You were criticising his method of argument and suggesting he's a dishonest interlocutor, which is ad hom, because you were attacking him personally rather than his argument.

(As per the basic definition:

Ad hominem means “against the man,” and this type of fallacy is sometimes called name calling or the personal attack fallacy. This type of fallacy occurs when someone attacks the person instead of attacking his or her argument.)

https://www.google.com/search?q=ad+hominem&oq=ad+hominem&aqs=chrome..69i57.2566j0j1&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 — Baden

An attack can be called "ad hominem" and yet not be fallacious in the specific sense of: "A makes a claim x, B asserts that A holds a property that is unwelcome, and hence B concludes that argument x is wrong" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ad_hominem). As far as I've understood from the recent exchange between the two, @Christoffer didn't conclude nor suggest that @Benkei's understanding about Zelensky's claims was wrong out of Benkei's dishonest way of arguing. He simply argued that Benkei's understanding of Zelensky's claims wasn't obvious (It could be actions to put much harsher pressure on Russia, it could mean actions to rally military defense lines at the borders, it could mean actions to, as I said, initiate a no-fly zone and be more active in the defense of Ukraine rather than just sending weapons. It could merely mean that the world needs to take more action to prevent Russia from continuously killing civilians.) and then he additionally argued that Benkei's way of arguing was dishonest (The way you handle discussions like these, pointing out that something is "obvious" when it clearly isn't obvious, other than supporting your own argument, makes it impossible to have a discussion with you. You demand that your interpretation is the valid one and then everyone around you should comply based on that interpretation because then you can win that argument... wake me up when you're a more honest interlocutor. ).
And therefore claiming or suggesting that Christoffer committed a fallacious argument ad hominem is questionable. While one can more easily argue that Benkei's claim "I get you're not a native English speaker and the finer points of the translation are lost in you" is a fallacious ad hominem attack, because he seemed to conclude that a correct understanding of Zelensky's claims (like his) depends on somebody being a native English speaker. But that doesn't logically nor empirically follow at all.

So I agree a quick ending is unlikely, but not impossible. — Olivier5

Any possible military success in that direction is conditional on the military support the West provides to Ukraine. And I'm not sure the West will continue as Ukrainians may hope.

literally cite the claims I'm rebutting that you just continuously deny ever making. — boethius

I never denied making the claim you literally cite (quote where I did). I continuously denied that you literally understood my quotes and I still do ("taking into account the deterrence means they both had" is the "precondition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue" (like the NTP and prior to that the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ). So "precondition" refers to a rational requirement for the US and Soviet Union to take into account their deterrence means while pursuing their agreements (like the NTP and prior to that the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ).).
Again I'm responsible for what I write not for what you understand.

It hasn't deterred Russia right, but Russia is paying and might pay more. So I'm not sure that what you presume is correct. Russia now knows better the costs of its adventurism. — neomac
Do you see Russia stopping the war of their own accord? — boethius

So what? There are three reasons your question is failing to take into account:
1. We are in the middle of the war so we don’t see the end of the war nor the full consequences of such war. The Soviet–Afghan War lasted 10 years, could anyone see the end of it and the following collapse of the Soviet Union while they were in the middle of it back then? No, because they didn’t happen yet.
2. Russia was complaining about NATO enlargement since the 90s, did Russia see NATO enlargement stopping for that reason? NATO/US can be as determined as Russia to pursue their goals in Ukraine at the expense of Russia. And since Russia, especially under Putin, took a declared confrontational attitude toward the hegemonic power, Russia made sure that NATO/US will deal with Russia accordingly as long as they see fit.
3. The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West.

So, what would be the reason to assume they are not willing to pay the same cost in the future? — boethius

But will it is not all that matters, what also and primarily counts is the actual material and human resources one country has to achieve its geopolitical goals.

So, "rationally" it would be nice to have some better reason, such as the US nuking Russia on behalf of Ukraine and being deterred that way. The only problem is there's no rational reason for the US to sign up to that, much less actually do when called upon.

Which is the core fallacy of Zelenskyites: that whatever is good for Zelensky to be true (at least according to him) we should also believe is true, or at least nevertheless support whatever he wants and is trying to get in saying whatever we agree isn't true. — boethius

Zelenskyites: Sure, maybe. But that's just all rational decision making that we should support and encourage escalation, if that's what Zelensky wants, it's just clever to use the missile issue to try to escalate. You see, he "believes it" so it's ok to say what you believe even if you have no evidence for it. — boethius

You keep generically mentioning people without quoting them: who are the Zelenskyites ? Can you quote them? Given the twisted way you literally processed my claims I prefer check their claims by myself. And if you can not quote them nor prove that they claim what you are attributing to them, your argument looks like a strawman.

The reason to believe Russia won't just re-invade is exactly as you describe: it's costly. — boethius

Since you can perfectly understand that there are implied and increasing non-negligible costs, especially when it’s matter of sunk costs and its psychological effects (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunk_cost#Fallacy_effect), talking about actual willingness or hypothetical willingness in conjectured scenarios doesn't suffice to reason about this matter. And for that reason I’m not sure that Russia could rationally want to aggress Ukraine again.
But assuming that Russia wants or could want to do that (rationally or irrationally), then the West must damage Russian resources to pursue that goal as long as possible and with most enduring consequences as possible, if they rationally believe that Russia constitutes a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West and as long as they have means to do that.

a potential scenario that makes clear the ornamental nature of any "guarantees" to any peace deal concerning Ukraine. — boethius

If "ornamental" is meant to suggest that it's irrational for Ukraine to look for “security guarantees” (or NATO membership for that matter) and claiming otherwise shows "completely ignorant understanding of international relations" because an avg dude like you can conjecture random scenarios where these “security guarantees” aren’t effectively pursued or deterring enough, then that's bullshit. As I said:

— neomac

• International relations include a legal framework based on voluntary acceptance by acknowledged independent nations. Within this legal framework one can implement “security guarantees” (https://www.academia.edu/16541504/Legal_Notion_of_the_Terms_Security_Assurances_Security_Guarantees_and_Reassurances_in_International_Security_Law).
• The primary involved parties in the Ukrainian war are clearly interested in such “security guarantees”: Putin urges West to act quickly to offer security guarantees. (https://www.npr.org/2021/12/23/1067188698/putin-urges-west-to-act-quickly-to-offer-security-guarantees). And Ukraine showed interest in having one, given the consequences of the Budapest Memorandum about “security assurances” (https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/stvorennya-mehanizmu-bezpekovih-garantij-dlya-ukrayini-stane-76129).
• To the extent there is an international law and rational agents engage in it, there must be some reasonable application for it, independently from any arbitrarily high standard of reliability and compatibly with power balance/struggle concerns. The reason to me is obvious: the international legal framework increases transparency and trust, given the coordinated and codified procedures/roadmap to monitor and measure commitment and implied costs.

I've quoted it back to you several times:

You misunderstood my claim. I was referring precisely to the following condition: “each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war”. The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue. — boethius

You keep quoting only the claim that triggered your misunderstanding without taking into account all my clarifications. But you misunderstood that quote: "taking into account the deterrence means they both had" is the "precondition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue" (like the NTP and prior to that the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ). So "precondition" refers to a rational requirement for the US and Soviet Union to take into account their deterrence means while pursuing their agreements (like the NTP and prior to that the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ).

It cannot be clearer that your implication is that it would not be rational for Ukraine to enter the same agreements without nuclear weapons. — boethius

I clarified what I could infer from my claim about Ukraine (not having nuclear bombs): since Ukraine doesn't have nuclear weapons, the deterrence strategy available to Ukraine in negotiating with Russia (which has nuclear weapons) can not be like the one available to the US in dealing with the Soviet Union. Therefore Ukraine is rationally looking for alternatives (e.g. security guarantees, NATO membership and the like)
So you must have understood from that too that I couldn't mean what you keep attributing to me like a fool.

Since, you moved the goalpost from "pre-condition" (the word you use) to "rational requirement" to "taking into account". — boethius

You understand words the way you like without double check, then you iterate on a huge strawman argument built out of this misunderstanding, and despite all the clarifications I've given to you. And you wanna get away with it? Are you crazy, dude?!

First, as a general principle, this is not a "precondition" or "rational requirement" — boethius

That's not what I claimed.

Second, Ukraine will receive zero meaningful security guarantees in any peace deal with Russia, other than the ornamental meaning of "trust us bro". — boethius

I'm not interested in claims, I'm interested in arguments.

there is no meaningful leverage NATO would have anyways that would actually stop them short of nuclear weapons, which obviously they won't be "deterring" Russia with concerning Ukraine. — boethius

I'm not interested in claims, I'm interested in arguments.

We can be pretty sure of this because NATO has already applied maximum pressure of sanctions and arms supplies and this hasn't "deterred" Russia from their course of acton, so presumably if Russia invaded again then the reasonable bet is we'd (at best for Ukraine) just be back in this same situation — boethius

It hasn't deterred Russia right, but Russia is paying and it didn't finish to pay. So I'm not sure that what you presume is correct. Russia now knows better the costs of its adventurism.

Whatever US promises to do and doesn't do, there would unlikely be any consequences at all. — boethius

I'm not interested in claims, I'm interested in arguments.

But whatever the consequences for breaking the agreement, they would not be "much" as some sort of contractual result.

The consequence for Russia of reinvading Ukraine would be war and likely sanctions and international pressure, perhaps from their own partners if it's a second time around of this mess for no reason.

This would be the reason to expect Russia to abide by a peace agreement, to avoid the negative consequences of war they have also experienced.

However, being nuked by the USA would not be a reason.

If there's a peace deal and then later war resumes, the reasonable expectation is that the parties to the agreement will do in the future whatever their policy is then in the future anyways. For example, let's say in the future Europe's and US economy is really hurting, monetary crisis, real domestic problems, in addition to potential war with China invading Taiwan any moment, all sorts of messes all around the world, and they simply don't have the capacity for this same kind of conflict, pour in billions and billions ("carte blanch"), then what we would expect is that their policy then would be "sorry Ukraine, but you're on your own this time" regardless of what is written on any piece of paper. — boethius

More claims and conjectures and ornamental blablabla.

First, your idea that the US and Soviet Union entered non-proliferation agreements based on the idea they could deter the other from not breaking them with their nuclear weapons. — boethius

Never made such a claim. Quote where I did.

is simply false. US and Soviet Union could sign a non-proliferation treaty one day — boethius

Besides, since when conceivable possibilities constitute evidence to falsify factual claims? Here: The impetus behind the NPT was concern for the safety of a world with many nuclear weapon states. It was recognized that the Cold War deterrent relationship between just the United States and the Soviet Union was fragile. Having more nuclear-weapon states would reduce security for all, multiplying the risks of miscalculation, accidents, unauthorized use of weapons, escalation in tensions, and nuclear conflict (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons)

That's in no way a "pre-conditon" in the sense Zelensky — boethius

Quote Zelensky. And then comment. Besides I didn't claim anywhere that I would use the word "pre-condition" the way Zelensky does.

Saying parties take information into account to make decisions ... is obvious. — boethius

Saying that nothing is certain in this life... is obvious.

So, where is the debate on this topic: — boethius

Security guarantees (or equivalent).

But, if there is some version of "precondition" that's not some vacuous tautology — boethius

As if you knew what "tautology" means

just reminding us that decisions are in fact based on information — boethius

Never made such a claim. On the other side you are trying to sell us that international relations is matter of "certain" or "ornamental". That is substantive steamy bullshit. Period.

However, the fact that non-nuclear states both can for pretty clear rational reasons (of making the world as a whole a safer place and being unable to compete in the nuclear game anyways) and actually do engage in non-nuclear proliferation treatise, often the exact same ones as the nuclear powers, is pretty clear indication that your idea of a "rational requirement" is also obviously false. — boethius

For the sixth time, the general principle is the following: available deterrence means are taken into account by rational agents when engaging in negotiations.
I'm not relating states attitude toward agreements and negotiations to one specific type of deterrence.
What is rational is to reliably relate available means wrt desired goals. Any rational agent will take into consideration available means to sanction agreement defection. For example, for countries without nuclear bombs it could be to military ally with those compliant which have them and apply economic/diplomatic sanctions to the rogue countries.

Now, the meaning of this paragraph is clear — boethius

I'm responsible for what I write, not for what you understand.

Zelensky has been demanding certainty (which is certainly rational to want) but phrasing things in absolute terms like "pre-condition" (you use this term because Zelensky uses this term). — boethius

It isn't absolute, for 2 reasons: first it's not a necessary condition, and secondly, it's conditional on the rationality of the agent. Concerning Zelensky perspective I clarified my point: since Ukraine doesn't have nuclear weapons, the deterrence strategy available to Ukraine in negotiating with Russia (which has nuclear weapons) can not be like the one available to the US in dealing with the Soviet Union. Therefore Ukraine is rationally looking for alternatives (e.g. security guarantees, NATO membership and the like).

You didn't even quote who is understanding "security guarantees" in terms of certainty. So everything you said about it sounds like a strawman argument which you are idly looping over.

Looking forward to explaining all that to you for the 7th time, dude.

What general point? — boethius

Here: available deterrence means are taken into account by rational agents when engaging in negotiations.

Having nuclear deterrence was not a "pre-condition" to entering non proliferation treatise, as countries with zero nuclear deterrence (including Ukraine) enter the same agreements. — boethius

If you think that's what I claimed. You are twice wrong (and for the fifth time!) as I explained here:

I suspect you took pre-condition as "necessary condition" instead of "rational requirement", and "the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue" as suggesting a one-to-many generalization between one type of deterrence (nuclear weapons) and states (with or without nuclear weapons) instead of a many-to-many generalization between types of deterrence and states. You were wrong in both cases. In other words, I didn't claim that possession of nuclear weapons is a necessary condition for agreements between states (with or without nuclear weapons ).

However, there is simply no system of "guaranteeing" any party will actually follow any agreement. — boethius

You forgot there are two meanings? Are you reading yourself? And neither Russia nor Ukraine would look for the kind of system of "guaranteeing" that you are imagining, of course. They are looking for the "security guarantees" that can be implemented.

There are two meanings to guarantee: certainty or then purely ornamental expression of confidence that is in no way certain. — boethius

Please read.

In short, the alternative you are selling me is between “certainty” and “ornamental”?! Are you crazy?!
Even our legal system grounded on the coercive power of a democratic central government can not make certain that our rights will be protected as it is expected, often it may look pretty darn disappointing at it. Yet I wouldn’t consider our legal system “ornamental”. Even NATO membership doesn’t make sure that everybody will act according to commitments. Yet I wouldn’t consider NATO membership “ornamental” (were this the case NATO enlargement wouldn't have been perceived as an existential threat by Russia, right?!).
“Voluntary” means that there is no apparent coercion, it doesn’t mean “for free” or “at whim”: in the domain of international relations there are explicit/implicit costs/benefits to join/challenge a certain order that rational political agents must take into account to optimise their strategy wrt potential/actual competitors/allies in the global arena.

Calling such "security guarantees" "ornamental" is a way to dismiss them which is unjustified from an international relations perspective (even if they are not certain). Your disquisition about the semantics of "guarantee" is irrelevant and embarrassingly clouding your reasoning about basic concepts of international relations. Suck it up and move on.

"The probability of a Ukrainian military victory — defined as kicking the Russians out of all of Ukraine to include what they claim as Crimea — the probability of that happening anytime soon is not high, militarily," Milley told a news conference at the Pentagon.
https://www.voanews.com/a/ukraine-military-victory-unlikely-soon-top-us-general-says/6837655.html

You literally state "this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue".

What was the "pre-condition"? "taking into account the deterrence means they both had". — boethius

Right, and I took the case of the US and the Soviet Union both as a way to illustrate this general point, and to compare it to the hypothetical case of Ukraine negotiating with Russia.

Which is obviously contradicted by other non-nuclear states doing the same thing, so obviously nuclear weapons isn't a pre-condition for "the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue", as other actors pursued the same agreements without having nuclear weapons. — boethius

You got it all wrong for the forth time despite all the clarifications I already provided to you!
Now I suspect you took pre-condition as "necessary condition" instead of "rational requirement", and "the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue" as suggesting a one-to-many generalization between one type of deterrence (nuclear weapons) and states (with or without nuclear weapons) instead of a many-to-many generalization between types of deterrence and states. You were wrong in both cases. In other words, I didn't claim that possession of nuclear weapons is a necessary condition for agreements between states (with or without nuclear weapons ).
I claimed that available deterrence means are taken into account by rational agents when engaging in negotiations. In the particular case of the US and Soviet Union joining the NPT (and prior to that the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty), they were factoring in the deterrence means available to them (i.e. nuclear weapons).
I also claimed that since Ukraine doesn't have nuclear weapons, the deterrence strategy available to Ukraine in negotiating with Russia (which has nuclear weapons) can not be like the one available to the US in dealing with the Soviet Union. Therefore Ukraine is rationally looking for alternatives (e.g. security guarantees, NATO membership and the like).

The precondition of any agreement is that the parties involved have some reason to pursue an agreement. Having nuclear weapons is not a "pre-condition" for entering that "kind of an agreement".

Lot's of non-nuclear powers have entered the same non-proliferation agreements ... without having nuclear weapons.

What you are saying is both meaningless and false.

The only "precondition" to negotiating any agreement is being able to communicate. Just declaring preconditions is just a way of saying you won't negotiate, or then because you think the other party will give you concessions for free for some reason. — “boethius

Dude, for the third time, you are mistaken about what I claim. I didn’t write anywhere that nuclear weapons is a “precondition of any agreement”. Means of deterrence available to the US and the Soviet Union (i.e. the nuclear arsenal) during the Cold War were factors rationally taken into as incentives toward solving conflicts through relatively balanced agreements. Since Ukraine can not count on equivalent deterrence means, then Ukraine can not rationally pursue with Russia the kind of agreements that the US could rationally pursue with the Soviet Union. Yet the US/NATO may have a strong rational incentive to weigh in and back up Ukraine at the expense of Russia as long as Russia is perceived as a threat to the West. And by this way some “security guarantees” may be implemented e.g. to replace NATO membership.

This is what Russia wants: Negotiate with the West, the counter-party with the actual leverage (the weapons, the money, the economic sanctions). — boethius

Russia as a declared challenger of the Western-led world order wants to negotiate with the West in position of strength. US/NATO as the challenged power has a strong rational interest to the exact opposite.

Ukraine will not and cannot get any sort of guarantee from the US, or anyone else, in the "sense of certainty". — boethius

Who is talking of “security guarantees” in terms of certainty? You didn’t quote anybody.

Again, if Ukraine signs, their guarantors sign, and then the "guarantors" don't do what they guaranteed, or did it in a bad faith way that is not fit for purpose. Is this a guarantee?

There are two meanings to guarantee commonly used: certainty (I guarantee you the sun will rise tomorrow) and a promise that is in no way certain (satisfaction guaranteed!). Now, the talk of US nuking Russia or doing something else, if they don't abide by the agreement or reinvade or whatever, if meant as a guarantee in the second sense (a promise that maybe kept, maybe not, the word "guarantee" just being an expression of confidence by a party that could be trying to deceive you), I have no issue. However, if people want to be able to actually visualise how Ukraine could be certain the agreement would be followed, and what the guarantee is in this sense, then we definitely seem to agree that there is no such guarantee.

Now, if such wording is useful diplomatically and adds some prestige reasons as additional motivation for parties to ensure the agreement happens, sure, have at it, add the word guarantee and "guarantor" after every sentence. — boethius

I don’t know who are the people you are referring to. We will see what security guarantees are going to be negotiated/implemented, if needed. From an international relation perspective, I find simply myopic to downplay the fact that States (like Russia and Ukraine) are seeking “security guarantees” just because such “guarantees” are not certain.

is exactly what I'm describing to explain why “guarantee” in such agreements would be ornamental and not representing something actually certain.
I point our your explanation is the same as mine (Ukraine will never get any sort of guarantee from anyone, other than ornamental) ... and then you complain that I'm not using your definition of international law as entirely voluntary? — boethius

In short, the alternative you are selling me is between “certainty” and “ornamental”?! Are you crazy?!
Even our legal system grounded on the coercive power of a democratic central government can not make certain that our rights will be protected as it is expected, often it may look pretty darn disappointing at it. Yet I wouldn’t consider our legal system “ornamental”. Even NATO membership doesn’t make sure that everybody will act according to commitments. Yet I wouldn’t consider NATO membership “ornamental” (were this the case NATO enlargement wouldn't have been perceived as an existential threat by Russia, right?!).
“Voluntary” means that there is no apparent coercion, it doesn’t mean “for free” or “at whim”: in the domain of international relations there are explicit/implicit costs/benefits to join/challenge a certain order that rational political agents must take into account to optimise their strategy wrt potential/actual competitors/allies in the global arena.

First, the deterrence means was not a pre-condition of the agreement but what the agreement was about (we both have too much deterrence to our mutual detriment). — boethius

Again that's not what I claimed. I didn't talk about the content of the agreement. Read carefully: The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue

That Ukraine has no nuclear deterrence just means that it needs to consider the fact that Russia does.

If you feel it's "unfair" that stronger parties have more influence over events than weaker parties, I don't know what to say other than welcome to the real world. — boethius

If the West is involved in this war there is a reason and if they want to weigh in about this agreement at the expense of Russia, Russia must deal with it, even if Russia thinks it's "unfair" to them.

But, ok, the question then comes up of what would actually make the US enforce the agreement? Especially if doing so risks nuclear confrontation with Russia they have zero rational reason to risk that for the perceived benefit of Ukraine (risking nuclear war doesn't necessarily benefit Ukraine in any net-present-value calculation of any plausible metric of human welfare, but let's assume it does for the sake of argument). — boethius

Ukraine's position now is basically "we'll start acting rationally if the world is changed to suit our irrational desires". — boethius

You are just reinforcing my impression that you have no clue what you are talking about. The Western involvement in the war in Ukraine is not for Ukraine, it's for the West. If a hegemonic power perceives a non-negligible threat to its hegemony, it will react accordingly. Russia is expressly framing this war as a struggle for the World Order at the expense of the Western/US hegemony. That's why Russia must now suffer the consequences.

International agreements are all voluntary. And so, a "guarantee" is likewise a voluntary thing ... and therefore not any sort of actual guarantee. These sorts of words in these sorts of agreements are purely ornamental. — boethius

What looks ornamental to me is your latest contributions to this thread. Money, law, language are based on voluntary accepted conventions. So what?

US can guarantee whatever it wants, doesn't mean it's going to do that. — boethius

So what? State powers (and even criminal organizations) ground their power not just in brute force but also in consensus and reputation relative to their competitors and among competitors&allies for their own selfish interest!

The talk of guarantees has been some sort of actual guarantee, like US using nuclear weapons. — boethius

Dude, it's not up to you to determine how these security guarantees are implemented. The security guarantees do not need to consist in the US swearing on their mother's head that they are going to nuclear bomb Putin's ass if he defects the agreement and act accordingly. It could simply require the forms and degree of military cooperation between Ukraine and its guarantors.

To the extent there is an international law and rational agents engage in it, there must be some reasonable application for it, independently from any arbitrarily high standard of reliability and compatibly with power balance/struggle concerns. — neomac

Is completely false, unless your just repeating what I stated and what you claim to have issue with. — boethius

You are claiming that "these sorts of agreements are purely ornamental". I claim that this claim of yours show "completely ignorant understanding of international relations". International law has its use (addressing coordination issues) and can help in increasing transparency and trust. For that reason, rational political agents are engaging in it.

International law is not "law" (in the sense of law within states) and "legal framework" is not a "legal system" (in the sense of legal system within states). Same language maybe used, but referencing completely different things. — boethius

I'm talking about https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_law
So if you have a problem with the standard usage of the term "international law", I don't care.

This is just foolish. At no point did either side threaten the other with a first strike nuclear launch if they broke or pulled out of any agreement.
The basis of diplomatic resolutions between the Soviet Union and the US was that each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war, and each side was able to believe the other side believed that too, so some agreements could be reached. — boethius

You misunderstood my claim. I was referring precisely to the following condition: “each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war”. The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue.

But the idea that guarantees are needed to enter into an international agreement is just a high school level and completely ignorant understanding of international relations. There is never any guarantees. — boethius

My impression is that you have no clue what you are talking about:

• International relations include a legal framework based on voluntary acceptance by acknowledged independent nations. Within this legal framework one can implement “security guarantees” (https://www.academia.edu/16541504/Legal_Notion_of_the_Terms_Security_Assurances_Security_Guarantees_and_Reassurances_in_International_Security_Law).
• The primary involved parties in the Ukrainian war are clearly interested in such “security guarantees”: Putin urges West to act quickly to offer security guarantees. (https://www.npr.org/2021/12/23/1067188698/putin-urges-west-to-act-quickly-to-offer-security-guarantees). And Ukraine showed interest in having one, given the consequences of the Budapest Memorandum about “security assurances” (https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/stvorennya-mehanizmu-bezpekovih-garantij-dlya-ukrayini-stane-76129).
• To the extent there is an international law and rational agents engage in it, there must be some reasonable application for it, independently from any arbitrarily high standard of reliability and compatibly with power balance/struggle concerns. The reason to me is obvious: the international legal framework increases transparency and trust, given the coordinated and codified procedures/roadmap to monitor and measure commitment and implied costs.

https://www.dw.com/en/russian-missiles-cross-into-nato-member-poland-report/a-63770954
shit hitting the fan?

for Russia this war is about securing land access to Crimea — Tzeentch

Maybe Kherson is not as high priority as land access to Crimea, yet it has its strategic importance (i.e. securing freshwater canals to Crimea).
Nevertheless there are demographic and economic reasons why giving up on those areas would hurt Ukraine badly:

Russia is going to get what it wants, and the only variable is how much of Ukraine will be destroyed in the process. — Tzeentch

Does Russia want Kherson?

Zelenskyy outlines Ukraine’s 10-point "formula for peace" at G20 summit

Details: Ukraine has outlined the following 10 propositions:

• Radiation and nuclear safety.
• Food security.
• Energy security.
• Release of all prisoners and deportees.
• Implementation of the UN Charter and restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the world order.
• Withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of hostilities.
• Justice.
• Immediate protection of the environment from ecocide.
• Preventing escalation.
• Confirmation of the end of the war.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/11/15/7376378/

:up: :100:

US and the Soviets never trusted each other, but entered into all sorts of agreements — boethius

US and Soviets had also deterrence means that Ukraine doesn't have though.

Ukraine's current position is the best it's ever going to be, — Tzeentch

What makes you think so?

Since you refuse to take a position — creativesoul

I took a position about the notions of "justification" and "knowledge". Here:

I think "justification" is a normative term, not a descriptive one. Additionally, justificatory practices vary depending on the genesis of a belief and they have different degrees of reliability (which also means that we distinguish "valid" from "sound" applications). Since our beliefs are fallible, our knowledge and justificatory claims are fallible as well (link)

since the distinction between justification+"no false lemma" and justification-"no false lemma" looks analogous to the distinction between sound and valid deduction, we could simply talk about sound vs valid justification depending on the context. So in the case of the farmer's false belief, we could say he is validly justified in believing that there is a cow, but not soundly justified. And only the latter case can be called knowledge. (link)

or offer valid criticism of mine — creativesoul

I didn't even get what your point is. You didn't explain how you changed your views nor why.

We could say it. It would not make it so. — creativesoul

Again it depends on what "justification" means to you.

Belief that there is a cow does not follow from mistaking cloth for cow. — creativesoul

"Follow" means what? If "follow" means "come after", then it can follow. If "follow" means some causal link, then it can still follow. If "follow" means "justifies" then we are back to square one: what do you mean by "justification"?

The United States pressured Ukraine to show willingness to negotiate a few weeks ago. — Tzeentch

Prior to the midterm elections. Now the situation doesn't look so bad for the Democrats though.

Are you claiming that the farmer's belief that there is a cow in the field
justified? — creativesoul

Again, it depends on what one means by "justification". If justification must comply with the "no false lemma" (or equivalent) then the farmer is not justified, if justification must not comply with "no false lemma" (or equivalent) then the farmer could be justified. You didn't clarify your understanding of "justification". On the contrary, your wrote:

It makes no sense to judge whether or not the farmer's belief is justified unless we carefully examine what grounds that target belief. — creativesoul

as if you didn't want to talk about justification before talking about belief.
So again, what's your point?

My point is the following: since the distinction between justification+"no false lemma" and justification-"no false lemma" looks analogous to the distinction between sound and valid deduction, we could simply talk about sound vs valid justification depending on the context. So in the case of the farmer's false belief, we could say he is validly justified in believing that there is a cow, but not soundly justified. And only the latter case can be called knowledge.

Do you agree that at time t1, this particular farmer looked out into a particular field at a particular piece of cloth and mistook it for a cow? — creativesoul

Yep. And?

Starting at "there is a cow in the field" does not consider the false belief, the case of mistaking cloth for cow, the belief that a particular piece of cloth in a particular field is a cow. — creativesoul

So what?

As if any judgment habit counts... — creativesoul

For what?

After 10 posts of yours I still didn't get what your point is.

This would be true if any daughter of literally anyone in Russia was murdered by a Ukrainian operation. — boethius

Are you suggesting that “literally anyone in Russia” whose daughter got “murdered by a Ukrainian operation” could become Kremlin ideologue? Coz that’s what the linked article was about.

And war policy hawks, even "philosophical" one's like Dugin, are rarely, if ever, some sort of threat. It would be like saying The Project of a New American Century and company, was a threat to Bush since he didn't invade Iran like many were insisting. — boethius

The analogy doesn't hold to me. First Putin's regime is authoritarian, more pyramidal, more relying on strong man figure and censorship of opposing views: so the more disgruntled voices by political and intellectual elites who once supported him unconditionally become public the greater is the pressure on the leader. Secondly, Dugin’s complaint is not important because of him, but because it might express a feeling deeply shared also among people within Putin’s closer entourage and since military defeat may increase a dictator’s odds of forcible ouster, perceived defeat may be as well insidious.

The oligarchs didn't overthrow Putin, the protesters in the streets didn't overthrow Putin, neither the rank and file or the generals, and Dugin is just now next on the list of people that have not overthrown Putin. — boethius

Western propaganda is not only for Western consumption. Putting all the blame on Putin, stressing his military humiliations and suggesting regime change can be instrumental to boost Putin’s paranoia at the expense of his entourage and offering a way out to potential high rank defectors as soon as things are going to look intolerably shitty to them. That’s part of the psychological warfare which is meant also to provoke decisional mistakes in Putin and his entourage. And if the mistakes were not enough for a coup from his entourage, they might still be enough to trigger a regime collapse.

For example, the "meme" of "everything is going to plan," which no Russian official has ever said — boethius

Yet,

“Putin says: everything is going to plan in Ukraine”
https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-putin-russia-idUSS8N2UP08I

“The work is proceeding in a calm and rhythmic way. The troops are advancing and reaching those endpoints that are assigned as a task at a certain stage of this combat work. Everything is going according to plan”
https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2022/06/30/2736617/russia-s-operation-in-ukraine-going-according-to-plan-putin

And in state run TV:
“We’ve been told that everything is going according to plan. Does anyone really believe that six months ago the plan was to be leaving [the city of] Balakliya, repelling a counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region and failing to take over Kharkiv?” usually pro-Putin political expert Viktor Olevich said on the state-run NTV channel, the Moscow Times reported.
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/09/12/pro-kremlin-figures-voice-frustration-after-ukraine-routs-moscows-forces-a78769

BTW I use memes like this for mocking not for their truth value.

When the offensives started we were made all sorts of promises about Russian lines collapsing, morale so bad the entire Russian army would essentially just disband into the fog, taking Kherson by force and encircling the Russians there (not just Russia withdrawing), and pushing deep into Russian territory all the way back to the Russian border!!

Has that plan happened? — boethius

Did Western/Ukrainian officials state: "Everything is going according to plan"?

we were made all sorts of promises about Russian lines collapsing — boethius

Can you quote these promises?

I seriously doubt it. Putin has never met Dugin and never referenced him. — boethius

Nevertheless Following the murder, Putin became “seriously interested” in Dugin. He sent him a telegram of condolences, and has since encouraged the administration’s contacts with the philosopher. It was one month after Daria Dugina’s murder, on September 30, that Putin first used one of Dugin’s favorite slurs: “the Anglo-Saxons” (in the sense of the presumed Anglo-American hegemony in the West). A Kremlin insider explains this as a direct result of Dugina’s death — and the way it was exploited to show Putin that “the enemies” are attacking “the upholders of traditional values,” those values being, of course, very dear to Putin. https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/11/03/hawkish-times-need-hawkish-people

We were first told the sanctions would compel powerful oligarchs to overthrow Putin any day ... any day. Dugin is an ersatz replacement in that narrative. — boethius

Sure, there is not even a single grain of truth in what they write. Putin's elite supporters are happy more than ever after the glorious retreat from Kherson. And "everything is going according to plan", right?
BTW you too stop spreading Western propaganda [1], the withdrawal is not an embarrassement at all: The Kremlin remained defiant Friday, insisting that battlefield developments in the Kherson region in no way represented an embarrassment for Putin.
https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-kyiv-europe-moscow-7dcca261a8af0641f9a3c11cc7f644b0


[1]

For all the embarrassment of the withdrawal, thousands of troops drowning or being permanently cut off would be far worse and immediately people would be ridiculing the Russians for not knowing the risks and taking the necessary measures! — boethius

I'm afraid I don't have any ideas about where we should go next. — Ludwig V

We could put some effort into clarifying the notion of "justification" according to an internalist epistemology. In that sense, I think "justification" is a normative term, not a descriptive one. Additionally, justificatory practices vary depending on the genesis of a belief and they have different degrees of reliability (which also means that we distinguish "valid" from "sound" applications). Since our beliefs are fallible, our knowledge and justificatory claims are fallible as well.

You've shown a penchant recently for not answering questions posed to you. — creativesoul

Well due to our past exchange I don't trust your way of framing problems.

Does "there is a cow in the field" follow from mistaking cloth for cow? — creativesoul

Yes but there might be some catch in the term "follow" (between perceptual belief and propositional belief there is not narrow logic linking).

Does the act of mistaking cloth for cow serve as sufficient reason to believe and/or state "there is a cow in the field"? — creativesoul

Yes but there might be some catch in the term "sufficient reason" (between perceptual belief and propositional belief there is not narrow logic linking).

Does mistaking cloth for cow warrant concluding that there is a cow in field? — creativesoul

I take "warrent" as a synonimous of "justify". As I pointed out we must agree on the notion of "justification" to discuss further the issue. In any case, I wouldn't claim "mistaking cloth for cow warrants concluding that there is a cow in field". I would claim "mistaking cloth for cow explains the belief that there is a cow in field"

↪neomac
Huh. So much for Dugin. (I think he is mixing up Frazer's The Golden Bough with Bellow's Henderson the Rain King - not that it matters in this context.) — SophistiCat

On a hill at Bomma near the mouth of the Congo dwells Namvulu Vumu, King of the Rain and Storm. Of some of the tribes on the Upper Nile we are told that they have no kings in the common sense; the only persons whom they acknowledge as such are the Kings of the Rain, Mata Kodou, who are credited with the power of giving rain at the proper time, that is, the rainy season. Before the rains begin to fall at the end of March the country is a parched and arid desert; and the cattle, which form the people's chief wealth, perish for lack of grass. So, when the end of March draws on, each householder betakes himself to the King of the Rain and offers him a cow that he may make the blessed waters of heaven to drip on the brown and withered pastures. If no shower falls, the people assemble and demand that the king shall give them rain; and if the sky still continues cloudless, they rip up his belly, in which he is believed to keep the storms. Amongst the Bari tribe one of these Rain Kings made rain by sprinkling water on the ground out of a handbell. (The Golden Bough - J.G. Frazer)

I read this passage you cite several times, but I don't see where is he calling to execute Putin. — boethius

Agreed. But Dugin's complaint might sound now more ominous than ever to Putin.

I don't understand what you mean by the de dicto (or de re) way(s) of reporting beliefs. I do know what di dicto and de re mean. Can you please explain? — Ludwig V

I and Creativesoul had a very long exchange about his views a while ago so I’m reusing here expressions I clarified there (and without worrying too much about standard usage).
To make a long story short, “de dicto” belief-attributions refer to belief-attributions relative to a certain believer’s p.o.v. For example, in “the farmer believes that is a cow”, the subordinate clause "that is a cow" is rendering the farmer’s belief content exclusively according to the farmer’s point of view in the given circumstances.
In the case of “de re” belief-attributions, we refer to belief-attributions independently from a certain believer’s p.o.v. . For example, in “the farmer believes that piece of cloth is a cow”, the subordinate clause "that piece of cloth is a cow" is rendering the farmer’s belief independently from his point of view because the piece of cloth wasn’t identified as such by the farmer. Indeed, we have linguistic tools to non-ambiguously render “de-re” belief attributions: e.g. “the farmer believes of that piece of cloth that is a cow” where “of that piece of cloth” is referring to something outside the p.o.v. of the believer as rendered by the subordinate clause “that is a cow”.

How does the "there is a cow in the field" follow from mistaking cloth for cow? How does mistaking cloth for cow serve as sufficient reason to state "there is a cow in the field"? — creativesoul

Not sure how to understand your questions, but I could say that there are 2 conditions to take into account: 1. perceptual evidences 2. justificatory practices. So e.g. the fact that available evidences fit enough into a cow-shape perceptual template, plus the fact that no other justificatory practice more reliable than judging by habit is applied may suffice to explain the mistaken belief.

Do we agree that at time t1, the farmer believed that the cloth in the field was a cow, but he does not know that? — creativesoul

I agree to the extent we can derogate to the de-dicto way of reporting beliefs, as explained.

the summary is altogether mistaken now — creativesoul

@invizzy apparently he changed his views.

Are we in agreement that the farmer sees a cloth and mistakes cloth for cow at time t1, but he does not know that? — creativesoul

Yep.

his contention looks different from the one you are attributing to him.

His claims concern how we (including S himself) ascribe beliefs to some S at time t1.
Consider this case:

• At time t1 S would say "that is a cow"
• At time t2 S realizes that he was wrong at t1, and will correctly say "that is a piece of cloth"

In this case, Creativesoul would claim that we (S included) must now revise S's belief attribution at t1, and instead of saying "At t1 S believed that is cow" we must say "At t1 S believed that piece of cloth was a cow". In other words, "At t1 S believed that was cow" is a wrong belief-attribution report, while "At t1 S believed that piece of cloth was a cow" is the only correct belief-attribution report.

If you disagree with his conclusion I couldn't care less, because you're not qualified to judge the validity of his conclusion. — Isaac

I don't care about Tyler Cowen’s conclusions either. I'm just questioning what you can infer from it wrt your claim that post-war reconstructions is "a corporate opportunity to 'screw everyone'". Indeed he's article is not focused on the contribution of the private post-war corporations e.g. to the Italian reconstruction at all (as the studies I linked are)! And given his liberal position, I guess he would not agree with your claim either [1].

No. One couldn't. Not unless one is a qualified economist. — Isaac

I disagree. To distinguish the scope of the studies I linked wrt Tyler Cowen’s article, and related main findings one doesn’t need to be an expert. It must be enough educated and read the articles carefully (especially if one wants to draw inferences from them).


[1]
Notice also that your original claim required just a single counterexample:

It's a pattern repeated over and over - War -> reconstruction requirements -> corporate opportunity to screw everyone.

I can't think of a single example from history where that's gone well for the inhabitants. Can you? — Isaac

Is that what counts as a valid reply/answer these days? That may count as an answer to some people, but others can plainly see that it does not answer the questions that it should. — creativesoul

Let's try something else then: explain to me upon what grounds are we claiming that the best time to proceed our driving is exactly when green light occurs, rather than at whatever other time we feel like driving on.

I've shown how that practice has been found wanting, lacking, and begging for truth about the farmer's belief at time t1. — creativesoul

Maybe you tried. To me without success.

Upon what ground do you accept the farmer's self-report at time t1, when he was wrong about what he saw and believed about that, and reject his report at time t2, when he is correct about what he saw and believed at time t1? — creativesoul

It depends on how you construct your thought experiment: if you surreptitiously project onto your fictional character your belief-attribution method (as you did with Jack) then I would make the same objections. If he's committed to an absurd belief-attribution method that he applies to others, that method doesn't become more plausible just because he readily applies it to himself. At best, that can show that he honestly believes in its effectiveness.
If you do not project onto your fictional character your belief-attribution method , then de-re belief attribution can be successfully worked out, if there are enough contextual assumptions shared by interlocutors, but only as a tolerable derogation to the standard method of belief-attribution, not as its replacement! Indeed also those contextual assumptions are based on the standard method of belief-attribution about other interlocutors' beliefs [1]!

[1] Example: If A tells B that C believes that piece of cloth is a cow, A is (reliably?) assuming that B believes that there there is a piece of cloth and not a cow.