Comments

  • Ukraine Crisis
    t1Td1H4.jpeg
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Odd how that whenever it suits your narrative we should trust his word, and whenever it doesn't suit your narrative, he's lying.

    15 years of protest against NATO expansion > Not a genuine expression of worry, but a carefully crafted lie.

    Some war-time rhetoric > Not nonsense narratives meant to influence the public, but a genuine expression of his intentions.


    You have to be pretty deep down the propaganda rabbit hole not to see this.     — Tzeentch

    Do you mean "some war-time rhetoric" is the lie while "15 years of protest against NATO expansion" is expression of Putin's genuine views? And doesn't that suit your narrative too?
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Top Russian official's remark about Ukraine war draws laughter
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    How does Gert’s definition of what is descriptively moral based on “lessening of harms” explain, as you claim:
    (A) “slaves must obey their masters”
    (B) “working on the sabbath deserves death”
    (C) “homosexuality is evil”.

    I don’t see that it can. My "Morality As Cooperation Strategies" (MACS) definition of what is descriptively moral does explain them because it includes cooperation strategies. It explains them as marker and domination strategies, strategies for increasing the benefits of cooperation in ingroups at the expense (always for domination norms and sometimes for marker norms) of outgroups.     — Mark S

    My points are 2: one is about explanation, the other about generality.
    1. Gert's descriptive definition of morality is : What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal”
    As I understand it, the definition itself in this formulation doesn't specify any strong rationality requirement nor how wide is the group of the people protected by the moral system. So if A, B, C are forms of lessening the harms of a certain group that is protected by the moral system, then these are moral rules that satisfy the definition offered by Gert. In case A the group would be the masters, in case B the group would be all those who need to rest at least once a week, in case C the group could be e.g. all those (as the politicians) would benefit from a demographic growth through etherosexual mating or by limiting the transmissibility of certain sexual diseases or by limiting naturally repugnant sexual behavior (and religious beliefs might have "irrationally" strengthen this belief)
    2. Gert's descriptive definition of morality can account for all moral rules (like A, B, C) your definition can account for then your definition is redundant wrt Gert's definition, because talking about "cooperative strategies" doesn't add anything valuable to the general definition, other then alluding to something that is more specific than required by a minimal general definition (for comparison take 2 definitions of "human beings" as "rational animals" or as "rational animals with sexual organs").
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    Yes, “slaves must obey their masters” has too often been a cultural moral norm enforced by an ingroup to exploit an outgroup.

    The reason that "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gert’s definition of what is descriptively moral is that 1) it adds explanatory power, particularly for marker norms such as “working on the sabbath deserves death” and “homosexuality is evil”, and 2) it directly follows from the ultimate source of morality - the cooperation problems that all highly cooperative societies must solve.

    Without "increasing the benefits of cooperation" you can’t say you have a definition of what is descriptively moral that explains past and present moral norms. And you can’t link cultural moral norms to their ultimate source - the cooperation problems that all highly cooperative societies must solve.     — Mark S

    These are just claims, where is the argument to support them?

    Consider:
    (A) “slaves must obey their masters”
    (B) “working on the sabbath deserves death”
    (C) “homosexuality is evil”.
    (BGD) Gert's definition: “What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal”
    (MSD) your definition: “An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has increasing the benefits of cooperation and lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal” (which looks like BGD plus "increasing the benefits of cooperation" clause)
    If A, B, C can be explained by both BGD and MSD then how is MSD more accurate than BGD and not just more redundant wrt BGD?
    To support your claims you should be able to provide an example X historically considered as moral that BGD does NOT classifies as moral while MSD classifies as moral, AND/OR an example Y historically considered as non-moral that BGD classifies as moral while MSD does NOT classify as moral.
    If you can't provide any such cases then your general definition is simply redundant, and the allusion to cooperation strategies (partnership, dominance, marker norms) belongs to a deeper level of analysis or empirical investigation (for comparison take 2 definitions of "human beings" as "rational animals" or as "rational animals with sexual organs").


    BTW can you clarify better what "marker norms" means and why it is to be distinguished from dominance and partnership norms?
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    He has not justified stating this as a normative (ought) claim as you (and perhaps others here) are interpreting it. — Mark S

    That said, I am frustrated by Gert’s ambiguity in his lecture about whether he means the definition to be descriptive (the only way I can make sense of it) or normative (which he has not justified). — Mark S

    To me, Gert’s definition of “morality” is descriptive. What I think Gert takes to be a normative definition of morality is the set of rules and ideals he discussed later in his lecture.


    For example, the definition includes the phrase “by those protected by the system”. Consider the moral norm: “slaves must obey their masters”. If those protected from harm by the system are only the slave masters (which was too often the historical case), then this repulsive moral norm would be included under Gert’s definition of what morality ‘is’. This makes no sense to modern sensibilities as a normative claim but is sensible as a claim about what is descriptively moral. — Mark S

    Both your descriptive definition of morality and Gert’s descriptive definition of morality can account for the fact that “slaves must obey their masters” can be taken as a moral rule. Can’t they? If so, this example doesn’t show us in what way adding "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gert’s definition of morality.


    My suggested revision, “An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has increasing the benefits of cooperation and lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal” more accurately reflects what science tells us of morality’s function – the principal reason what we call descriptively moral behavior exists. — Mark S

    In what sense it’s more accurate about the function of morality? Talking about “cooperation” seems to me a way to suggest that there are different ways in which morality can be implemented depending on the cooperation strategy (which must be specified and be correlated to other factors, e.g. material conditions of existence, demographic dynamics, environmental conditions, technological advancement). But the most general notion of “cooperation” itself can be formulated entirely in Gert’s descriptive moral terminology. So adding it to Gert’s general definition doesn’t bring anything to it. In other words, allusions to cooperation strategies should be part of a lower level wrt Gert’s general descriptive definition of morality and a more oriented toward an empirical investigation.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Explosions heard in western Crimea, test of civil defense alert system planned
  • Ukraine Crisis
    By the way, I can think of some that would like the US going all isolation and NATO closing up shop. Can't tell if that's what you're suggesting here; is it? — jorndoe

    If European leaders are incapable of serving European interests, NATO is a threat to European security.     — Tzeentch

    If European leaders are incapable of serving European interests, Europeans better be outside NATO. Feeling better now?
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has increasing the benefits of cooperation and lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal. — Mark S

    It's not clear in what way adding "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gert’s definition of morality. Can you give concrete example to clarify that?
  • Ukraine Crisis
    post-Soviet Russian hegemonic ambitions in short:
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Primakov_doctrine
  • Ukraine Crisis
    The shared rule. — neomac

    If we shared a rule we would have agreed on the first proposition. If there were some rule (which we agree on) that can be used to demonstrate the truth of a rational argument, such that it compels me to believe "you committed fallacy X", then it could have been used in the first place to compel me to believe your original proposition. I don't see why it suddenly becomes more compelling when used to argue for a fallacy.     — Isaac

    Not sure to understand what you are saying. I could explicitly conclude “all cats are animals” from “all cats are mammals” and “all mammals are animals” according to the “Barbara” syllogistic rule. You could argue instead that I inferred that conclusion from “all cats are planets” and “all planets are animals” always according to the “Barbara” syllogistic rule. And since the premises are false, so is the conclusion.
    Your counter-argument would be a strawman, since I didn’t infer that conclusion from the premises you suggested. The strawman fallacy expresses a rule that is different from the “Barbara” syllogistic rule.
    And the shared “Barbara” syllogistic rule might compel you to believe my conclusion if it wasn’t for the fact that you failed to use the right premises either because you overlooked my actual argument by mistake or because you are intellectually dishonest. In the former case you may readily acknowledge the strawman charge, in the latter case you may still want to escape the accusation with some other sophism.


    If we can't converge on such basic level, we remain unintelligible to each other. — neomac


    Nonsense. I can vaguely understand people even talking to me in a foreign language. Most of our words are just fluff. We needn't agree on much. I determine most of my opinion about what you mean from my experience of people and assumptions about what kind of person you are and what you might likely be trying to say. You become a character in my story, playing a role I determine. You'll fit that role all the while it's not overwhelmed by evidence to the contrary because it's easier for me to predict your behaviour that way. It's just basic cognition. We're not powered by words and their meanings, we're powered by predictions, stories, expectations.     — Isaac

    Not sure to understand the contrast between “words and their meanings” and “predictions, stories, expectations”, and how this relates to what I said. As far as I’m concerned your predictions, stories and expectations should still be based on shared rules to make sense to me. It’s also ironic that you are trying to evade my conclusion about nonsensical objections by calling it “nonsense” and still expecting to make sense to me.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    And what prevents anyone from rejecting that 'showing', why are they suddenly compelled by your second judgement when they weren't by your first? — Isaac

    The shared rule. If we can't converge on such basic level, we remain unintelligible to each other.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    I should have had you pegged for a 'fallacy-o-phile.

    A couple of questions...
    Do you think those with whom you're arguing would agree that their propositions succumb to these fallacies?     — Isaac

    To the extant I and my opponent share the same argumentative rules, we must converge about how we apply them too. So if I claim he failed or my opponent rejects the charge, it must be shown through the shared argumentative rule who is right.
    For example you recently accused me of strawmanning you, but I argued that I wasn't strawmanning you: if you make a general claim X but intend to refer specifically to Y, and I don't get what you are referring to (I even told you so), so I can just argue against X, you can not accuse me of strawmanning you, because I'm still arguing against your actual claims, not something different.

    If not, to what do you then appeal when arguing that they, in fact, do? More fallacies? Fallacy fallacies? And then, when we disagree about the fallacy fallacies? Fallacy fallacy fallacies, perhaps? — Isaac

    Shared rules are necessary to work out differences intelligibly. So if we disagree on some argumentative rule application, at best we can try to work it out through more basic rules (like our conceptual framework). At worst we remain unintelligible.
    For example, as far as I've understood, you accused me of "hypocrisy" based on the idea that I'm advocating for "dispassionate" contributions, while I myself am not contributing "dispassionately". But I'm not claiming to offer dispassionate contributions nor advocating for dispassionate contributions nor implying or suggesting in favor of "dispassionate" contributions. So either that's settled and you must agree, or you must offer a compelling argument against my objection: e.g. quote where I solicited people to offer dispassionate arguments or claimed I'm offering dispassionate arguments or implied or arguably suggested in favor of "dispassionate" contributions, and see if it is compelling enough to accuse me of hypocrisy.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    What are these rules? Can you enumerate a few? — Isaac
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_fallacies
  • Ukraine Crisis
    But usually failed wars don't bolster jingoism and your willingness to use force again. Usually the result is the opposite. After the Vietnam war the US wasn't eager to fight similar wars. It needed for the Cold War to end and 9/11 attacks to happen before the US was ready to go recklessly everywhere to fight "The War on Terror". Now with Afghanistan fallen and the Taliban with their Emirate back in charge, notice the absence of anyone talking about "The War on Terror". — ssu

    Sure, that sounds plausible, at least in the short term. But even in the short term, as long as the Russian political and military elites are the same along with their powerful triggers (fighting for hegemonic survival and perception of a “declining” West), they may still try to compensate or come back against the West in other forms, increasing control over strategic areas (in the mediterranean, North Africa and Middle East), reinforcing the anti-West alliance, by fostering instability within the West, and connive with rogue American politicians (if not presidents).



    But note, this fear of the dissolution of Russian federation is actually the pillarstone for Russian imperialism. Catherine the Great said something very crucial when she said that in order to defend her country's border, she has to push them further. Russia always portrays itself to be the victim, even if it isn't always Napoleon or Hitler marching into their country. This is the way the Russians are fed the propaganda of their imperialism: the evil West is out to destroy Russia. We must fight back!!!

    Similar reasoning is evident in Communist China too: if China would let democracy work, then "the Middle kingdom" would collapse again due to separatism. Tibet and the Muslim west would go, but perhaps also the south and the north would separate.

    These fears of course forget that India, which has so many different people and ethnycities and religions, is a democracy, and isn't likely to collapse.     — ssu


    Not sure to what extent this comparison is useful. Russia and China didn’t experience established Western-like democratic institutions to effectively channel ethnic grievances. So the transition to a more democratic regime might more easily support separatist movements wherever the relation between ethnic groups is diverging or has been historically tense if not dramatic. See the case of ex-Yugoslavia.
    Even in India authoritarianism has been on the rise for a while now (https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/indias-endangered-democracy/) and national unity crisis has been called out by Indian intellectuals (https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-facing-collapse-of-nation-crisis-amartya-sen/articleshow/92583017.cms).


    But those are hypotheticals, just like the lie that if Americans withdraw from Afghanistan and leave the country to the Taliban, it will become a haven for terrorists. Well, has it? — ssu

    There are reasons to be optimistic, I’m not questioning this. But strategic thinking has to deal with hypotheticals, and taking into account the worst scenarios given certain realistic circumstances is part of the task.


    In my view in similar line with France and Germany. — ssu

    But in their case the reason is clearer and more relatable (if you are a Western European). The benefit/cost delta of this war may be more positive for the US and the Eastern Europeans, than for the Western Europeans, at least in the short term. And in the long term there are lots of unknowns.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    I'm not the one claiming this is all about rational debate like some rules-based chess game. This is politics. It's your hypocrisy I'm pointing out. — Isaac

    I'm simply pointing out to you that your claim of dispassionate, rational, chess-grandmaster "weighing of the evidence" is preformatively contradicted by your use of pejorative rhetoric. — Isaac

    I claimed nowhere that I’m dispassionate nor that a rational debate should be dispassionate.
    Even in playing basketball or chess one can be passionate, especially if the opponent cheats or plays lazily.
    I’m not even questioning the fact that our moral/political views are motivating our engagement in such political discussions, colouring our communicative style, pressing us for certain conclusions.
    However the fun part to me is mainly to play by argumentative rules that make one’s views rationally compelling to opponents’ views. Besides since this is a philosophy forum and not a science forum, we can more easily end up discussing our conceptual frameworks, our terminology, our beliefs’ inferential or explanatory power, etc. and this in turn can help not fix the world, but fix (clarify/reorder/clean up) one self’s ideas about the world.
    Where is the hypocrisy in all this exactly?
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Where was the argument in... — Isaac

    I didn't claim that I or anybody should provide only arguments and counter-arguments.

    Because it sounds like a weak attempt at sarcasm, followed by a lame cliché about anyone not cheerleading the war being pro-Russia. — Isaac

    As lame as your attempts at calling opposing views "cheerleading the war", "bollokcs" and "bullshit". Serving you your own "sarcastic" soup.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Your idea of pariahship is having people engage with you in page-long discussions? :chin:

    I'm sorry the forum isn't your personal echo chamber, I guess.     — Tzeentch

    I don't see the relation of your comment with what I wrote which was about taking position and its costs.
    Besides if I'm engaging with other people who think differently from me, how am I in an echo chamber?
    That's a philosophy forum, so I guess if people provide arguments and question each other's arguments with arguments, it should be welcomed. If you do not feel like playing this game with me, don't do it. No hard feelings.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    You're presented with two theories, which you otherwise can't tell between A and B. Those advocating for A stand to gain several hundred billion dollars from the pursuit of policies according to A, those advocating B stand to gain nothing but pariah-ship and contempt for advocating it, yet do so anyway. — Isaac

    A horrible and bloody internet "pariah-ship and contempt" is what the majority of anonymous users of this thread have to suffer from the minority of other anonymous users for advocating B and calling "bollocks" and "bullshit" thinking otherwise. But they are doing it for a good cause, the Ukrainians' well being, which they know much better than the Ukrainians themselves. And that's no virtue signaling by no means. From Russia, with love.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    ↪ssu



    A humiliating defeat might not be enough to get rid of Russian hegemonic ambitions once for all. It may set also the grounds for the next imperialist surge. Unless it brings to the dissolution of the Russian federation. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_dissolution_of_Russia
    But this may bring other problems to the West: the fate of the Russian federation’s nuclear stockpile, China hegemonic expansion in post-Russia federation states.
    The American leadership and engagement in this war is indispensable to force Russia to back down yet the Americans, despite the rhetoric, can’t be fully trusted by the allies. Not with Biden, way less with presidents like Trump (and next elections are getting closer). If Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria definitely compromised the American reputation more in the Rest, Trump definitely compromised the American reputation more within the West. And the American contribution in the war in Ukraine looks suspiciously too slow-paced and replete with mixed-signals. For the Europeans the future looks pretty grim, especially if they are not pro-active and coordinated in building their own foreign politics (like a “new deal“ with Africa? and South America?), and more autonomous in shaping their military security.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    The loss of their “empire” after the collapse of Soviet Union principally due to NATO expansion and the need to recover their hegemonic status overshadowed by the Americans. — neomac


    ...is hypothetical.

    offensive means to threat Western security — neomac


    ...the actual use of which is hypothetical.

    Russian hegemonic ambitions. — neomac


    ...which are hypothetical.

    promoted/pursued an anti-West alliance with other authoritarian states (like China and Iran) with hegemonic ambitions. — neomac


    ...hypothetical ambitions.     — Isaac


    So you practically ignored all other facts to focus on “hegemonic ambitions” which in the case of Russia, China, and Iran you claim to be “hypothetical”. Let’s first clarify terminology. How do you understand the notion of “hegemonic”? And what constitute evidence of “hegemonic ambitions” to you?

    Russia’s military activity beyond its borders up until now shows an actual non-hypothetical pattern of “Western containment” — neomac

    ...not even going to dignify this bullshit with a response.     — Isaac

    Unless this kind of answers is the best you can afford.

    There's no debate at all about the threat Russia poses to Ukraine. That's the difference. — Isaac

    There is debate also about the threat Russia poses to Ukraine. You can hear it when discussing about peace. Different peace scenarios and conditions are also influenced by a different understanding of the threat Russia poses to Ukraine.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Russia's threat to 'the West' is entirely hypothetical — Isaac

    There is absolutely nothing hypothetical about Russia's threat to 'the West'.
    • Russia has actual non-hypothetical motives to be hostile against the West. The loss of their “empire” after the collapse of Soviet Union principally due to NATO expansion and the need to recover their hegemonic status overshadowed by the Americans.
    • Russia has actual non-hypothetical offensive means to threat Western security (3rd country by military capability, largest stockpile of nuclear warheads in the world, cyberwar capabilities through hackers and disinformation agencies), and ways to heavily interfere in Western political life, through lobby and a network of far-right movements.
    • Russia has plenty of actual non-hypothetical pretexts and leverage to conduct anti-Western activities in the West: Russian minorities in neighbouring countries, rebellious countries like Serbia and Hungary , political ties and support from within the West (Trump being the most clear example encouraging Russian adventurism), and economic bonds that up until now induced complacency toward Russian hegemonic ambitions.
    • Russia has actually non-hypothetically made plenty of hostile declarations against the West since 2008 and has promoted/pursued an anti-West alliance with other authoritarian states (like China and Iran) with hegemonic ambitions.
    • Russia’s military activity beyond its borders up until now shows an actual non-hypothetical pattern of “Western containment”: by encircling Europe with its military activity in the mediterranean, North Africa, Middle East and the Baltics. And now by meddling in Western backyard with a genocidal war: Ukraine wants to join the West and is also plenty of natural resources the West may integrate in its economy (wheat and gas among others). And during this war Russia also dared to threaten the West with a nuclear escalation.
    So no, there is absolutely nothing hypothetical about Russia's threat to 'the West'.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Acting as if something is safe, when it isn't, just because it ought to be, is reckless. It's not complicated. — Isaac

    It's not complicated. As this one: acting as if Russia is not a threat to the West, when it is, just because the West ought to be peaceful, is reckless too.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Ukraine ought to be able to enjoy its sovereignty without being threatened by powerful neighbours. Pretending that's how the world is when it blatantly isn't is reckless. — Isaac

    Unless you are confusing "ought" claims with "is" claims, aren't you?
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    I think that the notion of "morality" is at the crossroad of different considerations pointing in different directions. So it's very possible that any definition may leave something out. For example, the problem of Gert's definition is that it leaves us wondering what the notion of "rational people" and the "specified conditions" may mean or be determined without begging the question or being too large (traffic rules maybe a rule of conduct that satisfies the definition without being moral) or too strict (in certain societies homosexuality is considered immoral).

    In this situation we better maximise our understanding of moral behaviour by analogy/contrast between moral conduct/norms and non-moral conduct/norms. Here I can draft the main points:
    • - Moral norms apply timelessly, spacelessly, and universally: they apply to individuals at any time, and do not change. That is different from ludic or professional norms that can apply to us at a given time (e.g. when we play when we sign a work contract). They also differ from law: legal norms can be changed over time (like in a democracy and they do it also for moral reasons) and space (different countries have different laws), but moral norms do not change. If homosexuality or killing innocent people is immoral, there was no prior time (or different place) in which homosexuality or killing innocent people was moral and a later time (or different place) where both turned out to be moral. We shouldn’t confuse moral norms with their popularity. Popularity can certainly change over time, space and individuals.
    • - Moral norms can always overrule non-moral norms in both conduct and ethic assessment: concerning the conduct, let’s say that there is a law legitimising prostitution or weed selling, whoever considers that law immoral may protest against it or not act the way those laws allow. So the way one feels or decides to act wrt the law is overruled by moral norms. That doesn’t mean that moral norms can’t be occasionally and narrowly suspended: e.g. in box people are allowed to physically hurt each other, or in a movie people are allowed to lie, in art naked adult sculptures are not considered obscene, etc. At the end of the day, people’s life is ultimately assessed wrt moral conduct. Namely one life is more valuable if it is compliant to moral norms more than it is to legal or fashion norms or artistic norms.
    • - Moral norms are self-promoting at social level and psychological level: it’s not just that individuals should follow moral norms (like do not kill, do not steal, do not lie) but they should also care if other individuals follow them (e.g through praise and blame). Moral norms have an intrinsic social dimension (like laws). We can think of a code of conduct for specific individuals e.g. a king’s code of conduct, or private in its genesis (e.g. the son promises his father to continue his business after he retires). But they are qualifiable as moral only to the extant they should become object of social pressure (praise and sanction). Moral norms should also be internalised in both conduct and emotion as pre-reflexive habits accompanied by specific feelings e.g. outrage, dignity and guilt. While economic and legal conducts are more dependent on cost/benefit calculi, can be more emotionally neutral and evolve over time.
  • Vogel's paradox of knowledge
    Al doesn't know that p and that he doesn't know that not-p. — Ludwig V

    This might be true from a third person perspective. Not from a first person perspective. If a person makes a knowledge claims and then she herself discovers that what she believed is false, the discovery of her belief's falsity itself would support another first-person knowledge claim.
    That's different from the knowledge claim where the justification is to be questioned. Imagine I claim: I know that Erik the Red used to wear horned helmets because Erik the Red is a Viking and Vikings used to wear horned helmets. But then I discover that archeologists have widely called as a myth the belief that Vikings used to wear horned helmets. Then I might say: I didn't know (not "I don't know"!) that Erik the Red used to wear horned helmets, or I doubt that Erik the Red used to wear horned helmets.
  • Vogel's paradox of knowledge
    Something reliable can fail once or twice and still be classed as reliable. But if something certain turns out wrong, it is no longer certain. — Ludwig V

    I get your point. Still it depends on what we are certain about. We can also be certain that something is reliable. So if that something turns out to be wrong that doesn't mean it's unreliable, or no longer certain.


    I prefer "defeasible" because "fallible knowledge" can be taken to mean that If I claim to know something on good grounds but it still turns out false, it is nonetheless knowledge. So I'm anxious to insist that knowledge doesn't fail - people do. So a claim to knowledge that p must be withdrawn if p turns out to be false. — Ludwig V

    I substantially agree but what I find more interesting to notice is the following: while the falsity of p implies that "I know that p" is false, the epistemic "withdrawal" from a belief that "turns out" to be false (as opposed to "unjustified") might correspond to different epistemic conditions: e.g. "I don't know that p", "I know that non-p", "I believe that non-p", "I don't believe that p", or "I doubt that p". Yet only "I know that non-p" would make sense to say to me in that case. In other words, knowledge claims defeated out of falsify are not just "withdrawn" but "replaced" by other knowledge claims.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Scott Ritter on prior to the Russian invasion (in December 2021): Russia won't invade Ukraine, it's a manufactured crisis (by the West) and if there would be war between Russia and Ukraine, Russia would defeat Ukraine in 6 to 7 days (If Ukraine made an attack in the Donbas). And so on... — ssu

    what a guy:
    On April 6, 2022, Ritter was suspended from Twitter for violating its rule on "harassment and abuse" after he posted a tweet claiming that the National Police of Ukraine is responsible for the Bucha massacre https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scott_Ritter
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Disagreements are occasions for anybody to review their beliefs and reasons, making them explicit, examine how they link together, find inconsistencies, inefficiencies, holes. And what makes this king of exchange philosophical to me is that we can dig further into our background assumptions, especially our conceptual frameworks. — neomac

    Bollocks. You've done none of those activities. All you've done is use the spectre of them to pour cold water on any counter-arguments you don't like. For example...

    here there is a whole package of deep assumptions of yours that would need some reviewing — neomac

    ... is typical of your responses. No actual review, no actual analysis, and God forbid any comparison to your own assumptions. Just enough distraction to blunt the point that you have used US government funded sources to back up US government policy.     — Isaac


    As usual, you put most of your intellectual effort in caricaturing me the way it suits you. It’s expected and boring to read, but it’s still an occasion to denounce your intellectual dishonesty.
    I was making a general point there. And this is supported by what I have done in several past exchanges: conerning the clarification of my conceptual framework, e.g. I discussed my understanding of moral claims (with you a while back, almost at the beginning of our exchange in this thread), of the relation between morality and power in my infamous “wall of text”, of the way I understand my contributions here with its implied limits and possibility of agreement (about the meaning of the words, evidence-based reasoning, expert feedback). I also take my time to clarify my terminology when needed.
    But of course I can’t expand on all points at the same time at any moment and with all the interlocutors (you may have missed a bunch of my points with other interlocutors). Even more so if on the other side there is an interlocutor who shifts the burden back to his opponent when invited to clarify his own deepest assumptions [1] , and who accuses his opponent to write “wall of texts” to provide the requested clarifications.
    Not to mention that I’m not here to entertain you, I’m here to entertain myself.



    BTW even opendemocracy is financed by grants from funds and trusts in the hands of philanthropic wealthy or ultracapitalists like Soros. And Soros isn’t so “well reputed“ either, is he? — neomac

    Indeed. And if ever I was arguing in favour of the General Theory of Reflexivity I wouldn't cite a Soros-funded think tank in support of such an argument as it would be obviously at risk of bias.
    You cited US government funded think tanks to support your belief in a US government policy. It's not just intellectually dishonest, it downright dumb. You seriously think that an organisation funded by the US government and arms manufacturers is going to give you an honest assessment of the state of the war in which both are intimately involved?     — Isaac

    OK let’s dig deeper into my conceptual assumptions.
    First, it’s in the nature of the division of labor (material and intellectual) that there are cognitive asymmetries and conflict of interests. Cognitive asymmetries and conflict of interests are practically pervasive and overwhelming in a complex society like ours, and they may facilitate abuses depending on the circumstances (i.e. there are implied social or institutional costs in case of abuse). Somebody selling products and services may be prone to a dishonest marketing, but also consumers consuming products and services may be prone to dishonest reviewing. We can’t a-priori exclude that dishonest dispositions are present in anybody when their self-interest is concerned in any competition over scarce resources. And self-interest is very cheap to guess: e.g. Mearsheimer is an academic professional that has a self-interest in selling his theories as the best on the market, jacobins are militant agents self-interested in promoting their ideology as the best on the market, you are self-interested in promoting you as the the smartest guy in this forum. ===> Hence you can not impress me by denouncing some conflict of interest.
    Second, when we have to cope with cognitive asymmetries plus conflict of interests, we are compelled to develop some trusting strategy (and trust doesn’t need to be unconditional) over time to prevent possible abuses of our trust. These strategies comprise informal cost/benefit assessments, risk/opportunity assessments for competition and cooperation, and through several iterations (dense and extended as anybody’s personal intellectual and social life) they end up building relatively stable informational social networks/channels. The point is that it’s part of our social survival to be able to integrate into our proximate informational habitat, and as long as we live in a Western capitalist society under the American hegemony we can’t likely spare ourselves from integrating with the available informational network/channels that this habitat offers to us (not matter how critical or self-aware we can possible be about this) ===> Hence you can not impress me by claiming I can’t definitely trust X because it’s an agent of American capitalism.
    Third, in our society mainstream and non-mainstream media are mostly controlled either by government or capitalists. Even academic expertise is financed and marketed by government or capitalists, and in each domain pool of experts can self-organise in enterprises that government and economic agents can rely on, because it’s functional to their activity. Even anti-system and fringe informational network like the jacobins’ can be supported by political/economic forces antagonising government or capitalists, NOT because they want or can fix the world injustice but because they want to grab power. ===> Hence you can not impress me by saying expert views that conflict with dominant economic/political elites’ main narrative are more trustworthy because they are not financed/supported by dominant economic/political elites.
    Fourth, since there is a “physiological” drive for self-perpetuation in any power system and practically any ideology needs power to win over the competition, it’s important for us to understand how agents of any power system reasons over power ===> Hence it's not just intellectually dishonest, but also downright dumb to take political/economic elites’ narratives (like US government funded think tanks to support your belief in a US government policy) exclusively as a function of a specific ideology or specific power system, and “deconstruct” them accordingly. It’s intellectually dishonest because ANY ideology needs power to be promoted (jacobins included), it’s downright dumb because such narratives offer relevant clues on how ANY power system could reason as a function of power needs in similar conditions (e.g. security dilemmas, militarisation, technological/military/intelligence performance, and how economic, demographic, social factors can shape them etc.)


    Besides your argument looks questionable for 2 reasons: on one side, it recommends not to be dismissive toward views alternative to the ones spread by mainstream outlets while suggesting to be definitely dismissive toward the mainstream outlets (“mainstream outlets can't be trusted (and they definitely can’t)” as if mainstream outlets are like astrologists). — neomac

    How is that questionable. I'm saying don't trust mainstream outlets on certain issues because they're funded by the people who benefit from the issue in question. There's no contradiction there, no error of fact. So in what way is it "questionable"?     — Isaac

    It’s questionable because it generically suggests a trusting strategy that discriminates between mainstream and non-mainstream outlets on the preposterous ground that a conflict of interest suffices to make the point. It’s like me saying: your baker has a conflict of interest in marketing his products, and for that reason he definitely can’t be trusted, you better go to a fruit shop.


    even if it was true that definitely mainstream outlets can’t be trusted, that doesn’t imply non-mainstream views can definitely be trusted — neomac

    Absolutely. Which would be why I never made such a claim.     — Isaac

    But it was implicated in what you claimed. If you suggest that mainstream should definitely not be trusted because X has conflict of interest better listen to non-mainstream, the implicature is that latter is worth trusting. The problem is that the latter too may have conflict of interests.


    your argument is so general that it holds for any alleged non-mainstream view (islamists, nazis, anarchists, satanists, QAnon or flat-earth believers, etc.) — neomac

    No it doesn't. I'm referring here solely to the use of expert opinion. Not lay opinion. If you can find me an expert in geology who thinks the earth is flat we can have that discussion, otherwise this is just more straw-manning. We hear this garbage argument every time someone brings up an alternative perspective; it's like you guys just pick these off the shelf.     — Isaac

    I didn’t commit a strawman, because you are clarifying now what you meant before, and I warned you already several times about the fact that your general objections are decontextualised wrt the current exchange.
    So if you want to be better understood, you better make a bigger effort in that direction. Indeed, your accusation is still without clear reference:
    No idea what you are referring to. In our most recent exchange Tzeentch didn’t point at any expert source for his “diversion” hypothesis, except for Mearsheimer. But we interpret Mearsheimer somewhat differently. In any case, I didn’t claim that Mearsheimer is running pro-Russian propaganda, nor deny that what he says in that video should be discounted or ignored.
    Besides if Tzeentch can question experts, I can do the same. But, for the moment, he is the one questioning the experts I’m citing, while I’m just defending them.
    You opportunistically jump into an exchange I had with another interlocutor to resume your most general objections in such a completely decontextualised way that demotivates any attempt to answer. For example, can you quote claims or objections of mine where your conditional (“if you want to claim 'likelihood' you need to show how your sources are more likely to be right than others”) is supposed to apply? Because I have no idea.
    Source: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/782980
    In any case, feel free to post here military/intelligence experts that have a different view wrt mainstream narrative about Putin’s objectives in the first phase of the war.

    [1]
    It’s important you answer those questions because you are the one who claimed “the rich oppress the poor far more consistently than one nation oppresses another” and believes it’s pertinent in the debate about the war in Ukraine. — neomac

    Your argument relies on this not being the case, so it is incumbent on you (if you want to support your argument) to disprove it. I’ve not interest in supporting my case here (I don't even believe it's possible to support such a case in a few hundred words on an internet forum, and even if I did, I wouldn't make such a case as I've no expertise in the matter).     — Isaac
  • Ukraine Crisis
    190,000 troops is completely insufficient to control Ukraine. Everyone, even your own preferred experts, seem to agree on that. So we've made some progress. — Tzeentch

    No idea why you call it “progress”. I never argued that 190K troops are sufficient to control Ukraine.



    Your option - that number is a product of astronomic Russian incompetence and wishful thinking. In other words: "the Russians are dummies".

    My option - that number is a product of limited Russian goals.     — Tzeentch

    Even if the Russians had limited goals since the beginning, their poor execution didn’t shine as a paradigmatic example of military competency.
    Russia failed to achieve what was likely its main political objective: to overthrow the Kyiv government in a blitzkrieg military operation. The Russian military also faced significant challenges seizing and holding territory. These problems contributed to the suspension or firing of several senior military officials, such as Lieutenant General Serhiy Kisel, commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army, for dereliction during the offensive against Kharkiv; Lieutenant General Vlaislav Yershov, commander of the 6th Combined Arms Army, for failing to capture Kharkiv; and Vice Admiral Igor Osipov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, following the sinking of the flagship cruiser Moskva. In addition, roughly a dozen Russian generals and other senior officials were killed on the battlefield, such as Lieutenant General Andrei Mordvichev, Lieutenant General Yakov Rezantsev, Major General Andrei Sukhovetsky, Major General Vitaly Gerasimov, Major General Kanamat Botashev, Major General Andrey Kolesnikov, and Major General Oleg Mityaev.13 These firings and deaths may have exacerbated command and control problems that the Russian military was already experiencing.
    Source: https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare



    Still Western source — neomac

    Gee, really? You have a problem with western sources now?     — Tzeentch

    You said “I don't base my arguments on western media sources either.” But you do.

    If you rely on the estimate of “21,000 troops” from that report why don’t you rely on the claim “the Russian military’s main effort remains seizing Kyiv in an effort to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate” ? — neomac

    Because those estimates are not being contested by anyone, while the claim is.
    Are you really going to hide behind random objections like these? This is getting a little childish.     — Tzeentch

    It’s not random at all. It’s still related to the issue of expert source reliability. I asked several times what your expert sources were. So far, in our recent exchange, you linked Mearsheimer’s video claiming it was supporting your “diversion” hypothesis. But Mearsheimer in the clips you posted didn’t make the argument that 21K troops deployed by the Russians make it outlandish to believe that “Russian military’s main effort remains seizing Kyiv in an effort to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate” in that video. Now you claim that “the Russian military’s main effort remains seizing Kyiv in an effort to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate” has been contested, I’m asking you again: link here the expert source you rely on.



    The connection you fail to make is that all these western sources have one thing in common - they all spin the "Russian incompetence" yarn. CSIS, as ↪Isaac
    pointed out, is funded by the US government and the DoD - that could be a clear sign of bias, but perhaps it is just something so simple as intellectual arrogance or tunnel vision.
    In any case, the contradictions in their analysis are plain for all to see, and I've been pointing them out repeatedly.     — Tzeentch

    What doesn’t square in their analysis is “plain to see” if one shares your assumptions about how Russians might have planned this operation. But your assumptions can be questioned, without you being able to provide direct evidence that Russians had just the limited objectives you specified from the start. Yours remain guess work as mine.
    Even if there is a “Russian incompetence” argument to spin (which I don’t need to exclude, after all “truth is the first casualty in war“), this is something the Russians should have taken into account in their years of preparation for this war. Wars are most certainly a showcase of military/intelligence/technological competence by geopolitical agents with hegemonic ambitions. And Russian poor performance on the ground plus Putin’s military/intelligence purges reinforced their infamous image of corrupted and incompetent system of power with foolish hegemonic ambitions. The poor execution of their maskirovka operation not only kind of squanders the credit of a smarter plan with limited goals but it also backlashed against their chances for a successful negotiation and a reputational promotion of their military power.
    Not to mention that also the pro-Russian propaganda my be interested to spin the “feint” argument to minimise the reputational costs Russians have suffered on the ground.



    Let's do a quick recap:

    190,000 troops were insufficient to control large parts of Ukraine.
    You argue instead that the Russians' main goal was to control Ukraine by installing a puppet in Kiev.
    My objection to this is along two lines:

    > A puppet regime is completely unfeasible under conditions that were known prior to the invasion. The amount of western influence in Ukraine, the threat of a western-backed insurgency, the lack of troops to maintain control, etc. Your experts at CSIS seem to believe a Russian puppet would have "lasted hours."

    > The northern drive on Kiev in no way indicates either in its troop count or behavior that it comprised the Russians' main effort. If that had been the case we would have expected to see an attempt to overwhelm the Ukrainian defense through massed forces and firepower.

    Note: I did not claim the drive was too small to capture Kiev, though it was likely too small to capture Kiev if any sizable Ukrainian defense was present, which likely there was since it's the Ukrainian capital, though the Ukrainian order of battle remains undisclosed.
    Nor did I argue that the Russians didn't want Kiev. Just that the troop count and behavior does not imply the Russians were prepared to pay much of a cost to capture it, which in turn implies it was not of a high priority.

    My alternative to this theory is as follows:

    > Given the Russians' relatively low troop count in relation to the size of Ukraine and the Ukrainian military, their ambitions were likely limited to occupying strategically relevant areas in the south and east of Ukraine. Occupying small pieces of Ukraine mitigates the risk of insurgency.

    > The drive on Kiev likely had multiple possible goals, the first of which was probably to try and force the West to negotiate. If this failed, the attack would still be functioning as a diversion to lure Ukrainian defenders away from the strategically relevant areas in the east/south. Had the Ukrainians left their capital largely undefended in favor of defending the east/south, Kiev could have been captured.

    I've said all I have to say on the topic. I don't think further exchanges will yield much fruit, so I will leave it here. I suggest you try to make your case succinctly one last time like I did with my recap, so we end the conversation with a nice summary from both sides.     — Tzeentch

    What is missing in your recap is that you consider outlandish my view while I can acknowledge to your speculation some plausibility plus the benefit of being at least more economic (which doesn’t necessarily mean more plausible). So I might just add that a series of facts (like the assassination attempts against Zelensky, purges from Putin and Zelensky against high ranks in military and/or intelligence service, heavy losses of the Russian operation, Putin’s and Yanukovic’s calls, expert reports from CSIS, Wilson Centre, RUSI) and some background assumptions (like an economic/military/political network between Ukraine and Russia, an “illegally” ousted Ukrainian president to reinstate, besides the hazardous nature of Putin’s geopolitical ambitions and personalistic chain of command) support the idea (shared by Mearsheimer too!) that Russians might have actually tried to pursue regime change in the earliest phase of the war.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    As already said, “likelihood” expresses to me an assessment of the degree of confidence. There is no formula about this. Just informal assessment about what I’ve read so far from different sources — neomac


    Is there then a reason why you'd expect your "informal assessment" to be the same as anyone else's? You seem affronted by the fact that other people's views are different to yours. If you recognise it's all just "informal assessment" that should be expected.     — Isaac

    With your initial question, you seem to understand my claim out of its context. I was talking about “likelihood” as applied to expert feedback. This is an informal assessment expressing degree of confidence. That claim doesn’t imply nor presuppose that we all share the same degree of confidence for expert source.
    The rest of your comment seems to go back to the reasons why we are here. This is a philosophy forum. A place where people can discuss their reasons for believing certain things and question them. Disagreements are occasions for anybody to review their beliefs and reasons, making them explicit, examine how they link together, find inconsistencies, inefficiencies, holes. And what makes this kind of exchange philosophical to me is that we can dig further into our background assumptions, especially our conceptual frameworks. That’s an intellectual exercise that can be enjoyed as such, without being pressed by any moral, political, affective, humanitarian urge. Like a game. So having opponents is not the problem or reason for animosity. I’ll take it as part of the game I am playing.
    I’m just averse to intellectual dishonesty as in any game where rules are breached intentionally.



    CSIS — neomac


    ... seriously?

    CSIS is funded largely by Western and Gulf monarchy governments, arms dealers and oil companies, such as Raytheon, Boeing, Shell, the United Arab Emirates, US Department of Defense, UK Home Office, General Dynamics, Exxon Mobil, Northrop Grumman, Chevron and others. — https://fair.org/home/nyt-reveals-think-tank-its-cited-for-years-to-be-corrupt-arms-booster/


    WilsonCenter — neomac


    ... uh huh

    Approximately one-third of the center's operating funds come annually from an appropriation from the U.S. government, and the center itself is housed in a wing of the Ronald Reagan Building, a federal office building where the center enjoys a 30-year rent-free lease. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Woodrow_Wilson_International_Center_for_Scholars


    RUSI — neomac


    https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/ourbeeb/why-is-bbc-presenting-rusi-as-objective-analysts-of-middle-east/

    None of this is difficult to find. You just don't want to find it.     — Isaac

    By “well reputed” I didn’t mean that they are praised as anti-capitalist heroes by jacobins (here there is a whole package of deep assumptions of yours that would need some reviewing). I meant that in the domain of military/intelligence expertise they are “well reputed“ but if you have better source for military/intelligence expertise (indeed I wrote “(why aren’t they ‘well reputed’? What are better reputed domains-specific sources?)”), you can post it here.
    BTW even opendemocracy is financed by grants from funds and trusts in the hands of philanthropic wealthy or ultracapitalists like Soros. And Soros isn’t so “well reputed“ either, is he?


    I don’t think that non-US and non-Western administrations and media are immune from accusations about their honesty. The same goes for non-mainstream and anti-system source, not mention that they can absolutely be infiltrated, exploited and financed by foreign powers. What one can infer from such predicament or how we may cope with it is up for debate. — neomac

    It's really very, very simple. Don't dismiss dissent from mainstream views as if it were the notions of some conspiratorial nutters.
    If mainstream outlets can't be trusted (and they definitely can't) then views which dissent from the mainstream are not compromised simply because of that dissent. It is not a 'mark against them' in terms of credibility.     — Isaac

    “Mainstream” points to “medium” accessibility/popularity. Lots of academic source is not accessible by the widest audience yet it is trustworthy to me. Also within the “mainstream” world not all sources enjoy the same reputation or popularity. Alternative views, even fringe views, can find their way into the mainstream media. My criteria for placing trust in source of information is not based exclusively nor primarily on the distinction between mainstream and non-mainstream as you seem to suggest. And even in this case, it doesn’t need to be unconditional.
    Besides your argument looks questionable for 2 reasons: on one side, it recommends not to be dismissive toward views alternative to the ones spread by mainstream outlets while suggesting to be definitely dismissive toward the mainstream outlets (“mainstream outlets can't be trusted (and they definitely can’t)” as if mainstream outlets are like astrologists). On the other, even if it was true that definitely mainstream outlets can’t be trusted, that doesn’t imply non-mainstream views can definitely be trusted, and notice that your argument is so general that it holds for any alleged non-mainstream view (islamists, nazis, anarchists, satanists, QAnon or flat-earth believers, etc.)
  • Ukraine Crisis
    ↪ssu
    :up:

    talking about Russian plots:
  • Ukraine Crisis
    ↪ssu
    very interesting articles!
  • Ukraine Crisis
    If I’m claiming that “Russia likely pursued regime change in the first phase of the war based on what has been reported”, I need to provide what has been reported. And I did. — neomac

    No. If your claim is about likelihood, you need to provide some metric of likelihood (or prove that your record of 'what has been reported' is exhaustive). Without either, all you've shown is that it is plausible that Russia pursued regime change in the first phase of the war. You've not presented an argument regarding the claim that it was 'likely'.     — Isaac

    As already said, “likelihood” expresses to me an assessment of the degree of confidence. There is no formula about this. Just informal assessment about what I’ve read so far from different sources (which I partly linked). It’s like you talking about your experience, you can assess regularities and compare quantities, even without counting the exact amount of units, or computing and charting the actual stats. So at best I can try to explicit what kind of general criteria I consider to support such confidence on experts’ feedback, as I did. And what I could understand from there. But none of this will look like an academic review of course, nor does have to.


    That is why we are making alternative sources of information available to you. If you ignore them, that's an issue of bias, not availability. — Isaac

    No idea what you are referring to. In our most recent exchange Tzeentch didn’t point at any expert source for his “diversion” hypothesis, except for Mearsheimer. But we interpret Mearsheimer somewhat differently. In any case, I didn’t claim that Mearsheimer is running pro-Russian propaganda, nor deny that what he says in that video should be discounted or ignored.
    Besides if Tzeentch can question experts, I can do the same. But, for the moment, he is the one questioning the experts I’m citing, while I’m just defending them.

    Nonsense. You cite US government sources and those who cite them in turn, occasionally turning to Western mainstream media. None of these are "well reputed”. The US government have been shown time and time again to lie; with sources from military intelligence it is literally their job to lie (when it serves their country's interests). As to mainstream Western media, only recently has the Columbia Journalism Review written a damning report of press coverage regarding Russia, and here on the Ukraine war itself, The Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting group have written a considerable number of articles highlighting serious bias in press reporting (including specifically on Ukraine), not to mention the shocking level of blatant racism.
    As I said. If you merely want to claim plausibility, it is sufficient that your sources meet a threshold of expertise (which military intelligence and sourced journalism would meet), but if you want to claim 'likelihood' you need to show how your sources are more likely to be right than others, You've not even begun to make that argument.     — Isaac

    First, I didn’t cite only US government sources if you are referring to CSIS and WilsonCenter (why aren’t they “well reputed”? What are better reputed domain-specific sources?), I cited RUSI and Mearsheimer himself.
    Second, I don’t know what to make about your hyperbolic skepticism about the US government or Western mainstream media. On one side Western people can also learn about the US administration’s lies from mainstream media and other US administrations. On the other, I don’t think that non-US and non-Western administrations and media are immune from accusations about their honesty. The same goes for non-mainstream and anti-system source, not mention that they can absolutely be infiltrated, exploited and financed by foreign powers. What one can infer from such predicament or how we may cope with it is up for debate. Certainly, I don’t need to unconditionally trust the sources I’m providing here, I’m fine with elaborating my understanding of the war from such sources and to what extent I find them compelling. Finally, as I repeated many times, I’m more interested in the geopolitical implications than in the military/intelligence details: even if the “diversion” hypothesis turned out to be correct, this may not significantly impact the main geopolitical implications of this war.
    Third, you opportunistically jump into an exchange I had with another interlocutor to resume your most general objections in such a completely decontextualised way that demotivates any attempt to answer. For example, can you quote claims or objections of mine where your conditional (“if you want to claim 'likelihood' you need to show how your sources are more likely to be right than others”) is supposed to apply? Because I have no idea.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    This was a week into the war. You're using statements made months apart, under entirely different circumstances and in both cases no actual argument is presented for your claim. — Tzeentch

    I’m talking about Mearsheimer only because you took him to support your claims, which I find questionable. Besides I’m less interested in the details of the military special operation than you seem to be. If Mearsheimer’s argument in that video was that 190K ground troops were not enough to conquer the entire Ukraine, why did Mearsheimer concede that Russians might have pursued the capture of Kiev knowing that they didn’t have enough troops to capture Kiev? And EVEN IF later Mearsheimer changed his views about regime change (something which is not evident since he keeps talking about capturing Kiev, the Ukrainian political capital) , why on earth would I discount Mearsheimer’s claims in the first week of the war if at that time he found already enough credible the idea that the Russians were pursuing a regime change (at least in the earliest days of the war) given that early estimates weren’t certainly supporting that belief?! I’m not discounting the possibility that over march Russians may have realised that their most optimistic plan (regime change) wasn’t achievable, so that they were left with other more workable options. But it would be a revisionist fallacy to infer Russian intentions at the beginning of the war from Russian intentions at later stages of the war, as you seem to do.


    If the capture of Kiev would have forced a surrender and/or regime change, why was only a small portion of the Russian force dedicated to capturing it, and the Russians seemingly did not engage in heavy fighting in their operations around Kiev? I don't believe capturing Kiev would have been decisive at all. With a sizable Ukrainian military and western support the war could have been carried on from elsewhere in the country, possibly even over the border from a NATO country. — Tzeentch

    I already answered, but if you keep dismissing my answers as baseless because they do not provide whatever evidence you would find compelling, what can I do about it?
    If the Russians were relying on certain conditions like a military coup from within Ukraine and the population wasn’t so hostile (compare to the case of Crimea) and the logistic/coordination wasn’t so shitty and they manage to kill Zelensky, etc. things may have panned out differently for the Russians even with a small number of ground troops. As you suggested elsewhere the Russians had years to prepare for such war and a whole network of economic/state apparatus insiders to plot this with. So the likelihood of success depended on the cumulative effect of several factors in the most optimistic scenario the Russians might have had in mind at the beginning of the war. This is what I understood from different expert reports.
    And any single evidence might be deemed only circumstantial if considered in isolation from all other factors and their background history.

    Besides he’s claim is more cautious than yours: “There are no exact formulas for how many soldiers are required to hold conquered territory, but a force ratio of as many as 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants has sometimes been necessary to pacify a hostile local population.” — neomac

    Ahem. From the very same article...

    The force ratio of Russian soldiers in Ukraine was far too small to hold territory—including cities—for long.     — Tzeentch

    Ahem. From the very same article: “Russia failed to achieve what was likely its main political objective: to overthrow the Kyiv government in a blitzkrieg military operation.”
    So Jones’ claim (“The force ratio of Russian soldiers in Ukraine was far too small to hold territory—including cities—for long”) doesn’t seem enough to assess what Russia likely intentions were (at least at the beginning of the war), as you do ! Jones is not arguing that since “the force ratio of Russian soldiers in Ukraine was far too small to hold territory—including cities—for long” therefore overthrowing the Kyiv government most certainly wasn’t the main political objective Russians and it would be outlandish to think otherwise, indeed he claims it was and they failed it.



    So the point of contention is whether regime change is a feasible option without occupying (the vast majority of) Ukraine. I think it isn't because:
    - The Ukrainian military was never decisively defeated.
    - There is/was plenty of anti-Russian/pro-Western sentiment in Ukraine, especially in the western parts.
    - Western backing would likely counteract Russian influence in areas not held directly by the Russian military, if not outright create and fund a widespread insurgency.
    We've seen the United States try to enact regime change under much more advantageous conditions with no success.     — Tzeentch

    OK but that’s your personal view. Maybe the Russians had different views. For example I wouldn’t exclude that the Russians might have considered the Malorossia region (Kiev) as less anti-Russian than the Western side of Ukraine (Galicia), giving them some hope to find less hostile masses. Or that Ukrainian military would have been less of a problem if part of it also in the highest ranks would have revolted against Zelensky. On the other side I wouldn’t exclude that the Ukrainians didn’t fully trust Western military aid, or they might have feared further mobilisation, escalations, involvement of additional Russian private militia, etc. from Russians.
    In any case, I never said that regime change would have implied the end of the war.


    Where did you get the estimates of the number of Russian troops were between 15000 and 30000? — neomac

    The day-by-day campaign assessments by ISW. (note: not western media)
    On February 26th, 2022 their report stated:
    The Russian military’s main effort remains seizing Kyiv in an effort to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate. The Ukrainian General Staff reported at 11am local time February 26 that Ukrainian forces halted 14 Russian BTGs northeast of Kyiv and that Russia has committed its northern reserves – an additional 17 BTGs – along this operational direction.
    As you can see, these estimates are based on reports from the Ukrainian general staff.
    31 BTGs each comprised of roughly 600 - 800 officers and soldiers amounts to roughly 21,000 troops.
    As far as I know these numbers aren't being contested. If anything a western source would likely have a tendency to overstate rather than to understate Russian troop numbers. If they are being contested please show it to me and I might reconsider.     — Tzeentch

    Still Western source and no “tangible” evidence (you didn’t count them yourself, did you?). If you rely on the estimate of “21,000 troops” from that report why don’t you rely on the claim “the Russian military’s main effort remains seizing Kyiv in an effort to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate” ?
    The problem is not the lack of “tangible” evidence but a putative “blatant” incompatibility between the estimated number of ground troops and the estimated objective of the Russians. Yet if you find them so blatantly incompatible (because with 21,000 troops they couldn’t possibly overthrow Kiev’s regime), don’t you think that ISW would have noticed such blatant incompatibility? And once again, why did the Ukrainian feel threatened by 21k ground troops if this number was blatantly insufficient to capture Kiev, “Ukrainian military was never decisively defeated”, “There is/was plenty of anti-Russian/pro-Western sentiment in Ukraine, especially in the western parts”, “Western backing would likely counteract Russian influence in areas not held directly by the Russian military, if not outright create and fund a widespread insurgency”? Do you want me to believe that ISW, CSIS, WilsonCenter, RUSI, Ukrainian military experts don’t know the Russian military doctrine and couldn’t possibly think it was a maskirovka operation?
    Again, the problem is not just that there is a “blatant” incompatibility, but that it appears to you a “blatant” incompatibility in light of your assumptions about the kind of war was fought in the first phase.
  • Vogel's paradox of knowledge
    ↪Ludwig V


    "reliability" instead of "certainty", "defeasible" instead of "fallible".
    What's the difference in both cases?
  • Ukraine Crisis
    When you objected (“Russians were going to install a puppet regime in Kiev while occupying less than 1/5th of the country”) I argued yes so does Mearsheimer in that video by saying that a possible aim of Russia was capturing Kiev [2]. — neomac

    Where did you get the idea that Mearsheimer argues the Russians could install a puppet regime by capturing Kiev?     — Tzeentch

    Mearsheimer doesn’t explicitly talk about regime change in that video, all right. But he did it elsewhere:
    You don’t think he has designs on Kyiv?
    No, I don’t think he has designs on Kyiv. I think he’s interested in taking at least the Donbass, and maybe some more territory and eastern Ukraine, and, number two, he wants to install in Kyiv a pro-Russian government, a government that is attuned to Moscow’s interests.     https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine (March 1, 2022)
    And it makes sense. What else would be the purpose of capturing the political capital of Ukraine be? Forcing a negotiation (so surrender) and/or regime change. One can’t exclude regime change.



    Are you really going to stake your argument on a single line by Mearsheimer which he treats as no more than a passing comment? — Tzeentch

    Don’t need to, but you used to support your claims that “It's equally unlikely that with such a small force they sought to both occupy and hold Kiev and install a puppet regime and occupy and hold the southern regions”. So that comment doesn’t seem to support such a claim of yours.



    I'll repeat myself: it's obvious that Kiev was an interesting military and political target for the Russians. If they could have taken it at no cost they probably would have, for a myriad of possible reasons. However, the data from the battle does not indicate they were prepared to pay much of a cost at all, which puts into question the idea that their entire campaign hinged on capturing Kiev. — Tzeentch


    I didn’t even exclude that “things may have evolved differently from what initially planned, and still be worth it”. The change might have happened any time over march. In any case, the reports talking about blitzkrieg in capturing Kiev are giving a meaningful time range of around three days.



    I’m not over/underestimating anything because I’m relying on legit source reports. — neomac


    Your own source, Seth G. Jones, states that subdueing a country's population with a force ratio of 4 to 1000 is woefully inadequate, regardless of what metric you pick. I've already rebutted your example of Afghanistan which serves as a clear example in favor of the case I am making.     — Tzeentch

    That’s evidently false, Seth G. Jones himself claims: “Russia failed to achieve what was likely its main political objective: to overthrow the Kyiv government in a blitzkrieg military operation.”
    Besides he’s claim is more cautious than yours: “There are no exact formulas for how many soldiers are required to hold conquered territory, but a force ratio of as many as 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants has sometimes been necessary to pacify a hostile local population.” (so there are some assumptions to make, to accept that formula)
    https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare



    And no source or argumentation is given - not very convincing. Mearsheimer contradicts Jones directly and gives a detailed argumentation as to why he believes the Russians did not aim for a classic blitzkrieg. — Tzeentch

    Mearsheimer does not contradict Jones, because Mearsheimer is arguing against the idea that Russia could conquer the entire of Ukraine. If I’m reading more into Mearsheimer’s claims in that video, you do the same.


    Except that I don't base my arguments on western media sources either. — Tzeentch

    Really? Where did you get the estimates of the number of Russian troops were between 15000 and 30000? Did you count them yourself?
  • Ukraine Crisis
    If you want only to prove that your view is plausible, then you need to show that you have sufficient evidence and that it is trustworthy. You're failing to do that because you're instead asking others to show their evidence or to show yours isn't trustworthy. This is an incorrect burden of proof for this type of claim. Other people lacking evidence is not evidence that your position is plausible, it's evidence that their position might not be.

    If you want to prove that another's view is implausible, then you need to show that their position is overwhelmed by evidence to the contrary. You keep failing to do this because you revert instead to merely showing that there is evidence to contrary (sufficient to show your view is plausible, but insufficient to show another's view isn't).

    If you want to prove that your view is more likely true than another's, then you need to have some metric of likelihood. Again, you keep failing to do this, merely pointing out that there exists evidence of alternative views, none of which has any bearing on likelihood.

    You've written huge volumes of text, all of which add up to nothing more than that there exists evidence which supports (some of) your views. That's not an argument. That's the bare minimum threshold of entry into the debate. You then have to go on to argue either likelihood, or the implausibility (lack of evidence) for the alternative view. Otherwise, all you're doing is showing, at enormous length, that you qualify to be heard. Something which no-one is now contesting.     — Isaac

    Your opportunistic accusations are overlooking context and assumptions of my claims and objections.
    To me the “burden of proof” depends on what is claimed in the first place. If I’m claiming that “Russia likely pursued regime change in the first phase of the war based on what has been reported”, I need to provide what has been reported. And I did.
    Second “burden of proof” is limited by the available information, and how I can process them. I said and repeated that mine are just speculations under uncertainty (namely we lack enough relevant information to make my case conclusive) from a non-expert avg dude in a philosophy forum post format. Therefore there is no “overwhelmed by evidence” I can offer about “Russia likely pursued regime change in the first phase of the war” other then what has been reported by experts. As I already clarified even talking generically about evidences in a non-principled way is pointless, because I might still be unable to assess their authenticity or relevance due to lack of expertise.
    Third “burden of proof” can be assessed in terms of “likelihood” depending what it is claimed. “Likelihood” expresses to me an assessment of the degree of confidence. Generically speaking, the platforms I reported from (and they were just a part of the sources I consulted) are well reputed, domain-specific, corroborate each other and do not contradict my wider background assumptions. Hence the degree of confidence I put on them is enough to use them for my speculations.
    Fourth “there exists evidence which supports (some of) your views” holds also e.g. for Tzeench’s argument. The problem is not on the evidence, but on the assumptions made to assess those evidences. The price to pay for holding Tzeench assumptions is to conclude “the entirety of your argument, nay the entire western narrative, hinges on the idea that the Russians went in with a force to destroy the Ukrainian military and occupy all of Ukraine - something which is almost directly contradicted by the facts”, which are wrong (as far as I’m concerned) or implausible (as far as experts’ feedback is concerned).
  • Vogel's paradox of knowledge
    4. Having answered all three questions, would you like to revise your answer to any of them?

    5. Why?     — Ludwig V

    The point for me is that:
    1. "knowledge" claim is a principled based or procedural form of certainty. And principles/procedures can validate our "knowledge" claim to the extant they are reliable.
    2. we can't meaningfully set validation epistemic procedures arbitrarily high.
    Condition one makes "knowledge" claims legitimate. Condition two makes knowledge" claims fallible.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Mearsheimer claims that the strategic objective Russians were aiming at were either capturing or threatening Kiev. — neomac

    He does say that, without any elaboration whatsoever.     — Tzeentch

    I don’t care about your excuses. I myself still do not understand what “threatening” means if not “threatening to capture”.


    You look confused. — neomac

    Are you really implying the Russians were going to install a puppet regime in Kiev while occupying less than 1/5th of the country, with a western-trained, western-backed Ukrainian military occupying the rest, and an angry Ukrainian population to reckon with, with 190,000 troops? — Tzeentch

    Right, so it’s FALSE the assumption that one needs military control over the whole territory to install a puppet regime. — neomac

    Do you know what a strawman is?

    ... yet in the same post you claim that my argument hinges on “occupy all of Ukraine”. — neomac

    Which it essentially does, whether you realise it or not.     — Tzeentch


    Again you look confused. You made and apparently still making 2 claims [1], that Mearsheimer’s video supports your “diversion” theory but in that video Mearhsiemer is arguing against the hypothesis that Russia wanted to conquer the whole of Ukraine (which you claim my argument hinges on), so I argued against this by saying that no Russia didn’t need to conquer all of Ukraine. When you objected (“Russians were going to install a puppet regime in Kiev while occupying less than 1/5th of the country”) I argued yes so does Mearsheimer in that video by saying that a possible aim of Russia was capturing Kiev [2]. So no, I’m not strawmanning you, at best you are strawmanning yourself.



    Second, I do not have an equation on how many ground troops are necessary to ensure the success of a regime change in Ukraine. So the quantities you are considering in your arguments (“1/5th with the 4/5ths”, “occupy all of Ukraine”, “the vast majority of the country”) may make sense to support your claims under certain conditions, but not under all conditions (e.g. it depends on how hostile the population is, the contribution from state apparatus insiders, the support of aircraft/rocket shelling, the size of the targeted territory, etc.). — neomac

    It makes imminent sense in the conditions the Ukraine war is fought under.
    A large, capable Ukrainian military (outnumbering the Russians even). Vast amounts of Western support, etc.
    Regime change under the conditions you have suggested is outlandish.


    Russia might have had a complex strategy wrt Kiev (based on different possible scenarios), which include regime change. — neomac

    Again, lovely theory, but where is the evidence?
    Every time you need to invent a more complicated explanation as to why the facts don't line up with your view it becomes less convincing.     — Tzeentch

    Your argument is just dismissive of what has been reported due to the lack of certain evidence, which is essential if your assumptions are correct. And the assumptions are roughly that the conditions at the beginning of the war were such that the Russians absolutely needed a certain number of ground troops which they didn’t deploy, and since they knew that all along that implies it was likely a maskirovka kind of operation (at best aiming at forcing the Ukrainians to a negotiation table).
    But I’m questioning that assumption based on what has been reported. So your argument begs the question.



    To achieve regime change ground troops might have not been enough (also depending on how hostile the population would have proven to be), but in addition to that rocket/air-force strikes, possible inside jobs (especially by collaborationists within military/intelligence service favourable to a coup [1]) and killing Zelensky might have compensated. All these conditions are not implausible since they have some support from the available reports. — neomac

    You vastly overestimate the weight of miscellaneous factors, and underestimate the importance of boots on the ground. No control means no regime change.
    Your own article already blows your theory out of the water since it puts into perspective what kind of force is needed to occupy and control a population and what the Russians actually fielded.
    Remember your example of Afghanistan? The US enjoyed every advantage imaginable. A decisive military victory, complete air dominance, support from multi-national coalitions and indigenous forces, a way higher troop-to-population ratio. It was fighting a third world country. And it still lost. Russia has NONE of those things.     — Tzeentch

    First, I’m not over/underestimating anything because I’m relying on legit source reports. If you find them unreliable, that’s still your problem not mine.
    Second, no the article doesn’t blow out of the water my “theory out of the water since it puts into perspective what kind of force is needed to occupy and control a population” because the article (June 2022) is reporting about how the war in Kyiv actually evolved on the ground under the assumption that “a force ratio of as many as 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants has sometimes been necessary to pacify a hostile local population” and nothing of this questions the assumptions about Russian intentions that were made in the earliest phase of the war as reported on the same expert platform (March 2022): Russian intelligence and military agencies are also supporting paramilitary actors in Ukraine to conduct sabotage and subversion. The highest density of Russian-backed units appears to be in eastern Ukraine, where Russia has provided tanks, small arms, mobile artillery, fuel, training, and other aid to separatist rebels. Russian forces have helped create, sustain, and fund separatist political parties in Ukraine; established and aided paramilitary groups such as the Russian Orthodox Army and the Night Wolves; and recruited Cossack, Chechen, Serbian, and Russian paramilitaries to fight in Ukraine.16 But this Russian assistance to groups in Ukraine appears to be growing. One use of these groups may be in sabotage and other irregular warfare or “fifth column” activities in the capital of Kiev or in the rear of Ukrainian military forces while Russian conventional forces advance from the east. In addition, the Kremlin has developed plans to install a pro-Russian leader in Ukraine, according to British intelligence, possibly via a coup. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-gamble-ukraine
    Indeed, even in the very same article you took that excerpts it is still claimed: Russia failed to achieve what was likely its main political objective: to overthrow the Kyiv government in a blitzkrieg military operation. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare
    Whether those assumptions about early Russian intentions were wrong can’t be proved just by size and movement of ground troops over one month (even more so if one takes into account Russian logistical and coordination failures).



    Except that I'm not basing myself on Russian sources, but nice try. — Tzeentch

    As if in Western media are impenetrable by pro-Russian propaganda that you can read and regurgitate here.



    Here for more details: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/23003689/putin-ukraine-russia-donbas-energy-feint — neomac

    Don't bother with such blatantly biased and low-quality articles. The some of the sources linked in that article literally lead to Twitter.     — Tzeentch

    As if experts can’t comment the war on Twitter.



    If the point of the advance on Kiev was to force the Ukrainian leadership to the negotiating table they succeeded actually. Those negotiations failed, though - blocked by the US, we now know. And obviously Russia is so far unable to end the western policy of NATO membership for Ukraine, which I agree is probably their primary strategic objective. — Tzeentch

    So let’s not loop over the same arguments once again. (And notice I'm not claiming that your hypothesis is outlandish, while you do claim that mine is).



    [1]
    The Russians invaded Ukraine while outnumbered, with a force that was way too small to occupy all of it. This leads me to believe that the territories they occupied in east and southern Ukraine probably roughly coincide with the initial aims of the invasion.
    Mearsheimer makes that point in detail. — Tzeentch


    Russia pursued regime change, denazification of Ukraine. This doesn’t require the occupation of all Ukraine, it requires to take control over Kiev and install a pro-Russian puppet regime (as the US did in Afghanistan). So far Russia tried but failed this objective. Along with the objective of demilitarization (or neutrality). Ukraine is getting more pro-Western and its chances of joining the West have arguably increased thanks to the war started by Putin.
    The small number of troops at the beginning of the war was likely because Russians didn’t expect the kind of fierce resistance the Ukrainians demonstrated (due to the Russian intelligence failure).
    Concerning Mearsheimer’s video, it’s too long. It would be easier if you specified at what point of that video Mearsheimer is offering arguments in support of your belief that "the territories they [the Russians] occupied in east and southern Ukraine probably roughly coincide with the initial aims of the invasion".     — neomac





    [2]
    Are you really implying the Russians were going to install a puppet regime in Kiev while occupying less than 1/5th of the country, with a western-trained, western-backed Ukrainian military occupying the rest, and an angry Ukrainian population to reckon with, with 190,000 troops? — Tzeentch


    Yes I do. And also Mearsheimer is confirming it at minute 24:20 Mearsheimer of your video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qciVozNtCDM) where he claims that the strategic objective of 190K Russian troops were aiming at either capturing or threatening Kiev and conquer a large swath of territory in East and South Ukraine. And that is not implausible if one takes into account the Russian intelligence failure I was talking about (among other possible miscalculations, of course).     — neomac


    23:05 - 27:20 discusses the implications of the size of the Russian invasion force.
    1:30:40 - 1:32:00 Mearsheimer makes the point that he believes Russian territorial ambitions escalated as the war progressed.
    Mearsheimer throughout the lecture actually argues that Russia might not have had any major territorial ambitions at all at the start of the war.
    And recent revelations about the peace negotiations that took place weeks into the conflict might actually confirm that. The Russians were willing to make major concessions when they negotiated for Ukrainian neutrality, and it might only be after the negotiations failed that the Russian strategy changed to annexing parts of Ukraine. — Tzeentch


    In the first clip Mearsheimer’s is questioning the idea that Russia could conquer the entire of Ukraine. In the second clip Mearsheimer is questioning the alleged imperialistic ambitions of Putin. Neither of these arguments are relevant to counter the arguments that there were intelligence failures on the Russian side that might have compromised their strategic objectives whatever they were.
    Said that, I also remark that at minute 24:20 Mearsheimer is claiming that the strategic objective of 190K Russian troops were aiming at either capturing or threatening Kiev and conquer a large swath of territory in East and South Ukraine. That doesn’t seem to support your claim “It's equally unlikely that with such a small force they sought to both occupy and hold Kiev and install a puppet regime and occupy and hold the southern regions”, it just supports the idea that the Russian military deployment wasn’t enough to subdue the entire Ukraine.     — neomac
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