hope to make some small impact on our immediate surroundings.

I initially only intended to write out a response to @Wosret. However, after reading the above by darthbarracuda, I think that's a more relevant discussion to get into.
Questions:
1) Why is it necessarily the case that entropy is in some sense a necessary evil, at least at the present time?
2) By the same token, in what sense is it the case that an objective purpose or goal to life is a necessary requirement to justify bringing in new life?
3) In what sense is existential suffering related to physical and emotional suffering? Is there a hierarchy of suffering? Is one prior to the others? What is the character of this suffering, and in what sense is it related to lack of objective purpose/goal?
4) I grant this world is terrible. I even grant that it is likely that some form of population reduction is necessary in order to improve the livability of the world. What I don't understand is the argument that there is some necessary and fundamental flaw in the world that makes it impossible to justify bringing in new life. So I'd like to ask a different question. In what fundamental ways would this world have to change in order to justify natalism (in the sense that it is morally permitted, though not required to have children)?

I have read @darthbarracuda's previous comment that states that there is some structural flaw in that preferences will necessarily be frustrated through existence. I'm not convinced that preference frustration is even intrinsically bad to begin with; or that it's impossible to engineer a hypothetical where everyone is able to satisfy their desires/preferences.

@The Great Whatever on the other hand intuits that it might be impossible to improve the world in some fundamental way, and that if there were some way to alter the world in this way, philosophy wouldn't be able to say anything about it. I'd like to know your thoughts on 4.

Wosret, I initially wanted to write out an entire post responding to you specifically, but I'd like to make some clarificatory statements regarding my views: It isn't necessary for me to assume that we all ought to be moral. I think you have some concerns regarding the conflation of the meaning/purpose of life with the moral goals. I'm agnostic as to whether there is any meaning or purpose to life, but I think it is undeniable that objective morality exists. At the same time, I don't worry about the is-ought gap too much, since morality need only describe what the right thing to do is without making any assumptions about how the world "ought" to be. With regard to specific examples, I don't see how those would be fruitful without context. Think along the lines of Kant's formula of universal law and the golden rule.

I don't think the point of life is to save the world but I think we have a moral obligation towards improving the lives of other beings. What improving those lives entails is another matter altogether.

I'm just waiting for the experience machines to come along and resolve the problem of suffering.

On a more serious note, I would likely argue that (human) suffering isn't sufficient grounds to argue for (human) antinatalism, in an absolute form (I.e. The right thing for everyone is necessarily and always not to procreate), because it's an inherently anthropocentric view that leaves out far too much for me to subscribe to it. No one aside from Bittercrank, I believe, brought up non-human factors into the equation. I think we have strong moral duties towards other things, animals being the most obvious, and I think AI would be a close hypothetical relative. I think the balance of probabilities right now regarding our treatment of animals in general heavily skews to the possibility that we are treating them extremely poorly, and (at least in the current state of affairs) there are far too many humans on this planet.

On the other hand, I don't see it as being a necessary truth that we will always be in this state of affairs, and particularly after an extended period of reduced birthing, it would be possible to conceive of a state of affairs where we would be obliged to continue our existence, in order to benefit remaining human and animal/AI life. Goes without saying, this position makes a LOT of assumptions about our possible relationship towards other beings and that it's possible to even bring about a situation where we can ensure our descendants fulfil their putative moral obligations. It also begs the question of what our duties towards other beings entail, and whether these would even require our existence.

However, if we assume that somehow, we can bring about an antinatalist state of affairs, I doubt it's a stretch to bring about a state of affairs where humans act in a morally respectful manner towards other possible forms of life. Even given the poverty of the human condition, that would not negate the moral duty we would have towards other forms of life; in fact, given that human life (if I've understood antinatalists correctly) tends towards necessary suffering through existence, then it would follow that the only reason for human existence to begin with would be to improve the life of other living things.

Tl;dr: even if humans suck and human life sucks, we still need to stick around to facilitate the best possible lives for animals. In fact, that's probably the only reason why we're even needed around, if antinatalists are right about human existence.

PS: Also, by no means does facilitating a good life for animals necessarily entail facilitating a natural one.

I'm also curious why antinatalism is the go to response here. Is it necessarily impossible to improve the world at some point in the future, such that the balance of probability for an individual born skews to a good, rather than a poor existence? Or is antinatalism being proposed as a stop-gap measure until such a time? I.e. Are antinatalists here saying that existence necessarily entails suffering (at least in this world)? Also, do antinatalists here have any arguments for/against implementing political measures to enforce their moral principles?

Are antinatalists here also antinatalists with regards to plant and animal life?

Generalized label: You tell me
Form of government: Modified meritocratic democracy (voters and candidates should meet some minimum requirements, voters select from a pool of qualified candidates)
Form of economy: Undecided, but leaning towards a Rawlsian distribution of goods
Abortion: generally pro-choice
Gay marriage: For
Death penalty: Undecided, leaning strongly against
Euthanasia: Undecided, definitely support advanced medical directives
Campaign finance: Undecided, possibly irrelevant
Surveillance: For, with limitations and oversight
Health care: Universal medical insurance, paid for through an enforced savings plan. (roughly)
Immigration: Undecided, depends on the purpose of the state
Education: Light touch regulation. Compulsory basic education.
Environmental policy: Strong focus on duties towards animals. Regulate industrial emissions, invest in sustainable food sources, have infrastructure that promotes recycling and reduced waste and pollution.
Gun policy: Ban guns, strict regulations on military and police weaponry
Drug policy: Undecided, but consistency demands it all goes or it all stays
Foreign policy: Undecided, depends on the purpose of the state

My notion of a psychopath in essence is a person who is excellent at exploiting others and has no conscience about it. — Question

Not sure if that's what most people have in mind, but I'll grant you that definition.

So there seem to be two salient points here:
1) Psychopaths are excellent at exploiting others
2) Psychopaths have no conscience (when exploiting others)

The first point doesn't seem like it helps you all that much. It doesn't seem like it is necessarily a bad property to be excellent at exploiting others. There might even be situations where exploiting others would be a necessary ability to have in order to govern a successful state. In addition, the ability to X is a non-factor if it is never employed.

I think what you would have to establish is that exploitation is necessarily (i) an ability that can only be used to the detriment of the state or (ii) will necessarily be employed by a psychopath to the detriment of the state, and will inevitably be employed by a psychopath to the detriment of the state (or people of the state or whatever you see as the primary aim/purpose/beneficiary of the state)

I suppose what you hint at with the second point (psychopaths have no conscience when exploiting others) is that in some sense, exploiting others without conscience as a psychopath does will inevitably and necessarily lead to the detriment of the state.

Before establishing the rest of my counterargument, I will note that I am taking conscience to mean something approximating the faculty of the mind that compels a person to do the right thing. In other words, the lack of conscience of the psychopath can be translated to: The lack of motivation to do the right thing.

Now, why would the motivation to do the right thing be important to a leader? Presumably, because we expect that a leader who has this motivation necessarily is a certain way that facilitates her ability to benefit the state. However, I do not see how a clear link can be drawn between the lack of conscience and the ability to govern a state.

Consider: Hypothetically speaking, can an individual possess no conscience and still be legitimately interested in maintaining a successful state, for its own sake? What would the problem be with such an individual? On the other hand, suppose someone with access to the objectively correct moral theory has a strong conscience that requires him to go against the "interests" of a state? Would such an individual be considered a good political leader? (Assuming that the moral imperative and the aims of a good government are irreconcilable)

I think a lot of this turns on what psychopathy is and what about it would necessarily entail that a psychopathic person would be unfit to be in a position of power. Following which the question would be, why focus on psychopaths as opposed to the set of properties they possess?

Also I may have a different notion of what a psychopath is, judging from what people have said so far.

I am under the impression that the only time it is morally acceptable to act is when such behavior is deemed to be morally acceptable.

This statement is critical. Right off the bat it isn't clear what moral standards you're referring to. Are you simply stating that according to any given moral theory, it is morally acceptable to X when X is a morally acceptable action according to said moral theory?

That would be tautologous and uncontroversial. However, your following statements lead me to believe you're sneaking in this proposition under the guise of a tautology: According to any given moral theory, the only time it is morally acceptable to X when such behaviour is deemed morally acceptable by a particular set of people

Note that while the first statement is entirely uncontroversial because of its tautologous nature, the second requires justification to hold. Your further statements lead me to believe it is this second proposition you are attempting to use here such as in this case:

Blowing up an abortion clinic in protest of abortion is immoral because it violates the code of morality that a society has in place.

This assumes that the right thing to do is in fact to abide by the code of morality society has in place, regardless of any objective moral truths that may exist. While this can be justified by some moral theories, it still requires justification, and it is far from clear that all moral theories would produce this conclusion.

Consider this scenario:
There is only one objectively true moral theory, and you are its only adherent, and you know it to be true. According to this moral theory, you are morally required to blow up an abortion clinic.

By definition, the right thing to do in this instance would in fact be to blow up the abortion clinic.

Now, we might feel that it is wrong, and socially acceptable practice may be to refrain from blowing up the abortion clinic; but the intellectually honest response to this situation would not be to insist that blowing up the abortion clinic is the wrong thing to do. We could instead say that while the right thing to do is to blow up the clinic, in order to remain a functional member of society and to live a happier life, one should not blow up the clinic.

But what if, in your gut, you felt that something ought to be done and yet this was not accepted by society? Should you become a moral vigilante?

I would say, no, you are not morally permitted to be a moral vigilante because your opinion of what is moral may differ from the opinions of everyone else in the society. If you don't like the morality of the society you live in, then either gtfo or peacefully demonstrate to try to change the accepted morality.

Otherwise, to be a moral vigilante means to assume that your opinion has more worth than the opinions of others before it has been established by democratic vote or social meme.

This section on the other hand is positing that moral feelings and beliefs are simply opinions. In other words, it is denying that individuals are (at least at present) incapable of knowing an objectively true moral theory. However, this does not address the argument I have made above. I concede that for the vast majority of people, acting on what feels to be moral or what they believe to be moral would likely not be the right thing to do. This would depend on a host of other factors, but the most important one would be that they likely do not have knowledge of the objectively true moral theory.

In summary, these are the important points I want to convey:
1) The introductory lines are misleading, implying that what is said follows from the first interpretation, rather than the second
2) If one adopts the more robust first interpretation, what follows is that in the extreme case where the objectively true moral content is diametrically opposed to what the vast majority of people believe to be the moral content, the morally right action remains dictated by the objectively true moral content and not by what society believes to be the moral content.