↪neomac
Ironically, the post-Cold War plans for NATO and Ukraine were made not long after Vidal made that statement. — Tzeentch

Yeah until someone again pointed at the actual signs of NATO falling apart:
Emmanuel Macron warns Europe: NATO is becoming brain-dead
https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-warns-europe-nato-is-becoming-brain-dead
But I guess you know better.

Meanwhile, the 21st century's real and only empire, the American empire, is showing actual signs of falling apart. — Tzeentch

Interesting, never heard that before.

January 11, 1986

Requiem for the American Empire
“Empires are restless organisms. They must constantly renew themselves; should an empire start leaking energy, it will die.”
Gore Vidal

https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/requiem-american-empire/

When I was the only one who had brought up or defended the idea of truth-preservation in the entire thread? — Leontiskos

You weren't the only one to bring this up:

Logic rules allow us to infer some conclusions from some premises. Such rules ensure that if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true. — neomac

Let's apply your reasoning to mortuary. "A mortician is concerned with preserving bodies. Therefore a mortician builds/creates bodies. Q.E.D." — Leontiskos

"Built-in" is a figure of speech. We are talking semantics. Let's apply MY reasoning to mortuary "A mortician is concerned with preserving bodies so the notion of 'body' is semantically built in the notion of 'mortician'".

This just isn't right. It is not true that, "[T]he notion of 'truth' is built in the 'logic' rules themselves, in other words the meaning of 'truth' is determined by 'logic rules' too" (↪neomac
).

The notion of truth is not semantically built in the idea of correct inference. Truth is something beyond inference and beyond validity. Validity can be formally defined, but truth cannot be formally defined. Of course we can talk about "truth" qua some logical system, but this is technically an equivocation. This sort of "truth" is different from actual truth, and we do not hesitate to call it false in certain instances. — Leontiskos

Apparently you disagree with yourself. Indeed you yourself wrote “Currently our central criterion is validity, where the truth of the premises ensures the truth of the conclusions” so you determined the meaning of “valid inference” by explicitly referring to the notion of truth. If a valid inference must be truth-preserving then the notion of truth is built in that of valid inference. Q.E.D.

If something is meant to preserve another thing, then it is not building or creating that thing. — Leontiskos

"Built-in" is a figure of speech, we are talking semantics. So the point is that the notion of truth is semantically built in the idea of correct inference. This holds even if we occasionally fail to process the inference or if the inference is simply valid but not sound.

Trouble is, truth does not enter into formal systems until they are given an interpretation. — Banno

Notice that the opening post takes "formalisation" to be but one approach to answer the question of "what is logic?" so we are not just talking about logic in formal systems or just formal systems.
I can get that "formal systems" do not all make explicit use of the notion of truth and false (e.g. algebra). But my claim is more radical than it appears. Indeed, I take the notion of "truth" to be so primitive and pervasive along with the notion of "logic" that I take the concept of "truth" to be built-in that of "logic" ALSO independently from ANY interpretation. Indeed, any rule-based manipulation of symbols would still have a correct or incorrect application and this necessarily equates (even if it may not be identical) to answering the question: "This application conforms to the rules, true or false?". Besides if the meaning of "logic" (classic and non-classic) is not stretched to the point of not being about propositions/sentences (in other words representations), then it is still linked to possible interpretations.

But there is no way for me to make sense of “true” as applied to “logic” since the notion of “truth” is built in the “logic” rules themselves, in other words the meaning of “truth” is determined by “logic rules” too. — neomac


On the other hand, I don't agree with this. Logic can be said to be true insofar as it does what it is supposed to do: aid us in reasoning well. Currently our central criterion is validity, where the truth of the premises ensures the truth of the conclusions. So if I take a logical system and I scrupulously follow the rules, beginning with true premises, but then arrive at false conclusions, the logical system is bad or false. It is false in the sense that it is not doing what it was meant to do (i.e. preserve truth). Truth is not built in logic; it transcends it. — Leontiskos

Notice that quote of mine was questioning the notion of “true logic” if applied to different logic systems or different sets of logic rules which are all supposed to “preserve truth“. On the other side if your claim is supposed to question my claim that “the notion of ‘truth’ is built in the ‘logic’ rules themselves”, then you are failing since your own notion of logical system as a set of truth preserving rules is also grounded on the notion of “truth”. That doesn’t compromise the distinction between valid and sound deduction, by any means.

I'm just trying to explain the bucket of answers to "what is logic," that I was trying to group together with point 1. — Count Timothy von Icarus

All right, I think I got it now. In my own words, your summary amounts to pointing at 3 ways of approaching the question “what is logic?”:
1. The formalist, which understands logic as a system of rules independently from any reference to mental processes or the world.
2. The psychologist (comprising behaviourist, cognitivist, neurologist views), which understands logic as an empirical description of “laws of thought”.
3. The realist, which understands logic as metaphysical description of meta-empirical principles.

Concerning the "Scandal of Deduction", even though I do not share your naturalist assumptions, my way out is somehow similar to yours. We do not have the full list of valid representations of the world in our mind simultanously. We process them progressively according to some logic/semantic rules. And we may also fail in doing it.


Gotcha. But then why do we only progress through these rules so quickly and why are some people much faster than others at doing so? Or why are digital computers so much quicker than any person? I'm curious how that can be answered without reference to the physical differences between people or people and machines. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Your questions about cognitive performance in processing logic inferences are empirical questions not conceptual ones. So they deserve an empirical answer as offered e.g. by cognitive sciences.
What is crucial to me here is the distinction between empirical and conceptual questions. Naturalist views tend to conflate them. The co-existence between two distinct domains (the empirical and the conceptual) is undigestible for naturalists. Naturalists are mostly reductionists or eliminativists (there are also the mysterianists though) about the mental.

The term “influence” may express an ontological notion of causality, but I find this notion problematic for certain reasons. On the other side, if we talk in terms of nomological regularities, surely I do believe that certain external facts (e.g. the light reaching our retina) correlate with visual experiences which then we have learned to classify in certain ways. That would be enough for me to talk about “influence” but at the place of ontological causal links, there are just nomological correlations plus a rule-based cognitive performance.


Yeah, I think that works for what I'm thinking of. I don't really like eliminative views on causation, e.g. Russell's "a complete description of the solar system includes no room for cause," but even accepting his view it seems like there are still relations of a sort between the world and beliefs. But this to me suggests that our perceived order corresponds to an order that exists outside of our perceiving it.

But is it logic by which physical states seem to orderly evolve into only other certain configurations of future physical states? I feel like a different word should be used because "logic" is more associated with definitions 1 and 2 I laid out. It is certainly very common in the natural sciences to read phrases like "because of the logic of thermodynamics...." etc., but it's obviously not a reference to thought in those cases. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The empirical method obliges scientists to check their theories against the facts, therefore the confidence one can scientifically grant to scientific theories remains conditional for any empirical theory no matter how successfully it looks in competition to other theories.
Anyways I too find the expression “because of the logic of thermodynamics” a bit confusing (e.g. “logic of thermodynamics” is not yet another a logic system distinct from “propositional logic”), however I find it harmless if it simply equates to claiming: “Given the premises of the theory we call ‘thermodynamics’, we can logically infer this and that”.

Since they are mostly primitive concepts they can not be questioned or explained away without ending up into some nonsense or implicitly reintroducing them.


I'm reading Terrance Deacon's "Incomplete Nature," right now and it makes the same sort of argument. I'm really enjoying it, and I think he has a point here.

But Deacon is also coming from a naturalist frame, so he has different ideas about where to go from there. He has what I thought at first glance was a good argument against nominalism and the idea that all our categories are products of mind "in here," as opposed to reflections "out there." Perhaps not directly relevant to what we're talking about, since he is focused on how universals can have causal efficacy, but somewhat related. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Unfortunately I didn’t read "Incomplete Nature". And I find that passage rather obscure, even in relation to what I said. From what I gathered around he seems to support a peculiar notion of causality that would allow to bridge the gap between mental phenomena and physical explanation, so I guess it might be an interesting reading.

The question remains: if Prigozhin, Utkin and other prominent wagnerites are dead, what is the future of the Wagner mercenaries considering their pro-Russian activities in Africa? Are they going to be absorbed/replaced?

Mutiny feint? Russian aircraft shot down feint? The mutineer then killed feint? :roll: — ssu

Not sure if they wanted us to believe he is dead but he isn't, or that he's only presumed dead but he is, or that he was supposed to be in Russia but in reality he is still in Africa or in Belarus, or neither, because he is in Ukraine. Dead or alive.
This reminds of a famous line from Shakespeare's Hamlet: "There are more feints in Russia, dude, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.”

Neverending Russian feints:
https://www.euronews.com/2023/08/23/wagner-mercenary-chief-yevgeny-prigozhin-killed-in-plane-crash

If you say in the latter statement that there can be many formalisms mapping on the same rules, then formalism is distinct from rules. And surely, by formalism, you could mean to refer to the logic rules as you also stated. But were this the case the following claim of yours “1. Logic is a set of formal systems; it is defined by the formalism” would equate to “1. Logic is a set of logic rules; it is defined by the logic rules” which sounds, if not tautological yet, very little informative.


Sure, it's tautological. That was the position of Russell and the Vienna Circle. Moreover, by this view, all of mathematics is itself tautological. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Certain logic formulas are tautologies e.g. "( P ⇒ Q ) ⇔ ( ¬ P ∨ Q )" in the sense of being always true whatever is the truth value of the variables P and Q. However not all logic formulas are tautologies (e.g. P ⇒ Q). The idea that logic (and mathematics to the extent it is reducible to logic) is tautological basically comes from the idea that logic theorems can prove only tautological formulas. And this is in line with what I also said about deductive reasoning “from premises to conclusions we are manipulating our own representations so that, semantically speaking, there is no more truth in the conclusion than there is in the premises, there is no more information in the conclusion than there is in the premises.“
But your statement “Logic is a set of formal systems; it is defined by the formalism” (which is neither a logic formula nor a logic tautology) seemed to offer a definition for “Logic”. And valid definitions should not be tautological in the sense that what is to be defined should not occur in what is defining. Yet your other claims made your definition of “logic” look tautological (even claiming “Logic is all about tautologies” would sound tautological if it equates to “Logic is all about logic”).

The rules define what the system is. And per deflationary theories of truth, that tend to go along with this sort of view, truth is itself simply something defined in terms of such systems. That is, truth is "neither metaphysically substantive nor explanatory. For example, according to deflationary accounts, to say that ‘snow is white’ is true, or that it is true that snow is white, is in some sense strongly equivalent to saying simply that snow is white, and this, according to the deflationary approach, is all that can be said significantly about the truth of ‘snow is white.” — Count Timothy von Icarus

I’m not persuaded by the deflationary theories of truth so I can’t share your assumption. The most intuitive objection I can make against it is that, asserting p doesn’t mean nor implies that p is true.

the general idea is that logic is about abstract systems, not thought and certainly not the world or metaphysics.Logic might inform our metaphysics, but our metaphysics (or philosophy of mind) should not inform our consideration of logic. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Notice that “abstract” in “abstract systems” may also have a metaphysical connotation: namely, being out of space and time. And this understanding would lead us to a form of platonism about logic (which is also a metaphysical view). However “abstract” can simply refer to the result of a cognitive task by which we are focusing on certain set of characteristics or type of information while ignoring others. So “abstract systems“ refers to the possibile result of such cognitive task. I guess that’s the understanding suggested by your claim, right?

Independently from the merits of Tarski’s semantic theory of truth for formal systems, if the price for it is to relativize the notion of truth to a given (object) language, my problem with it is: what does “if and only if” in the T-condition mean? If the be-conditional requires the notion of “True” to be understood as a logic operator, but the notion of true can not be applied at the same language level in which the bi-conditional is expressed, then what does that bi-conditional even mean? Besides asserting p (in the most basic object language and since it’s a language it can offer just representations of facts not facts themselves) doesn’t mean that p is true.


Right. Or what does it mean to "describe things" at all in a language we are pretending is completely divorced from anything else in reality? At a certain point, when you get into very deflationary views, you're no longer describing "things." All you can say is that "a system can produce descriptions.” — Count Timothy von Icarus

Indeed, I’m not even sure that such views would even justify anybody saying “a system can produce descriptions”, since the notion of “description” to me conceptually implies the idea that representations of states of affairs are distinct from the states of affairs in the world as the former refers to the latter (not the other way around), and the idea that the former can correctly or incorrectly apply to the latter (hence the distinction between “true” and “false”).

But most philosophers are naturalists, so it doesn't seem too outlandish. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If you mean that this thread is specifically about naturalist views of logic, then I didn’t get it but I will take it into account from now on. On the other side, if you mean that this thread is about views on logic and your views on logic are grounded on popular naturalist assumptions, then I’ll confirm what I said that I do not share such popular views and I’m open to discussing them.

What you may be tempted to say instead is that if there are representational tools that can successfully represent the world, then the world must be such that our representational tools can succeed in representing it. But this claim does very much sound like claiming that we can represent the world that we can represent, doesn’t it?

It sounds similar; I don't think it's identical. First, if we posit that any intelligibility we find in the world is hallucinatory, something we project onto a world that lacks it, I don't see how this doesn't slide into the territory of radical skepticism. The steps to get us to "how do you know cause and effect exist? Maybe your mind creates all such relationships," seem like they should also get us to "why do you think other minds exist?" Or "why should we think an external world exists outside of our perceptions?" Afterall, don't we suppose that others have minds because of how those minds seem to effect their behaviors?

The fact that animism is pretty much universal in early human cultures (e.g., "the river floods because it wants to"), and that children tend to provide intentional explanations for natural phenomena ("the clouds came because the sky is sad") seems to show we can "hallucinate" other minds to some degree. But if we think all of the intelligibility we find in the world is simply projected, then I'm not sure how solipsism isn't a problem.

Most philosophers are naturalists though, and most think the natural sciences are one of the best sources of information we have about how the world is though. And if we accept we are formed by natural selection, then it is prima facie unreasonable to think how we "make the world intelligible" has nothing to do with how the world is.

Second, what is the point of positing aspects of reality that we cannot ever, even in principle, experience? To be sure, people have experiences all the time that they say they cannot put into words. That makes perfect sense; we do more than just use language. But aspects of reality we can never know? They are like Penrose's invisible fire breathing dragon who is flying around our heads and not interacting with anything. We can imagine an infinity of such entities. But as long as they are, in principle, forever unobservable, their being or not being seems identical. When we move to the existence of that which cannot even be thought it seems even weirder. It's the inverse of radical skepticism, instead of seeing a way to doubt everything, now we can posit anything (so long as we can never know of it). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I’m not positing “that any intelligibility we find in the world is hallucinatory”, I’m not a radical skeptic, I’m not a solipsist. My point is more that we have a network of concepts (like representation, world, truth, fact, possible fact, logic/semantic inference) that enable us to talk meaningfully and reflectively about our own cognition. Since they are mostly primitive concepts they can not be questioned or explained away without ending up into some nonsense or implicitly reintroducing them. To me “realism” about the existence of the external world (that can be experienced or referred to by other minds beside mine) is matter of conditions to talk meaningfully about the external world, so any attempt to question the existence of the external world sounds nonsensical to me as much as any attempt to demonstrate it, because one needs demonstration were things can be questioned meaningfully.
On the other side, our representations of the world may not correspond to what is the case, and may refer to mind dependent facts (as human linguistic conventions or social institutions). Unfortunately we may hold more false beliefs than we are able to detect or wish to admit. And human representations and logic/semantic inferences may serve human biological extinction as much as they can serve human biological survival.

Logic rules allow us to infer some conclusions from some premises. Such rules ensure that if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true. And that’s possible because from premises to conclusions we are manipulating our own representations so that, semantically speaking, there is no more truth in the conclusion than there is in the premises, there is no more information in the conclusion than there is in the premises. The mapping to the world can be done by the premises. But logic would work even without any such mapping. E.g. Premise 1: squares are triangles; Premise 2: triangles are circles; Conclusion: squares are circles.


This gets to the "Scandal of Deduction." If in all valid deductive arguments all information in the conclusion is contained in the premises, what exactly is the point of deduction? It tells us nothing. So why does deduction seem so useful? Why can't we memorize Euclid's axioms and then immediately solve every relevant geometry problem we come across?

This is probably the best example I know of where thinking of logic as completely abstract runs into problems. A lot of ink has been spilled trying to figure out some sort of formal solution to the Scandal, because the idea is that any solution has to lie within the scope of the abstract systems themselves.

I don't think this works. Floridi and D'Agostino put a lot of work into their conception of virtual information, trying to figure out how it is that at least some inference rules introduce new information in an analysis. But it seems like such a project is doomed. As both they and Hintikka agree, Aristotelian syllogisms only deal with surface information, information explicit in the premises. The problem is that we can still find this type of analysis informative, just as we can not know the answers to very simple arithmetic problems until we pull out a pencil and start computing.

Naturalist approaches have no problem here. We don't see things and immediately know what they entail because thought is a complex process involving a ton of physical interactions, all of which occur over time-- simple as that. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Concerning the "Scandal of Deduction", even though I do not share your naturalist assumptions, my way out is somehow similar to yours. We do not have the full list of valid representations of the world in our mind simultanously. We process them progressively according to some logic/semantic rules. And we may also fail in doing it.

It’s not the world that satisfies such rules, but our representations of the world. While we can represent and logically process representations of state of affairs that do not map into reality and do not correspond to facts, are there real states of affairs that we can not represent ? But how can we answer such question without possibly representing such state of affairs? What are we picking with the notion “state of affairs“ for whatever goes beyond our means of representation (so including the notion of "state of affairs" itself)?


Not everything can be put into words. I'm not sure if it makes sense to posit things that can be known in any way though. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure we may be unable to describe many of our experiences to any arbitrary degree of detail. For example there are many varieties of “red” and yet we can refer to all of them simply as “red”. That’s not the point, the point is that in order to talk meaningfully about experiences we can’t put into words, we still need to apply correctly a sufficiently rich set of notions and make inferences accordingly: e.g. that the varieties of red are not varieties of grey, they are colors and not sounds, that they are phenomenal experiences and not subatomic particles, that one normally needs functioning eyes and not functioning ears to experience them, etc.

Anyhow, would you agree that the world has an influence on how we represent it? — Count Timothy von Icarus

The term “influence” may express an ontological notion of causality, but I find this notion problematic for certain reasons. On the other side, if we talk in terms of nomological regularities, surely I do believe that certain external facts (e.g. the light reaching our retina) correlate with visual experiences which then we have learned to classify in certain ways. That would be enough for me to talk about “influence” but at the place of ontological causal links, there are just nomological correlations plus a rule-based cognitive performance.

By formalism I mean "the rules" not merely their particular expression, or to borrow a term from information theory, the "encoding." There can be many formalisms that map on to the same rules — Count Timothy von Icarus

.

Your way of talking looks confusing to me. If you say in the latter statement that there can be many formalisms mapping on the same rules, then formalism is distinct from rules. And surely, by formalism, you could mean to refer to the logic rules as you also stated. But were this the case the following claim of yours “1. Logic is a set of formal systems; it is defined by the formalism” would equate to “1. Logic is a set of logic rules; it is defined by the logic rules” which sounds, if not tautological yet, very little informative.
To me it’s more clear to simply say that formalism is the symbolic codification of logic rules as opposed to the natural language codification of such rules. My substantial points here are that one thing is the subject of our representations (logic rules) another is our representations (formalised vs natural) and that formalisation would be a fix for natural language ambiguities. Wrt these points the observation that for exactly the same set of logic rules one can have many symbolic or natural language codifications is correct but marginal.

Good points, and we have the problem, per Tarski, of being able to define truth from within a system. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Independently from the merits of Tarski’s semantic theory of truth for formal systems, if the price for it is to relativize the notion of truth to a given (object) language, my problem with it is: what does “if and only if” in the T-condition mean? If the be-conditional requires the notion of “True” to be understood as a logic operator, but the notion of true can not be applied at the same language level in which the bi-conditional is expressed, then what does that bi-conditional even mean? Besides asserting p (in the most basic object language and since it’s a language it can offer just representations of facts not facts themselves) doesn’t mean that p is true.

But my understanding of the search for the "one true logic" was that the pioneers of post-Aristotelian logic were looking for something that would be both a rigorous system and which would reflect facts perfectly. From the 19th century view, where it looked like all the world would soon be explainable in a rigorous way, this makes sense. They hadn't run into undecidability, the entscheidungsproblem, incompleteness, undefinability, etc. yet. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I see your point. But I think it is relatively easy to realign it with what I said. Indeed the “rigorous system” condition can reflect the need to have a system that doesn’t suffer from the ambiguities which e.g. the natural language suffers from. And the “reflect facts perfectly” condition refers to the fact that a certain set of logic rules can serve science better than other conceivable set of logic rules, as much as a set of mathematical analysis rules can serve science better than other conceivable mathematical rules.

However, I feel like the response to the aforementioned list might have been to throw the baby out with the bath water, since we've now disembodied logic in a sort of neo-Platonism. This is my problem with "game" theories of language as well. Maybe I'm just too much of a close-minded naturalist, but I tend to think that rules exist out in the world, in minds that are natural themselves, and that the rules must thus have natural causes. — Count Timothy von Icarus

All I can say at this point is that if your naturalist assumptions play a role in your understanding of logic, then they deserve to be addressed as well.

Right, but generally in the sciences we think that if a formal system very closely (or ideally, perfectly) describes something in the world, and if it allows us to make good (or ideally, perfect) predictions, this is because the formalism corresponds to something in the world. We don't think our language is magic, that it is sorcery that causes the world to correspond to it (else why all the failed formalisms, right?). But we also don't think our systems can have no connection to the world, because then science isn't about the world at all, its about language and formalisms. Except it also seems to tie to our experiences and have huge pragmatic value, so that doesn't seem right.

Of course, we can justify the sciences on pragmatic grounds, but it feels worthwhile to ask "why is it pragmatically valuable?" Presumably, because our formalisms, e.g. Newton's laws, the Schrodinger equation, etc. correspond to external reality in some way. But then if logical rules correspond to reality, it seems reality has some rules. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Without directly joining the debate between idealists and realists, my point is that if we develop tools (formal systems) to better serve a purpose (to describe the world), then we shouldn’t be all that surprised if these tools serve that purpose. What you may be tempted to say instead is that if there are representational tools that can successfully represent the world, then the world must be such that our representational tools can succeed in representing it. But this claim does very much sound like claiming that we can represent the world that we can represent, doesn’t it?

Formalism helps us discriminate better different ways allowing us to meaningfully speak of things according to various sets of “logic” rules.


Right, but then the question is: why do some formalisms work for meaningfully speaking of things better than others? And why is it that breaking our inference rules, committing logical fallacies, computing incorrectly, etc. all cause our models to fail at predicting what we see in the world? If there is no mapping between the formalism and the world, then using inappropriate inferences, bungling our computations-- these shouldn't necessarily be a problem for predicting nature. They are just violations of a game we invented. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Logic rules allow us to infer some conclusions from some premises. Such rules ensure that if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true. And that’s possible because from premises to conclusions we are manipulating our own representations so that, semantically speaking, there is no more truth in the conclusion than there is in the premises, there is no more information in the conclusion than there is in the premises. The mapping to the world can be done by the premises. But logic would work even without any such mapping. E.g. Premise 1: squares are triangles; Premise 2: triangles are circles; Conclusion: squares are circles.

What does one mean by “being sufficiently rational”? To me, appeal to “rationality” is nothing other than an appeal to the set of rules thatmust be satisfied in order to make things intelligible to somebody. And this may certainly include logic rules, too.


If something needs to satisfy certain rules to be intelligible, and we think the world is intelligible (sort of a prerequisite of the scientific project), then doesn't that mean the world must, in at least many key respects, satisfy such rules too? — Count Timothy von Icarus

It’s not the world that satisfies such rules, but our representations of the world. While we can represent and logically process representations of state of affairs that do not map into reality and do not correspond to facts, are there real states of affairs that we can not represent ? But how can we answer such question without possibly representing such state of affairs? What are we picking with the notion “state of affairs“ for whatever goes beyond our means of representation (so including the notion of "state of affairs" itself)?

3. Logic refers to rules that make the world intelligible to us.


I'm most interested in this one. If this is the case, are there rules out in nature that shaped us such that we need said rules to make the world intelligible to us? That is, why would natural selection endow us with such a need if such rules only exist in our minds? This is what I find most puzzling and hard to wrap my mind around; it's hard to know what a satisfactory answer to the puzzle looks like.

I'd like to buy into pancomputationalist physics as much as I used to because that seems to explain things well, but the bloom is off the rose for me. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I guess that these questions are all the more pressing because of your naturalist assumptions which I’m afraid I do not share. My assumptions have been more shaped by a certain reading of Wittgenstein’s views, especially in his later phases, and according to such reading there are reasons to be skeptical about both platonism and naturalism.
Concerning your claims, let me list just the points I’m having problems with: 1. if by “rules out in nature” you are literally referring to the “laws of nature” then I find your usage conceptually confused, because the former concept is conceptually distinct and irreducible to the latter. And rules are not “in our minds” if this means a private phenomenon, something only a given subject can possibly have access to. I won’t elaborate further such claims now 2. If by “laws of nature” you are referring to some theory of natural selection then I’m not sure we have such a theory for logic rules. Notice that logic rules can be used to justify anti-natalism, human killing and suicide depending on the premises so both for human beings’ survival as much as for their extinction. Besides natural selection can be used to explain also failures to follow logic rules, think of our cognitive biases (and more radically, if you remember, even Nietzsche claimed that the notions causality, will, subject, substance are false representations of the world which we have to survive).
Anyways, as far as I’m concerned, a more Humean understanding of “laws of nature” plus some form of “emergentism” may help us make the coexistence of “laws of nature” and “rule following” less untreatable.

Crimea is important also for its underwater resources:
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/world/europe/in-taking-crimea-putin-gains-a-sea-of-fuel-reserves.html
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2014/05/27/the-energy-dimensions-of-russias-annexation-of-crimea/index.html

To me, this is the best starting point: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socratic_questioning

But this brings up the question, "does the absence of a 'one true logic' necessitate deflating logic into formalism? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think you didn't clarify much what you mean by "formalism". As a starter, I take "formalism" to be broadly speaking the symbolic codification of a set of logic rules. If there are one or many sets of logic rules, this is a distinct issue.
"Formalism" to me is required to standardize a given set of rules and remove ambiguities of ordinary language for certain syntactic terms (e.g. we can attributing different meanings to “to be“, “if…,then…”, “not”, “or” or “all” in logic).
Said that, I find the expression "one true logic" nonsensical. One may be willing to count "logic" by counting the number of "set of ‘logic’ rules" we want to distinguish (for example in geometry different set of postulates can different geometries the same can go for logic see e.g. non-classical logic). But there is no way for me to make sense of “true” as applied to “logic” since the notion of “truth” is built in the “logic” rules themselves, in other words the meaning of “truth” is determined by “logic rules” too. One might be tempted to see “logic rules” as a description of how things are, but that’s a categoric confusion to me: “logic rules“ are rules, not description of facts. To me.

Or can we meaningfully speak of things like the logic of cause? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Broadly speaking yes, if you mean by "logic of cause" the set of semantic rules that govern the notion of “cause”. However, more strictly speaking, "logic" refers to rules governing synthatic terms (like propositional operators, quantifiers, modal operators, etc.)

And if we can meaningfully speak of things, what is the relationship between the formalism and the referents? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Formalism helps us discriminate better different ways allowing us to meaningfully speak of things according to various sets of “logic” rules.

When we say: "you're acting illogically? "or "that doesn't follow logically," we often mean something different from: "you are not acting according to a formal system," or "I am not aware of any formal system where the inference you are making works." Rather, we tend to be criticizing someone for failing to think in a way that is sufficiently rational.. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What does one mean by “being sufficiently rational”? To me, appeal to “rationality” is nothing other than an appeal to the set of rules that must be satisfied in order to make things intelligible to somebody. And this may certainly include logic rules, too.

1. Logic is a set of formal systems; it is defined by the formalism.
2(a). Logic is a description of the ways we make good inferences and determine truth, or at least approximate truth pragmatically.
2.(b). Logic is a general description of the features or laws of thought. (This is more general than 2(a).
3. Logic is a principle at work in the world, its overall order. Stoic Logos, although perhaps disenchanted. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Following what I wrote, I disagree with all 3 responses to "what is logic?" partially or totally:
1. Logic is not defined by formalism. Formalism is a way to express a set of logic rules.
2. Logic is not a description of the ways we make good inference or laws of thought, if this is taken to be an empirical enterprise like a scientific theory.
3. Logic refers to rules that make the world intelligible to us.

Some thoughts: maybe the coup in Niger (after the coups in Mali and Burkina Faso), will make France less hesitant against the Russians now. So either hit back in Niger and try to take down the Wagnerites (maybe by drawing more of them from East Europe first), or contribute more in Ukraine? https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/18/russian-mercenaries-are-pushing-france-out-of-central-africa/

Then why propose the scenario of a freeze, so desired by Russia, instead of speeding up the supply of weapons? — Mykhailo Podolyak (Aug 15, 2023)

Here one major problem "Ukraine is burning through ammunition faster than the US and NATO can produce it": https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/17/politics/us-weapons-factories-ukraine-ammunition/index.html

Your inference here makes no sense syllogistically or syntactically; motivations is neither mentioned nor implied. Again, you are imposing your erroneous belief and acting like it is a correct inference.
— Jack Rogozhin

But I wasn’t making an inference of the kind you suggest. — neomac


Yes you were. — Jack Rogozhin

You should write “I thought you were making an inference” or “I still think you were making an inference”. Unfortunately you are wrong as a matter of fact and beyond any reasonable doubt.

The problem however is not necessarily on denying such facts but on questioning if such facts are enough to support the claim that the Revolution of Dignity was a coup as Russia and pro-Russian propaganda claims — neomac


I agree here and this is what we should be discussing — Jack Rogozhin

Too late for that, I think your own notions of “imperialism” and “legitimate threat” may likely be part of your main assumptions in discussing about the alleged coup, so I think you too should be focusing on such notions of yours even before talking about those facts. At this point, if you are not willing to clarify your own notions, then neither am I in discussing your understanding of those facts.

I claimed “Ukrainian ethnic Russians and Russophone are still Ukrainians and must abide by Ukrainians rules”, but that’s it. “No matter what” is your spurious addition. — neomac


Yes you did, and it's reprehensible...and I made no spurious addition and you haven't shown I have. — Jack Rogozhin

Yes I did, and I’ll do it again easy-peasy. You attributed to me “the notion citizens have to abide by their country's rules no matter what” while my original quote was “Ukrainian ethnic Russians and Russophone are still Ukrainians and must abide by Ukrainians rules.” (dot sign included). So there is no final “no matter what” in my original quote, you spuriously added it and then presented it as a factual report of what I said or meant. But you are factually wrong beyond any reasonable doubt. If you think you could infer it from my original quote, then your inference here makes no sense syllogistically or syntactically; “no matter what” is neither mentioned nor implied. If you thought you were making explicit what I left implicit, then you are still factually wrong beyond any reasonable doubt: indeed, what I left implicit at most is “if they do not want to pay the consequences” and not “no matter what“. Finally, and more importantly, I didn’t make a moral claim, but a political and legal one that holds for any state. So yes, you are factually wrong beyond any reasonable doubt no matter how you want to play it.
Oh, and if you don’t like to waste your time, then let me warn you that I don’t care about your emotional blackmailing.

First, if Russia didn’t spill violence and murder into Ukraine by supporting militarily the separatists FIRST, and so be a legitimate threat AGAINST Ukraine, its people and its territory (according to your own notion of “legitimate threat”), things wouldn’t as likely have reached such a scale to be a legitimate threat AGAINST Russia and its borders, assumed that’s the case. — neomac


This is an unfounded lie. What happened first is the US backed coup led to 50 Russian Ukrainians being burned alive in the Trade House and Donbass Russian Ukrainians rejecting the coup being shelled and terrorized by Azov Nazis. The fact you ignore that is also reprehensible. And calling it a "revolution of dignity" when it was a foreign-backed coup where citizens and police were executed by CIA-trained snipers is both erroneous and disgusting — Jack Rogozhin

Focus, I was talking about your notion of “legitimate threat” as it applies in the inter-ethnic conflict between Ukraine and Russia. And even if, for the sake of your argument, one was willing to concede that there was a “coup”, it remains the fact that it was widely welcomed by the dominant ethnic group in Ukraine as much the Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea was widely welcomed by the dominant ethnic group in Crimea (which however is a minority in Ukraine). So much so that Ukrainians are asking support from the US against Russia, not from Russia against the US.


Dude, if it is of any consolation, you must know I take no particular pleasure in damaging your goofy self-promoting beliefs and claims. Actually it’s getting more and more boring. In any case, I’m here to entertain myself, not to tolerate your incontinent lack of self-confidence. I’m not your therapist and I have no pity for you.

Ssu’s implicit claim came after you solicited him and he clarified on what grounds he made his claims. At the first round, your response seemed to me something like: Putin did not commit imperialist acts, therefore Putin didn’t have imperialist motivations. Were this the case, then you too in the end were making an implicit knowledge claim on Putin’s motivations, just you took Putin’s acts as more relevant evidence than Putin’s words to assess imperialist motivations.
But then at a second round you wrote “I'm not addressing the motivations here; I'm addressing the act. Those are not the same things”, so you are addressing just “the act”. And you wrote “when Russia extends greatly beyond the Donbass and begins regularly taking resources from that area and its citizens, then I will consider it imperialism”, so what I understood so far is that you can assess Russian imperialism based on such acts, independently from whatever Putin’s declared motivations were. I take such acts to be broadly “non-speech acts” because such acts are not talking and writing. So yes you were grounding your claims on non-speech acts actually or hypothetically committed by Russia, while ssu was arguing based on what was written and said by Putin, so broadly Putin’s speech-acts, to legitimise what Putin did (invading and annexing Ukrainian territories). — neomac


This is all supposition, and you admit it is. You cannot make a logical claim based on "it seems" and "what I understood" and assert it as fact. That is not just analytically incorrect, it is syllogistcally so. You must provide factual premises to synthesize a factual claim..and you don't do that here. Also, you clearly don't know what "speech act" means. — Jack Rogozhin

The fact I’m stating is nothing other than my understanding of your views. As I repeated many times, I’m not sure to understand your claims, so I’m expressing how I understood what you said so far, and “it seems” and “I understood” are intentional warnings to signal that. You too keep misunderstanding what I (and others) say and render your own misrepresentations as a factual claim as you just did by attributing to me inference I didn’t make. Instead of repeating that I’m misrepresenting you, even though I’m literally quoting your claims, can you try to clarify better what you meant in those quotes?
Since you know, what does “speech act” mean in your own words? I’m eager to share your superior knowledge.

The point here is that your claims are implicit knowledge claims grounded on certain evidences relevant for your understanding of “imperialism” as much as ssu’s implicit knowledge claims are grounded on other evidences relevant for his understanding of “imperialism”. And as long as one just expresses one’s beliefs to illustrate one’s own implicit assumptions to an interlocutor who doesn’t necessarily share them there is nothing really challenging about it, one is simply talking past each other. — neomac


The one who needs to heed this admonishment is you, as you have been doing what you admonish against here this whole discussion, and you do it in the sentence right above. You make another false claim against me without supporting it in any way, which is not philosophical at all. Remember, what is asserted without proof or evidentiary support can be refuted without such — Jack Rogozhin

I still have no idea what you are talking about though. You keep accusing me of misrepresenting you, but adding no clarifications about the claims I allegedly misrepresented in order to rectify my misrepresentations, and keep avoiding to answer my questions directly. So I’ll cut with this pointless exchange over my alleged misrepresentations by asking you more directly: do you distinguish imperialist acts and imperialist motivations as you distinguish acts and motivations? Yes or no? If so, would this distinction imply that non-imperialist acts can have imperialist motivations and that imperialist acts can have no imperialist motivations?

The point is that if I misrepresented them, maybe it’s because I didn’t understand them and need to question your claims to understand them better, after all you do not seem to understand my claims either. — neomac


This is not an excuse for misrepresentation. You should only claim, particularly in a philosophical discussion, your interlocutor is doing or saying something if you actually think they are. If you are not, you should either say "I think you are doing/saying this" or "i think you are doing saying this, could you clarify if you are or are not.” Otherwise you are being unfair to your interlocutor and degrading the discussion — Jack Rogozhin

Well I don’t really see why reiterated expressions of “it seems”, “I understood” and “am I misinterpreting you?” can not do the same job as “I think you are doing/saying this”, but if that will make things more clear to you then I’ll give it a try. Glad that you got rid of your glib “you don't get to tell me how I make my arguments, just as I don't get to tell you how you make yours”.

All right, can you give me your definition of “selfishness” as a general characteristic that is not about motivations and psychologies? Because after a quick check on wikipedia — neomac


Yes: the quality or condition of being selfish...from Merrian-Webster. As I said, it's a characteristic
— Jack Rogozhin

Sure a psychological characteristic concerning people’s motivations. — neomac


Your inference here makes no sense syllogistically or syntactically; motivations is neither mentioned nor implied. Again, you are imposing your erroneous belief and acting like it is a correct inference. — Jack Rogozhin

But I wasn’t making an inference of the kind you suggest. I was simply making explicit what I thought and still think you are leaving implicit, based on ordinary semantics. Indeed, strictly speaking, the Merrian-Webster definition doesn’t mention nor implies that “selfishness” is a characteristic for that matter, the words used are “quality” and “condition”, not “characteristic”. But if you implicitly assume that English speaking people have enough semantic competence to understand that “quality” and “condition” equate to “characteristic” in that context, then I too can implicitly assume that English speaking people can have enough semantic competence to understand if “selfishness” is a psychological characteristic or non-psychological characteristic, if it’s about people’s motivations or it’s not about people’s motivations. Besides relying on the Merrian-Webster definition simply shifts the burden of the semantic clarification from “selfishness” to “being selfish”. So I’ll cut with this pointless exchange over my alleged misrepresentation by asking you more directly: is “selfishness” a psychological characteristic about people’s motivations to you? Yes or no? If yes then, “selfishness”, as a general characteristic of politicians, is still a claim about their psychology and motivations, as I said. If no, enlighten me what kind of characteristic is that?
Notice also that here you are not using “I think you are doing/saying this” (i.e. “I think your inference makes no sense…”) but actually presenting as a fact you misrepresentation of my claim as a “syllogistically or syntactically” inference.

First, yes it is controversial for one reason or the other, again you just recently joined the thread, and I’m not here to keep you up-to-date on what has been discussed in this thread. Just as an example, what you call “the Maidan coup” has sparked some controversy in this thread at least 7 months ago (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/776025), use the search function. Also the alleged Ukrainian war crimes sparked some controversies in this thread. — neomac


It is controversial for those who deny the facts, such as the US sending CIA agents to Ukraine right before the coup, and Gloria Nuland and our ambassador to Ukraine discussing who should replace the deposed democratically-elected leader...as if they have substantial say. The fact Nuland recently visited Niger to sway events there shows she hasn't changed her spots — Jack Rogozhin

Well, then it’s controversial because it wouldn’t make much sense to me to claim that there is a controversy about facts for those who agree on the facts. I think what you are trying to say is that there is an overwhelming large consensus over certain facts (like CIA agents and Gloria Nuland). The problem however is not necessarily on denying such facts but on questioning if such facts are enough to support the claim that the Revolution of Dignity was a coup as Russia and pro-Russian propaganda claims (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolution_of_Dignity). But again, I’m not interested in restarting the debate about these facts as such. And as long as you keep accusing me to misrepresent you at every exchange for whatever reason (including irrelevant editing incidents), instead of clarifying better your views, I don’t feel encouraged to widen the debate over other subjects. My focus is on your claims about “imperialism” and ”legitimate threat”.

Second, I didn’t claim that “the notion citizens have to abide by their country's rules no matter what”. My claim wasn’t about moral assessments of laws and related citizens’ attitude, it was about what Russia can claim as a legitimate threat against Russia — neomac


Ukrainian ethnic Russians and Russophone are still Ukrainians and must abide by Ukrainians rules — neomac


You did claim this and you did not just say that about Russia...you said what you said above, proving me right. — Jack Rogozhin

I claimed “Ukrainian ethnic Russians and Russophone are still Ukrainians and must abide by Ukrainians rules”, but that’s it. “No matter what” is your spurious addition. And, I didn’t mean to make a moral claim either. To me “must” can legitimately express a rule-based injunction that can apply to maths, logic, juridical laws, morality, games, etc. (e.g. if you want to play chess, you must abide by chess rules), so with that statement I meant to make a legal and political claim: sovereign states (like Ukraine, Russia, the US, Switzerland, etc.) impose their rules over their citizens within their territories by using their coercive power, so citizens must abide by them if they do not want to pay the consequences. This holds for democratic and non-democratic regimes, moral and nor moral laws. And since we were talking about legitimate threats AGAINST Russia, my point was: can imposing rules to its own citizens by a sovereign state (Ukraine) be a legitimate threat against other sovereign states (Russia)?
BTW even here nowhere you are saying “I think you are doing/saying this”, but you keep asserting your misrepresentations of my views as a fact, proofs. And yet you admonish me to do otherwise with your views. I almost feel like complaining about this treatment. But my spider-senses tell me that you have a very good excuse or justification that makes you happy, right?

Even if Ukraine is repressing or oppressing a minority of its own citizens, that doesn’t seem to be a threat against Russia (so much so that Russia needed to distribute Russian passports into annexed territories to have a convenient pretext that Ukraine is threatening Russian citizens) — neomac


Actually it is a threat against Russia and their people as it is fomenting violence and murder right at their border, which can spill into their own territory. And it is being done against their own ethnic people who were citizens of their country only thirty years ago. If Mexico had annexed San Diego 30 years ago and started slaughtering the Americans within their new borders, the US certainly--and rightly--would militarily step in

And you must certainly disapprove of all of the US's military border crossings/bombings since WWII. I agree with you there. — Jack Rogozhin

First, if Russia didn’t spill violence and murder into Ukraine by supporting militarily the separatists FIRST, and so be a legitimate threat AGAINST Ukraine, its people and its territory (according to your own notion of “legitimate threat”), things wouldn’t as likely have reached such a scale to be a legitimate threat AGAINST Russia and its borders, assumed that’s the case. Indeed, what does it mean “it can spill into their own territory”? How could such violence and murder spill into the Russian territory and become a threat against Russian people and territory exactly? Let’s not forget that Russia has the largest stockpile of nuclear warheads in the world, that Ukrainian military couldn’t match in the past and still can hardly match the Russian war machine with the current Western support, and a quite effective repressive machine within its own territory against unwanted political movements or social unrest?
Second, I find the claim “And it is being done against their own ethnic people who were citizens of their country only thirty years ago.” quite problematic for several reasons:
1. thirty years ago they were citizens of the Soviet Union not of Russia,
2. if ethnic Russians are Ukrainian citizens they must abide by the Ukrainian rules in Ukraine as much as ethnic Ukrainians who are Russian citizens must abide by the Russian rules in Russia,
3. if ethnic Russians feel persecuted they can still flee Ukraine as much the Jews fled from Nazi Germany, being so close to the Russian border it shouldn’t have been that difficult, and since Russia was so keen on saving the ethnic Russians in Ukraine with all the land they have, they could have helped them with the same efficiency the Soviet Union deported Crimean Tatars from Crimea to relocate inside Russia as they have relocated Ukrainian children.
4. if protecting ethnicity was a reason for invading and annexing, how about all Ukrainian citizens of those annexed areas which weren’t ethnic Russians or just pro-Russia?
5. Russia itself is a multi-ethnic country and repressed the separatist movements in Chechnya supported by many ethnic Chechens, why can’t Ukraine do the same within its territory and its ethnic minorities?
6. There are Russian minorities also in other Russian neighboring countries, like in some Baltic States, if such minorities complain about prosecution and want to separate from the State that is hosting them, Russia should see it as a legitimate threat against Russia, and so again invade and annex those territories too, but if that’s the reasoning all neighboring countries with Russian minorities should see Russia as a legitimate threat against their security with all non-assimilated Russian minorities, right?
Certainly, I do understand that Russia is concerned about ethnic Russians around the world and can exercise diplomatic and coercive pressure to protect them, if they are threatened. But can this predicament be qualified as a legitimate threat AGAINST Russia? Or AGAINST Russia more than or with greater priority than a legitimate threat AGAINST Ukraine? And consequently justify invasion + annexation by Russia of Ukrainian territories?
Concerning your last remark, I “must certainly disapprove of all of the US's military border crossings/bombings since WWII”, if I shared enough of your assumptions. That's not my impression.

If China tortures, imprisons, and persecutes Chinese muslim Uyghurs that doesn’t count as a legitimate threat against muslim states either. Right? BTW Russia too oppresses minorities up until now (like the Crimean Tatars which were occupying Crimea way before the Russians) that doesn’t make it a legitimate threat against other states (other than Ukraine of course, since Crimean Tatars are Ukrainian citizens too within Ukrainian territories), or does it? — neomac


This is a terrible analogy. Firstly, this action against the Uygures is still in dispute; the UN admits they have no evidence of such a persecution. Secondly, the Uyghurs are not ethnically Russian and the posited persecution is neither at the Russian border or involving shellings at that border — Jack Rogozhin

Firstly, “disputed” as the claim that the Revolution of Dignity was a coup. Or that the Ukrainians committed a genocide in Donbas. Can you post a link with the UN admitting “they have no evidence of such a persecution”? Anyway the UN is not the only relevant source about the Uyghurs’ case. BTW the UN also condemned Russian aggression of Ukraine (https://press.un.org/en/2022/ga12407.doc.htm), this is not controversial either, or is it?
Secondly, I’m still trying to understand your notion of “legitimate threat“ (“a legitimate threat to the security of a nation and its borders, and the safety of its people, is a legimtiate threat”, and I’ll ignore that it would be a very bad definition, being evidently tautological), I think you are conceiving it as a geopolitical general principle not as a principle that just happens to be so narrow that it can practically apply only to the Russian state, people and borders. Indeed, there have been and are lots of proxy conflicts and inter-states and intra-states threats in the world (think of the conflicts in the Middle East between major powers like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, or the case of Islamic terrorism) which are grounded more and religion then ethnicity. So the analogy with Uyghurs case was a way to test how your notion of “legitimate threat“ works in other scenarios.
Anyways, since you now insist on ethnicity and borders, I'll reformulate the hypothetical case of the Uyghurs: the Uyghurs are Muslim, ethnically Turkic, living in the Xinjiang and confining with another Muslim and ethnically Turkic state, namely Kazakhstan, so if China is oppressing Uyghurs, would this be a legitimate threat against Kazakhstan (let’s forget that the Kazakh government wants to preserve good relations with China, it’s just a hypothesis), to the point that they would be justified to invade and annex Xinjiang, if they only could?
And if you still don’t like the Uyghurs analogy, how about the inter-ethnic conflicts on the border between Azerbaijan and Iran, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, Armenia and Azerbaijan? Which state’s acts are “a legitimate threat” against which state? Which state would your notion of “legitimate threat” justify territorial invasion and annexation from which state? In other words, let’s see if you can find a real case good enough analogy to illustrate how your notion of “legitimate threat” applies on other non-Russian related scenarios. Because if you can’t , well that’s a problem to me.
Besides, your second comment makes me wonder how narrow is your notion of “legitimate threat”: e.g. by “nation” and “its people” you mean “citizens” or “dominant ethnic group”? A threat against the safety of the people of a given state can be qualified as a “legitimate threat“ against the State no matter if such people are living within their State or somewhere else? For example, Ukrainians ethnically Jewish are suffering as well the horrible consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and fighting for that too (https://www.timesofisrael.com/ukrainian-jews-recount-stories-of-survival-endurance-escape-after-1-year-of-war/, https://genevasolutions.news/ukraine-stories/in-ukraine-jews-embrace-their-double-identity, https://www.npr.org/2022/10/01/1126217137/jewish-ukrainian-father-son-soldiers-russia-war), Zelensky himself is a Ukrainian Jewish president, so is Russia a legitimate threat against Israel given that Russia is murdering and willing to murder ethnic Jews in Ukraine?

I wouldn't presume to know his actual motivations. I don't know him and I'm not a psychologist.
— Jack Rogozhin
You don't have to be. A good start is to read what Putin has said and written. There's bound to be some links to his actual motivations on what he has written or what speeches he has given. — ssu

First, your name in the quotation came from the quotation function not from me — neomac


As you can see, that quote couldn't have come from the quote function as it was SSU's quote responding to me. To willfully misrepresent that is either a mistake or dishonest; i'll assume it was the former — Jack Rogozhin

Then I don’t know what else went wrong in my quotation and I don’t mind to correct it. If you wish so, just tell me. This incident is however irrelevant to the point I was making and I also acknowledged that the word “accusation” was bad wording, so I’m not going to waste more time on such mishaps.

I didn’t formulate my question appropriately. I was wrong in using the word “accusation” there. Mea culpa. What however I noticed is that ssu didn’t make any explicit knowledge claim first, it was you to introduce it while commenting his claims, to question ssu implicit knowledge claim. I didn’t find it fair because “if you can ground your claims about Russian imperialism on non-speech acts — neomac


SSU did make a knowledge claim about how I could know things. I, on the other hand didn't "ground my claims on Russian imperialism on non-speech acts" and you didn't show I did. Also you are mixing up two discussions here, try to stick the one that was at hand — Jack Rogozhin

Ssu’s implicit claim came after you solicited him and he clarified on what grounds he made his claims. At the first round, your response seemed to me something like: Putin did not commit imperialist acts, therefore Putin didn’t have imperialist motivations. Were this the case, then you too in the end were making an implicit knowledge claim on Putin’s motivations, just you took Putin’s acts as more relevant evidence than Putin’s words to assess imperialist motivations.
But then at a second round you wrote “I'm not addressing the motivations here; I'm addressing the act. Those are not the same things”, so you are addressing just “the act”. And you wrote “when Russia extends greatly beyond the Donbass and begins regularly taking resources from that area and its citizens, then I will consider it imperialism”, so what I understood so far is that you can assess Russian imperialism based on such acts, independently from whatever Putin’s declared motivations were. I take such acts to be broadly “non-speech acts” because such acts are not talking and writing. So yes you were grounding your claims on non-speech acts actually or hypothetically committed by Russia, while ssu was arguing based on what was written and said by Putin, so broadly Putin’s speech-acts, to legitimise what Putin did (invading and annexing Ukrainian territories).
The point here is that your claims are implicit knowledge claims grounded on certain evidences relevant for your understanding of “imperialism” as much as ssu’s implicit knowledge claims are grounded on other evidences relevant for his understanding of “imperialism”. And as long as one just expresses one’s beliefs to illustrate one’s own implicit assumptions to an interlocutor who doesn’t necessarily share them there is nothing really challenging about it, one is simply talking past each other.

Forth, to be clear, if I don’t understand your reasoning or your assumptions, and I feel like questioning them, then I’ll question them. I've been doing this for several hundred pages before you joined the thread and nothing could change it. That’s a philosophy forum after all. — neomac


I never said you can't question my reasonings...I made no assumptions. I said you can't misrepresent my reasoning and arguments as you are doing now. This is a philosophy forum after all — Jack Rogozhin

The point is that if I misrepresented them, maybe it’s because I didn’t understand them and need to question your claims to understand them better, after all you do not seem to understand my claims either. And since we are at the beginning of our exchange, you joined just recently this thread, and we don’t know each other from other threads unintentional misunderstandings are likely to happen on such controversial political topics.

Unless your glibly usage of the verb “to show” shows otherwise. — neomac


My usage of the verb "to show" wasn't glib; it was accurate — Jack Rogozhin

Whatever makes you happy.

I didn’t say that one has “to distinguish imperialism motivations from non-materialist motivations when one does so with imperialist and non-materialist acts”. — neomac


You did say that.

I took as premises your distinctions between motivations and acts, between imperialist acts and non-imperialist acts, and between imperialist motivations and non-imperialist motivations, and then concluded that also imperialist motivations and imperialist acts are distinct. If set M (set of motivations) is distinct from set A (set of actions), M is constituted by subsets M1 and M2 (e.g. imperialist and non-imperialist motivations), and A is constituted by subsets A1 and A2 (e.g. imperialist and non-imperialist acts), then M is distinct from A subsets as much as A is distinct from M subsets as much as M subsets are distinct from A subsets. This conditional must be logically true if we understand the notion of “distinction” in the same way. If not, I literally do not understand what you are claiming. — neomac


So what is your point here? I literally do not understand what you are claiming — Jack Rogozhin

Again, I was asking questions for you to clarify your views, not making a point yet. The question was: “by distinguishing imperialist acts and imperialist motivations, are you suggesting that non-imperialist acts can have imperialist motivations and that imperialist acts can have no imperialist motivations?”. You had problems to understand the question, so I clarified in that piece you quoted, that my understanding is that since you distinguish motivations and acts then you also distinguish imperialist motivations and imperialist acts, because this is what your claims would allow me to logically infer. So I hope that after my clarifications you can answer the question.

Your final balance sheet of what you succeeded in showing and I failed at every round doesn't impress me and, worse, it shows nothing more than your lack of self-confidence to me. — neomac


This is just ad hominem and projection. It shows nothing more than your lack of self-confidence to me. And what do you mean by "final balance sheet"? It's a bizarre phrase for a philosophical discussion — Jack Rogozhin

Again, whatever makes you happy.

All right, can you give me your definition of “selfishness” as a general characteristic that is not about motivations and psychologies? Because after a quick check on wikipedia — neomac


Yes: the quality or condition of being selfish...from Merrian-Webster. As I said, it's a characteristic — Jack Rogozhin

Sure a psychological characteristic concerning people’s motivations. Not, say, a chemical characteristic concerning unicorns’ rainbow farts, or am I misinterpreting you?

You see, there is a lot more to unpack in your “evaluating acts on their own to a great degree”. Each example of “immediate and primary causes” you listed is controversial and can be used to argue the opposite, namely that the alleged coups and their consequences were “immediate and primary causes” for Ukraine to look for Western support against a foreign power messing up within its territory, and discounting the fact that Ukrainian ethnic Russians and Russophone are still Ukrainians and must abide by Ukrainians rules. — neomac


No, nothing I said was controversial. You keep making claims without backing them up, and that is not appropriate for a philosophical conversation. Also, the notion citizens have to abide by their country's rules no matter what is both wrong and anti-Humanist. According to you, American slaves and Native Americans needed to bow to its country's rules of slavery and oppression, and Japanese Americans would have been wrong to defy the US' internment of them...and all rebels, including the American Revolutionaries were inherently wrong. This is pure authoritarianism. Poroshenko literally said Russian Ukrainians of the Donbas would be cut off from state benefits and their own language and you want them to sit like good dogs and take it...because rules? — Jack Rogozhin

First, yes it is controversial for one reason or the other, again you just recently joined the thread, and I’m not here to keep you up-to-date on what has been discussed in this thread. Just as an example, what you call “the Maidan coup” has sparked some controversy in this thread at least 7 months ago (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/776025), use the search function. Also the alleged Ukrainian war crimes sparked some controversies in this thread.
Second, I didn’t claim that “the notion citizens have to abide by their country's rules no matter what”. My claim wasn’t about moral assessments of laws and related citizens’ attitude, it was about what Russia can claim as a legitimate threat against Russia. Even if Ukraine is repressing or oppressing a minority of its own citizens, that doesn’t seem to be a threat against Russia (so much so that Russia needed to distribute Russian passports into annexed territories to have a convenient pretext that Ukraine is threatening Russian citizens). If China tortures, imprisons, and persecutes Chinese muslim Uyghurs that doesn’t count as a legitimate threat against muslim states either. Right? BTW Russia too oppresses minorities up until now (like the Crimean Tatars which were occupying Crimea way before the Russians) that doesn’t make it a legitimate threat against other states (other than Ukraine of course, since Crimean Tatars are Ukrainian citizens too within Ukrainian territories), or does it?

"I wouldn't presume to know his actual motivations. I don't know him and I'm not a psychologist.
— Jack Rogozhin
You don't have to be. A good start is to read what Putin has said and written. There's bound to be some links to his actual motivations on what he has written or what speeches he has given."
— Jack Rogozhin

The reason why I talked about “accusation” is that in the passage you just quoted ssu is arguing about a link between Putin’s motivations and what he said. So if you can ground your claims about Russian imperialism on non-speech acts (like invading and annexing Donbas and Crimea) others can ground their claims about Russian imperialism on speech acts (like denying Ukrainian identity as distinct from the Russian, talking about denazifying Ukraine) made to legitimate certain non-speech acts. — neomac


That second quote isnt mine (it's SSU's). So, I still made no accusation and you haven't shown I have. I also made no speech acts and you haven't shown I have. Also, you don't get to tell me how I make my arguments, just as I don't get to tell you how you make yours. Let's actually discuss the issue — Jack Rogozhin

First, your name in the quotation came from the quotation function not from me.
Second, you are right. I didn’t formulate my question appropriately. I was wrong in using the word “accusation” there. Mea culpa. What however I noticed is that ssu didn’t make any explicit knowledge claim first, it was you to introduce it while commenting his claims, to question ssu implicit knowledge claim. I didn’t find it fair because “if you can ground your claims about Russian imperialism on non-speech acts (like invading and annexing Donbas and Crimea) others can ground their claims about Russian imperialism on speech acts (like denying Ukrainian identity as distinct from the Russian, talking about denazifying Ukraine) made to legitimate certain non-speech acts.”
Third, when I talked about “speech acts” I was referring to the acts committed by Russia, not you. You based your arguments on Russian invasion and annexation, ssu based his arguments based on what Putin said and wrote to legitimate Russian invasion and annexation.
Forth, to be clear, if I don’t understand your reasoning or your assumptions, and I feel like questioning them, then I’ll question them. I've been doing this for several hundred pages before you joined the thread and nothing could change it. That’s a philosophy forum after all.

Where did I distinguish between imperialist acts and imperialist motivations? Where did I say the invasion was an imperialist act, and how do you draw that suggestion from the first premise? You're making a lot of unfounded assumptions here
— Jack Rogozhin

Dude, chill down, I’m still exploring your assumptions with some questions. You distinguish acts from motivations (“I'm not addressing the motivations here; I'm addressing the act. Those are not the same things”). And then you distinguish imperialist acts from non-imperialist acts (“when Russia extends greatly beyond the Donbass and begins regularly taking resources from that area and its citizens, then I will consider it imperialism”). Therefore you must distinguish imperialist motivations (if also some motivations can be qualified as imperialist) from imperialist actions too, that’s logic.
I didn’t say nor implied that you said “the invasion was an imperialist act”. I’m aware you are trying to argue against it. — neomac


I am and was chill, and my quote you posted shows that. So, you need to chill a bit yourself. I made no assumptions. As I showed, you have and did. And no, one does not have to distinguish imperialism motivations from non-materialist motivations when one does so with imperialist and non-materialist acts, and I already showed that. Your saying otherwise is just an assumption, not logic. Show otherwise if you can — Jack Rogozhin

Unless your glibly usage of the verb “to show” shows otherwise.
I didn’t say that one has “to distinguish imperialism motivations from non-materialist motivations when one does so with imperialist and non-materialist acts”. I took as premises your distinctions between motivations and acts, between imperialist acts and non-imperialist acts, and between imperialist motivations and non-imperialist motivations, and then concluded that also imperialist motivations and imperialist acts are distinct. If set M (set of motivations) is distinct from set A (set of actions), M is constituted by subsets M1 and M2 (e.g. imperialist and non-imperialist motivations), and A is constituted by subsets A1 and A2 (e.g. imperialist and non-imperialist acts), then M is distinct from A subsets as much as A is distinct from M subsets as much as M subsets are distinct from A subsets. This conditional must be logically true if we understand the notion of “distinction” in the same way. If not, I literally do not understand what you are claiming.
So either those premises are wrong or we do not share the same notion of “distinction”. That’s all there is to clarify to me at this point.
Again, I’m simply asking questions to understand your assumptions (for example on what you take to be imperialist or a legitimate threat). And for that reason I do not want my non-shared implicit assumptions nor misreadings nor my slips of the tongue get in the way of your attempts to clarify yourself. What I can’t avoid however is to question your views on things I find unclear or unconvincing about your claims. Your final balance sheet of what you succeeded in showing and I failed at every round doesn't impress me and, worse, it shows nothing more than your lack of self-confidence to me.

OK when you are talking about selfish leaders (selfishness here is about leaders' psychology and motivations, right?) you do not mean to address particular motivations or psychologies but general ones. — neomac


No, selfishness is a characteristic, not a motivation. If a hot-headed person yells at someone because they are hot-headed, that doesn't mean they are motivated by hot-headedness. Again, you are drawing unfounded conclusions.
— Jack Rogozhin

I didn’t mean that selfishness is a motivation, but that when you talk about leaders’ selfishness you are talking about psychology and motivations of such leaders. Indeed, it’s hard for me to even understand what you mean by “selfishness” without referring to people’s motivations. — neomac


I showed why this you're wrong here in the quote you quoted of mine above. I'm sorry your understanding of "selfishness" is limited as such — Jack Rogozhin

All right, can you give me your definition of “selfishness” as a general characteristic that is not about motivations and psychologies? Because after a quick check on wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychological_egoism) I find statements like this: Psychological egoism is the view that humans are always motivated by self-interest and selfishness, even in what seem to be acts of altruism. It claims that, when people choose to help others, they do so ultimately because of the personal benefits that they themselves expect to obtain, directly or indirectly, from so doing. And this is also what I mean when I claim that “selfishness” even as a general characteristic is still about psychology and motivations.

If ordinary peoples’ judgments of politicians are just a reflection of their own bias, then every ordinary person’s judgement of Putin would just be their bias, not an objective judgment. I'm surprised you believe that
— Jack Rogozhin

First, my claim was generic about ordinary people’s bias, I didn’t say every ordinary person is biased about politicians’ selfishness. Generic generalisations should not be conflated with universal generalisations. The bias I’m referring to can be read in different ways: e.g. avg politicians may be prone to selfish reasoning no more than avg ordinary people, “selfish” reasoning may not always be a bad thing as much as ordinary people would assume.
Second, concerning Putin, he may hold some nationalist motivations (and I don’t take nationalism to be a form a selfishness) besides worrying about his own political or material survival (which would be a more selfish motivation). — neomac


Generic and universal work the same here; universal is just more extreme. You made a claim about how ordinary people are biased towards politicians, and I correctly showed how that would apply to their (including your) view of Putin as well — Jack Rogozhin

First, if you intend to question my assumptions appropriately, fine but you have to understand them as close as possible to how I understand them. I didn’t make a particularly strong claim, I just made a cautious conjecture. Concerning the distinction of generic generalisations and universal generalisations, they are not the same as far as my claims are concerned, I clarified what I meant, plus there is a whole entry in SEP (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/), if you are unfamiliar with it.
Second, I also answered positively about Putin to the extent that ordinary people’s may be biased about Putin’s selfishness too. I don’t find it implausible that Putin could be motivated to some extent by genuine nationalist reasons as his rhetoric of the great patriotic war, the Russian minority genocide in Ukraine and Russian Crimea suggests, and I don’t take Putin’s nationalist motives to be selfish motives as such. That is perfectly compatible with Putin also having more selfish motives like his political survival.

I asked you the same question by mistake. Indeed my second question should have been “was Russia a legitimate threat to Ukraine before after the invasion of Crimea?”. I’m not making “the presumption Russia just invaded Crimea out of the blue without taking into account the factors preceding and causing that” (assumed it makes sense). On the contrary I’m reasoning from your own assumptions. You yourself claimed “histories are important, but we still have to evaluate acts on their own to a great degree” (like all the declarations against Ukraine joining NATO) and “a legitimate threat to the security of a nation and its borders, and the safety of its people, is a legimtiate threat”. So If NATO could be perceived as a legitimate threat by Russia, why couldn’t Russia be perceived as a legitimate threat by Ukraine prior the invasion of Crimea and/or after? — neomac


Yes, and evaluating acts on their own to a great degree includes immediate and primary causes, with less (but not no) attention given to older history. That would include the Maidan coup, the burning alive of the Crimean anti-coup protesters in the trade house building, Kiev's shelling of the Donbass Ukrainians, and Kiev's admitted (Merkle admits this too) breaking of the Minsk Accords

I answered your final question in my last post. You're repeating your questions again — Jack Rogozhin

You see, there is a lot more to unpack in your “evaluating acts on their own to a great degree”. Each example of “immediate and primary causes” you listed is controversial and can be used to argue the opposite, namely that the alleged coups and their consequences were “immediate and primary causes” for Ukraine to look for Western support against a foreign power messing up within its territory, and discounting the fact that Ukrainian ethnic Russians and Russophone are still Ukrainians and must abide by Ukrainians rules. But I’m not interested to investigate them further at this point. What I would say though is that none of them SHOWS “a legitimate threat to the security of a nation and its borders, and the safety of its people, is a legimtiate threat” AGAINST Russia to me, does it to you? The torture, imprisonment, and persecution of (more than a million?) muslim Uyghurs by China doesn’t count as a legitimate threat to muslim states from China, or does it to you?

I didn't accuse others. He said he knew Putin's motivations beforehand
— Jack Rogozhin

Where did he say it? Can you quote him saying this verbatim? — neomac

Here you go:

"I wouldn't presume to know his actual motivations. I don't know him and I'm not a psychologist.
— Jack Rogozhin
You don't have to be. A good start is to read what Putin has said and written. There's bound to be some links to his actual motivations on what he has written or what speeches he has given." — Jack Rogozhin

The reason why I talked about “accusation” is that in the passage you just quoted ssu is arguing about a link between Putin’s motivations and what he said. So if you can ground your claims about Russian imperialism on non-speech acts (like invading and annexing Donbas and Crimea) others can ground their claims about Russian imperialism on speech acts (like denying Ukrainian identity as distinct from the Russian, talking about denazifying Ukraine) made to legitimate certain non-speech acts.

By distinguishing imperialist acts and imperialist motivations, are you suggesting that non-imperialist acts can have imperialist motivations and that imperialist acts have no imperialist motivations? If so, do you have historical examples to illustrate your point? — neomac


Where did I distinguish between imperialist acts and imperialist motivations? Where did I say the invasion was an imperialist act, and how do you draw that suggestion from the first premise? You're making a lot of unfounded assumptions here — Jack Rogozhin

Dude, chill down, I’m still exploring your assumptions with some questions. You distinguish acts from motivations (“I'm not addressing the motivations here; I'm addressing the act. Those are not the same things”). And then you distinguish imperialist acts from non-imperialist acts (“when Russia extends greatly beyond the Donbass and begins regularly taking resources from that area and its citizens, then I will consider it imperialism”). And you also seem to acknowledge that imperialist motivations can exist in political leaders, but you don't know if Putin's motivations are imperialist, that's why you focus on acts. Therefore you must distinguish imperialist motivations from imperialist actions too, that’s logic.
I didn’t say nor implied that you said “the invasion was an imperialist act”. I’m aware you are trying to argue against it.

OK when you are talking about selfish leaders (selfishness here is about leaders' psychology and motivations, right?) you do not mean to address particular motivations or psychologies but general ones. — neomac


No, selfishness is a characteristic, not a motivation. If a hot-headed person yells at someone because they are hot-headed, that doesn't mean they are motivated by hot-headedness. Again, you are drawing unfounded conclusions. — Jack Rogozhin

I didn’t mean that selfishness is a motivation, but that when you talk about leaders’ selfishness you are talking about psychology and motivations of such leaders. Indeed, it’s hard for me to even understand what you mean by “selfishness” without referring to people’s motivations.

Talking generally about motivations and psychologies , I suspect that the difference between politicians and ordinary people in terms of "selfishness" may be biased in favor ordinary people when the judgement comes from ordinary people. — neomac


If ordinary peoples’ judgments of politicians are just a reflection of their own bias, then every ordinary person’s judgement of Putin would just be their bias, not an objective judgment. I'm surprised you believe that — Jack Rogozhin

First, my claim was generic about ordinary people’s bias, I didn’t say every ordinary person is biased about politicians’ selfishness. Generic generalisations should not be conflated with universal generalisations. The bias I’m referring to can be read in different ways: e.g. avg politicians may be prone to selfish reasoning no more than avg ordinary people, “selfish” reasoning may not always be as bad as ordinary people would often assume.
Second, concerning Putin, he may hold some nationalist motivations (and I don’t take nationalism to be a form a selfishness) besides worrying about his own political or material survival (which would be a more selfish motivation).

Was Russia a legitimate threat to Ukraine before the invasion of Crimea? If so when did it start to become a legitimate threat to Ukraine? If not, was Russia a legitimate threat to Ukraine before the invasion of Crimea? — neomac


You ask the same question twice here and you make the presumption Russia just invaded Crimea out of the blue without taking into account the factors preceding and causing that, so the question is a loaded one. Also, if by threat, you mean actually threatening Ukraine,I would say no — Jack Rogozhin

I asked you the same question by mistake. Indeed my second question should have been “was Russia a legitimate threat to Ukraine before after the invasion of Crimea?”. I’m not making “the presumption Russia just invaded Crimea out of the blue without taking into account the factors preceding and causing that” (assumed it makes sense). On the contrary I’m reasoning from your own assumptions. You yourself claimed “histories are important, but we still have to evaluate acts on their own to a great degree” (like all the declarations against Ukraine joining NATO) and “a legitimate threat to the security of a nation and its borders, and the safety of its people, is a legimtiate threat”. So If NATO could be perceived as a legitimate threat by Russia, why couldn’t Russia be perceived as a legitimate threat by Ukraine prior to the invasion of Crimea and/or after?

I didn't accuse others. He said he knew Putin's motivations beforehand — Jack Rogozhin

Where did he say it? Can you quote him saying this verbatim?

Because I'm not addressing the motivations here; I'm addressing the act. Those are not the same things — Jack Rogozhin

By distinguishing imperialist acts and imperialist motivations, are you suggesting that non-imperialist acts can have imperialist motivations and that imperialist acts have no imperialist motivations? If so, do you have historical examples to illustrate your point?
BTW psychologists typically talk about motivations based on people's behavior (words and acts), right?

I'm not addressing motivations or psychologies here. I'm addressing general characteristics...and most leaders' today, particualry the ones Ilisted, are greatly driven by self interest....as many firemen/women are greatly driven by wanting to help people. You think otherwise? — Jack Rogozhin

OK when you are talking about selfish leaders (selfishness here is about leaders' psychology and motivations, right?) you do not mean to address particular motivations or psychologies but general ones. Talking generally about motivations and psychologies , I suspect that the difference between politicians and ordinary people in terms of "selfishness" may be biased in favor ordinary people when the judgement comes from ordinary people.

A legitimate threat to the security of a nation and its borders, and the safety of its people, is a legimtiate threat. — Jack Rogozhin

Was Russia a legitimate threat to Ukraine before the invasion of Crimea? If so when did it start to become a legitimate threat to Ukraine? If not, was Russia a legitimate threat to Ukraine before the invasion of Crimea?

on the Russian foreign currency stash: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-01/russia-s-rupee-trap-is-adding-to-147-billion-hoard-stuck-abroad#xj4y7vzkg

If you accuse others

you think you know Putin's motivations — Jack Rogozhin

and then claim

I wouldn't presume to know his actual motivations. I don't know him and I'm not a psychologist. — Jack Rogozhin

why are you so confidently expressing the following?

This isn't an issue of imperialism at this point. It is a security and territorial dispute. You can argue its a wrong one on Russia's part, but this isn't--at least not yet--an act of imperialism. — Jack Rogozhin

I would say every leader's--including Biden's, Zelensky's, Macron's, and Xi's--are primarily selfish and self-centered. I do, however, think sometimes a leader's self-interest can alighn with his country's. I don't think Putin was primarily acting out of his country's interests, but Ukraine and NATO created a legitmate threat against his country and himself when Ukraine refused to remain neutral and NATO refused to not put missiles in Ukraine. — Jack Rogozhin

OK let's not talk about Putin's, Biden's, Zelensky's, Macron's, and Xi's motivations, or simply assume they are selfish and self-centered. Let's talk about "legitimate threat against the country and himself", what makes a threat perception (NOT based on leaders' actual motivations because we do not know that other than assuming they are selfish) but on potential and precedent (like placing NATO missiles on the border between Ukraine and Russia that could kill Russian people and trigger a regime change in Russia) "legitimate"? And what would need to happen for you to believe that is an act of imperialism yet?

OK. Have they and the claims against them be resolved? Judging by the discourse around the topic, and the changing support for US funding of the war. I imagine they haven't. — Jack Rogozhin

It depends on what you take to be a resolution of such claims. For sure there is enough disagreement.

What is the rule here? Are positions only allowed to be said once? — Jack Rogozhin

The rule here is that positions ought to be repeated many more times than God can count.

Newcomer here, so tell me if I'm repeating. — Jack Rogozhin

Yes, you are repeating claims that have been repeated already many many times in this thread.

If we cannot discuss moral claims, then what is left to us - we just fight it out? — Isaac

Precisely. Moral conflicts can as well lead to war.

If another country comes and steals it using military force, they are not entitled to use the same lethal force to retrieve it just because it's rightfully theirs. — Isaac

Yes they are. That's the whole point of "sovereignty". The state has the legitimate monopoly of force within a territory. And that's a moral point too.

Russia meddling in Africa for Macron's joy:
https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/regional-global-powers-decry-nigers-coup-countrys-future-101846403

"Just give them your handbag, it's not worth your life" well it depends on what is in the handbag.
Besides, as Holy Guru Mearsheimer spoke, in the international arena anarchy reigns: “It simply means that there is no centralized authority, no night watchman or ultimate arbiter, that stands above states and protects them.” So states have to protect themselves against bullies.

I doubt that negotiations will lead to conflict resolution IF Russian annexations won't be acknowledged by Ukraine and the West. And I find this acknowledgment politically suicidal for Ukraine and the world order promoted by the West.

What do you think you've provided evidence for? That Russia might not overthrow tyranny in eight years? Sure. But that's not the claim, the claim was that it will not. Or your later claim that it is more likely to not. Nothing you've provided has any probability assigned to it. It all simply might be the case. — Isaac


If past facts are irrelevant for probabilities, then anything really might come up. Why should we avoid war then? Past wars cannot inform us if there will be victims, simply that it might be the case. That is your reasoning, right?

Facts underdetermine theories. If you're having trouble with the notion, I'm sure I can dig out a Wikipedia article for your edification. — Isaac


But you do not have facts. If all the evidence I have provided is just 'some other people think otherwise', as you say, then your evidence is also just 'some other people think otherwise', which, as you say, cannot support or counter any claim. So neither theory has sufficient support, we have no reason to believe any of them is true. — Jabberwock

You must have realized by now how full of sophistry, incoherence and self-defeating conclusions his arguments are. Many of the points you have raised are similar to the ones me and others have raised against his arguments. The problem is however deeper because it is rooted into the meaning of words and in concepts (like argument, bias, likelihood), he thinks he scores points by messing with words and concepts until he simply becomes unintelligible. That's why I have no pity for him.

The usual intellectually miserable tactic of framing opponents’ views. Apparently, on matter of facts we can’t prove anything, if we happen to believe anything is because of Western propaganda, what they believe is clearly not propaganda though (even if, on the other side, all narratives are claimed to be all plausible interpretations), on matter of moral we are either coward or cynical (is that yet another interpretation? or The Facts™?). — neomac


What does your comment have to do with my comment?

Are you disputing the fact that other Western countries, and also all the other countries, have not sent their soldiers into Ukraine?

Or are you arguing sending arms to Ukraine is brave? That's what a "brave" country would do, send arms instead of their own soldiers.

Feel free to have at it: You / the Western legacy media / NATO says Ukrainian sovereignty is a moral imperative to uphold ... just not without sending themselves or their own soldiers. If Ukrainian sovereignty is so important, why is it not worth risking our own soldiers lives to see it preserved? — boethius

The usual intellectually miserable tactic of framing opponents’ views. — neomac

Ok, well, un-frame it for me.

In what moral theory is there a cause not worth risking much of anything yourself but is like "totally so important"? Worth sending arms ... but not too many arms!!! — boethius

As far as I’m concerned, you (and others) keep arguing based on background assumptions (on morality, propaganda, geopolitics, etc.) that I do not share at all, and keep challenging me based on your background assumptions, even after I explicitly questioned them. One of MY assumptions is that in an anarchic environment constituted by many nation states, there are 2 constitutive shared rules: pursue national interest, do not aggress acknowledged sovereign states first. The first is a domestic politics engagement between governments and its citizens. The second is a foreign politics engagement between states. There is absolutely nothing intrinsically immoral, coward or cynical in the Western decision to send weapons and not soldiers in Ukraine IF this serves Western national interests, and even if this is NOT in Ukraine’s best national interest, because Ukrainian sovereignty is a moral imperative AT BEST of the Ukrainian government. So no, I do not believe at all that Ukraine is "totally so important” or “Ukrainian sovereignty is a moral imperative to uphold” as if this is Western top priority, Ukraine is instrumental to the Western national interest (the European security, as Zelensky puts it) as much as the West is instrumental to the Ukrainian national interest (Zelensky’s moral imperative is Ukraine’s national interest, not European national interests). But the Western support doesn’t need to end up being some sort of cynical exploitation (as the “Ukrainians as cannon fodder” accusation suggests), even in case of significant power or costs imbalance, because again harnessing foreign consensus, allies and partners can also be part of power struggle strategies.

Now, seen as everyone agrees Ukraine is not worth spilling their own countries blood to defend (at least anyone who actually affects policy), the key question is whether the policy of sending arms instead is a morally justifiable in lieux of our cowardice or then a smart geopolitical move to cynically use Ukrainians to harm Russia, and if the whole of Ukraine needs to be sacrificed to do so that's just "gainz" on the geopolitical chess board. — boethius

The usual intellectually miserable tactic of framing opponents’ views. Apparently, on matter of facts we can’t prove anything, if we happen to believe anything is because of Western propaganda, what they believe is clearly not propaganda though (even if, on the other side, all narratives are claimed to be all plausible interpretations), on matter of moral we are either coward or cynical (is that yet another interpretation? or The Facts™?).

you have argued for an alternative between 'peaceful protests and military invasion', but that alternative is false and ahistorical — Jabberwock

That alternative sounds foolish after so candidly claiming:

Of course it is. Sachs's question isn't 'what caused the revolution in Ukraine', it's 'what caused Russia to invade Ukraine'. His answer to that is the threat of foreign interference in Ukraine, his evidence is the foreign interference in the revolution. To demonstrate that point he need only show that there was indeed foreign interference in the revolution. He does not have to show what proportion of the revolution's cause it was because his argument isn't that "Russia were provoked by over 56.98% foreign interference". It is that Russia were provoked by foreign interference. Any value above zero demonstrates that possibility. — Isaac

ANY government (ESPECIALLY AS AUTHORITARIAN AS RUSSIA !) can VERY EASILY claim foreign interference for any fucking peaceful protest (see the protests in Iran for more than 20 years).

Depends on the framing. As I said above...

Easy. The 'desired effects' are freedom for Ukrainians with fewer than a hundred thousand dead. Your proposal has zero chance of achieving that, so mine only has to have greater than zero. Are you arguing that mine also has zero, that Russia cannot shake off tyranny? — Isaac


...if you want to put it in terms of likelihood. — Isaac

Dude, focus. The point is not if I want to put it in terms of likelihood. But that you wanted to put it as well (framing or not framing). So if you talk about "more likely" events, others can do the same and challenge you accordingly. Framing interlocutors' views as a matter of possibility or impossibility constitutes a strawman argument. Repeatedly soliciting interlocutors to frame their arguments as a matter of taking position for or against possibilities is intellectually cringe.

Sure, if your sole concern is the ability of Ukrainians to vote in an unimpeded election then maybe there'd be an argument about probability, but why the hell would anyone sane have that as their only goal. — Isaac

If your sole concern is "freedom for Ukrainians with fewer than a hundred thousand dead", then maybe there'd be an argument about probability, but why the hell would anyone sane have that as their only goal?!

We're comparing two options here, It's no good just dismissing one because it's unlikely. What matters is whether it's more likely than the other. — Isaac

For both sides the burden of proof is exactly the same – to show that the expected results of the proposed course of action are more likely than not. Without that it does not matter at all whether the solution would be preferred by both sides, because if it is not likely to happen, it makes no difference. — Jabberwock

It's not about possibility and necessity. It's about "more likely".