I don't agree with the details of the method, but I will agree with the conclusion. — Banno

:up: It's just one way of looking at science. There definitely are other and better perspectives around.

That's a list of things science might work on. I asked what you thought the course correction mechanism might be.

In the post I talked about science being recursive; it refers back to itself. The course correction I have in mind is the way science looks very hard for errors in the descriptions it produces, and rectifies them over time. Scientists go out of their way to find problems in the science with which they are involved.

You seem to have something else in mind. — Banno

It seems we were talking about two entirely different issues. What I had in mind was how many scientific achievements (discoveries/inventions) seem to have side-effects, you know, harmful consequences like diseases and environmental damage and how these can be offset by nothing else but taking a scientific approach to these problems. The bad news is science causes problems, big and small; the good news is only science can solve them. That sums up what I meant by course-correction mechanisms that are part and parcel of the scientific enterprise.

As for how science improves its descriptions of reality, all I can say is there is constant pressure being exerted on any scientific description of reality (hypotheses and theories) that takes the form of experiments that serve a dual purpose, one to confirm and the other to disprove a given hypothesis/theory. This confirm/disprove cycle defines the scientific spirit and with it science asymptotically approaches the truth. This is course-correction at its best in my humble opinion.

Curious. What do you think this course correction mechanism is? — Banno

Environmental Science, Solar Power, Low emission vehilces, Electric vehicles, and so on

"Ergo, if I = something that's thinking, you are me, I'm you, you're Descartes, Descartes is me, so and so forth until I = everyone."

I don't agree with that. "I" /= "something that's thinking". "Something that's thinking" is a necessary condition for the self to exist, but it's not a sufficient condition. I like the definition of the self as "this particular conscious awareness". — RogueAI

We're on the same page.

Get what? Put it together. — Banno

This :point:

science has an inbuilt course-correction mechanism i.e. it detects its own flaws and autocorrects them
— TheMadFool
On time? — baker

On time?
— baker

It's too early to comment. — TheMadFool

It's too early to comment.
— TheMadFool

Then it's too early for praise. — baker

Speaking for myself, I'd say we need to look at science's 1) course correction mechanism and 2) timing of the course correction mechanism's activation. To be fair, baker's right, the timing seems off as a lot of damage has already been done and many of the branches of science directly or indirectly involved in mitigating science's impact on health and environment are in their infancy or adolescence. However, we must give the devil his due - science at least has a course correction or self-righting mechanism (srimech).

@frank

I mean, you can read his biography. He was an amazing guy besides being a genius.
— frank

Yeah, especially when he cut up live animals. — baker

Sad but true but as Voltaire said, "Le meglio è l'inimico del bene"

Better a diamond with a flaw than a pebble without — Confucius

1. Either I'm sane or I'm insane [premise]
2. If I'm sane then, I'm logical [premise]
3. If I'm logical then, logic determines my choices [premise]
4. If logic determines my choices, I don't have free will [premise]
5. If I'm insane then, I don't have free will [premise]
6. If I'm sane, logic determines my choices [2, 3 HS]
7. If I'm sane, I don't have free will [4, 6 HS]
8. I don't have free will or I don't have free will [1, 5, 7 CD]
9. I don't have free will [8 Taut]

QED

N.B. Logical choices are, by definition, necessary which is just another way of saying you don't have a choice.

I recall someone else starting a thread in the same vein:

1. Assume U = the set that contains everything
2. If there's a that U contains everything, U must contain itself

Line 2 might need some explaining. Suppose E = everything. U = {E}. But then U can't be {E} because we can think of {{E}, E} that's a better match for U. However, {{E}, E} ain't it either because there's {{{E}, E}, {E}, E} [nested sets]...the process reiterates ad infinitum and, I suppose, ad nauseum.

There's also the matter of power sets. Suppose P(A) is the power set of set A, I believe a proven theorem in set theory is that the P(A) > A.

1. There's a U that's the set of everything [assume for reductio ad absurdum]
2. P(U) > U [The theorem I spoke of above]
3 . If U is the set of everything then, any set A is such that A < U
4. Any set A is such that A < U [from 1, 3 modus ponens]
5. If any set A is such that A < U then, P(U) < U
6. P(U) < A [from 4, 5 modus ponens]
7. P(U) > A and P(U) < A [2, 6 conjunction, also a contradiction]
Ergo,
8. There's no U that's the set of everything [1 to 7 reductio absurdum]

It's too early to comment.
— TheMadFool

Then it's too early for praise. — baker

@Banno, did you get that? How would you respond?

It's a delusion — RogueAI

Agreed but the question, to me, is which is the delusion? Descartes' cogito argument or Cotard "delusion"? Don't be fooled by the word "delusion" in Cotard delusion - that's not as cut-and-dried as it's made out to be for it assumes Descartes is right and that's precisely what needs to be proved.

We can quibble about what "I" means — RogueAI

This is the nub of the issue. Let's discuss the Descartes' argument and Cotard's argument and may be the truth will emerge from it.

Descartes' cogito argument (argument D)
1. Thinking is occurring
2. There's something that's thinking
3. I am that something that's thinking
Ergo,
4. I exist (as something that's thinking)


Cotard delusion argument (argument C)
1. Thinking is occurring
2. There's something that's thinking
3. I am not that something that's thinking
Ergo,
4. I don't exist (as something that's thinking)

Both arguments have two identical premises (1 & 2) but differ with respect to premise 3 and, quite obviously, the conclusion.

As is evident, premise 3 in argument D is being challenged by premise 3 in argument C.

Perhaps premise 3 in argument C can be explained in terms of an incongruence between the patient's idea of who fae is (the patient's I) and the "something that's thinking." Cotard delusion has been reported to occur after severe trauma (major vehicular accidents for example) and such patients may argue in the following way.

1. Nobody could've survived the accident I was in
2. If nobody could've survived the accident I was in then I'm dead
Ergo,
3. I'm dead
4. If I' m dead then I don't exist
Ergo,
5. I don't exist

Could Descartes' cogito argument help cure Cotard delusion? Suppose I offer Descartes' cogito argument to someone suffering from Cotard delusion. If the delusion is deeply entrenched, the patient will not accept the argument and the only way that's possible is if fae believes premise 3 in argument C which is. 3. I am not that something that's thinking, and we've circled back to where we began, is the I = that something that's thinking?

At this juncture, it seems we need to discuss the notion of "something that's thinking" (see premises 2, 3 in argument C and D). Everyone is "something that's thinking" because everyone thinks. Ergo, if I = something that's thinking, you are me, I'm you, you're Descartes, Descartes is me, so and so forth until I = everyone.

Argument E
1. I = Something that's thinking
Ergo,
2. I = Everyone
Ergo,
3. I = You
4. I'm thinking about Descartes
5. You're thinking about the woman in the red dress (homage to The Matrix) [you're not thinking about Descartes]
6. If I'm thinking about Descartes and you're not thinking about Descartes (the woman in the red dress) and I = you then, I'm/you're thinking about Descartes and I'm/you're not thinking about Descartes
7. I'm/you're thinking about Descartes and I'm/you're not thinking about Descartes [contradiction]
So,
8. I = You is false
Therefore,
9. I = Everyone is also false
Hence,
10. I = Something that's thinking too is false

Looks like, from line 10 just above, those who "suffer" from Cotard delusion are spot on (see premise 3 in argument C)

What next?

If you ask me, the only option we have to identify ourselves with the mind is to base it on thought content. In argument E, we noticed that a single individual can't think about, say, X and also not think about X. So, if I were to claim that there are two thoughts occurring at the same time viz. a thought about Descartes and a thought about a woman in a red dress (not Descartes), I could immediately infer on pain of a contradiction that there are at least two persons (I's) involved.

Taking this a step further, let's do a thought experiment. Imagine a universe U with the following setup:

1. You don't know how many persons are there in this universe.
2. The only activity possible in this universe is thinking.
3. There are only two thoughts available to wit, A and B.
4. The only information given to you is/are the thought(s) taking place in this universe.

Imagine now that you're told that at time t1, the thoughts in U are A and B (not A). You can immediately infer, on pain of contradiction, that there are at least two persons in U - one is thinking A and the other is thinking B (not A).

At another time t2, you're informed that the thought in U is A. This is insufficient to infer anything about the number of people in U: it could be that everyone (more than one) in U is thinking the same thing (A) or it could be that there's only one person thinking A.

At a different time t3, you discover that the thoughts in U are, again, A and B. From this, as before, you conclude there are at least two persons in U - one having thought A and the other thought B.

There are now two distinct sequence of thoughts:

Thought sequence P
1.A at time t1, A at time t2, B at time t3 [AAB]
2. B at time t1, A at time t2, A at time t3[BAA]

or

Thought sequence Q
1. A at time t1, A at time t2, A at time t3 [AAA]
2. B at time t1, A at time t2, B qt time t3 [BAB]


The sequence of thoughts is critical to the identity of a person (the "I" in Descartes' cogito argument) in U because uniqueness, as you can see above, is to be found in the sequence of thoughts [AAB, BAA, AAA, BAB, all unique]. What we can infer then is, either as per thought sequence P, there are at least two persons viz. AAB and BAA or as per thought sequence Q, there are, again, at least two persons viz. AAA and BAB. In short, the "I" in Descartes' cogito argument is a label for a one particular permutation (order matters) of all possible sequences of thoughts.

Firstly, such a conception for the "I" in the cogito argument seems to be a big disappointment. How comforting it is to believe the "I" = "something that thinks" for to say "I exist" then is more meaningful, more tangible, more uplifting. As just or nothing more than a sequence of thoughts, the "I" loses its luster, becomes dull, unappealing and uninteresting.

Secondly, I wish to discuss the matter of how it's possible for two persons to experience the exact same sequence of thoughts. There's no reason why you wouldn't find out that in universe U, the thoughts were: at time t1, A; at time t2, B; and at time t3, A. The sequence of thoughts would be ABA. Given this data, you wouldn't know if there was only one person thinking ABA or a gazillion persons thinking ABA since they can be duplicated precisely. In other words, because no sequence of thoughts is going to be exclusive to one person, a sequence of thoughts doesn't really provide you with a foolproof method of identifying a particular person in universe U. This means, in the simplest of terms, a sequence of thoughts also can't be the necessary foundation for Descartes' "I".


In summary, we have only two options for a referent for Descartes' "I" viz. 1. "something that's thinking" or 2. a sequence of thoughts and both don't make the cut so to speak. Ergo, in full agreement with those with Cotard "delusion", I don't exist. :chin: :chin: :chin:

Psychologist to Philosopher: I know why you think. [Complexes ]
Philosopher to Psychologist: I know how you think. [Critical Thinking ]

Incidentally check out the synopsis of this video, Dangerous Knowledge. I haven’t watched it but intend to, if I can find a copy. It’s a BBC production. — Wayfarer

I'm in your debt. Thanks

On time? — baker

It's too early to comment.

I’ve always considered nihilism to be a journey through rather than a philosophical position. — Possibility

Do you mind explaining that? Thanks.

According to Nietzsche, it is only when nihilism is overcome that a culture can have a true foundation on which to thrive. He wished to hasten its coming only so that he could also hasten its ultimate departure. — Wikipedia, ‘Friedrich Nietzsche’

:clap: So, what's the status of nihilism vis-à-vis humans? Is its "departure" imminent or has it already taken place? If it's still with us, how is humanity coping with it? What's the most promising philosophical idea in re a solution to nihilism?

I missed this one. Is the view negative? I think many people are suspicious of intellectuals and pseudo-intellectuals (not always unreasonably so). Philosophy is often depicted as a rarified intellectual pursuit and it doesn't exactly recommend itself with dynamic results and user friendliness. — Tom Storm

Why is the general public view of philosophy so negative? — baker

Why is the general public view of philosophy so negative?
— baker
Good question. I suppose because thinking is difficult and thinking about thinking is counter-intuitive. — 180 Proof

Assuming you're all right that people have a dim view of philosophy, Plato's warning (vide infra) should resonate with all philosophers worth their salt.

Plato's Allegory Of The Cave

Return to the cave

Plato continues, saying that the freed prisoner would think that the world outside the cave was superior to the world he experienced in the cave and attempt to share this with the prisoners remaining in the cave attempting to bring them onto the journey he had just endured; "he would bless himself for the change, and pity [the other prisoners]" and would want to bring his fellow cave dwellers out of the cave and into the sunlight (516c).[2]

The returning prisoner, whose eyes have become accustomed to the sunlight, would be blind when he re-enters the cave, just as he was when he was first exposed to the sun (516e).[2] The prisoners, according to Plato, would infer from the returning man's blindness that the journey out of the cave had harmed him and that they should not undertake a similar journey. Plato concludes that the prisoners, if they were able, would therefore reach out and kill anyone who attempted to drag them out of the cave (517a). — Wikipedia

What I wrote the post I was thinking about some discussions I had on this site in January. One of these people was clearly coming from the standpoint of defending nihilism as a philosophical position. However, he saw it as not being a source for feeling miserable but as a foundation from which to build a creative life. — Jack Cummins

:clap: He wishes to make a stepping stone (a meaningful life) out of a stumbling block (nihilism)! Did he succeed?

I think that the original context of me using the phrase 'psychology danger' in discussions with Madfool a couple of days ago was about thinking error, but, then, we revisited it and expanded it a bit yesterday, and, here, in this thread he has expressed it mainly as the psychological danger of how people can come to harm or peril through engagement with ideas — Jack Cummins

Excelente Señora! The dangers are, if you really look at it, psychological and this opens up a new front in this discussion viz. the relationship, if any, between psychology and philosophy. Is, for instance, philosophy driven by psychological forces such as insecurity, or any one or more of the large list of complexes psychologists have identified?

No, because there is no evidence that philosophy kills. At all.
If you want to lay some instances of mental illness at the feet of philosophy you have to be able to show how you can tell the difference between the philosophical cause and a pre-existing mental illness. How would you be able to tell when it was the philosophy doing it? — DingoJones

My own impressions on the link between philosophy and so-called mental illness (depression, suicide, or worse) is that it (the connection between the two) is, inter alia, about how emotionally invested we are in a particular philosophy. At a minimum, becoming involved at the level of feelings with a certain philosophical theory/hypothesis makes one susceptible to all kinds of mental ailments from anger & frustration towards those who hold an opposing view (e.g. theists vs atheists) to total insanity/inanity.

However, more importantly, many people, including philosophers themselves, don't seem to realize the full import of philosophical positions, even those they themselves either directly or indirectly, established. To do that one needs to feel the idea whatever that idea is and this seems to rarely occur; probably because to comprehened a philosophical standpoint one needs to become an ideal observer and that, according to some, is only possible if one is dispassionate.

To illustrate, the difference between someone who comprehends (say) nihilism and someone who realizes it:

1. Comprehends nihilism: :meh: [unfeeling]

2. Realizes nihilism: :sad: [feeling]

an incapacity to cope with the human condition — thewonder

Such people have then realized as opposed to comprehended.

One such red zone is solipsism — god must be atheist

Indeed! The implications of solipsisim hasn't really sunk in for me. My experience with it has been more as a disinterested observer than anything that I might consider a realization Perhaps I should clarify this a bit more. What's the difference between comprehension and realization? To my reckoning, the latter is an experience imbued as it were with emotion - it almost feels like an orgasm if you ask me. Comprehension, on the other hand can be achieved sans feelings. Is this the philosophers' dirty little secret? Is Sophia (wisdom) the ultimate sex goddess? :chin:

Anyway, as I was saying, I haven't been able to connect with solipisism at an emotional level and my view is that until that happens, I won't realize what it really is. @Wayfarer once, in another thread, mentioned about how we can talk about nirvana but never get to know what nirvana really is (by just talking about it) and my hunch is that boils down to the difference between comprehension and realization. I went off on a tangent there, had to get this off my chest. Please ignore the digression.

But, does this swallowing of pills really address the philosophy quest? — Jack Cummins

That, my friend, is the right question — Dr. Lanning (I, Robot)

I know this is philosophical heresy and I may be guilty of a hasty generalization but makes you wanna ask, "is philosophy a disease that needs to be cured?" Some, especially scientists, have accused philosophy of being a total waste of scarce state resources but could it be, brace yourself o philosopher , worse than that?

("bulletproof") optimists. — 180 Proof

:rofl:

The human mind expects M O R E from the world than the world has to offer. (e.g. Zapffe, Cioran, Camus, Rosset, Murray, Brassier) How does a mind cope with this congenital – radical – dissatisfaction, frustration, misery? — 180 Proof

I can't help but agree. Speaking for myself, I've always been somewhat troubled by one recurring thought, "there's something that I'm missing here" which in more familiar language would be "there's more to reality than meets the eye."

You know, like,

There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy. — Hamlet

but of late I'm beginning to doubt my instincts in this regard. I haven't yet changed my mind - old habits die hard - but I am beginning to lean towards a position that can be summed up in the statement,

That's all there is, there isn't any M O R E — Ethel Barrymore

Optimism is the true killer (suicidal or homicidal, it doesn't seem to matter). — 180 Proof

Much tears have been shed, lives lost, on its watch.

To put it simply: A reflective study of self is needed for all philosophers. — Tiberiusmoon

The unexamined life is not worth living — Socrates

Philosophy is a journey into the self in tandem with an attempt to understand our place in the world as we know it. These two goals don't seem to be as mutually compatible with each other as we would've liked - our hopes seem to be exceed reality's ability to make them come true in any satisfactory sense.

Rather, it's already having an absurdist view that will make one interested in what others had to say about it — baker

True! Philosophy, no matter what effect it has on our mood and no matter what it might lead to, whether you might end up laughing like Democritus or constantly weeping like Heraclitus, might be a voyage of self-discovery but that would mean there's no objectivity to it.

I admit to confusion — Jack Cummins

I don't know if this makes any kind of sense or even whether this has any significant philosophical meaning but much of the 5 or so years I've been participating in this forum and the old one can be summarized in one word, confusion. A couple of weeks ago I experienced an epiphany of sorts - I (finally) became aware of my confusion and it was oddly, satisfying. All this time I had been living under the dark cloud of befuddlement at its extreme and realizing that I was befuddled, bewildered, confused, and also baffled was a liberating experience for me.

I know that I know nothing — Socrates

I began using the term philosophical danger during discussion with you on one of your threads and I think that you saw it like a movie, often with a girl going somewhere she should not go. You also spoke of cats' 9 lives and wondering if you had used yours. I wonder how many lives we have on the forum and whether there are threads where we should not go. I also see dangers as being related to untying philosophical knots, and like being in a Celtic maze or labyrinth. — Jack Cummins

The Red Zones Of Philosophy (Philosophical Dangers)

I am glad this was noted. — Banno

:ok:

In which category would you put police detectives acting on a working hypothesis to solve a crime? — Apollodorus

Well, I don't know how real detectives handle actual cases - I suspect it's some combination of evidence gathering, talking to suspects and witnesses, consulation with colleagues, narrowing the list of possible culprits down to one, and then making the arrest - but the basic idea is to figure out how probable is it that a person x is the culprit given the evidence. Sounds very Bayesian too me.

Fictional detectives like Sherlock Holmes and Hercule Poirot are a different story altogether - the guilty person is usually the one who's the last person you'd suspect. I recommend, when reading detective fiction, a mindset that considers anything's possible.

This may be because the people can explore the dark depths through art. — Jack Cummins

@Daemon disagrees.

Your psyche may be dark and unforgiving, mine is generally lighthearted and easy-going. I'd recommend avoiding Camus and other miseryguts authors. — Daemon

We must imagine Sisyphus happy — Sisyphus

.

Not all doom and gloom I suppose.

I feel like if math is a universal language then it should express properties that the universe contains. — Thinking

Mathematics is the alphabet with which God has written the universe — Galileo Galilei

Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (Max Erik Tegmark)

The universe I think isn't simply just cold logic but also contains feelings, reason, and everything in between. — Thinking

I know where you're coming from. I think I have a name for it - Spock Paradox which is the hard-to-explain Spockmania given Spock is a personification of cold logic. Think of it, if logic were really that emotionally empty would people actually spend their whole lives studying it? Plus, what if there are no good reasons to be emotional about anything? Yet, philosophy means love of wisdom! I guess, as the ones who seem to know what they're talking about say, it's complicated.

So, more accurately I would like to say mathematics should be expressed through rationality rather than just simply logic in itself. — Thinking

Explain the difference between rationality and logic

and

what the heck is anti-rationality? Irrationalism?

philosophical danger — Jack Cummins

You have my attention! What exactly do you mean by "philosophical dangers"?

I'm sorry to say I can't seem to find an overarching principle/theory/concept but as @Echarmion pointed out, it's related to epistemology. Two things to consider here:

1. Probability of truth: Given a set of facts (events, statements, etc.) multiple explanations can be formulated but they're all not equiprobable; some, given our background knowledge, are more likely than others.

2. Possibility of truth: No matter how improbable a given explanation is, so long as the odds aren't zero, that explanation could be the truth.

I suspect conspiracy theorists give more weightage to 2. Possibility of truth and those not so inclined prefer 1. Probability of truth.

It wouldn't be completely wrong to say conspiracy theorists endorse some version of Modal Realism, a position that seems to blur the lines between possibility and actuality and those who aren't conspiracy theorists seem more familiar, intuitively or by exposure, with Probability Theory

I think that looking at problems from various perspectives and angles helps, rather than being locked into one specific point of reference, helps one avoid being too narrow. — Jack Cummins

Rather, we should be adoxastoi (without views), aklineis (uninclined toward this side or that), and akradantoi (unwavering in our refusal to choose), saying about every single one that it no more is than it is not or it both is and is not or it neither is nor is not — Pyrrhos of Elis

I wouldn't mind someone explaining Pyrrho's statement above. Anyone?

So just took a free online class at Hillsdale college about logic and reasoning and how learning geometry from Euclid and his elements help with that. My question is how in what ways do you think Euclid's elements helped you out the most? I can tell you it helped me learn geometry a bunch but not so much on the logic/reasoning side. What say you pilgrim? — Thinking

Same here! I enjoyed math in my teens, especially geometry and I, sadly, failed to make the connection between geometry in particular, mathematics in general and logic. My life would surely have been greatly enriched had I realized that.

For my money, Euclid's place in logic is the same as (say) Arnold Schwarzenneger's place in bodybuilding - both were paragons in their respective fields. That being so, they become, by virtue of their excellence in their areas of expertise, perfect reference points for beginners to get a feel of what it's all about. @alan1000 is spot on.

Also relevant seems to be the relationship between mathematics and logic? Are they one and the same thing? After all, the content of the branches of mathematics (theorems) seem to be arbitrary - mathematicians seem at liberty to begin with any axiom of their choice - and the only permanent fixture in the mathematical universe is logic. So, the natural question is, is math just logic in its [Euclid's] elements?

Where Are We From? What Are We? Where Are We Going ', is a title of a painting by , Paul Gaugin, in 1897, when he was suicidal, — Jack Cummins

A few things that seem intriguing about the late Paul Gaugin ( :flower: :death: ):

1. My own experience with so-called suicidal ideation has been wholly and unequivocally about "me, "myself" and "I". I find it very odd that Gaugin was more of a "we" kinda guy. Where Are We From? What Are We? Where Are We Going? What factors could've influenced him to take what is at its core self, self, and self, and turn into an inquiry about others? :chin: Gaugin's self seems to have, uncharacteristic for a man experiencing the blues, expanded to encompass all and the three questions he asks seem to be reminiscent of the Holy Trinity all united in one final, ultimate one which is,

There is only one really serious philosophical question, and that is suicide — Albert Camus

2. I find it both exhilarating and also terrifying that if one has to, in a sense, engage in true philosophy one must be willing to descend into the dark and unforgiving regions of the human psyche which are but outposts of Algea & Thanatos. Reminds me of the sci-fi story, Breeds there a man...?

I got a bit confused — Jack Cummins

Who isn't?

it's all fun and games until somebody... — frank

loses an eye :rofl:

I am sure that science will win on this thread, but it doesn't mean it has won completely in the world. I am not against science, but I see it as mixture of potential for benefit or harm, with a lot of unanswered questions about the future. — Jack Cummins

While I'm not going to disagree with you since you're right of course (double-edged swords are the norm), the fact that everything (actions, thoughts, words, etc.) is like that - comes with both pros and cons - kinda makes it meaningless to say that science has a "...potential for benefit or harm..."

Do you think Banno, the OP, doesn't know that? The OP in my humble opinion is highlighting the fact that unlike the others, science has an inbuilt course-correction mechanism i.e. it detects its own flaws and autocorrects them. This particular highly-desirable feature seems unique to science, its self-improvement at its finest. That is, in my humbld opinion, Banno's message.

I don't speak teenage girl. Could you explain what's amusing you?

Is it that Jack hasn't heard of the Amish?

Because that's no cause for mockery, is it?

You should not seek to make it embarrassing to learn things! — counterpunch

Sorry Jack Cummins. No offense intended.

I am not Amish, whoever he is.
— Jack Cummins

The Amish are a religious sect in the US that forgoes the use of modern technology. — counterpunch

:rofl:

Come to think of it, this question - do atheists hope there is no God? - gets right to the crux of the issue of theism-atheism.

For theists, it's a prompt, gentle/rude, for some deep soul-searching. The bottom line is that theism, from beginning to present and probably for the foreseeable future, may be more about hope than truth - fed up with the this world's hostility and indifference towards our condition, we envision the better, a world without, in the most basic sense, suffering and death and since we ourselves seem utterly powerless to create such a world, we entertain the possibility of a being, God, who can, someone who'll save the day come hell or high water. Among logicians this is known as the fallacy of wishful thinking which implies that all attempts by believers to prove the existence of God are nothing more than textbook cases of rationalization - ascribing a belief/action to a better (here more logical) reason than the true rather pathetic one.


For atheists, the question does about the same thing. Do they too secretly hope that a God exists? After all theism "...makes an offer we can't refuse..." and I mean that in both senses of that which simply can't be refused - either irresistably good (heaven) or horrifyingly bad (hell). That a Mafia Don (The Godfather) no less, too said, even if only in a fictional universe, "I'm gonna make him an offer he can't refuse" sends chills down my spine, I don't know about you though. Hope suddenly turns into despair! For certain, given what I said vide supra, atheists hope but do they hope God is or do they hope God is not? That, my friend, is the million dollar question.

You two should stop jerking each other off. It's disgusting and unbecoming on a philosophy site. — tim wood

:lol: Jerk me off! Jerk me off! :rofl:

Nietzsche characterizes slave morality as one which emphasized obedience, pity, conformity and following the herd. — Ross Campbell

Non serviam

The original Hebrew phrase is לֹא אֶעֱבֹד (Lô´ ´e`ĕvôd), where it appears in a jeremiad against Israel, accusing them of refusing to serve God. Some English language Bibles may translate "non serviam" as "I will not transgress"; this seems to be an alternative reading of certain manuscripts. This is most likely a scribal error because the difference between "serve" (עבד) and "transgress" (עבר) in late Hebrew characters is so minute that it would be easy to mistake one for the other when hand-copying a manuscript. Most modern literal translations (such as the Revised Standard Version) choose "serve" over "transgress" as the proper reading because the context calls for a statement of disobedience, not of obedience.

Some heavy interpretation in there. Could the so-called "God" of the Bible have been Satan who'd demonsrated beyond the shadow of a doubt that he was lord, master and ruler of the universe, demanded people do the exact opposite of the decalog injunctions and the people, "revolted" by these commands to commit evil, well...er...revolted en masse, declaring in unison, "Non serviam"? Makes sense doesn't it, considering the call to conduct horrific genocide in "the good book."

TMF's perspective is uninformed & pseudo-philosophical. — 180 Proof

Et tu Brute. :lol:

It's not whether you win or lose. It's how you play the game. — frank

Would really like to believe that but...did you ever win a prize, a medal, a certificate, or the like for "...how you play the game..."?

I will be winning when this thread continues without my intervention. That's when I will know the point has been well-made and is bothersome. — Banno

The detective is the murderer! There's not much you can do about the murders without compromising the investigation. So, you may fault science all you want, you'll still need it to fix the problems. I consider that a win for science.

I have absolutely no bad feelings towards Banno
— Jack Cummins

I can fix that... — Banno

:lol:

@Jack Cummins I was just thinking about how science seems to operate. There's a lot of cases in the scientific world in which discoveries/inventions in one are turn out to be critical to discoveries/inventions in other areas as well e.g. CT scans and MRIs used in medicine began life in physics. This sometimes gives us the impression that the sciences are a well-coordinated system of ideas, working synergistically, complementing each other, like an orchestra playing music with a unity of purpose. This would be an ideal scenario, but alas, such is not always true - plastics, the internal combustion engine, pesticides, to name a few of the major sources of pollution are unmistakable signs that the orchestra of science needs more work than we thought it did.

Representationalism notoriously courts scepticism: Why should awareness of one thing (an inner object) enable awareness of a quite different thing (an external object), and how can we ever know that what is internally accessible actually corresponds to something external? On Husserl's anti-representationalist view, however, the fit and link between mind and world – between perception and reality – isn't merely external or coincidental: “consciousness (mental process) and real being are anything but coordinate kinds of being, which dwell peaceably side by side and occasionally become ‘related to' or ‘connected with' one another” (Husserl 1982: 111 — Joshs

I may have completely misunderstood representationalism and anti-representationalism both but I recall writing in another thread that if the former is false, everytime someone thinks of (say) the Eiffel tower, the whole tower, all 300 m of it must be somehow inside that person's head. Representationalism thus, in other matters too, is but a colloraly of the simple truth that when one looks at the Eiffel tower, only a representation of it exists, if that is even the right word to describe it, inside one's mind.

For Husserl, physical nature makes itself known in what appears perceptually. The very idea of defining the really real reality as the unknown cause of our experience, and to suggest that the investigated object is a mere sign of a distinct hidden object whose real nature must remain unknown and which can never be apprehended according to its own determinations, is for Husserl nothing but a piece of mythologizing (Husserl 1982: 122). Rather than defining objective reality as what is there in itself, rather than distinguishing how things are for us from how they are simpliciter in order then to insist that
the investigation of the latter is the truly important one, Husserl urges us to face up to the fact that our
access to as well as the very nature of objectivity necessarily involves both subjectivity and
intersubjectivity. Indeed, rather than being the antipode of objectivity, rather than constituting an obstacle and hindrance to scientific knowledge, (inter)subjectivity is for Husserl a necessary enabling condition. “ — Joshs

I more or less agree with Husserl. Firstly because there really is no point in complaining about what one can't do anything about (subjectivity); disliking your hat is not as foolish as being unhappy about your baldness - you can do something about the hat but nothing about your receding hairline. Subjectivity is part and parcel of conscious beings; intersubjectivity then is nothing more than shared subjectivity like, for instance, mass hysteria or folie à deux.  

I am a bit surprised that you think that what is important is whether Banno is winning to be the most important criteria. Surely, science and all other methods of investigation, and of knowledge are of seeing knowledge as serving humanity are far more important than proclaiming Banno as the ultimate expert. — Jack Cummins

Guilty as charged! He is winning though!

Banno's winning. I more or less concur, science is a self-cleaning (c)oven of witches scientists.

To clarify, science does create problems, huge ones - nuclear power (radioactive fallout), the internal combustion engine (global warming), plastics (pollution), so and so forth - but it's science itself that discovers these are a major headahce with long-lasting negative effects on the health of humans and in a wider context, the global ecosystem. Reminds me of a movie someone told me she'd seen - about a murder mystery in which the detective is himself the murderer. This particular TV trope goes by the name Hired To Hunt Yourself

Aramis: The King has ordered me to seek out the secret general of the Jesuits and to kill him.
Porthos: You should let the secret general worry about that.
Aramis: Problem is that, ah... I am he.

— The Man in the Iron Mask (1998)