Since we have gone off topic (I agree with
@Olivier5), that is going to be my last post on this side issue (désolé).
And if we disagree about those judgements? — Isaac
Disagreement is not the problem, since we could still rationally explore the extent of our disagreements. And for that you still would need rationally compelling arguments which are possible only thanks to a shared set of epistemic rules and shared ways to apply them. Rebutting to your opponent’s objections by expressing a disagreement without providing rationally compelling arguments amounts to withdrawing from a rational confrontation. That’s all.
Another point I would make is that while politics, moral, philosophy are domains where disagreement is frequent and persistent, reaching consensus may be a major issue for the former two, namely politics and moral, not for philosophy. Indeed philosophy is the kind of activity where people can try to rationally examine their own political and moral beliefs without being pressed by consensus concerns and as long as they are willing to put some effort into it. And, again, that effort should go into rationally elaborating arguments, not into acknowledging or listing contentious points or their popularity distribution among people, intelligent people or competent people.
Right. And I disagree that those rules have been broken (by my claims). I think they have been broken by yours. So now what? How can I now argue (using those same rules) that you broke those rules. We're just going to end up in the same position (you think you didn't break them, I think you did). — Isaac
Where is the pertinent argument proving that I broke the rules? And what shared rationale rules are you talking about? If you honestly disagree with my argument proving that you failed to logically process a modus tollens (under the implicit assumption that you fully understand what a modus tollens is and must be correctly applied by anybody, me and you included), you have to provide pertinent rationally challenging arguments yourself.
We play games with actual moves in the play field, not by news reporting about them from the stands.
To convince me (or others) to believe the same. — Isaac
Then - as I already anticipated - I would exactly do all I did, so what is the point of claiming that my judgements are completely subjective as yours or anybody else’s? We would still be in condition to possibly convince others based on rational compelling arguments! Claiming that all my claims or judgements are completely subjective is devoid of any cognitive meaning. So, at best it expresses your intention to withdrawal from rational confrontation.
I'm not claiming that nothing is objectively irrational (it's a word in a shared language, so it has a shared meaning, not a private one). What I'm saying is that you cannot get further then the range of shared meaning. Several contradictory things can be equally rational (they all fit the definition of the word). Take 'game' for example. A Cow is not a 'game', it's a type of farm animal. Anyone claiming a cow is a game is wrong. But the question of whether, say, juggling is a 'game' is moot - some say it is and others say it isn't. There's nothing more you can do from there to determine whether it's a game or not, there's no outside agency to appeal to. Whether an argument is 'rational' is like that. — Isaac
Here my comment:
First, I’m not not sure what the sentence “I'm not claiming that nothing is objectively
irrational” is supposed to mean, maybe you should rephrase it. And if what you wanted to claim is that you admit objective and rational judgement then how could you at the same time claim “There’s literally nothing more that can be appealed to other than our judgements” or that my claims are completely subjective?!
Second, can you tell me then what is the shared meaning of a claim like “all of the above are completely subjective” through words whose meaning you assume we share and how could we possible share meanings if all my and your judgements are completely subjective?
Third, “contradictory things can be equally rational” looks a poor phrasing for the claim that people may have classificatory disagreements because the concepts used suffer from some indeterminacy. Agreed, so what? The indeterminacy can be still disambiguated in a way that is still intelligible by relying on the use cases where indeterminacy doesn’t arise and other shared concepts not suffering from such indeterminacy. In other words indeterminacies must be commensurable to still be intelligible as indeterminacies of certain classificatory concepts. Besides some epistemic rules at the core of our rational methods are so basic and cross domain that putative indeterminacies would quickly escalate into nonsense if they resist rational examination: e.g. you can not possibly understand and apply the modus tollens in a different way from what I did , unless you did it by mistake. And if I’m wrong about it because I missed something in the given circumstances that would justify that apparent transgression, then go ahead and show me what that is with an actual counter-argument.
Not without providing some evidence. It would be a ridiculous claim. — Isaac
Here “some evidence”: you said “the West and Ukraine bear the blame of this war so now Putin is morally justified to send his army to bomb kill rape loot Ukrainians”.
“Evidence”, “providing some evidence”, “ridiculous claim” would still be matter of my completely subjective judgment and differ from yours. And I could play it all the ways I want since there is nothing you can appeal to except my own judgement and completely subjective interpretation.
And again why would I need to provide evidence? Why would I care if you claim that I’m ridiculous? If I needed your consensus it would be easier for me to feed your informational bubble, not to question it.
Here's a dictionary explaining what the Idiom "you're saying" means in English. As you can see, it doesn't literally mean that you actually spoke (or wrote) those exact words. It's an understanding of your meaning. Hence, again, what you think is objectively false only seems that way to you. Other interpretations see it differently. — Isaac
Here my objections:
First, I don’t care if there are whatever other possible use cases of the word “say”. I care about the ones that make sense to apply to your claim against mine in the specific context you used it. So pointing me to some unrelated idiomatic usage of the word “say” is pointless.
Second, your actual usage was contrasting my actual claim with some other claim you misattributed to me (“Now you're saying you don’t”) to suggest an inexistent inconsistency. And that’s exactly another example of objective intellectual failure, because when rationally challenging peoples’ claims and arguments, accuracy and clarity are key. Certainly loose or ambiguous talk may be tolerated to some extent yet not at the expense of your opponents’ actual claims as they have been formulated, especially if you have objections to raise against them.
Third, there are different interpretations as there are mistakes, and it’s a very bad self-serving line of reasoning to admit the former to question the possibility of admitting the latter and dispense people from acknowledging their own blatant mistakes, as you keep doing.
I do. Absolutely none of which is happening here. There have been no scientific papers produced on Russia's invasion of Ukraine, no statistical analysis, no accepted methods and no peer review. But it's not these standards that make for a filtered set of theories in the scientific journals - it's the agreement on how they're measured. If I published a paper in which the conclusion was "I reckon..." without any reference to an experiment or meta-analysis, we'd all agree that's a failure to meet the standards. We're talking here about situations where we disagree about such a failure. You keep referring to epistemic standards (as if I'm disputing they exist), but the question is not their existence it's the resolution of disagreements about whether they've been met. — “Isaac
Once one has learnt an arithmetic rule like summing natural numbers, the application of the rule doesn’t change if one is no longer supervised by the professor of math or in a math class. The same goes with the rule of the modus tollens or the rule of accurately reporting people’s claims.
And as you don’t deliver your scientific results through insulting people, repeating ad nauseam claims, alluding to risks of ostracism, sarcastic comments, accusing people of serving some political agenda, and expect others to question your scientific research in the same spirit (not with rebuttals like “I disagree with you and you didn’t literally give me anything more than your completely subjective judgement as a measure”), then you can as well deliver your rationally compelling arguments in the same spirit here and expect others do the same with your arguments.
The problem here is that you keep insisting I'm not meeting those standards, but you’ve got nothing more than your opinion that I'm not. No evidence can be brought to bear, no external authority appealed to. It's just you reading my argument and concluding it is not 'rational' and me reading it and concluding it is. There’s literally nothing more that can be appealed to other than our judgements. — Isaac
My opinion that you are not meeting those standards results from arguments applying precisely those standards I’m appealing to (and distinct from my judgement!). So yes, there is literally more than just my opinion that you are not meeting those standards: there is an argument from which that conclusive opinion results as a corollary. And you are challenged to address that argument with a counter-argument possibly more effective than mine in applying shared rational standards. Claiming that you disagree with that opinion of mine is totally missing the point I’m making.
Worse than this, I find your claim “There’s literally nothing more that can be appealed to other than our judgements” empty because it applies equally to all our judgements (including those “appealing to” evidences and authorities) at any moment in any circumstance no matter if they are correct or wrong. And even the concept of “appealing to” which we all have learnt as referring to normative principles distinct from our own judgement is misused and voided of its normative force when every “appealing to” is eventually reduced to our own personal judgement.
So what I'm asking is what is your method for demonstrating that I'm wrong in that disagreement and you're right? — Isaac
There is no method of demonstrating the rule that has been infringed other than showing how the rule must have been correctly applied. When you fail to calculate an arithmetic sum, I can show you how to calculate it correctly by actually calculating that sum as everybody learnt to effectively calculate it. When you fail to process a modus tollens, I can show you how to process it correctly by actually processing the modus tollens as everybody learnt to effectively apply it.
And it would pointless to still observe “you just ‘keep saying’ you applied the rule correctly” because even claiming to have applied some rule correctly is an activity which should be again correctly executed to grant claim accuracy wrt actually shared epistemic rules. In other words, by providing actual pertinent arguments I’m thereby illustrating to you exactly all those epistemic rules I must assume sharable with you, intelligible to you and applicable by you in the same way in that context, also when correcting you.
So what method (if not numerical) is used to perform this 'aggregation' and reach the assessment? — Isaac
The aggregation can be numerical or not, all depends on how it is implemented of course. My point was that instead of directly calculating the numeric probability of a Russian nuclear attack against some NATO country, it could be easier to ask some security expert or team of security experts how likely a Russian nuclear attack against some NATO country is, where the “likelihood” parameter ranges over a non-numerical ordered set of values like very unlikely, unlikely, possible, very likely, practically certain ).