What? — 180 Proof

:chin: WTF?

Presuppositions have to be true in order that a supposition is considered as true.

And so your point in reference to my position which you've quoted is what? I'm concerned wirh philosophical statements and that's all.

And so your point in reference to my position which you've quoted is what? — 180 Proof

There are some who explore with a compass (suppositions analysis). There are others who explore the compass. (presuppositions analysis).

Intriguingly, there comes a point when presuppositions analysis fails:

Push these presuppositions back far enough — tim wood

We have to presuppose language is adequate and that logic is too to have this conversation. When we challenge these presuppositions, we must again presuppose that both language and logic are adequate - we've hit a wall and we're now stuck.

Though there are differences between suppositions analysis and presuppositions analysis - the former supposes an explicit proposition's truth and investigates what follows while the latter consists of implicit propositions that have to be true to provide the milieu (for the former) - they both bear the signature of skepticism which is that:

To my mind, a philosophical expression amounts to a supposition – 'Suppose X, then possibly Y' – that is, a proposal for reflective consideration (e.g. dialectics, gedankenexperiment, daily (fitness / therapeutic) praxis, etc) tested only by its comparatively rational adequacy for some reflective task, and not a proposition asserting what is or not a fact of the matter. — 180 Proof

They are instead representations of the ground the thinking in itself arises from. — tim wood

Yep. AKA....principles. Does RGC say anything about those, in relation to AP’s?

To my mind, a philosophical expression amounts to a supposition – 'Suppose X, then possibly Y' – that is, a proposal for reflective consideration (e.g. dialectics, gedankenexperiment, daily (fitness / therapeutic) praxis, etc) tested only by its comparatively rational adequacy for some reflective task, and not a proposition asserting what is or not a fact of the matter. — 180 Proof

That's why most of the assertions on a philosophy forum should be taken with a grain of salt. Unlike physical scientists, philosophers -- and theoretical scientists -- are not bound by proven physical facts. Instead, they are free to suppose -- to say "what-if, given a few assumptions, X is true?" This is how Einstein discovered the physical implications of living in a relative, rather than an absolute & deterministic, world. Hence, most modern scientific "facts" are relative to a point-of-view or frame-of-reference. And they are provisional, given certain presumed preconditions.

By contrast, many informal philosophical expressions are based on un-stated pre-suppositions (beliefs), in which the conditions & limitations on the truth of the statement are not clearly defined. That's why Voltaire warned that, before making a definitive assertion, "first define your terms". Unfortunately, all too many of those implicit "facts" are only loosely defined -- adequate to a narrow task -- and may be interpreted to suit a presumed inference. Even Skeptics argue from a complex worldview that seems to them to be The Simple Truth. So, it's easy to be skeptical of other people's beliefs (presuppositions), but harder to skeptically dig around in the foundation of your own worldview, for fear of undermining The Truth. :smile:

Suppose :
1. assume that something is the case on the basis of evidence or probability but without proof or certain knowledge.
1a : to lay down tentatively as a hypothesis, assumption, or proposal

False Consensus :
"Everyone tends to assume that most normal, decent, intelligent people believe what we believe.":
SKEPTIC magazine, v26 n2

It implies to me an importance in remembering that it's not just what I may know, but the system and framework within which it is know — tim wood

Which connects with structuralism, and PoMo, although Collingwood's philosophy is more logically structured than that of the err... French structuralists.

Ok so things exist. Among those is logic. These are trivial presuppositions, trivially true. The non-trivial presupposition is that human natural logic works.

Philosophers talk about (understanding) ideas and possibilities and scientists talk about (knowing) facts and probabilities, no? The latter propositions and the former suppositions, right? Yeah, in practice there are overlaps but the respective functions (i.e. epistemology & epistemes) are distinct.

Neither do I remember any mention of principles in RGC nor find the word in the indexes of either An Essay on Metaphysics or The Idea of Nature. And so it is not clear to me what he would have understood by the word, or what use he'd have made of it.

My guess is that for his purposes he would have "taken" the principle as expressed by some proposition and subjected it to his metaphysical analysis. On which he says, "To question a presupposition is to demand that it should be 'verified'; that is, to demand that a question should be asked to which the affirmative answer would be that presupposition itself, now in the form of a proposition.... Hence to speak of verifying a presupposition involves supposing it is a relative presupposition" (30).

At some point in a series of verifications - tests - of presuppositions one hits the one that is not verified but is instead taken for granted, or that is the from-which that is the foundation for all the relative presuppositions. What RGC says about Kant is that, "Kantian principles ["System of Principles"] are nothing more permanent than the presuppositions of eighteenth-century physics, as Kant discovered them by analysis. If you analyze the physics of today, or that of the Renaissance, or that of Aristotle, you get a different set" (179).

"So acute and conscientious a thinker [Kant] could not possibly have thought that the absolute presuppositions of eighteenth-century physics were the only ones which human understanding could make had he given to medieval physics and ancient Greek physics the same attention he gave to Galileo and Newton.... The short historical perspective that Kant inherited from Voltaire was at this point his undoing, and made it possible for him to write what was in reality neither more nor less than a history of the absolute presuppositions of physics from Galileo's time to his own. without being aware that this was what he was doing, and in the mistaken belief that he was writing an account of the absolute presuppositions of any possible physics" (249).

The idea being that the principles or absolute presuppositions held by different groups at different times as being the case, always having been the case, and always being the case, are in truth short-lived ideas subject to change. An error certainly not limited to being made only in the past.

↪Gnomon
Philosophers talk about (understanding) ideas and possibilities and scientists talk about (knowing) facts and probabilities, no? The latter propositions and the former suppositions, right? Yeah, in practice there are overlaps but the respective functions (i.e. epistemology & epistemes) are distinction. — 180 Proof

Yes. But, there is a wide range of those uncertain "overlaps" between "known" or "proven" facts, and "received opinions" or "heresies". The Scientific Method is a set of guidelines, intended to prevent scientists from confusing little "F" facts that are "adequate for some particular task", and capital "F" Facts that are True, now & forever, here & there. Philosophers have also devised long lists of Fallacies, to deter them from stumbling into the pitfalls of False Generalization from "known facts".

And yet, both professions still have room for disagreement on "facts" that fall into the gray area, between proven and proposed. Both groups try to walk the chalk line, but all too often stray from the strait & narrow. Which is one reason we have online Philosophical forums, where rational thinkers with slightly different worldviews, can share Facts and Opinions remotely without the danger of throttling each other.

For those of us, who are not omniscient, all our general "facts" are also personal "opinions". In all ages, the list of "proven" scientific facts is contingent upon further evidence, and always subject to change. For example, the Standard Model of Quantum Theory was essentially a contentious quorum consensus, similar to that of the official Catholic Canon of Nicaea -- not a revelation from above. And, many of the "propositions" of that theory would have been preposterous to Isaac Newton, who worried about his own proposition of "spooky action at a distance" : the pull of gravity.

That's why a touch of scientific humility is advisable for those on internet forums who wish to argue fixed facts and potential probabilities. Because Your Facts are pre-suppositions and My Facts are mere opinions. So, I could be wrong . . . . but I doubt it. :grin:

Scientific Humility :
Humility means being open to the possibility of being wrong, being willing to consider other people's ideas and being respectful
https://in-training.org/humility-science-science-always-wins-11239

Science is not about certainty. Science is about finding the most reliable way of thinking at the present level of knowledge.
https://newrepublic.com/article/118655/theoretical-phyisicist-explains-why-science-not-about-certainty

I May Be Wrong but I Doubt It is a memoir by former American professional basketball player Charles Barkley.

Philosophy doesn't "disagree" with science (or history) over "the facts" because science (& history) provides philosophy with "the facts". You and I, however, disagree over whether or not philosophy determines "facts" – I say philosophy doesn't, and only that it proposes ideas about or interpretations/evalutations of facts (as well as other ideas and interpretations). Only idealists seem to conflate ideas with facts so promiscuously and then leap to the conclusion that "philosophy is a/the science". For me, a realist, philosophy is not theoretical or a science. (Witty).

"Kantian principles ["System of Principles"] are nothing more permanent than the presuppositions of eighteenth-century physics, as Kant discovered them by analysis. If you analyze the physics of today, or that of the Renaissance, or that of Aristotle, you get a different set" (179). — tim wood

So Collingwood treated Kantian a priori principles as examples of presupposition.

Philosophers talk about (understanding) ideas and possibilities and scientists talk about (knowing) facts and probabilities, no? — 180 Proof

:fire: :fire: :fire:

The idea being that the principles or absolute presuppositions (.....), are in truth short-lived ideas subject to change. — tim wood

So.....no irreducible, apodeictic, time-independent criteria for human rationality itself, merely as a condition of being human. No metaphorical “one ring to rule them all” kinda thing, then. That’s fine.....nobody dives that deep into his own cognitive methodology anyway, simultaneously with the use of it.

Not to take anything away from AP’s, mind you, insofar as the common understanding is more apt to consider them as short-lived ideas subject to change, than the principles under which they are subsumed, which are neither.

Thanks for the info.

So Collingwood treated Kantian a priori principles as examples of presupposition. — Olivier5

A distinction that becomes significant if there is also thinking that does not involve presuppositions. Inasmuch as all thinking seems to, then yes (imo).

Not to take anything away from AP’s, mind you, insofar as the common understanding is more apt to consider them as short-lived ideas subject to change, than the principles under which they are subsumed, which are neither. — Mww

The evidence of even this site is that relative and absolute presuppositions are not commonly understood, or not understood at all, and as well there seems a good bit of resistance to them as ideas. But we - you - have laid the grounds for an investigation of sorts. Let's take a look at one or more of the "principles under which they are are subsumed" to see what they themselves are, if we can, and whether 1) they are any different from all other thinking which per our author always involve presuppositions, and 2) whether they're short-lived (which we may not be able to define) and more importantly, subject to change. There seem two points to this latter, that they are mutable, or, that they could have been just plain different than they are.

We may have to discuss facts. RGC defines all facts as historical facts. I.e., (as I read it) the proposition that X is a fact always refers to something that has happened. "Future facts" being then either untenable or depending on a separate definition/understanding of "fact."

Can you present one or two or three principles for our knives?

↪Gnomon
Philosophy doesn't "disagree" with science (or history) over "the facts" because science (or history) provides philosophy with "the facts". You and I, however, disagree over whether or not philosophy determines "facts" – I say philosophy doesn't, and only proposes ideas about or interpretations/evalutations of facts (as well as other ideas and interpretations). Only idealists seem to conflate ideas with facts so promiscuously and then leap to the conclusion that "philosophy is a/the science". For me, a realist, philosophy is not theoretical or a science. (Witty). — 180 Proof

No. I actually agree with you, that the job of science is to test & "prove" hypothetical (philosophical) conjectures & factoids, in order to turn them into reliable & settled knowledge that can be used to predict the course of Nature. Unfortunately, scientific "facts", while temporarily "adequate for some particular task", remain subject to change over time. The scientific "facts" of Newton are now referred to as "classical physics", because they have been found to be inadequate at the quantum scale of reality.

So, Scientists "prove" philosophical hypotheses with practical tests, turning some of them into pragmatic theories. But then, Philosophers put some of those useful "facts" under a mental microscope, to discover the logical cracks in the facts. Einstein was a theoretical physicist, which is basically a philosopher who focuses on physics instead of meta-physics. He was once asked, "where is your laboratory?", and simply held up a pencil. By merely using imagination & math, he was able to turn classical physics on its head.

As the quote below asserts, Philosophers study "relations of (metaphysical) ideas", while Scientists study "matters of (physical) fact". When the two professions work together, human understanding progresses. Therefore, I also disagree with your denigration of philosophical reasoning, in that theoretical Philosophy is an integral part of practical Science :nerd:


Factoid : an assumption or speculation that is reported and repeated so often that it becomes accepted as fact.

Facts :
The word “fact” is used in at least two different ways. In the locution “matters of fact”, facts are taken to be what is contingently the case, or that of which we may have empirical or a posteriori knowledge. Thus Hume famously writes at the beginning of Section IV of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding: “All the objects of human reason or inquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact”.

Physics Needs Philosophy / Philosophy Needs Physics :
Philosophy has always played an essential role in the development of science, physics in particular, and is likely to continue to do so. ___Carlo Rovelli, theoretical physicist
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/physics-needs-philosophy-philosophy-needs-physics/

Philosophy may be called the "science of sciences" . . . .As a whole, philosophy and the sciences are equal partners assisting creative thought in its explorations to attain generalising truth.
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Philosophy_and_Science_what_is_the_connection

I also disagree with your denigration of philosophical reasoning ... — Gnomon

I only denigrate idealist (anti-realist, subjectivist) "reasoning" and agree with you that philosophy and science taken together can be quite synergistic.

I only denigrate idealist (anti-realist, subjectivist) "reasoning" and agree with you that philosophy and science taken together can be quite synergetic. — 180 Proof

That's a neat black & white worldview : " Idealism versus Realism". But is your world really that simplistic, and devoid of ideas about things that could be, but are not? Are pre-suppositions idealistic while post-suppositions are realistic? Aren't hypothetical presuppositions a necessary first step toward empirically "proven" theoretical models of Reality? I doubt that you are really dead-set against human imagination, as a tool for learning. Instead, your dichotomy may be better summarized as Spiritualism versus Materialism. Where would we be now, if Einstein had never imagined himself, counter-factually, riding on a beam of light? ( (rhetorical questions) )

Ironically, Quantum Theory could be interpreted as "anti-realist", in that the ancient search for the reductionist Holy Grail -- the Atom -- has now been reduced to imagining invisible and intangible "fields" of virtual particles. Yet, physicists are prepared to accept that abstract mental model as-if it is real --- just as Spiritualists accept the notion of a ghost as real, even though it is merely the remnant Idea of a formerly living (real) person. When quantum theorist Feynman was challenged to prove that that his models represented true reality, he responded "shut-up and calculate".

All I'm suggesting is that Reality is not that simple. It includes both Things and Ideas-About-Things, both wet Brains and airy Minds. Idealism is merely a philosophical focus on the ideas we conceive about the presumed reality out there, beyond the reach of our physical senses. Unfortunately, some people are so in love with the idea of their ideal realm (e.g. Heaven) that they are willing to have their real bodies burned at the stake rather than recant. That's not Idealism, it's extremism. :cool:


Difference Between Idealism and Realism :
The two concepts can, in layman’s terms, be deemed different in perspectives; with idealism focusing on ‘what could be’, and realism focusing on ‘what actually is.’
http://www.differencebetween.net/miscellaneous/difference-between-idealism-and-realism/

Are quantum fields real, or merely a mathematical tool ? :
The point of all of above is, as far as science goes, what an experimentally established theory says is, for all intents and purposes, the reality.
https://www.quora.com › Are-quantum-fields-real-or-m...
Note -- "for all intents and purposes" means "not really"

Idealism :
Scientific Materialism is the assumption that particle Physics is the foundation of reality, and that our ideas are simply products of material processes. Empirical Idealism doesn't deny the existence of a real world, but reasons that all we can ever know about that hypothetical reality is the mental interpretations of sensory percepts. Platonic Idealism (Myth of the Cave) calls those interpretations illusions, and asserts that true Reality is equivalent to an idea in the mind of God. Enformationism is compatible with both views, depending on your perspective.
http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page11.html

Ideality :
In Plato’s theory of Forms, he argues that non-physical forms (or ideas) represent the most accurate or perfect reality. Those Forms are not physical things, but merely definitions or recipes of possible things. What we call Reality consists of a few actualized potentials drawn from a realm of infinite possibilities.
1. Materialists deny the existence of such immaterial ideals, but recent developments in Quantum theory have forced them to accept the concept of “virtual” particles in a mathematical “field”, that are not real, but only potential, until their unreal state is collapsed into reality by a measurement or observation. To measure is to extract meaning into a mind. [Measure, from L. Mensura, to know; from mens-, mind]
2. Some modern idealists find that scenario to be intriguingly similar to Plato’s notion that ideal Forms can be realized, i.e. meaning extracted, by knowing minds. For the purposes of this blog, “Ideality” refers to an infinite pool of potential (equivalent to a quantum field), of which physical Reality is a small part. .
http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page11.html

Too many misdirected and rhetorical questions. I never claimed or implied that "reality is simple" – less is more, parsimony demands; I find the "idealist", etc approaches, however, extravangant and unwarranted and patently unhelpful (à la woo). "Spirtualism" is wholly subjective and you're welcome to it but I'm under no epistemic (or existential) obligation to take such ad hoc whimsy seriously. Defeasible, not wishful or magical, thinking suffices for (more than merely heuristically) 'grasping' reality. :fire:

Can you present one or two or three principles for our knives? — tim wood

To do so would detract from the theme you’ve intended here. Let’s just let RGC speak for himself, through you, without undue influence.

Too many misdirected and rhetorical questions. — 180 Proof

If the questions are misdirected, it's only because the target is fuzzy, or moving around. For example, what do you mean by "idealist (anti-realist, subjectivist) "reasoning"? That's not a rhetorical question. I offered "spiritualism" , but you are welcome to present other examples of "idealist reasoning".

Plato was perhaps the most influential "idealist" reasoner. And Aristotle is noted for trying to make his mentor's ideas more sensible and realistic. But, in fact he also relied on the notion of ideal essences underlying real substances. The point of Idealism is not to be "anti-realist", but to remind us that all of our knowledge of reality is a mental construct. Are you familiar with Donald Hoffman's book : The Case Against Reality? He doesn't deny Reality out there, but merely shows that we only know our ideas about reality, in here. :smile:


Idealism :
In philosophy, idealism is a diverse group of metaphysical views which all assert that "reality" is in some way indistinguishable or inseparable from human perception and/or understanding, that it is in some sense mentally constructed, or that it is otherwise closely connected to ideas.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism

Why is it said that Plato was an idealist and Aristotle a realist? :
Very briefly, Aristotle was a realist because he believed that "forms" or universals couldn't exist uninstantiated, Plato believed they could.
I think it more proper to say that Plato was a non-dualist, rather than an idealist or even a monist. Also, one should not lose sight of the fact that Aristotle, being a disciple of Plato, was not only an empiricist (at heart or by temperament) but also a metaphysician (e.g. the ‘unmoved mover’). Someone here has drawn the attention on the misleading epithets, realist/idealist.
https://www.quora.com/Why-is-it-said-that-Plato-was-an-idealist-and-Aristotle-a-realist-when-Aristotles-book-Politics-is-called-a-copy-of-Republic
Note -- Again, all I'm saying is that Reality is not really a simple stark Black vs White or True/False duality. That's why I have built my personal philosophy on the BothAnd Principle of Complementarity.

Interface : Window to Reality :
Reality is not what you see
http://bothandblog6.enformationism.info/page21.html

Plato was perhaps the most influential "idealist" reasoner. And Aristotle is noted for trying to make his mentor's ideas more sensible and realistic. But, in fact he also relied on the notion of ideal essences underlying real substances. The point of Idealism is not to be "anti-realist", but to remind us that all of our knowledge of reality is a mental construct. Are you familiar with Donald Hoffman's book : The Case Against Reality? He doesn't deny Reality out there, but merely shows that we only know our ideas about reality, in here. — Gnomon

Mere truisms^ ...

Hoffman's quasi-Kantianism is contra-Platonic.

"Essences"?

Read Witty, Dewey & Popper. Read Epicurus, Pyrrho & Sextus Empiricus. Read Nietzsche, Hume & Spinoza.

By "anti-realist" I understand subject-dependency (i.e. conflation of ideas (maps) with facts (territory)) that is disputed by the Private Language argument and self-refuting Protagorean relativism.

... ^ideas are "mental-constructs"; knowledge is more than it's constituent ideas.

Are you familiar with Donald Hoffman's book : The Case Against Reality? He doesn't deny Reality out there, but merely shows that we only know our ideas about reality, in here. :smile: — Gnomon

What does he think is difference between the reality "out there" and the ideas about reality "in here"? If he says the difference is that one is "out there" and the other "in here" I'm not sure he says anything of note, so assume he says something else.

Hoffman's quasi-Kantianism is contra-Platonic. — 180 Proof

Quasi- and Contra- are in the eye of the beholder. maybe what you mean is contra-180proof. I would call Hoffman's analogy of concepts with computer icons to be an update of both Kant and Plato.

By "anti-realist" I understand subject-dependency (i.e. conflation of ideas (maps) with facts (territory)) that is disputed by the Private Language argument and self-refuting Protagorean relativism. — 180 Proof

Unfortunately, your Ideal "Realist" world would be a world without Homo Sapiens -- a world without Selves -- just TV cameras recording reality without meaning.

... ^ideas are "mental-constructs"; knowledge is more than it's constituent ideas. — 180 Proof

Is that another "truism", or merely an opinion? If your worldview is holistic, then everything that is not simplistic and reductive is more than its constituents. Sounds like we agree on something. But I'm not sure what we are disagreeing about. :wink:

Field Guide to The Contrarian :
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/articles/201205/field-guide-the-contrarian

What does he think is difference between the reality "out there" and the ideas about reality "in here"? If he says the difference is that one is "out there" and the other "in here" I'm not sure he says anything of note, so assume he says something else. — Ciceronianus the White

Yes. Hoffman is saying something much more significant and revealing than "subjective is not objective". :smile:

The Case Against Reality :
A professor of cognitive science argues that the world is nothing like the one we experience through our senses.
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/04/the-illusion-of-reality/479559/

Reality is not what you see :
In his doctrine of Transcendental Idealism, 18th century philosopher, Immanuel Kant argued that our perception of reality is limited to constructs created in our own minds to represent the invisible and intangible ultimate reality that he mysteriously labeled “ding an sich” [things-in-essence, as opposed to things-as-we-know-them]. In other words, what we think we see, is not absolute reality but our own ideas about reality.
http://bothandblog6.enformationism.info/page21.html

Well, you've not challenged me on a substantive basis, so there's that.

↪Gnomon
Well, you've not challenged me on a substantive basis, so there's that. — 180 Proof

Touche! You've made it murkily clear that, for you, there is no "substantive basis" for any ideas that don't fit into your subjective view of objectivity. Touche! :joke:

Presuppositions versus Potentialities

Quote from Aristotle and Science thread :
"In [a] paper, three scientists argue that including “potential” things on the list of “real” things can avoid the counterintuitive conundrums that quantum physics poses."
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11494/aristotle-and-science


The quote seems to imply that, to reconcile Relativity and Quantum Theory, Plato's Ideal Forms (potential things) should be considered among the "real" things of the world. Hmmmmm. :chin:

I wonder if there can be a more compelling example of a difference which makes no difference.

"The quote seems to imply that, to reconcile Relativity and Quantum Theory, Plato's Ideal Forms (potential things) should be considered among the "real" things of the world. Hmmmmm." -- Gnomon

↪Gnomon
I wonder if there can be a more compelling example of a difference which makes no difference. — Ciceronianus the White

I'm not sure what your point is -- other than a snarky remark -- but Potential is the difference that makes THE difference between something and nothing. It's what makes thermodynamics dynamic. It's what differentiates positive directional change from random non-directional disorder.

Into The Cool, by Schnieder and Sagan, says "nature abhors a gradient", meaning that any difference attracts change -- it's a hole just begging to be filled ; it's a potential on the verge of actuality ; it's a possibility that "wants" to be realized. :joke:

Into The Cool :
Their central thesis is contained in the striking catchphrase “nature abhors a gradient”; they propose that it is the flow of energy down gradients that is the central driving force that balances the Second Law’s drive toward disorder.
https://ncse.ngo/review-cool

Thermal gradients are caused by differences . . . .
https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/engineering/thermal-gradient

A voltage gradient is a difference in electrical potential across a distance or space.

Potentiality and Actuality :
Aristotle describes potentiality and actuality, or potency and action, as one of several distinctions between things that exist or do not exist. In a sense, a thing that exists potentially does not exist, but the potential does exist.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potentiality_and_actuality
Note -- in other words, Potential is essential to Reality