I pointed this out to a Catholic once, and she was deeply offended and called me immature and disrespectful. There appears to be an unwritten agreement that the biblical account is not to be taken literally. — baker

The idea that the biblica sacra is to be interpreted metaphorically was at the back of my mind but that point of view does more damage to the Abrahamic triad than my accusations of incest, no? Much of the evidence for God, miracles to be precise, wouldn't amount to much if it were all symbolism.

This just popped into my head. It would be stating the obvious that homophobia is a distinctly religious phenomenon, that too almost-exclusively a feature of the Abrahamic religions.

If so, one only has to read the book of Genesis to realize that if humamity started off with one man (Adam) and one woman (Eve), incest was/is inevitable.

Suppose now that homosexuality is less/equally sinful than/as incest. If so, homosexuality should be permisssible.

The only way the Abrahamic triad can object to homosexuality is if it's worse than incest. Is it? I'd like to hear from you.

Incest-Homosexuality Study
Department of Ethics

Question 1. Suppose you're a straight person held at gunpoint. Your captor gives you two choices. Either sleep with someone who's the same sex as you (homosexuality) or sleep with your child (incest). (Ignore the possibility that your child is the same sex as you in which case you would be an incestuous homosexual). What would you choose?

a) Have sex with someone who's the same sex as you (homosexuality)

b) Have sex with your child (incest)

In short, which is the lesser evil, homosexuality or incest?

Kavka's Toxin Puzzle

An analysis as per Wikipedia.

1. A person should intend to drink the poison (there's a pay-off worth it).

However,

2. Once a person intends to drink the poison (1 above), there are no good reasons to drink it (pay-off already achieved).

Thus a reasonable person must intend to drink the toxin by the first (1) argument, yet if that person intends to drink the toxin, he is being irrational by the second argument (2). — Wikipedia

The solution:

1 (above) is based on the condition that a person can intend only to drink the poision. The person doesn't have to put his money where his mouth is. That's why the intention to drink the poison is rational.

2 (above), however, makes sense only if the person who intends to drink the poison has to drink the poision (intentions have to be matched with appropriate, corresponding deeds). That's why to intend to drink the poision is irrational.

Put simply, Kavka's paradox switches between intentions only (intend to drink the poison, 1) and intentions & actions (intend to drink the poison and drink it, 2). That's the meat and potatoes of Kavka's paradox!

I suppose the point Kavka's trying to make here is we can break the causal chain between intentions and deeds based on intentions, just what the doctor ordered if we're to live in peace (deterrence theory, mutually assured destruction).

To anyone who has the answer. @180 Proof??? Care to weigh in?

No doubt the nature of mind is uncertain. Is the mind physical or not? Why else the debate between physicalists and nonphysicalists?

Put simply, we aren't sure that the mind is physical but then nonphysicalists have to explain why? i.e. what (good) reasons are there that the mind could be nonphysical?

The Unicorn Problem For Nonphysicalism.

One very potent argument in favor of nonphysicalism is the mind can produce mental objects that aren't physically instantiated e.g. unicorns and that's just one example, there are numerous other objects that exist only in the mind. Is this a good reason to doubt the physicality of the mind?

Not so fast. A unicorn (physically nonexistent) = Horse (physically exists) + Horn (physically exists). In other words, a pure nonphysical object can be and is reducible to physical objects.

Is the mind a unicorn? Let's grant that the mind is nonphysical like a unicorn but just like the unicorn can be expressed in physical terms - horse & horn - the mind too can be expressed (reduced) to the physical.

Philosophers talk about (understanding) ideas and possibilities and scientists talk about (knowing) facts and probabilities, no? — 180 Proof

:fire: :fire: :fire:

The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. — Ludwig Wittgenstein

Yes I was explaining this to another poster. What if "most people" want something that isn't good for them? You just automatically give them this? What if work, maintenance, and even entertainment are actually quite harmful to that person when compared to never existing? — schopenhauer1

That's something to think about. A desideratum of most people is life but it didn't take us long to find out that's just not enough (suicide); another essential requirement is happiness or the absence of suffering. The question of all questions is, "is a life of happiness possible?" If yes, anitnatalism is wrong but if no, antinatalism is right on the money.

And so your point in reference to my position which you've quoted is what? — 180 Proof

There are some who explore with a compass (suppositions analysis). There are others who explore the compass. (presuppositions analysis).

Intriguingly, there comes a point when presuppositions analysis fails:

Push these presuppositions back far enough — tim wood

We have to presuppose language is adequate and that logic is too to have this conversation. When we challenge these presuppositions, we must again presuppose that both language and logic are adequate - we've hit a wall and we're now stuck.

Though there are differences between suppositions analysis and presuppositions analysis - the former supposes an explicit proposition's truth and investigates what follows while the latter consists of implicit propositions that have to be true to provide the milieu (for the former) - they both bear the signature of skepticism which is that:

To my mind, a philosophical expression amounts to a supposition – 'Suppose X, then possibly Y' – that is, a proposal for reflective consideration (e.g. dialectics, gedankenexperiment, daily (fitness / therapeutic) praxis, etc) tested only by its comparatively rational adequacy for some reflective task, and not a proposition asserting what is or not a fact of the matter. — 180 Proof

What? — 180 Proof

:chin: WTF?

Presuppositions have to be true in order that a supposition is considered as true.

And your point? — 180 Proof

Presuppositions form the enviroment of ideas, conceptual schema, methodological systems, etc. in which suppositions are studied.

To my mind, a philosophical expression amounts to a supposition – 'Suppose X, then possibly Y' – that is, a proposal for reflective consideration (e.g. dialectics, gedankenexperiment, daily (fitness / therapeutic) praxis, etc) tested only by its comparatively rational adequacy for some reflective task, and not a proposition asserting what is or not a fact of the matter — 180 Proof

Spoken like a true skeptic! Pyrrho would be proud!

I did some reading up on presuppositions and suppositions and here's what I found out:

1. Suppositions: Explicit propositions that could be true/false that one wants to work with to discover their implications e.g. suppose physicalism is true, what follows?

2. Presuppositions: Implicit propositions that are necessarily true for suppositions to make sense e.g. with regard to "suppose physicalism is true", presuppositions would be that the methodology used to conduct the analysis of what follows (logic) is adequate, that language is powerful enough to handle the situation, so on and so forth.

Clarification:

1. We have a proposition P.
1a. Proposition P is justified (knowledge) [known knowns]
1b. Proposition P is not justified (not knowledge) [known unknowns]

2. We don't have a proposition P (not knowledge) [unknown unknowns]

Meno's paradox concerns 1a (we know - inquiry unnecessary) and 2 (no proposition - inquiry impossible). Meno seems to have forgotten the possibility 1b (inquiry both possible and necessary so that we can know P).

I accused Meno of equivocating on the words "don't know". In 1a (one horn of the dilemma - inquiry unnecessary) "know" means there's a proposition and that proposition is justified. In this case, "don't know" implies,

3. No proposition

or

4. Yes proposition but proposition unjustified

In 2 (the other horn of the dilemma) , "don't know" means there's no proposition which matches 3 (inquiry impossible) above. But "don't know" can also mean 4 (inquiry possible & necesssary).

Thus, Meno's "don't know" in 1a (one horn of the dilemma) also means 4 (yes proposition but proposition unjustified) but "don't know" in 2 (the other horn of the dilemma) means 3 (no proposition).

One meaning of "don't know": yes proposition but that proposition unjustified.

The other meaning of "don't know": no proposition.

Equivocation!

1. Those we have asked and know the answer.
2. Those we have asked and do not know the answer.
3. Those we have never considered asking. — hypericin

:up:

1. Known knowns [proposition (+), justification (+)]
2. Known unknowns [proposition (+), justification (-)]
3. Unknown unknowns [proposition (-), justification (Mu/NA)]

In 1, Rumsfeld considers known to be both that there is a proposition & that proposition is justified.

In 2, Meno-Rumsfeld are of the view that known means there is a proposition and unknown is absence of justification.

In 3, Meno-Rumsfeld treats the absence of a proposition as unknown. Looks very much like an equivocation to me. I could be wrong of course. Thanks!

Why is it a paradox? — Cuthbert

That slipped under my radar. My guesstimate is that Meno's argument proves that inquiry is either pointless or impossible AND yet we engage in both informal and formal inquiry as if both that inquiry is possible and also has a point to it.

In the context of the Dialogue of that name, the idea of recollection was introduced, proposing we are able to understand new things because we already have a kind of understanding of them.
You seem intent upon separating the "paradox" from one of the possible solutions.
How does your approach relate to leaving the Platonic element out of — Valentinus

Good question. Thanks for bringing it to my attention. It seems Socrates chose to grab this horn of the dilemma :point:

2. If one knows then inquiry is unnecessary. (premise) — TheMadFool

Socrates thought that we do know i.e. knowledge is innate but that doesn't mean inquiry is unnecessary (as premise 2 in the OP suggests) because we've forgotten, and inquiry amounts to jogging one's memory.

Meno is talking about the unknown unknowns, the subjects of which our ignorance is so profound that we can't even frame a question. — fishfry

I now realize Meno's equivocating. When he says "know" he means a justified, true belief (no inquiry necessary) but when he says "don't know" he's talking about the absence of a proposition (inquiry impossible).

Had he been consistent, two possibilities:

1. "Don't know" implies that there's a proposition that's yet to fulfill the conditions for it to qualify as knowledge. Inquiry ergo, possible.

or

2. "know" implies there's a proposition and nothing else i.e. it isn't justified and nor do we believe it. Inquiry ergo, possible.

Donald Rumsfeld — fishfry

Donald Rumsfeld equivocates like Meno

3. Known unknowns: Known means a proposition formulated. Unknown means justification pending

4. Unknown unknowns: Unknown means proposition not formulated.

Notice: Unknown in 3 refers to justification but in 4 refers to a propositions.

Say all you like, you've created a muddle of apparent paradoxes for yourself again, Fool, this time based on a category error (and some historical anachronisms to boot). — 180 Proof

:ok: I won't pursue the matter further.

Maybe we as humans are to be the nociceptors and sex organs of the machine world. — Nils Loc

Interesting!

This counterargument to utilitarianism although old still packs a punch.

How do utilitarians respond?

1. The usual utilitarian comeback: The pleasures of carnal knowledge isn't what utilitarianism is about. I believe J. S. Mill made a distinction between lower pleasures (sex, food, other bodily desires) and higher pleasures (cultivating one's mind, developing one's talents, etc.). This basically means there's an extra condition over and above pleasure simpliciter in utilitarianism.

2. Radically novel response by utilitarians: Bodily pleasure is an illusion i.e. having sex isn't pleasure at all, nor is chowing down on haute cuisine so and so forth.

1 is the standard, official, reply to this particular brand of criticism leveled against utilitarianism. No point discussing it.

What about 2? It's, to my reckoning, a hitherto unknown retort. Is 2 a defensible position? I'm fully aware of how bizarre this point of view is but...

As a rule, the more bizarre a thing is, the less mysterious it proves to be. — Sherlock Holmes

A non-sentient robot is a tool. A sentient slave used like a non-sentient robot is not a tool but is, in effect, a torture victim, a slave. The latter is dehumanizing. So they are not comparable (i.e. category error); sentience, acknowledged or not, makes all the difference. — 180 Proof

All I'm saying is that when slavery was all the rage, if someone had invented reasonably functional robots, slaves would've had the same rights as robots i.e. no rights at all!

Thus, if I were an emancipated slave, I would see my past (slavery) in a robot and would, for that reason, feel uncomfortable around robots to say nothing of using them.

Using a hammer appropriately does not reflect on the user's sentience (or lack thereof). Using another person in any way, however, does. I fail to see your point, Fool. — 180 Proof

What I want to bring to your attention is a rather simple fact. Slavemasters were treating human slaves back when slavery was the norm the same as we intend to treat robots in the future. The sentience of human slaves was completely ignored i.e. human slaves were treated as if they weren't sentient. In other words human slaves were equivalent to robots for all intents and purposes.

Thus, I was just curious about how all of us - white, yellow, black, and brown - having a family history of slavery would feel about using robots because there's no difference between slaves and robots. The fact that slaves were/are sentient human beings is irrelevant because they were treated as if they weren't. That's the whole point of slavery and robotics - in the latter case, sentience is absent and in the former case, sentience is deemed absent.

Why not start the question with enslavement of humans (or animals) instead of robots. We treat classes of humans like shit which are much more likely to be sentient than whatever constitutes a "robot". — Nils Loc

Read my reply to 180 Proof above.

We already do. It won't be bad for the robots, unless they develop the ability to suffer.

Bearing in mind we enslave animals for our taste pleasure, it would not be unreasonable to assume we would enslave sentient robots for our pleasure too. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Indeed the "ability" ( :chin: disability?) to suffer is key to the ethics of slavery but my point is those involved in the slave trade closed their eyes to the suffering of the slaves which boils down to treating slaves as robots.

Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic. — DingoJones

science fiction — Jack Cummins

The Peter Poppof Problem! How poetic?!

Featuring:

1. Gullible people as The Sentinel Tribe (Andamans).

2. Peter Poppof as the unscrupulous, technologically-enhanced magician. (Cyborg?)

3. James, The Amazing, Randi as Newton, the scientific skeptic.

Jokes aside, that's why the moral rule that has the most appeal is the Golden Rule: Do unto others as you would like others do unto you. Ethics isn't about what most people would want but about what you want. The underlying assumption though, ironically, is that other people are like you and Bob's your uncle!

Yet, it isn't that simple. It's not just about what most people want. We all know that! ( :wink: :wink: :wink: ) - the list of most popular and fastest growing websites will vouch for what I'm hinting at.
— TheMadFool

That's another point.. What if what most people want IS NOT GOOD, but they are not aware of this? — schopenhauer1

Yes, that was my point precisely. The most people defense as you put it is unacceptable as a justification for why something (thoughts/speech/deeds) is good.

Nonetheless, I still feel there's moral value in the most people defense. Remember what I said:

I find it fascinating that both X (Christ) and XXX (porn) turn us on! — TheMadFool

Most people want to tell the truth (not lie), respect private property (not steal) and life (not kill). In other words, most people want to be good.

It reminds me of the red herring fallacy. A hound's sense of smell (our pleasure center - our wants) is a great asset to hunters (us) - sniffing out rabbits (good) but the same keen nose can also be misled by a rotting herring carcass (bad). Put differently, a hound's nose is as attracted to rabbits as it is to putrefied red herrings. That's the nub of the most people defense conundrum - most people want good but also, unfortunately, bad.

That's what happens when you're too efficient. Evolution, instead of developing a separate morality sensor simply used the old pleasure center (the one used for sexual desires, etc.).

Don't reinvent the wheel, just realign it. — Anthony J. D'Angelo

My view is actually that both are not immoral. I don’t understand why we hate incest if we acknowledge that homosexuality is ok — TheHedoMinimalist

:chin: So, you're turning the tables on homophobes. Their argument is that homosexuality is bad because it's like incest and incest is bad. Your argument is incest isn't bad because it's like homosexuality and homosexuality is not bad!

There are two arguments:

A. The argument from incest against homosexuality. (homphobia)

1. If incest is bad then homosexuality is bad.
2. Incest is bad
Ergo,
3. Homosexuality is bad

B. The argument from homosexuality for incest. (your argument)

4. If homosexuality is not bad then incest is not bad
5. Homosexuality is not bad
Hence,
6. Incest is not bad

Note: Statements 1 and 4 are logically equivalent.

The pro-gay camp rejects premise 1 in argument A. That amounts to saying that premise 4 in argument B is dubious. The bottom line -> you can't make the argument B if argument A is not accepted on the grounds that premise 1 is false.

It doesn't make sense?! A set can't contain another set?

I think most fathers don’t necessarily like to think of their daughters as sexual beings to begin with. Regardless, I think you can desire someone to be sexually attractive to certain people while also not being sexually attracted to that same person. For example, I hope that my brother remains sexually attractive to his wife but I’m not sexually attracted to him. — TheHedoMinimalist

Yes, I understand!

Let's get this discussion back on track shall we?

You want prove that there's no difference between homosexuality and incest and that if one is immoral, so is the other.

A coupla points

1. Not everybody thinks/believes that incest is bad. In fact there are cultures which promote relationships between relatives that border on incest. These are so because of certain nonbiological benefits - property is retained within the family, maintaing a bloodline as paractised by royalty, etc.

Thus, homosexuality, even if it amounts to incest, isn't bad.

2. Indeed as you said, homosexuality and incest seem to be the same thing but to come to this conclusion requires convoluted reasoning.

Homosexuality is in one sense taking a member of the same sex out of the gene pool - if you're a gay woman, you remove a woman and if you're a gay man, you retire a man from the eligible-for-marriage category of people.

Incest amounts to the same thing. If a person is having an incestuous relationship then this amounts to deleting their names from matrimonial websites. Consanguinous partners are unavaiable for a genetically healthy pairing with their opposite sexes.

What say you?

Order is a phase in chaos. Causation is an aspect of order. In chaos there is no order, no causation. Ergo, causation is an illusion, a temporary state of order, in what is actually chaos.

Your question about an uncaused cause is moot! There is no causation!

By the way, what about us, yes, us humans? Did you forget free will?

I see no reason to get god involved, and whether or not there is an infinite set of beliefs is also not relevant, which you would know if you had read the relevant posts. Please post things that are salient, or create a new thread. — ToothyMaw

My post is germane to your question. There are an infinite number of beliefs as demonstrated in my previous post. Thus the set of beliefs is an infinite set but whether infinite sets exist/not is controversial. So controversial in fact that the project of arguing for them was abandoned and mathematicians simply decided to make the existence of an infinite set an axiom.

Hence, if the set of beliefs is infinite, it is, can it be considered a set? Finitists would say no!

Great question!

Suppose there's a world W in which there's initially only one person X and only two beliefs, God and self (X).

Later, X invents sets. X then claims, that the set of his beliefs, B1 = {God, Self, Set}. Is B1 itself a belief? Yes, it is because sets like B1 are ultimately propositions.

Ergo,

B2 = {God, Self, Set, B1}

But then B2 is also a belief (a proposition)

Ergo,

B3 = {God, Self, Set, B1, B2}

B4 = {God, Self, Set, B1, B2, B3}

So on and so forth,

The set of beliefs is infinite!

B[infinity] = {God, Self, Set, B1, B2, B3,...}

From the bottom of my heart, I hope that your daughter-cum-granddaughter is not a total munter. — Kenosha Kid

I hope and pray! The only problem is I'll have to arrange for a gun very soon! :lol:

My two cents.

It's not an open and shut case that religion is wrong. Suppose it is wrong! A cult is wronger than wrong!

Here's an alternative point of view if anyone's interested.

I won't say I had a normal childhood, I definitely did not but given my experience of humanity's moral dimension - the small kid's section that I have some idea of - there are three kinds of immoral acts that are a big no-no and they are:

1. Murder
2. Lying
3. Theft

These three sins if I may call it that for convenience and not for religious reasons implies that we humans hold three things as of incalculable value (laying it on thick):

1. Life
2. Truth
3. Personal property

Crushing a bug amounts to killing it and that, if you do it to another person, is murder. Much of what has been discussed should revolve around the difference between bugs and humans.

The objective?

To demonstrate, if possible, that stomping on a bug isn't the same as dropping an intermodal container on a person below. However, that would mean life isn't the main issue (bugs can be killed) or, in other words, there are "things" more important than life. Life, in and of itself, its destruction, is not what murder is about!

Murder is taking the life of another person i.e. Murder is ending the life of x and x is a human.

Spraying a bug with poison is ending the life of x and x is not human.

I suspect that those who dislike people who crush bugs to death have the good sense to realize that bug-killing is just too close for comfort to condone - one condition for becoming a murderer is met (don't care about life; that's why bugs are killable). The day a person who kills bugs comes to know there really is no difference between insects and humans will be celebrated mourned as the birthday of a serial killer, a genocidal maniac, a mass-murderer, a homicidal maniac. Too dramatic? Sorry! I just couldn't help it!

May God have mercy on our souls! :chin:

Beauty relies on facial symmetry.

Incest causes high probability of facial assymetry.

The offspring of the man with his daughter is his daughter.

Ergo the man should not mate with his daughter. — Kenosha Kid

You speak from facts (I hope)! I speak from hopes! Apples and oranges! Good point though!

Are you implying that Ivanka knows something that we don't? :smile: — Apollodorus

Short answer, no!

Long answer, oh fucking no!

:lol:

Pterodactyls came first. — T Clark

Pedantry has its limits.

I think perhaps you misunderstand the role of the 10th man, although that does explain a lot about some of your ideas. — T Clark

What's the role of the 10th man?

I'll go first. A certain event that transpired in the Middle East sometime in the '70s convinced the Israeli top brass that being in agreement threat of attack was zero in no way implies/implied that an attack wouldn't take place. In fact Israel was attacked despite the consensus among its leaders that it wouldn't be. That too given strong evidence that its enemies were not making any suspicious moves.

Thus,

1. There was absolutely no reason (no evidence) to suspect an attack.

2. Everyone that mattered were in total agreement that 1.

and yet,

3. There was an attack.

As you can see, either there was an intelligence failure or there was none and the leaders simply failed to recognize the danger.

Intelligence is not an exact science you know - too many variables as some might say. In other words, good intelligence is rare or perhaps even nonexistent.

So, where can we intervene to prevent such catastrophes?

At the level of decision-making bodies. We need to put a person in them who will act as the devil's advocate, who'll refuse to follow the herd and stubbornly refrain from giving his nod of approval to a decision that all but faer endorse.

I suppose the point of all this, in philosophical terms, is it's good to have a diehard skeptic on the team. An in-depth analysis of the 10th man idea will spread out into epistemology, logic, etc. I suppose.

In the end, it's about not being caught with your pants down ( :lol: I wish I'd been caught off guard like that. It would've been something to brag about. :rofl:) and not being lulled into a sense of false security.

Si vis pacem, para bellum. — Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus

One argument that gets made against homosexuality is that there isn’t any meaningful difference between homosexuality and incest — TheHedoMinimalist

Incest-Beauty Paradox

A man wants his daughter to be beautiful.

Beauty is what sexually arouses a man.

Ergo,

A man wants his daughter to be sexually attractive.

A man doesn't want to have sex with his daughter.

What could possibly go wrong?

doesn't the moon continue to exist when nobody's looking at it? — Wayfarer

A good question with no easy answer but definitely dives headlong into the meaning of existence itself. How, may I ask, dear Albert Einstein, paragon of genius, did we ever come to the conclusion that there evere was a moon? Observation, another word for perception/detection with senses/instruments. If so, why is it difficult for you Albert to grasp that absent an observation, the moon's existence is a question mark, a very big question mark!

Wayfarer, kind person, can you help me out regarding a certain problem that I've been mulling over since last month.

The brain-No brain Thought Experiment

You know EEGs are used to detect so-called brain waves, right? So here's the scenario. Person A has an active brain (alive). A has an EEG reading. Person B has an inactive brain (dead). B has a flat EEG reading. "Person" C is a mannequin, has no brain. C has a flat EEG reading.

Clearly A is not the same as B or C, A has an EEG reading. However, B and C aren't the same. B has a brain but it's just no longer active. C has no brain. The EEg report though is identical for both B and C - no reading. Thus, it can be said that we couldn't distinguish between there being a brain (dead B/inactive brain) and there being no brain (C). An inactive brain = no brain. :lol: Reminds me of myself!

How does this relate to Einstein's question? Simply in this way: Insofar as our eyes are concerned, not seeing the moon is like the flat EEG. We can't know therefore whether the moon exists and it's not registering in our retinas (inactive brain B) or the moon doesn't exist (no brain C).

I think I went off on a tangent. Sorry if it was not worthwhile. G'day.

X: (Most people) think TPF is such a boring place.
Y: Speak for yourself - I like it!

Jokes aside, that's why the moral rule that has the most appeal is the Golden Rule: Do unto others as you would like others do unto you. Ethics isn't about what most people would want but about what you want. The underlying assumption though, ironically, is that other people are like you and Bob's your uncle!

Yet, it isn't that simple. It's not just about what most people want. We all know that! ( :wink: :wink: :wink: ) - the list of most popular and fastest growing websites will vouch for what I'm hinting at.

I find it fascinating that both X (Christ) and XXX (porn) turn us on! :chin: Threesomes, Anyone?

I bet they don't. A tenth man's day is not always honky-dory. BTW, I didn't use any facts or assumptions that you hadn't provided. But that's okay, I won't resent your bitterness — god must be atheist

Good! Thank you!

Whoa... where is the tenth man? You are supposed to be OPPOSING all the points, not agree with them. — god must be atheist

The assumptions from which the above statement follows doesn't appeal to me! G'day!

But it has made you into being a liar. Where is the honesty and virtue in that? — god must be atheist

All TPFians are liars! Chew on that, god must be atheist.

Now, who'd a thunk non-euclidean space could be useful... — Banno

If you don't mind me butting in, I feel non-euclidean geometry is important to non-classical logic. N. A. Vasiliev (father of paraconsistent logic) drew an analogy between his paraconsistent logic and N. Lobachevsky's (father of non-euclidean geometry) and all we need to do is take the analogy just one step further and say that in higher-dimensional analogs of classical logic, "contradictions are true" (more on this below).

A simple example of this is Lobachevsky's take on Euclid's fifth postulate itself. In 2 dimensions, true that only one line can be drawn through a point that's parallel to another line but in higher dimensions (I hope I got this right), an infinite number of lines can go through a point such that they're all parallel to another line.

However, note that we have to switch between euclidean space and noneuclidean space for there to be a contradiction i.e. each of the two spaces above are self-consistent; it's only when the two are juxtaposed that a contradiction rears its ugly head so to speak.

Thus, as I mentioned earlier, whenever a contradiction arises, it should send alarm bells ringing - we're looking at the same thing in different contexts (analogously different dimensions). For this reason, I recommend paraconsistent logic for human experiences that are inherently subjective, each point of view providing its own "dimension" and assigning its own unique truth value to a proposition.