Comments

  • Ukraine Crisis
    Assuming that's true, and I suspect that it is (and probably the reason why the order of battle remains undisclosed), this means the defense of Kiev was a successful Russian attempt at diverting forces away from the east. — Tzeentch

    Logic jump [1].

    If we are to believe Hersh's sources, it turns out the idea of the advance on Kiev being a binding operation and not an attempt at capturing and occupying Kiev - an idea that I have posited multiple times in this thread - wasn't so far-fetched after all. In fact, it might've been exactly what took place. — Tzeentch


    In other words, the western media spin was pure bullshit to influence the public perception of Ukraine's chances in this war.

    Let me end by saying, I find no pleasure in these hard facts.     — Tzeentch

    Rhetoric jump.


    [1]
    BTW Scott Ritter, a "diversion theory" supporter (I suspect it's him your first expert source), also claims:
    Moscow had opted not to employ its forces according to standard doctrine, opting instead to take a light approach, which appeared to be born from a concerted effort to minimise civilian casualties and harm to civilian infrastructure that itself was derived from a fundamental misunderstanding of the reality of the situation on the ground in Ukraine.
    The reported purging of 150 officers from the 5th Department of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), responsible for operations in the so-called ‘near abroad’ (which includes Ukraine), along with the
    arrest of Sergei Beseda, the former head of the department, suggests that Russia had suffered a failure of intelligence the likes of which has not been seen since the Israeli failure to predict the Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal during the Yom Kippur War of October 1973    .
    While the Russian government has remained characteristically tight-lipped about any possible shortcomings regarding the work of the 5th Department prior to the start of the military operation, the statements by Russian leadership suggesting that the Ukrainian military might remain in its barracks and that civilian leadership would not interfere with Russia military operations suggest that these assumptions were made using intelligence provided by the 5th Department.
    That such assumptions, if indeed they were made, proved to be so fundamentally off target, when combined with the preparedness of the Ukrainian military to engage the initial columns of Russian forces, suggests that the work of the 5th Department had been disrupted by Ukrainian security services, who took control of Russian human networks and fed false reports back to the Russian leadership.
    The fact is that columns of Russian troops, advancing boldly into Ukraine without the kind of attention to route security and flank protection that would normally accompany offensive operations, found themselves cut off and annihilated by well-prepared Ukrainian ambushes. It was, to use an American colloquialism, a Turkey shoot, and the Ukrainian government made effective use of combat footage obtained from such encounters to great effect in shaping global public opinion about the effectiveness of Ukraine’s defences. However, the limitations of the Ukrainian armed forces did not allow it to turn its impressive tactical victories into positive operational and strategic outcomes.
    https://www.herald.co.zw/ukraine-winning-battle-on-twitter-on-the-ground-kiev-is-losing-fight/
  • Ukraine Crisis
    ↪neomac
    So you agree that a European security cooperation that does not involve primarily the United States and the United Kingdom would be beneficial to Europe, and it's just the practical aspects that you are worried about?     — Tzeentch

    Yes if it was feasible and sustainable. In the shitty situation we are I simply don't see how we can get there. Even less, safely (or "democratically" for that matter).
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Obviously the practical implementation of this is a whole other story. The European Union is a non-democratic abomination that needs to be replaced with something that is actually functional before this could ever happen, but lets leave that aside for now. — Tzeentch

    Yet that's practically the whole point whatever one might think of the EU. It's more easy to agree on what is desirable, than on what is feasible. Outside the EU (or some other form of federation) Europeans might go back to compete one another not only economically but also for security. And outside the US sphere of influence, we might compete not only with Russia, and China and other regional or global competitors, but also with the US. Good luck with that.
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    This is where I see the "no true Scotsman," 20/20 hindsight problem coming in. It's easy to say now that all sorts of prior norms were irrational. — Count Timothy von Icarus

    But I'm not denying the possibility of rationally justifying some past practice in certain circumstances, yet such possibility doesn't imply that the rational justification was what led people to adopt that practice. Many behavioral dispositions are acquired by individuals since they were children before any actual pros/cons calculation rationally justifying that behavior could take place. And also in our adult life we may show a significant degree of gregarious behavior that encourages conformity to some common pattern of behavior without there being any conscious calculation of pros/cons at the origin of that collective behavior (which is also what could explain social reluctance to change behavior as soon as circumstances rationally require it). All I'm saying is that we shouldn't confuse rationality with a posteriori rationalizations. Said that, I didn't mean to exclude that certain now morally questionable practices (like the alleged practice of infanticide in ancient Greece) were grounded on plausible reasons and widely accepted for those reasons.

    we can posit and idealized world where agents agree to follow moral principles before they enter the world, perhaps from behind some "viel of ignorance." — Count Timothy von Icarus

    I think this would be a more charitable understanding of what Gert's normative definition of morality might assume. However "idealized" Gert's assumptions are, yet they may explain why we might be inclined to consider those 10 moral rules as plausibly universally acceptable by rational individuals. Besides those practices like infanticide or human sacrifices do not necessarily question Gert's normative definition of morality, instead they simply suggest the existence of extreme social or environmental conditions that would allow individual to exceptionally but rationally derogate to default rational moral rules.
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    Do you mean include rules about human sacrifice and slavery? — Count Timothy von Icarus

    I was referring to Gert's 10 rules that all moral agents would follow (it looks like the first 5 should be taken to be the most evident to him): https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/006.htm
    Plus 5 five ideals (which however are supererogatory): https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/008.htm
    As I understand them, they would exclude slavery and human sacrifice at least by default, because all rational human beings would find unacceptable a moral system where human sacrifice or slavery would be permitted. I guess that this conclusion follows from assuming that rational people want to avoid harm by default (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/002.htm, https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/003.htm) and impartiality (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/007.htm). Rational people wouldn’t find acceptable a moral system that would permit anybody to enslave or sacrifice them by default. However there might be ad hoc social rules that may specify under which exceptional circumstances moral rules would need to be rationally integrated with other rules.


    If you really thought human sacrifice meant the difference between famine and a good harvest, isn't human sacrifice rational? There it is merely an information constraint that changes the nature of such a behavior.
    We might abhor slavery, but military conscription, a form of temporary bondage, is seen as essential to virtually all states.     — Count Timothy von Icarus

    Two comments:
    1. As far as I understand Gert’s normative definition of morality, only a subset of social rules can be considered rationally moral and such rules apply to the default behaviour (which doesn’t exclude exceptions). The acceptability of “human sacrifice” practices can not be dictated by rational moral rules in that sense. Maybe there are religious or pagan social rules that govern human behaviour in exceptional cases but it's not up to morality to determine such cases and their rationality remains to be established depending on the circumstances. On the other side “prostitution” as a free choice is not excluded by default by those 10 moral rules. Other religious or legal rules might however exclude it as an unacceptable behavior.
    2. As far as I’m concerned, I wouldn’t be so quick in calling some behaviour “rational” just because it may look functional to the survival of the individual or the community. I don’t know enough relevant details about human sacrifice practices but I’m not sure that human beings adopted or preserved such practices as the result of some conscious effective calculation that would make look their behaviour rational (e.g. addressing the problem of famines which may be more plausible in case the ritual increased the availability of food by reducing the demand of food within the community and/or by allowing cannibalism) and not just an evolutionary unintended consequence of some traditionalist cultural imprint.
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    What do you understand descriptively moral and normatively moral to refer to? — Mark S

    As I understand it, Gert's "descriptive" notion of morality tries to capture what would characterize normative systems as "moral" cross-culturally, independently from the geographic or historical latitude, in short rules/ideals protecting a group from harm is what counts as moral [1].
    Gert's “normative” notion of morality requires that these rules/ideals be acceptable by all rational agents. He identified 10 rules (and 4 ideals, if I remember correctly) that satisfy this normative constraint (they do not seem to include e.g. rules against cannibalism or prostitution but they seem to exclude rules about human sacrifice or slavery).
    Gert’s doesn’t need to talk about cooperation strategies (domination, partnership, marker) because he is not interested in classifying systems that satisfy his descriptive definition of morality. This classificatory task belongs to a lower level of analysis (which I guess would be a preliminary step to morally profile societies of different geographic and historical latitude and correlate such profiles with other social/natural factors).
    The reference to cooperative strategies is not only a further classificatory task wrt the general “descriptive” definition of morality offered by Gert, but it suggests a whole different research program, namely one that tries to connect pre-human pro-social behaviour and human morality. Indeed the cooperative behaviour is present in some “natural” form also in certain non-human animals. So morality would be an upgrade of these pro-social animal dispositions. The problem is again if this is just matter of degrees or there is something emergent in the moral dimension. In both cases one might take morality as an improvement of such pro-social animal dispositions, yet one would need to specify in what sense morality constitutes an improvement (e.g. in what sense circumcision - which animals do not have - is a marker rule that improves the benefits of cooperation?)
    Conclusion, even if I see why you might be interested in integrating Gert’s definition with a reference to cooperative strategies, I don’t think it would be an improvement, because Gert’s definition belongs to a greater level of abstraction (once again compare “rational animal” and “rational animal with genital organs“) and results from a philosophical investigation about the notion of human morality (independently from its continuity wrt animal behaviour).

    [1] notice that the notion of "moral agents" in Gert's descriptive definition of morality risks to make the definition circular.
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    Morality descriptively is NOT simply lessening harm as Gert’s version implies. Morality descriptively is lessening harm by increasing the benefits of cooperation. — Mark S

    Yet I didn't see how you can prove that the definition you suggest is an improvement. You are simply making claims not proving a point. For example, is it possible to have an informal public system applicable to human beings that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal, but it decreases the benefits of cooperation? If it's not possible, then you definition is just redundant.
    Besides the more I think of your definition and the less I find it clear. I think cooperative behavior can be found also in animals. The partnership, dominance and marker proto-rules (or patterns of behavior) can be found also in the animal world. Am I wrong? If so and animals showing cooperative behavior are not moral agents, then cooperative behavior must be conceptually decoupled from morality. Now, if morality increases the benefits of cooperation, there must be something in "morality" that can not be reduced to those patterns of behavior constituting cooperation the increases the benefits from such patterns.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    t1Td1H4.jpeg
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Odd how that whenever it suits your narrative we should trust his word, and whenever it doesn't suit your narrative, he's lying.

    15 years of protest against NATO expansion > Not a genuine expression of worry, but a carefully crafted lie.

    Some war-time rhetoric > Not nonsense narratives meant to influence the public, but a genuine expression of his intentions.


    You have to be pretty deep down the propaganda rabbit hole not to see this.     — Tzeentch

    Do you mean "some war-time rhetoric" is the lie while "15 years of protest against NATO expansion" is expression of Putin's genuine views? And doesn't that suit your narrative too?
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Top Russian official's remark about Ukraine war draws laughter
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    How does Gert’s definition of what is descriptively moral based on “lessening of harms” explain, as you claim:
    (A) “slaves must obey their masters”
    (B) “working on the sabbath deserves death”
    (C) “homosexuality is evil”.

    I don’t see that it can. My "Morality As Cooperation Strategies" (MACS) definition of what is descriptively moral does explain them because it includes cooperation strategies. It explains them as marker and domination strategies, strategies for increasing the benefits of cooperation in ingroups at the expense (always for domination norms and sometimes for marker norms) of outgroups.     — Mark S

    My points are 2: one is about explanation, the other about generality.
    1. Gert's descriptive definition of morality is : What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal”
    As I understand it, the definition itself in this formulation doesn't specify any strong rationality requirement nor how wide is the group of the people protected by the moral system. So if A, B, C are forms of lessening the harms of a certain group that is protected by the moral system, then these are moral rules that satisfy the definition offered by Gert. In case A the group would be the masters, in case B the group would be all those who need to rest at least once a week, in case C the group could be e.g. all those (as the politicians) would benefit from a demographic growth through etherosexual mating or by limiting the transmissibility of certain sexual diseases or by limiting naturally repugnant sexual behavior (and religious beliefs might have "irrationally" strengthen this belief)
    2. Gert's descriptive definition of morality can account for all moral rules (like A, B, C) your definition can account for then your definition is redundant wrt Gert's definition, because talking about "cooperative strategies" doesn't add anything valuable to the general definition, other then alluding to something that is more specific than required by a minimal general definition (for comparison take 2 definitions of "human beings" as "rational animals" or as "rational animals with sexual organs").
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    Yes, “slaves must obey their masters” has too often been a cultural moral norm enforced by an ingroup to exploit an outgroup.

    The reason that "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gert’s definition of what is descriptively moral is that 1) it adds explanatory power, particularly for marker norms such as “working on the sabbath deserves death” and “homosexuality is evil”, and 2) it directly follows from the ultimate source of morality - the cooperation problems that all highly cooperative societies must solve.

    Without "increasing the benefits of cooperation" you can’t say you have a definition of what is descriptively moral that explains past and present moral norms. And you can’t link cultural moral norms to their ultimate source - the cooperation problems that all highly cooperative societies must solve.     — Mark S

    These are just claims, where is the argument to support them?

    Consider:
    (A) “slaves must obey their masters”
    (B) “working on the sabbath deserves death”
    (C) “homosexuality is evil”.
    (BGD) Gert's definition: “What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal”
    (MSD) your definition: “An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has increasing the benefits of cooperation and lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal” (which looks like BGD plus "increasing the benefits of cooperation" clause)
    If A, B, C can be explained by both BGD and MSD then how is MSD more accurate than BGD and not just more redundant wrt BGD?
    To support your claims you should be able to provide an example X historically considered as moral that BGD does NOT classifies as moral while MSD classifies as moral, AND/OR an example Y historically considered as non-moral that BGD classifies as moral while MSD does NOT classify as moral.
    If you can't provide any such cases then your general definition is simply redundant, and the allusion to cooperation strategies (partnership, dominance, marker norms) belongs to a deeper level of analysis or empirical investigation (for comparison take 2 definitions of "human beings" as "rational animals" or as "rational animals with sexual organs").


    BTW can you clarify better what "marker norms" means and why it is to be distinguished from dominance and partnership norms?
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    He has not justified stating this as a normative (ought) claim as you (and perhaps others here) are interpreting it. — Mark S

    That said, I am frustrated by Gert’s ambiguity in his lecture about whether he means the definition to be descriptive (the only way I can make sense of it) or normative (which he has not justified). — Mark S

    To me, Gert’s definition of “morality” is descriptive. What I think Gert takes to be a normative definition of morality is the set of rules and ideals he discussed later in his lecture.


    For example, the definition includes the phrase “by those protected by the system”. Consider the moral norm: “slaves must obey their masters”. If those protected from harm by the system are only the slave masters (which was too often the historical case), then this repulsive moral norm would be included under Gert’s definition of what morality ‘is’. This makes no sense to modern sensibilities as a normative claim but is sensible as a claim about what is descriptively moral. — Mark S

    Both your descriptive definition of morality and Gert’s descriptive definition of morality can account for the fact that “slaves must obey their masters” can be taken as a moral rule. Can’t they? If so, this example doesn’t show us in what way adding "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gert’s definition of morality.


    My suggested revision, “An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has increasing the benefits of cooperation and lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal” more accurately reflects what science tells us of morality’s function – the principal reason what we call descriptively moral behavior exists. — Mark S

    In what sense it’s more accurate about the function of morality? Talking about “cooperation” seems to me a way to suggest that there are different ways in which morality can be implemented depending on the cooperation strategy (which must be specified and be correlated to other factors, e.g. material conditions of existence, demographic dynamics, environmental conditions, technological advancement). But the most general notion of “cooperation” itself can be formulated entirely in Gert’s descriptive moral terminology. So adding it to Gert’s general definition doesn’t bring anything to it. In other words, allusions to cooperation strategies should be part of a lower level wrt Gert’s general descriptive definition of morality and a more oriented toward an empirical investigation.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Explosions heard in western Crimea, test of civil defense alert system planned
  • Ukraine Crisis
    By the way, I can think of some that would like the US going all isolation and NATO closing up shop. Can't tell if that's what you're suggesting here; is it? — jorndoe

    If European leaders are incapable of serving European interests, NATO is a threat to European security.     — Tzeentch

    If European leaders are incapable of serving European interests, Europeans better be outside NATO. Feeling better now?
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has increasing the benefits of cooperation and lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal. — Mark S

    It's not clear in what way adding "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gert’s definition of morality. Can you give concrete example to clarify that?
  • Ukraine Crisis
    post-Soviet Russian hegemonic ambitions in short:
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Primakov_doctrine
  • Ukraine Crisis
    The shared rule. — neomac

    If we shared a rule we would have agreed on the first proposition. If there were some rule (which we agree on) that can be used to demonstrate the truth of a rational argument, such that it compels me to believe "you committed fallacy X", then it could have been used in the first place to compel me to believe your original proposition. I don't see why it suddenly becomes more compelling when used to argue for a fallacy.     — Isaac

    Not sure to understand what you are saying. I could explicitly conclude “all cats are animals” from “all cats are mammals” and “all mammals are animals” according to the “Barbara” syllogistic rule. You could argue instead that I inferred that conclusion from “all cats are planets” and “all planets are animals” always according to the “Barbara” syllogistic rule. And since the premises are false, so is the conclusion.
    Your counter-argument would be a strawman, since I didn’t infer that conclusion from the premises you suggested. The strawman fallacy expresses a rule that is different from the “Barbara” syllogistic rule.
    And the shared “Barbara” syllogistic rule might compel you to believe my conclusion if it wasn’t for the fact that you failed to use the right premises either because you overlooked my actual argument by mistake or because you are intellectually dishonest. In the former case you may readily acknowledge the strawman charge, in the latter case you may still want to escape the accusation with some other sophism.


    If we can't converge on such basic level, we remain unintelligible to each other. — neomac


    Nonsense. I can vaguely understand people even talking to me in a foreign language. Most of our words are just fluff. We needn't agree on much. I determine most of my opinion about what you mean from my experience of people and assumptions about what kind of person you are and what you might likely be trying to say. You become a character in my story, playing a role I determine. You'll fit that role all the while it's not overwhelmed by evidence to the contrary because it's easier for me to predict your behaviour that way. It's just basic cognition. We're not powered by words and their meanings, we're powered by predictions, stories, expectations.     — Isaac

    Not sure to understand the contrast between “words and their meanings” and “predictions, stories, expectations”, and how this relates to what I said. As far as I’m concerned your predictions, stories and expectations should still be based on shared rules to make sense to me. It’s also ironic that you are trying to evade my conclusion about nonsensical objections by calling it “nonsense” and still expecting to make sense to me.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    And what prevents anyone from rejecting that 'showing', why are they suddenly compelled by your second judgement when they weren't by your first? — Isaac

    The shared rule. If we can't converge on such basic level, we remain unintelligible to each other.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    I should have had you pegged for a 'fallacy-o-phile.

    A couple of questions...
    Do you think those with whom you're arguing would agree that their propositions succumb to these fallacies?     — Isaac

    To the extant I and my opponent share the same argumentative rules, we must converge about how we apply them too. So if I claim he failed or my opponent rejects the charge, it must be shown through the shared argumentative rule who is right.
    For example you recently accused me of strawmanning you, but I argued that I wasn't strawmanning you: if you make a general claim X but intend to refer specifically to Y, and I don't get what you are referring to (I even told you so), so I can just argue against X, you can not accuse me of strawmanning you, because I'm still arguing against your actual claims, not something different.

    If not, to what do you then appeal when arguing that they, in fact, do? More fallacies? Fallacy fallacies? And then, when we disagree about the fallacy fallacies? Fallacy fallacy fallacies, perhaps? — Isaac

    Shared rules are necessary to work out differences intelligibly. So if we disagree on some argumentative rule application, at best we can try to work it out through more basic rules (like our conceptual framework). At worst we remain unintelligible.
    For example, as far as I've understood, you accused me of "hypocrisy" based on the idea that I'm advocating for "dispassionate" contributions, while I myself am not contributing "dispassionately". But I'm not claiming to offer dispassionate contributions nor advocating for dispassionate contributions nor implying or suggesting in favor of "dispassionate" contributions. So either that's settled and you must agree, or you must offer a compelling argument against my objection: e.g. quote where I solicited people to offer dispassionate arguments or claimed I'm offering dispassionate arguments or implied or arguably suggested in favor of "dispassionate" contributions, and see if it is compelling enough to accuse me of hypocrisy.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    What are these rules? Can you enumerate a few? — Isaac
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_fallacies
  • Ukraine Crisis
    But usually failed wars don't bolster jingoism and your willingness to use force again. Usually the result is the opposite. After the Vietnam war the US wasn't eager to fight similar wars. It needed for the Cold War to end and 9/11 attacks to happen before the US was ready to go recklessly everywhere to fight "The War on Terror". Now with Afghanistan fallen and the Taliban with their Emirate back in charge, notice the absence of anyone talking about "The War on Terror". — ssu

    Sure, that sounds plausible, at least in the short term. But even in the short term, as long as the Russian political and military elites are the same along with their powerful triggers (fighting for hegemonic survival and perception of a “declining” West), they may still try to compensate or come back against the West in other forms, increasing control over strategic areas (in the mediterranean, North Africa and Middle East), reinforcing the anti-West alliance, by fostering instability within the West, and connive with rogue American politicians (if not presidents).



    But note, this fear of the dissolution of Russian federation is actually the pillarstone for Russian imperialism. Catherine the Great said something very crucial when she said that in order to defend her country's border, she has to push them further. Russia always portrays itself to be the victim, even if it isn't always Napoleon or Hitler marching into their country. This is the way the Russians are fed the propaganda of their imperialism: the evil West is out to destroy Russia. We must fight back!!!

    Similar reasoning is evident in Communist China too: if China would let democracy work, then "the Middle kingdom" would collapse again due to separatism. Tibet and the Muslim west would go, but perhaps also the south and the north would separate.

    These fears of course forget that India, which has so many different people and ethnycities and religions, is a democracy, and isn't likely to collapse.     — ssu


    Not sure to what extent this comparison is useful. Russia and China didn’t experience established Western-like democratic institutions to effectively channel ethnic grievances. So the transition to a more democratic regime might more easily support separatist movements wherever the relation between ethnic groups is diverging or has been historically tense if not dramatic. See the case of ex-Yugoslavia.
    Even in India authoritarianism has been on the rise for a while now (https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/indias-endangered-democracy/) and national unity crisis has been called out by Indian intellectuals (https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-facing-collapse-of-nation-crisis-amartya-sen/articleshow/92583017.cms).


    But those are hypotheticals, just like the lie that if Americans withdraw from Afghanistan and leave the country to the Taliban, it will become a haven for terrorists. Well, has it? — ssu

    There are reasons to be optimistic, I’m not questioning this. But strategic thinking has to deal with hypotheticals, and taking into account the worst scenarios given certain realistic circumstances is part of the task.


    In my view in similar line with France and Germany. — ssu

    But in their case the reason is clearer and more relatable (if you are a Western European). The benefit/cost delta of this war may be more positive for the US and the Eastern Europeans, than for the Western Europeans, at least in the short term. And in the long term there are lots of unknowns.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    I'm not the one claiming this is all about rational debate like some rules-based chess game. This is politics. It's your hypocrisy I'm pointing out. — Isaac

    I'm simply pointing out to you that your claim of dispassionate, rational, chess-grandmaster "weighing of the evidence" is preformatively contradicted by your use of pejorative rhetoric. — Isaac

    I claimed nowhere that I’m dispassionate nor that a rational debate should be dispassionate.
    Even in playing basketball or chess one can be passionate, especially if the opponent cheats or plays lazily.
    I’m not even questioning the fact that our moral/political views are motivating our engagement in such political discussions, colouring our communicative style, pressing us for certain conclusions.
    However the fun part to me is mainly to play by argumentative rules that make one’s views rationally compelling to opponents’ views. Besides since this is a philosophy forum and not a science forum, we can more easily end up discussing our conceptual frameworks, our terminology, our beliefs’ inferential or explanatory power, etc. and this in turn can help not fix the world, but fix (clarify/reorder/clean up) one self’s ideas about the world.
    Where is the hypocrisy in all this exactly?
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Where was the argument in... — Isaac

    I didn't claim that I or anybody should provide only arguments and counter-arguments.

    Because it sounds like a weak attempt at sarcasm, followed by a lame cliché about anyone not cheerleading the war being pro-Russia. — Isaac

    As lame as your attempts at calling opposing views "cheerleading the war", "bollokcs" and "bullshit". Serving you your own "sarcastic" soup.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Your idea of pariahship is having people engage with you in page-long discussions? :chin:

    I'm sorry the forum isn't your personal echo chamber, I guess.     — Tzeentch

    I don't see the relation of your comment with what I wrote which was about taking position and its costs.
    Besides if I'm engaging with other people who think differently from me, how am I in an echo chamber?
    That's a philosophy forum, so I guess if people provide arguments and question each other's arguments with arguments, it should be welcomed. If you do not feel like playing this game with me, don't do it. No hard feelings.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    You're presented with two theories, which you otherwise can't tell between A and B. Those advocating for A stand to gain several hundred billion dollars from the pursuit of policies according to A, those advocating B stand to gain nothing but pariah-ship and contempt for advocating it, yet do so anyway. — Isaac

    A horrible and bloody internet "pariah-ship and contempt" is what the majority of anonymous users of this thread have to suffer from the minority of other anonymous users for advocating B and calling "bollocks" and "bullshit" thinking otherwise. But they are doing it for a good cause, the Ukrainians' well being, which they know much better than the Ukrainians themselves. And that's no virtue signaling by no means. From Russia, with love.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    ↪ssu



    A humiliating defeat might not be enough to get rid of Russian hegemonic ambitions once for all. It may set also the grounds for the next imperialist surge. Unless it brings to the dissolution of the Russian federation. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_dissolution_of_Russia
    But this may bring other problems to the West: the fate of the Russian federation’s nuclear stockpile, China hegemonic expansion in post-Russia federation states.
    The American leadership and engagement in this war is indispensable to force Russia to back down yet the Americans, despite the rhetoric, can’t be fully trusted by the allies. Not with Biden, way less with presidents like Trump (and next elections are getting closer). If Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria definitely compromised the American reputation more in the Rest, Trump definitely compromised the American reputation more within the West. And the American contribution in the war in Ukraine looks suspiciously too slow-paced and replete with mixed-signals. For the Europeans the future looks pretty grim, especially if they are not pro-active and coordinated in building their own foreign politics (like a “new deal“ with Africa? and South America?), and more autonomous in shaping their military security.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    The loss of their “empire” after the collapse of Soviet Union principally due to NATO expansion and the need to recover their hegemonic status overshadowed by the Americans. — neomac


    ...is hypothetical.

    offensive means to threat Western security — neomac


    ...the actual use of which is hypothetical.

    Russian hegemonic ambitions. — neomac


    ...which are hypothetical.

    promoted/pursued an anti-West alliance with other authoritarian states (like China and Iran) with hegemonic ambitions. — neomac


    ...hypothetical ambitions.     — Isaac


    So you practically ignored all other facts to focus on “hegemonic ambitions” which in the case of Russia, China, and Iran you claim to be “hypothetical”. Let’s first clarify terminology. How do you understand the notion of “hegemonic”? And what constitute evidence of “hegemonic ambitions” to you?

    Russia’s military activity beyond its borders up until now shows an actual non-hypothetical pattern of “Western containment” — neomac

    ...not even going to dignify this bullshit with a response.     — Isaac

    Unless this kind of answers is the best you can afford.

    There's no debate at all about the threat Russia poses to Ukraine. That's the difference. — Isaac

    There is debate also about the threat Russia poses to Ukraine. You can hear it when discussing about peace. Different peace scenarios and conditions are also influenced by a different understanding of the threat Russia poses to Ukraine.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Russia's threat to 'the West' is entirely hypothetical — Isaac

    There is absolutely nothing hypothetical about Russia's threat to 'the West'.
    • Russia has actual non-hypothetical motives to be hostile against the West. The loss of their “empire” after the collapse of Soviet Union principally due to NATO expansion and the need to recover their hegemonic status overshadowed by the Americans.
    • Russia has actual non-hypothetical offensive means to threat Western security (3rd country by military capability, largest stockpile of nuclear warheads in the world, cyberwar capabilities through hackers and disinformation agencies), and ways to heavily interfere in Western political life, through lobby and a network of far-right movements.
    • Russia has plenty of actual non-hypothetical pretexts and leverage to conduct anti-Western activities in the West: Russian minorities in neighbouring countries, rebellious countries like Serbia and Hungary , political ties and support from within the West (Trump being the most clear example encouraging Russian adventurism), and economic bonds that up until now induced complacency toward Russian hegemonic ambitions.
    • Russia has actually non-hypothetically made plenty of hostile declarations against the West since 2008 and has promoted/pursued an anti-West alliance with other authoritarian states (like China and Iran) with hegemonic ambitions.
    • Russia’s military activity beyond its borders up until now shows an actual non-hypothetical pattern of “Western containment”: by encircling Europe with its military activity in the mediterranean, North Africa, Middle East and the Baltics. And now by meddling in Western backyard with a genocidal war: Ukraine wants to join the West and is also plenty of natural resources the West may integrate in its economy (wheat and gas among others). And during this war Russia also dared to threaten the West with a nuclear escalation.
    So no, there is absolutely nothing hypothetical about Russia's threat to 'the West'.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Acting as if something is safe, when it isn't, just because it ought to be, is reckless. It's not complicated. — Isaac

    It's not complicated. As this one: acting as if Russia is not a threat to the West, when it is, just because the West ought to be peaceful, is reckless too.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Ukraine ought to be able to enjoy its sovereignty without being threatened by powerful neighbours. Pretending that's how the world is when it blatantly isn't is reckless. — Isaac

    Unless you are confusing "ought" claims with "is" claims, aren't you?
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    I think that the notion of "morality" is at the crossroad of different considerations pointing in different directions. So it's very possible that any definition may leave something out. For example, the problem of Gert's definition is that it leaves us wondering what the notion of "rational people" and the "specified conditions" may mean or be determined without begging the question or being too large (traffic rules maybe a rule of conduct that satisfies the definition without being moral) or too strict (in certain societies homosexuality is considered immoral).

    In this situation we better maximise our understanding of moral behaviour by analogy/contrast between moral conduct/norms and non-moral conduct/norms. Here I can draft the main points:
    • - Moral norms apply timelessly, spacelessly, and universally: they apply to individuals at any time, and do not change. That is different from ludic or professional norms that can apply to us at a given time (e.g. when we play when we sign a work contract). They also differ from law: legal norms can be changed over time (like in a democracy and they do it also for moral reasons) and space (different countries have different laws), but moral norms do not change. If homosexuality or killing innocent people is immoral, there was no prior time (or different place) in which homosexuality or killing innocent people was moral and a later time (or different place) where both turned out to be moral. We shouldn’t confuse moral norms with their popularity. Popularity can certainly change over time, space and individuals.
    • - Moral norms can always overrule non-moral norms in both conduct and ethic assessment: concerning the conduct, let’s say that there is a law legitimising prostitution or weed selling, whoever considers that law immoral may protest against it or not act the way those laws allow. So the way one feels or decides to act wrt the law is overruled by moral norms. That doesn’t mean that moral norms can’t be occasionally and narrowly suspended: e.g. in box people are allowed to physically hurt each other, or in a movie people are allowed to lie, in art naked adult sculptures are not considered obscene, etc. At the end of the day, people’s life is ultimately assessed wrt moral conduct. Namely one life is more valuable if it is compliant to moral norms more than it is to legal or fashion norms or artistic norms.
    • - Moral norms are self-promoting at social level and psychological level: it’s not just that individuals should follow moral norms (like do not kill, do not steal, do not lie) but they should also care if other individuals follow them (e.g through praise and blame). Moral norms have an intrinsic social dimension (like laws). We can think of a code of conduct for specific individuals e.g. a king’s code of conduct, or private in its genesis (e.g. the son promises his father to continue his business after he retires). But they are qualifiable as moral only to the extant they should become object of social pressure (praise and sanction). Moral norms should also be internalised in both conduct and emotion as pre-reflexive habits accompanied by specific feelings e.g. outrage, dignity and guilt. While economic and legal conducts are more dependent on cost/benefit calculi, can be more emotionally neutral and evolve over time.
  • Vogel's paradox of knowledge
    Al doesn't know that p and that he doesn't know that not-p. — Ludwig V

    This might be true from a third person perspective. Not from a first person perspective. If a person makes a knowledge claims and then she herself discovers that what she believed is false, the discovery of her belief's falsity itself would support another first-person knowledge claim.
    That's different from the knowledge claim where the justification is to be questioned. Imagine I claim: I know that Erik the Red used to wear horned helmets because Erik the Red is a Viking and Vikings used to wear horned helmets. But then I discover that archeologists have widely called as a myth the belief that Vikings used to wear horned helmets. Then I might say: I didn't know (not "I don't know"!) that Erik the Red used to wear horned helmets, or I doubt that Erik the Red used to wear horned helmets.
  • Vogel's paradox of knowledge
    Something reliable can fail once or twice and still be classed as reliable. But if something certain turns out wrong, it is no longer certain. — Ludwig V

    I get your point. Still it depends on what we are certain about. We can also be certain that something is reliable. So if that something turns out to be wrong that doesn't mean it's unreliable, or no longer certain.


    I prefer "defeasible" because "fallible knowledge" can be taken to mean that If I claim to know something on good grounds but it still turns out false, it is nonetheless knowledge. So I'm anxious to insist that knowledge doesn't fail - people do. So a claim to knowledge that p must be withdrawn if p turns out to be false. — Ludwig V

    I substantially agree but what I find more interesting to notice is the following: while the falsity of p implies that "I know that p" is false, the epistemic "withdrawal" from a belief that "turns out" to be false (as opposed to "unjustified") might correspond to different epistemic conditions: e.g. "I don't know that p", "I know that non-p", "I believe that non-p", "I don't believe that p", or "I doubt that p". Yet only "I know that non-p" would make sense to say to me in that case. In other words, knowledge claims defeated out of falsify are not just "withdrawn" but "replaced" by other knowledge claims.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Scott Ritter on prior to the Russian invasion (in December 2021): Russia won't invade Ukraine, it's a manufactured crisis (by the West) and if there would be war between Russia and Ukraine, Russia would defeat Ukraine in 6 to 7 days (If Ukraine made an attack in the Donbas). And so on... — ssu

    what a guy:
    On April 6, 2022, Ritter was suspended from Twitter for violating its rule on "harassment and abuse" after he posted a tweet claiming that the National Police of Ukraine is responsible for the Bucha massacre https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scott_Ritter
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Disagreements are occasions for anybody to review their beliefs and reasons, making them explicit, examine how they link together, find inconsistencies, inefficiencies, holes. And what makes this king of exchange philosophical to me is that we can dig further into our background assumptions, especially our conceptual frameworks. — neomac

    Bollocks. You've done none of those activities. All you've done is use the spectre of them to pour cold water on any counter-arguments you don't like. For example...

    here there is a whole package of deep assumptions of yours that would need some reviewing — neomac

    ... is typical of your responses. No actual review, no actual analysis, and God forbid any comparison to your own assumptions. Just enough distraction to blunt the point that you have used US government funded sources to back up US government policy.     — Isaac


    As usual, you put most of your intellectual effort in caricaturing me the way it suits you. It’s expected and boring to read, but it’s still an occasion to denounce your intellectual dishonesty.
    I was making a general point there. And this is supported by what I have done in several past exchanges: conerning the clarification of my conceptual framework, e.g. I discussed my understanding of moral claims (with you a while back, almost at the beginning of our exchange in this thread), of the relation between morality and power in my infamous “wall of text”, of the way I understand my contributions here with its implied limits and possibility of agreement (about the meaning of the words, evidence-based reasoning, expert feedback). I also take my time to clarify my terminology when needed.
    But of course I can’t expand on all points at the same time at any moment and with all the interlocutors (you may have missed a bunch of my points with other interlocutors). Even more so if on the other side there is an interlocutor who shifts the burden back to his opponent when invited to clarify his own deepest assumptions [1] , and who accuses his opponent to write “wall of texts” to provide the requested clarifications.
    Not to mention that I’m not here to entertain you, I’m here to entertain myself.



    BTW even opendemocracy is financed by grants from funds and trusts in the hands of philanthropic wealthy or ultracapitalists like Soros. And Soros isn’t so “well reputed“ either, is he? — neomac

    Indeed. And if ever I was arguing in favour of the General Theory of Reflexivity I wouldn't cite a Soros-funded think tank in support of such an argument as it would be obviously at risk of bias.
    You cited US government funded think tanks to support your belief in a US government policy. It's not just intellectually dishonest, it downright dumb. You seriously think that an organisation funded by the US government and arms manufacturers is going to give you an honest assessment of the state of the war in which both are intimately involved?     — Isaac

    OK let’s dig deeper into my conceptual assumptions.
    First, it’s in the nature of the division of labor (material and intellectual) that there are cognitive asymmetries and conflict of interests. Cognitive asymmetries and conflict of interests are practically pervasive and overwhelming in a complex society like ours, and they may facilitate abuses depending on the circumstances (i.e. there are implied social or institutional costs in case of abuse). Somebody selling products and services may be prone to a dishonest marketing, but also consumers consuming products and services may be prone to dishonest reviewing. We can’t a-priori exclude that dishonest dispositions are present in anybody when their self-interest is concerned in any competition over scarce resources. And self-interest is very cheap to guess: e.g. Mearsheimer is an academic professional that has a self-interest in selling his theories as the best on the market, jacobins are militant agents self-interested in promoting their ideology as the best on the market, you are self-interested in promoting you as the the smartest guy in this forum. ===> Hence you can not impress me by denouncing some conflict of interest.
    Second, when we have to cope with cognitive asymmetries plus conflict of interests, we are compelled to develop some trusting strategy (and trust doesn’t need to be unconditional) over time to prevent possible abuses of our trust. These strategies comprise informal cost/benefit assessments, risk/opportunity assessments for competition and cooperation, and through several iterations (dense and extended as anybody’s personal intellectual and social life) they end up building relatively stable informational social networks/channels. The point is that it’s part of our social survival to be able to integrate into our proximate informational habitat, and as long as we live in a Western capitalist society under the American hegemony we can’t likely spare ourselves from integrating with the available informational network/channels that this habitat offers to us (not matter how critical or self-aware we can possible be about this) ===> Hence you can not impress me by claiming I can’t definitely trust X because it’s an agent of American capitalism.
    Third, in our society mainstream and non-mainstream media are mostly controlled either by government or capitalists. Even academic expertise is financed and marketed by government or capitalists, and in each domain pool of experts can self-organise in enterprises that government and economic agents can rely on, because it’s functional to their activity. Even anti-system and fringe informational network like the jacobins’ can be supported by political/economic forces antagonising government or capitalists, NOT because they want or can fix the world injustice but because they want to grab power. ===> Hence you can not impress me by saying expert views that conflict with dominant economic/political elites’ main narrative are more trustworthy because they are not financed/supported by dominant economic/political elites.
    Fourth, since there is a “physiological” drive for self-perpetuation in any power system and practically any ideology needs power to win over the competition, it’s important for us to understand how agents of any power system reasons over power ===> Hence it's not just intellectually dishonest, but also downright dumb to take political/economic elites’ narratives (like US government funded think tanks to support your belief in a US government policy) exclusively as a function of a specific ideology or specific power system, and “deconstruct” them accordingly. It’s intellectually dishonest because ANY ideology needs power to be promoted (jacobins included), it’s downright dumb because such narratives offer relevant clues on how ANY power system could reason as a function of power needs in similar conditions (e.g. security dilemmas, militarisation, technological/military/intelligence performance, and how economic, demographic, social factors can shape them etc.)


    Besides your argument looks questionable for 2 reasons: on one side, it recommends not to be dismissive toward views alternative to the ones spread by mainstream outlets while suggesting to be definitely dismissive toward the mainstream outlets (“mainstream outlets can't be trusted (and they definitely can’t)” as if mainstream outlets are like astrologists). — neomac

    How is that questionable. I'm saying don't trust mainstream outlets on certain issues because they're funded by the people who benefit from the issue in question. There's no contradiction there, no error of fact. So in what way is it "questionable"?     — Isaac

    It’s questionable because it generically suggests a trusting strategy that discriminates between mainstream and non-mainstream outlets on the preposterous ground that a conflict of interest suffices to make the point. It’s like me saying: your baker has a conflict of interest in marketing his products, and for that reason he definitely can’t be trusted, you better go to a fruit shop.


    even if it was true that definitely mainstream outlets can’t be trusted, that doesn’t imply non-mainstream views can definitely be trusted — neomac

    Absolutely. Which would be why I never made such a claim.     — Isaac

    But it was implicated in what you claimed. If you suggest that mainstream should definitely not be trusted because X has conflict of interest better listen to non-mainstream, the implicature is that latter is worth trusting. The problem is that the latter too may have conflict of interests.


    your argument is so general that it holds for any alleged non-mainstream view (islamists, nazis, anarchists, satanists, QAnon or flat-earth believers, etc.) — neomac

    No it doesn't. I'm referring here solely to the use of expert opinion. Not lay opinion. If you can find me an expert in geology who thinks the earth is flat we can have that discussion, otherwise this is just more straw-manning. We hear this garbage argument every time someone brings up an alternative perspective; it's like you guys just pick these off the shelf.     — Isaac

    I didn’t commit a strawman, because you are clarifying now what you meant before, and I warned you already several times about the fact that your general objections are decontextualised wrt the current exchange.
    So if you want to be better understood, you better make a bigger effort in that direction. Indeed, your accusation is still without clear reference:
    No idea what you are referring to. In our most recent exchange Tzeentch didn’t point at any expert source for his “diversion” hypothesis, except for Mearsheimer. But we interpret Mearsheimer somewhat differently. In any case, I didn’t claim that Mearsheimer is running pro-Russian propaganda, nor deny that what he says in that video should be discounted or ignored.
    Besides if Tzeentch can question experts, I can do the same. But, for the moment, he is the one questioning the experts I’m citing, while I’m just defending them.
    You opportunistically jump into an exchange I had with another interlocutor to resume your most general objections in such a completely decontextualised way that demotivates any attempt to answer. For example, can you quote claims or objections of mine where your conditional (“if you want to claim 'likelihood' you need to show how your sources are more likely to be right than others”) is supposed to apply? Because I have no idea.
    Source: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/782980
    In any case, feel free to post here military/intelligence experts that have a different view wrt mainstream narrative about Putin’s objectives in the first phase of the war.

    [1]
    It’s important you answer those questions because you are the one who claimed “the rich oppress the poor far more consistently than one nation oppresses another” and believes it’s pertinent in the debate about the war in Ukraine. — neomac

    Your argument relies on this not being the case, so it is incumbent on you (if you want to support your argument) to disprove it. I’ve not interest in supporting my case here (I don't even believe it's possible to support such a case in a few hundred words on an internet forum, and even if I did, I wouldn't make such a case as I've no expertise in the matter).     — Isaac
  • Ukraine Crisis
    190,000 troops is completely insufficient to control Ukraine. Everyone, even your own preferred experts, seem to agree on that. So we've made some progress. — Tzeentch

    No idea why you call it “progress”. I never argued that 190K troops are sufficient to control Ukraine.



    Your option - that number is a product of astronomic Russian incompetence and wishful thinking. In other words: "the Russians are dummies".

    My option - that number is a product of limited Russian goals.     — Tzeentch

    Even if the Russians had limited goals since the beginning, their poor execution didn’t shine as a paradigmatic example of military competency.
    Russia failed to achieve what was likely its main political objective: to overthrow the Kyiv government in a blitzkrieg military operation. The Russian military also faced significant challenges seizing and holding territory. These problems contributed to the suspension or firing of several senior military officials, such as Lieutenant General Serhiy Kisel, commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army, for dereliction during the offensive against Kharkiv; Lieutenant General Vlaislav Yershov, commander of the 6th Combined Arms Army, for failing to capture Kharkiv; and Vice Admiral Igor Osipov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, following the sinking of the flagship cruiser Moskva. In addition, roughly a dozen Russian generals and other senior officials were killed on the battlefield, such as Lieutenant General Andrei Mordvichev, Lieutenant General Yakov Rezantsev, Major General Andrei Sukhovetsky, Major General Vitaly Gerasimov, Major General Kanamat Botashev, Major General Andrey Kolesnikov, and Major General Oleg Mityaev.13 These firings and deaths may have exacerbated command and control problems that the Russian military was already experiencing.
    Source: https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare



    Still Western source — neomac

    Gee, really? You have a problem with western sources now?     — Tzeentch

    You said “I don't base my arguments on western media sources either.” But you do.

    If you rely on the estimate of “21,000 troops” from that report why don’t you rely on the claim “the Russian military’s main effort remains seizing Kyiv in an effort to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate” ? — neomac

    Because those estimates are not being contested by anyone, while the claim is.
    Are you really going to hide behind random objections like these? This is getting a little childish.     — Tzeentch

    It’s not random at all. It’s still related to the issue of expert source reliability. I asked several times what your expert sources were. So far, in our recent exchange, you linked Mearsheimer’s video claiming it was supporting your “diversion” hypothesis. But Mearsheimer in the clips you posted didn’t make the argument that 21K troops deployed by the Russians make it outlandish to believe that “Russian military’s main effort remains seizing Kyiv in an effort to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate” in that video. Now you claim that “the Russian military’s main effort remains seizing Kyiv in an effort to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate” has been contested, I’m asking you again: link here the expert source you rely on.



    The connection you fail to make is that all these western sources have one thing in common - they all spin the "Russian incompetence" yarn. CSIS, as ↪Isaac
    pointed out, is funded by the US government and the DoD - that could be a clear sign of bias, but perhaps it is just something so simple as intellectual arrogance or tunnel vision.
    In any case, the contradictions in their analysis are plain for all to see, and I've been pointing them out repeatedly.     — Tzeentch

    What doesn’t square in their analysis is “plain to see” if one shares your assumptions about how Russians might have planned this operation. But your assumptions can be questioned, without you being able to provide direct evidence that Russians had just the limited objectives you specified from the start. Yours remain guess work as mine.
    Even if there is a “Russian incompetence” argument to spin (which I don’t need to exclude, after all “truth is the first casualty in war“), this is something the Russians should have taken into account in their years of preparation for this war. Wars are most certainly a showcase of military/intelligence/technological competence by geopolitical agents with hegemonic ambitions. And Russian poor performance on the ground plus Putin’s military/intelligence purges reinforced their infamous image of corrupted and incompetent system of power with foolish hegemonic ambitions. The poor execution of their maskirovka operation not only kind of squanders the credit of a smarter plan with limited goals but it also backlashed against their chances for a successful negotiation and a reputational promotion of their military power.
    Not to mention that also the pro-Russian propaganda my be interested to spin the “feint” argument to minimise the reputational costs Russians have suffered on the ground.



    Let's do a quick recap:

    190,000 troops were insufficient to control large parts of Ukraine.
    You argue instead that the Russians' main goal was to control Ukraine by installing a puppet in Kiev.
    My objection to this is along two lines:

    > A puppet regime is completely unfeasible under conditions that were known prior to the invasion. The amount of western influence in Ukraine, the threat of a western-backed insurgency, the lack of troops to maintain control, etc. Your experts at CSIS seem to believe a Russian puppet would have "lasted hours."

    > The northern drive on Kiev in no way indicates either in its troop count or behavior that it comprised the Russians' main effort. If that had been the case we would have expected to see an attempt to overwhelm the Ukrainian defense through massed forces and firepower.

    Note: I did not claim the drive was too small to capture Kiev, though it was likely too small to capture Kiev if any sizable Ukrainian defense was present, which likely there was since it's the Ukrainian capital, though the Ukrainian order of battle remains undisclosed.
    Nor did I argue that the Russians didn't want Kiev. Just that the troop count and behavior does not imply the Russians were prepared to pay much of a cost to capture it, which in turn implies it was not of a high priority.

    My alternative to this theory is as follows:

    > Given the Russians' relatively low troop count in relation to the size of Ukraine and the Ukrainian military, their ambitions were likely limited to occupying strategically relevant areas in the south and east of Ukraine. Occupying small pieces of Ukraine mitigates the risk of insurgency.

    > The drive on Kiev likely had multiple possible goals, the first of which was probably to try and force the West to negotiate. If this failed, the attack would still be functioning as a diversion to lure Ukrainian defenders away from the strategically relevant areas in the east/south. Had the Ukrainians left their capital largely undefended in favor of defending the east/south, Kiev could have been captured.

    I've said all I have to say on the topic. I don't think further exchanges will yield much fruit, so I will leave it here. I suggest you try to make your case succinctly one last time like I did with my recap, so we end the conversation with a nice summary from both sides.     — Tzeentch

    What is missing in your recap is that you consider outlandish my view while I can acknowledge to your speculation some plausibility plus the benefit of being at least more economic (which doesn’t necessarily mean more plausible). So I might just add that a series of facts (like the assassination attempts against Zelensky, purges from Putin and Zelensky against high ranks in military and/or intelligence service, heavy losses of the Russian operation, Putin’s and Yanukovic’s calls, expert reports from CSIS, Wilson Centre, RUSI) and some background assumptions (like an economic/military/political network between Ukraine and Russia, an “illegally” ousted Ukrainian president to reinstate, besides the hazardous nature of Putin’s geopolitical ambitions and personalistic chain of command) support the idea (shared by Mearsheimer too!) that Russians might have actually tried to pursue regime change in the earliest phase of the war.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    As already said, “likelihood” expresses to me an assessment of the degree of confidence. There is no formula about this. Just informal assessment about what I’ve read so far from different sources — neomac


    Is there then a reason why you'd expect your "informal assessment" to be the same as anyone else's? You seem affronted by the fact that other people's views are different to yours. If you recognise it's all just "informal assessment" that should be expected.     — Isaac

    With your initial question, you seem to understand my claim out of its context. I was talking about “likelihood” as applied to expert feedback. This is an informal assessment expressing degree of confidence. That claim doesn’t imply nor presuppose that we all share the same degree of confidence for expert source.
    The rest of your comment seems to go back to the reasons why we are here. This is a philosophy forum. A place where people can discuss their reasons for believing certain things and question them. Disagreements are occasions for anybody to review their beliefs and reasons, making them explicit, examine how they link together, find inconsistencies, inefficiencies, holes. And what makes this kind of exchange philosophical to me is that we can dig further into our background assumptions, especially our conceptual frameworks. That’s an intellectual exercise that can be enjoyed as such, without being pressed by any moral, political, affective, humanitarian urge. Like a game. So having opponents is not the problem or reason for animosity. I’ll take it as part of the game I am playing.
    I’m just averse to intellectual dishonesty as in any game where rules are breached intentionally.



    CSIS — neomac


    ... seriously?

    CSIS is funded largely by Western and Gulf monarchy governments, arms dealers and oil companies, such as Raytheon, Boeing, Shell, the United Arab Emirates, US Department of Defense, UK Home Office, General Dynamics, Exxon Mobil, Northrop Grumman, Chevron and others. — https://fair.org/home/nyt-reveals-think-tank-its-cited-for-years-to-be-corrupt-arms-booster/


    WilsonCenter — neomac


    ... uh huh

    Approximately one-third of the center's operating funds come annually from an appropriation from the U.S. government, and the center itself is housed in a wing of the Ronald Reagan Building, a federal office building where the center enjoys a 30-year rent-free lease. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Woodrow_Wilson_International_Center_for_Scholars


    RUSI — neomac


    https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/ourbeeb/why-is-bbc-presenting-rusi-as-objective-analysts-of-middle-east/

    None of this is difficult to find. You just don't want to find it.     — Isaac

    By “well reputed” I didn’t mean that they are praised as anti-capitalist heroes by jacobins (here there is a whole package of deep assumptions of yours that would need some reviewing). I meant that in the domain of military/intelligence expertise they are “well reputed“ but if you have better source for military/intelligence expertise (indeed I wrote “(why aren’t they ‘well reputed’? What are better reputed domains-specific sources?)”), you can post it here.
    BTW even opendemocracy is financed by grants from funds and trusts in the hands of philanthropic wealthy or ultracapitalists like Soros. And Soros isn’t so “well reputed“ either, is he?


    I don’t think that non-US and non-Western administrations and media are immune from accusations about their honesty. The same goes for non-mainstream and anti-system source, not mention that they can absolutely be infiltrated, exploited and financed by foreign powers. What one can infer from such predicament or how we may cope with it is up for debate. — neomac

    It's really very, very simple. Don't dismiss dissent from mainstream views as if it were the notions of some conspiratorial nutters.
    If mainstream outlets can't be trusted (and they definitely can't) then views which dissent from the mainstream are not compromised simply because of that dissent. It is not a 'mark against them' in terms of credibility.     — Isaac

    “Mainstream” points to “medium” accessibility/popularity. Lots of academic source is not accessible by the widest audience yet it is trustworthy to me. Also within the “mainstream” world not all sources enjoy the same reputation or popularity. Alternative views, even fringe views, can find their way into the mainstream media. My criteria for placing trust in source of information is not based exclusively nor primarily on the distinction between mainstream and non-mainstream as you seem to suggest. And even in this case, it doesn’t need to be unconditional.
    Besides your argument looks questionable for 2 reasons: on one side, it recommends not to be dismissive toward views alternative to the ones spread by mainstream outlets while suggesting to be definitely dismissive toward the mainstream outlets (“mainstream outlets can't be trusted (and they definitely can’t)” as if mainstream outlets are like astrologists). On the other, even if it was true that definitely mainstream outlets can’t be trusted, that doesn’t imply non-mainstream views can definitely be trusted, and notice that your argument is so general that it holds for any alleged non-mainstream view (islamists, nazis, anarchists, satanists, QAnon or flat-earth believers, etc.)
  • Ukraine Crisis
    ↪ssu
    :up:

    talking about Russian plots:
  • Ukraine Crisis
    ↪ssu
    very interesting articles!
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