If it's the monetary aspects of vaccines - the profit motive - that's disconcerting to you, I suggest you follow the money so to speak and you might be in for a surpise as I suspect that the huge amounts of gains made by drug companies eventually land up, much diminished of course but pro rata, at your doorstep.

Too, why stop your accusations/allegations of deplorable conduct at drug companies? What about the economic system that enables profiteering big time? Isn't that the very economic system that you're part of and that facilitates your livelihood? You can't eat your cake and have it too is the most appropriate adage here.

If X says P is false it's on X to prove P is false not on you to prove — New2K2

A couple of things to consider. Suppose Mr. X claims P. He can't do that without an argument i.e. Mr. X must have an argument that proves P. If Ms. Y disagrees with Mr. X, all Ms. Y has to do is prove Mr. X's argument's unsound i.e. show that the argument is invalid and/or that at least one of the premises is false. Ms. Y doesn't have to prove P is false. In short, disagreeing that P doesn't amount to saying ~P [P is false]. Disagreeing that P can simply mean that P hasn't been proven and, take note, that P hasn't been proven isn't the same as claiming ~P.

Edit: If all (perception and understanding of) reality is subjective then the burden of proof is not on the claimant but on the disagreer.

Thoughts. — New2K2

You mean to say that if I make a claim P to another person X, the burden of proof (for P) is X's? That doesn't sound right.

No person. No exploitation. Period. — schopenhauer1

The dangers of AI

In other words, he was not actually claiming that God exists. He was aware of a force which he felt able to call God but he was unable to say whether this force represented the reality of God beyond his own consciousness. — Jack Cummins

I guess that boils down to Carl Jung being, like some of us, unsure whether god is real or a figment of his/our imagination. This inability to distinguish reality from make-belief is open to a dual interpretation. A theist-turned-atheist would consider it as faer first steps towards freedom, liberation from a falsehood that has huge swathes of people in its grips. On the other hand, an atheist-turned-theist will regard it (also) as faer first steps towards freedom, liberation from a falsehood that has huge swathes of people in its grips. You get the idea.

Another way to make sense of Agrippa's argument is by rejecting Agrippa's trilemma as something that doesn't matter. When we do that, all that Agrippa has to do is craft an argument or a justification that Agrippa's trilemma matters and that it can't be rejected.

1. Agrippa's trilemma doesn't matter = ~M [Assume for reductio ad absurdum]
2. If ~M then Agrippa's argument/justification that Agrippas's trilemma matters is good
3. If Agrippa's argument/justification that Agrippa's trilemma matters is good then Agrippa's trilemma matters
4. If ~M then Agrippa's trilemma matters [2, 3 HS]
5. M = Agrippa's trilemma matters [1, 4 MP]
6. M & ~M [1, 5 Conj]
7. ~~M [1 to 6 Reductio ad absurdum]
8. M = Agrippa's trilemma matters [5 DN]
9. If M then there are no justified beliefs
10. There are no justified beliefs [8, 9 MP]

Basically, if we assume Agrippa's trilemma doesn't matter, we can infer that it matters. If Agrippa's trilemma matters, there are no justified beliefs. It all boils down to the first assumption we make. When I assume that Agrippa's trilemma doesn't matter (line 1) what I actually mean is that there are justified beliefs. If there are justified beliefs/Agrippa's trilemma doesn't matter, Agrippa's justification/argument that there are no justified beliefs is good/sound. If so, we must accept that there are no justified beliefs.

Ah ok, so you are saying if I assume Agrippa's conclusion, then I can't even conclude that “There are no justified beliefs is not justified”, because in order to do so, I would have to justify it and then the conclusion would be justified, which contradicts 3, right? In that case though, you would be unable to justify the claim that my counter-argument destroys itself, since you are also using an argument which pretends to be a justification of the conclusion that my counter-argument destroys itself, which can't be the case if Agrippa's conclusion is right, correct? — Amalac

Since you made the first move with a justification, I followed suit with my own justification. On the whole though you're right on target - I'm not justified in saying you're not justified IF Agrippa is correct but, by the same token, neither are you justified in saying Agrippa is not justified and, to further complicate matters, neither is Agrippa himself justified but that doesn't contradict Agrppa's claim that there are no justified beliefs and that's perfectly ok.

my advice would be to suspend judgement. — Amalac

Music to a skeptic's ears. I'm sure Agrippa would've been delighted.

Here's some food (argument) for thought.

If one believes, asserts, maintains that J = There are justified beliefs, we must accept Agrippa's argument/justification; it is, after all, a justification. Agrippa's argument/justification proceeds as follows:

1. J = There are justified beliefs [Agrippa's trilemma doesn't matter]
2. If J then we must accept Agrippa's justification/argument as good [Agrippa's trilemma doesn't matter]
3. If we must accept Agrippa's justification/argument as good then we must accept Agrippa's conclusion, A = There are no justified beliefs
4. If J then we must accepy Agrippa's conclusion, A = there are no justified beliefs [2, 3 HS]
5. We must accept Agrippa's conclusion, A = There are no justified beliefs [1, 4 MP]

If one assumes that there are justified beliefs and since Agrippa's argument/justification is good (it's a sound argument since Agrippa's trilemma doesn't matter), it follows that we must accept Agrippa's conclusion which is A = There are no justified beliefs.

Note how Agrippa manages to use the proposition J to ensure that his argument/justification is good/sound. Basically, Agrippa's claim A = There are no justified beliefs, is justified if we assume J = There are justified beliefs.

Jesus! What a mind-job! — Cypher

Ok. Let me try a different approach. Given a vaild argument form and true premises (a sound argument), the conclusion has to be true. This is logic 101, right?

The only reason, given a valid argument, for that argument to fail is if the premises are false. That out of the way, focus on the Agrippa's argument below:


Agrippa's justification/argument
1. Agrippa's trilemma [premise]
2. If Agrippa's trilemma then there are no justified beliefs [premise]
Ergo,
3. There are no justified beliefs [conclusion, modus ponens 1, 2] This is Agrippa's conclusion

Your counterargument:
3. There are no justified beliefs [Agrippa's conclusion]
4. If there are no justified beliefs then there are no justified beliefs is not justified
Ergo,
5. There are no justified beliefs is not justified [your conclusion, 3, 4 modus ponens[

Notice that 3. there are no justified beliefs is a premise in your argument i.e. 3. There are no justified beliefs has to be true; your argument has to be sound to make an impact and in addition to being valid (it is, modus ponens) the premises need to be true. In other words, for your conclusion 5. There are no justifies beliefs is unjustified, 3. There are no justified beliefs must be true [it's a premise that needs to be true]. If not, you wouldn't be able to justify 5. There are no justified beliefs is not justified. In the end by having to assume 3. There are no justified beliefs, you destroy your own counterargument which is a justification, no? To top it all off, you're agreeing with Agrippa that 3. there are no justified beliefs. The bottom line - your counterargument requires Agrippa to be right on the money viz. 3. there are no justified beliefs.

Agrippa justifies that A = There are no justified beliefs. His argument's premises are Agrippa's trilemma which everyone's familiar with.

Thus,

Agrippa's justification
1. Agrippa's trilemma [premise]
Ergo,
2. There are no justified beliefs = A [conclusion]

However, the conclusion A applies to itself as A is a belief and if so, Agrippa's justification for A is unacceptable. In other words, A isn't justified because A claims "there are no justified beliefs".

One is tempted on that score to reject Agrippa's claim, A = there are no justified beliefs, since the justification for A is, by its own admission, inadequate. Agrippa, by claiming that A = there are no justified beliefs, has shot himself in the foot because he can't justify A.

However, notice something interesting here: Agrippa failing to justify A doesn't contradict A i.e. instead of Agrippa's inability to justify A working against him, it actually is an instance of Agrippa's claim that A = there are no justified beliefs. What this means is that A isn't justified can't be used against A for it isn't a counterexample; to the contrary, it's a confirmatory example of A.

I say that it doesn't prove that its conclusion is true, not that it (the conclusion) isn't true. It may be true, but if it were true then, by it's own implications, the premises (the horns of the Trilemma) would not prove its conclusion (otherwise it would contradict itself). — Amalac

Agrippa's conclusion, A = There are no justified beliefs. If A itself were a justified belief, that would contradict A. Ergo, A must be unjustified but doesn't that fit neatly into Agrippa's claim that A = there are no justified beliefs? That Agrippa can't justify his own claim which is A = there are no justified beliefs, proves his point, no?

There are two sets of beliefs to consider here. One, Agrippa's conclusion, A and two, all other beliefs. That all other beliefs can't be justified follows from Agrippa's trilemma. That A can't be justified follows from the contradiction that arises when we assume A is justified (kind courtesy of your keen observation). Ergo, ALL beliefs can't be justified. Am I justified in believing this?

Change is a most fundamental nature of this world. When we suiffer, it's usually in some part because of a failure adapt to change. We got to where we are as humans because we adapted. — Yohan

Therefore,

the most useful skill is the ability to adapt to change. — Yohan

Why do you say that it's self-evident when you take the trouble of proving it?

That does not contradict Agrippa's argument, but does show that Agrippa's argument doesn't prove that its conclusion is true. — Amalac

I don't mean to be rude or anything like that but I'd like to refer you to the reasons why your argument "...does show that Agrippa's argument doesn't prove that its conclusion is true". These reasons are Agrippa's trilemma. Basically, you're using Agrippa's trilemma against Agrippa. Doesn't that prove Agrippa's point? The situation is analogous to the statement, "this sentance has three erors". The statement is right because it's wrong. Agrippa is right because Agrippa is wrong; Agrippa is wrong because Agrippa is right. :chin:

It's self-evident to me. — Yohan

Self-evident [to me]. Ok! I can't argue with that.

Two people with opposing core views will not convince each other of their views by providing arguments. — Yohan

That's odd because you seem to be "...providing arguments..."

Profit and profit motive need at least some working definitions here. I'm thinking (hearsay warning) that the concern with maximizing short-term profit at the expense of almost everything else is a result of Harvard Business School teachings and philosophies through most of the 20th century and even now, the neglect in the US of infrastructure being one result, for the repair of which Biden's $3T proposal is likely just a down payment. Nor should profit, wealth, and ownership be confused. Profits can be and are taxed, but I'm increasingly persuaded that wealth, assets, also need to be taxed.

US Banks take one or both of two actions with regard to dormant accounts. They 1) turn them over to government, or 2) control and reduce them through fees. The idea being to shield the bank from the effects of long-term compound interest.

Just a thought: Perhaps the problem is not with profits, or even so-called excess profits - no one gains any profit until someone else chooses to buy - but instead with passive wealth. Passive wealth deprives the community of the (compounded) benefits that money could pay for. Inflation is already a tax on passive wealth, but maybe a much sharper and targeted tax on passive wealth would put a lot of money back to work. The underlying philosophy of such a tax being, "Use it or lose it." — tim wood

:ok:

How does everything supervene on thinking?
Most failure of understanding is due to an inability to see the obvious, rather from an inability to think. — Yohan

How did you arrive at this conclusion? To what do you owe this insight to if not thinking?

What I mean by "everything supervenes on thinking" is that no matter what this exercise of homing in on the "...most useful skill..." involves, it, for certain, requires us to think well.

Agrippa's Trilemma Argument

1. X = [Every argument must have one of the following formats:
a) It must be circular i.e. the conclusion is part of the premises.

b) It must regress into infinity i.e. each premise requires an argument, the premises of that argument, each must itself require another argument and so on.

c) It must be such that the premises are axiomatic i.e. assumed to be true without proof.]

2. IF X THEN there are no justified beliefs

Therefore,

3. There are no justified beliefs [1, 2 Modus Ponens]

The proposed counterargument @Amalac

3. There are no justified beliefs

4. IF there are no justified beliefs THEN there are no justified beliefs is (also) not justified

Therefore,

5. There are no justified beliefs is (also) not justified

Statement 5 undermines Agrippa's argument as it casts doubt on Agrippa's conclusion 3. There are no justified beliefs.

However, the counterargument to Agrippa's argument is itself an argument and one of the premises is Agrippa's conclusion, 3. There are no justified beliefs. This premise needs to be true if the counterargument to Agrippa is to work but then, if 3. There are no justified beliefs, is true, the counterargument itself fails as a justification for the conclusion that 5. There are no justified beliefs is (also) not justified.

Put differently, the counterargument offered by @Amalac fails for the reason that it assumes 3. There are no justified beliefs, but when that's done, it self-destructs.

What's the best way to resolve the matter?

We can't use Agrippa's trilemma on Agrippa's trilemma argument because when we do that we're conceding that Agrippa's trilemma argument is sound or that Agrippa is justified in claiming 3. There are no justified beliefs (based on Agrippa's trilemma).

We can't also try @Amalac's technique because it fails for the reasons shown above.

It appears we have no choice but to agree with the great Agrippa.

Of course, Agrippa's trilemma argument applies to this very argument I'm making. Wow! Mind blowing!

most useful skill — Yohan

Thinking well. Given everythjng else supervenes on this one skill, it would stand us in good stead if each and everyone of us honed it to perfection, if possible of course.

Adaptive ability doesn't quite cut it because it fails Kant's maxim. What if everyone adapated (to each other)? I would adapt to you and you would adapt to me but that doesn't make sense because if I adapt to you, you wouldn't need to adapt to me and vice versa.

Others have objected to Agrippa's trilemma as flawed for the following reason. However, first impressions may be deceiving.

Agrippa's argument's conclusion, A = There are no justified beliefs

Counter-argument to Agrippa
1. IF A THEN A is not justified
2. A
So,
3. A is not justified = U [1, 2 Modus Ponens]

Agrippa's conclusion is self-refuting. However, the counter-argument itself fails because it has as its premise, A = There are no justified beliefs, and if so, U = A is not justified, is itself not justified. This counter-argument refutes itself too.

Try something else please.

Higher ideals than the profit motive — Shawn

I'd say there's nothing wrong with profit motive. It's a sentiment that defines life itself - we need to a get a little more out of something than you put in. If not, forget about economy, survival itself would be impossible.

Thus, by higher ideals, we shouldn't be looking for a replacement ideology for profit motive. What I recommend though are ancilliary ideas that can take profits, an acceptable portion of it of course, and use them to bring about desired outcomes. Such an approach seems more realistic and also likely to satisfy all parties involved. Game theoretically, it makes more sense than alternatives that aim to supplant the profit motive with higher ideals that don't give due consideration to an instinct as old as the human race itself.

Big whup. Human is as Human does. — 180 Proof

Our CNS-brains are (heuristic) confabulation-survival engines and not (causal) 'truth machines'; the latter is merely a cultural exaptation. Thus, the prevalence of (emotional investment in) wishful-magical-group/conspiracy thinking (i.e. religiosity, ideology ... ego-fantasy) and the persistence of cognitive dissonance when the facts push back. — 180 Proof

:up: Thanks

Why does it have to "add up"? The prospect isn't an argument, it's an endeavor. — 180 Proof

Inconsistency? You want the world to be real but, at the same time, don't mind living a life that's unreal.

Our CNS-brains are (heuristic) confabulation-survival engines and not (causal) 'truth machines'. The latter is merely a cultural exaptation. Thus, the prevalence of wishful-magical-group/conspiracy thinking and cognitive dissonance when the facts push back. — 180 Proof

:up: :ok:

Suppose John fantasizes about being the great fictional detective Sherlock Holmes. He is then offered a VR in which he can be Sherlock Holmes. If John is anything like the rest of us he will insist that the VR be realistic but the catch is Sherlock Holmes ain't real.

It doesn't add up.

Apparently. 'Unrealistic experientially' we reject. 'Unreal narratively' we crave. — 180 Proof

Yes. What's up with that?

In other words, fantasy "life" is about control – having far greater control over one's experiences than non-fantasy living. In so far as the human brain-CNS can't discern VR from R, the experiences are persistently indistinguishable. — 180 Proof

You're right on that score but my concern is about, I realize now, a paradox in fantasy-VR. Allow me to explain. The holy grail of VR is to make it identical to R (reality). Otherwise, we won't accept it - there'll always be something unrealistic in the simulation to spoil it for us.

Contrast the above demand for realism in VR with the fact that we don't mind a virtual life that's different from our real life. This is, if you really look at it, a desire/wish for what is, essentially, an unreal life.

Thus, we have us unwilling to accept VR that's unrealistic but, simultaneously, willing to accept a virtual life that's unreal. Paradoxical, no? :chin:

Del

@180 Proof Sorry, I'm a bit confused here so please do forgive the double post but allow me to clarify.

What I mean is people don't mind living the life of a fictional character so long as the fictional world and the real world can't be differentiated. This means, in terms of VR, people desire realistic VR but there's some flexibility when it comes to the realness of the life they have in VR.

del

I don't disagree — 180 Proof

Then that means the direction VR is taking - improvement in graphics and sound - is wrong . The idea isn't to make the world, the objects, the characters as real, sensorily, as possible. Rather we need to offer people good, meaningful, alternative storylines to their real, mundane existence. Once the narrative makes an impression, the high-end simulated world will be what it should be - the cherry on top.

I think it's deeper than that: if the experiential fidelity of VR is indistinguishable from R, then isn't it reasonable for one to prefer the – in principle – "programmable & replayable" experience (VR)? And wouldn't this preference also belong to "the truth of" one's life story? — 180 Proof

The way I see it, every person is part of two narratives - one, faer real life and two, faer fantasy life. The only reason that people are drawn to their fantasy lives - why fantasizing is so common and satisfying too - is the alternate life story which is more appealing than their real lives. It can't be that people's liking for fantasy is because of how well it decieves our senses because it definitely does not; we know that fantasy ain't real, that's why it's called fantasy, right?

Or VR will be "R (reality)" for VL (virtual lives). — 180 Proof

I'm a bit confused about the whole idea of VR/fantasy. Correct me if I'm wrong but VR has to be realistic for it to be taken seriously by people. However, what exactly about VR/fantasy should be realistic? To answer this question we need to understand that fantasy/VR has two aspects that need to be taken into consideration:

1. The fantasy/VR world, the objects and the characters contained therein.

2. The narrative or story that has one as the main protagonist in the fantasy/VR world.


My suspicion is that when people talk of realistic fantasy/VR they're mainly interested in 1 above, specifically how closely the fantasy/VR world, the objects and characters contained therein mimic reality. In other words, people are only interested in things like whether or not, for instance, touching, peeling, chewing, tasting, swallowing a virtual orange is the same as actually doing these things to a real orange.

However, the desire for realism doesn't extend to 2 above i.e. people won't mind the story of their life being a fantasy or a big fat lie. As long as the fantasy/VR world is identical to the real deal, living an invented life isn't an issue at all.

It appears that this distinction - the fantasy/VR world, complete with objects and characters vs the life story of the person in the fantasy/VR world - is of great significance if only because it reveals how people will voluntarily live as fictional characters so long as the fictional world is indistunguishable from reality. Reminds me of Cypher from the Matrix movies. Cypher when he betrays Neo to Agent Smith asks in return for the tip off that he (Cypher) be plugged back into The Matrix, made rich and famous, "like an actor" The takeaway being, people don't mind living a life that's made up so long as our sensory apparatus (sight, hearing, touch, smell, taste) can't tell the difference between the fantasy/VR world and the real world.

What gives?

I guess this is why you are called:"TheMadFool". — A Realist

:rofl:

On Certainty it is not only Moore's claim to knowledge that Wittgenstein criticizes, but he also critiques the skeptic, and specifically their use of the word doubt. — Sam26

It's tough on philosophers, to be deprived of obvious choices. I know between certainty and doubt, one has to go but to disallow both is going to leave even the best thinkers scratching their heads.

I can get a handle on how certainty can be questioned but to claim, if I read the OP correctly, that doubt ain't it too is as perplexing as it is depressing.

I think psychology has two parts to it: 1. finding out how we think, patterns in them obviously and 2. constructing theories that explain how we think. The first of these has merit while the second one leaves much to be desired.

There are no saints. — A Realist

Exactly! Imagine you went to a drug cartel meeting and one of the things they discuss is how to make the drugs less addictive. Whether it makes sense or not, I feel the same way about people, humanity. Please note, I'm known for my optimism and that's usually backfired on me.

You bring up valid points, however, each of those improvements were only required due to the baseness of humanity initially. The rapist that stops raping should perhaps not be selling himself as saintly because he stopped doing something he should never have been doing in the first place. The stopping is worthwhile, but still, no hero cookie for that guy. — Book273

:ok: but...

humanity's "baseness" is a rather harsh verdict to be given for actions that have their roots in primeval instincts and proclivities that humans have yet to grow out of, no? Think of humans as alcoholics and drug addicts who, despite their addictions, manage to go a day or two without a swig or fix. Commendable, no?

Il meglio è nemico del bene — Voltaire

In a sense, there's greater virtue in a sinner who refuses to sin than a saint who refuses to sin for the intensity and ferocity of the battle between good and evil is greater in the sinner than in the saint.

His writings shine a light on some of the darkest aspects of human nature; the things that we tell ourselves are fundamentally wrong, regardless of religion or upbringing, and yet, his works are widely read and reread. That we are unable to extricate ourselves from his works, instead electing to roll around in it, suggests that, despite what we tell ourselves, the dark and nasty animal is never far below the surface. We pretend we are better, more evolved, advanced, but are unable to rise above ourselves. — Book273

Abolishment of slavery and indentured labor, the decalogue, the eight-fold path, PETA, RSPCA, etc. ? We've covered some ground, no? If you ask me, humans should get an award for how much we've achieved. Despite the innate savegery that's, as you said, "...never far below the surface" we've managed to lend an ear to what's essentially the voice of compassion, reason. A stupendous feat by your reckoning. Not all, I agree, have been able to make the transition from sinner to saint and by the way the world is currently operating, humanity's transformation from beast to best is not going to be anytime soon. However, there are some who've managed to do it and well at that and, my feelings, for what they're worth, inform me that if X can do it, so can Y.

Too optimistic for your taste?

yes we are. Likely the worst of all animals. — Book273

Then Marquis de Sade is not too far from the truth then. Perhaps, he might've inadvertently hit the nail on its head. Right?

You mean we're not all jacked-in to The Matrix already? :scream:

(Btw, I've yet to experience VR with the improvisational fidelity and depth of feeling of any fantasy, so they're not comparable as far I'm concerned. Like I've been arguing about with one of my nephews for over a decade now: video "RPGs" are like jack-off porn in comparison to the immersive sex of tabletop RPGs (at least, back in my day), or like playing "Guitar Hero" compared to playing guitar).

NB: "Experience machine" = lobotomy plus a continuous 24/7 morphine drip ... — 180 Proof

What bothers me is how fantasizing seems to prefigure virtual reality as it exists today. VR is getting more and more realistic every month it seems. Since it's quite obvious that people prefer their fantasies to real life, it's likely that VR will, at some point, give R (reality) a good run for its money.

I guess nothing is completely random. — Gregory

Randomness can be simulated by a mind capable of understanding its mathematical interpretation. Imagine X is such a mind and Y is us. Suppose there's a machine which displays a number from 1 to 6 (a die). X operates the machine but Y doesn't know that. Y checks the machine and X makes it display 1. The next time Y checks the machine, X makes it display 6. Every time Y looks at the display X manipulates it in such a way that the frequency of each digit is 1/6. Y concludes the machine is random when in fact X was merely simulating it.

Are we animals? — A Realist

That, my friend, is the right question — Dr. Lanning (I, Robot)

Are we?