Possibilities:

1. Something [includes possible worlds]

Or

2. Nothing

Possible worlds:

Any world that doesn't entail a contradiction. Most importantly doesn't include the situation in which nothing exists for if nothing exists, it can't be a world

If not, could our search for what we think of as the "soul" be somehow related to a connection between dimensions. — Steve Leard

Except for one important difference - after death, if souls are real, we're supposed to get a fresh start as babies.

Because there is no possible world at which there is no world, regardless of what it means for there to “be a possible world”. — Pfhorrest

Interesting. A world in which nothing exists wouldn't be a world let alone a possible world. Perhaps we shouldn't bring up the notion of "possible worlds" as "worlds" becomes a source of confusion because it's a loaded term - comes with ontological baggage so to speak.

How are they different specifically? Different like in ontological dualism? Different how? — khaled

The difference between "the mind is the brain" and "the mind reduces to the brain" is the same as that between pantheism and theism. That god is the universe itself is like "the mind is the brain" and that god is distinct from the universe is like "the mind reduces to the brain". The difference rests on whether mind is a distinct entity from the brain.

The latter makes sense and the former does not. "Mind" is predicate (processing), "brain" is subject (processor) like e.g. walk and legs, respectively. Mind(ing) is what a brain does — 180 Proof

:up:

you really would need to read a book in mathematical logic — TonesInDeepFreeze

Thanks for the tip. I don't follow what you're saying but I can make some sense of what tim wood is trying to get at. Please join the conversation if you feel so inclined.

It works, roughly, like this: Godel created/discovered a method by which every proposition and every sequence of propositions in T can be assigned a unique number. His sentence (a number - a pretty big number) then (when translated appropriately), becomes (roughly), "The proposition with the Godel number G is not provable (in T)." And you might ask, so what? Well, the number of this proposition is just G itself! (How did he do that? Read the paper, or research Godel numbering. He did it his way, and subsequently other people found different ways.) — tim wood

So, the key proposition in Gödel's proof is K = The proposition with Gödel number G is not provable (in T) and the "coincidence" is that K is the proposition with Gödel number G. In other words, K is not provable.

But...

K has to be a mathematical theorem, no? After all, "incompleteness" in Gödel's incompleteness theorems refer to mathematical theorems that aren't provable but K [The proposition with Gödel number G is not provable] is definitely not a mathematical theorem. What gives?

"The mind is the brain" and "The mind reduces to the brain"? — khaled

First things first, are there are any differences between the mind and the brain?

If the answer is no, then that would be "the mind is the brain".

On the other hand, if the answer is yes, then the task is to explain how "the mind reduces to the brain."

SEP = Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy

statement GF in F is often called “the Gödel sentence” of F — SEP

Therefore (1), GF cannot be false, and must be true. For this reason, the Gödel sentence is often called “true but unprovable (2)” — SEP

The word "therefore" (1) suggests an argument i.e. there's a proof for the Godel sentence GF. However, the next line asserts that GF is ...often called "true but unprovable (2)".

What puzzles me is that the unprovable status of GF is not what matters. GF should be asserting a mathematical theorem, call it T, and asserting that T is unprovable and not that GF itself can't be proved.

What gives? :chin:

"The first incompleteness theorem shows that the Gödel sentence G_F of an appropriate formal theory F is unprovable in F. Because, when interpreted as a statement about arithmetic, this unprovability is exactly what the sentence (indirectly) asserts, the Gödel sentence is, in fact, true. For this reason, the sentence G_F is often said to be "true but unprovable." However, since the Gödel sentence cannot itself formally specify its intended interpretation, the truth of the sentence GF may only be arrived at via a meta-analysis from outside the system." — TonesInDeepFreeze

Indeed! You're right.

Godel sentence = G = There's a mathematical theorem, call it T, in a given axiomatic system A, such that T is unprovable/undecidable (which word is apt?) in A.

Kurt Godel's tour de force was proving G, the Godel sentence, is true. Am I right?

But there is a possible world that is empty. — Banno

Interesting approach. I guess it's the fastest and shortest route the the heart of the issue.

Stupidity is, as my link points out, a congenital species defect which intellience struggles with / against and occasionally exploits (e.g. pioneers, explorers, thrill-junkies, young parents ...) — 180 Proof

Nice! A great way to look at the things - how intelligence operates at another level and "...occasionally exploits..." stupidity.

'ineffable' is a way of trying to avoid going too far in thinking — Jack Cummins

This resonates at some level with the experiences I've had but the impossibility that I mentioned follows from the contradiction inherent in asking us to,

eff the ineffable — Samuel Beckett

However, it appears that we're at liberty to beat around The Burning Bush

How soon you've forgotten: the incorrigible misuse / abuse of intelligence, knowledge and/or judgment that inadvertently does harm for no gain or profit. That said, in the context of the original thread (linked by my user name), "stupid question" was merely sarcastic and seriously descriptive; a more accurate adjective would've been "pseudo" rather than "stupid" — 180 Proof

My memory isn't what it used to be. I hope you'll find it in you to let some of my errors, slight and gross, slide on that score.

To court harm, injury, loss, even death would mean stupidity for you as there's no gain or profit discernible in that but isn't risk of harm, injury, loss, even death the stuff great people are made of. Imagine if the Wright brothers were scaredy-cats, averse to risk and danger. Would the jet age have been a reality? By your logic all pioneers in every field and discipline would be morons because they would've asked questions that wouldn't have made sense within the paradigms of their time. All this assuming of course that stupidity is context-sensitive vis-a-vis the framework of knowledge it "lives" in.

To carry the analogy further, at one time it would've been considered rather foolish, even utterly insane, to talk of men taking to the air in metal contraptions but now such events are an everyday affair and thinking/saying the opposite would be considered foolish/mad. Stupidity, ergo, in my humble opinion, depends on which era or period one belongs to. Calling an idea, a question, a point of view, etc. stupid could be rather premature given the facts of history. Just saying...

TMF!

Thank you kindly for the link, it said:

Ineffability is concerned with ideas that cannot or should not be expressed in spoken words (or language in general), often being in the form of a taboo or incomprehensible term. This property is commonly associated with philosophy, aspects of existence, and similar concepts that are inherently "too great", complex or abstract to be communicated adequately.

I agree, as you alluded, that there are varieties of religious experiences that are ineffable. In your mind, are there others? For example, say the feelings of love, or to be excruciatingly graphic, during procreation activities/love-making, are those kinds of things similar, you think? — 3017amen

What "...should not be expressed..." has nothing to do with language and is more about stuff like respect, pity, love, goodwill, taboo, etc. For instance, many times I find myself thinking "I don't want to talk about it" and I'm sure this unwillingness to "talk about it" is quite common as evidenced by the many times I've heard it being said aloud to overly inquisitive folks. This, however, as is obvious, not a limitation of language - we can talk about something but it's just that we don't wish to.

What "...cannot be expressed..." is what the limitations of language should (try to) discuss. Come to think of it, this seems to be an impossible task; after all if something is ineffable, it precludes any and all language-based inquiry. It's like trying to break a bulletproof glass with a bullet. It doesn't make sense [@180 Proof "stupid question"].

huge profit — javi2541997

profit — javi2541997

I wonder how big the global arms industry is. Many countries make a show of how peace-oriented their policies are but "discreetly" trade in weapons whose selling point is lethality both in terms of the severity of the injuries they can inflict and the size of their kill zone.

Could it be money that's the reason for all the violence we see around us? Presumably, yes but money, to my reckoning, is just the modern form of resource and if you offer the right price, you can buy anything and everything. It appears that the reason we fight, the reason for the arms race, is rights to resource. The world's population is growing exponentially and the per capita slice of the pie is shrinking rapidly and no prizes for guessing what lies at the end of that road.

So what is your proposed solution to this? — Outlander

To be frank, I'm more than a little late to the party so to speak. All my time and energy are spent trying to understand problems, so you can forget about getting any pointers from me on solutions.

However, to offer a suggestion, since being unarmed is equivalent to being armed and given that in possessing arms, there's a small but non-zero risk of minor disputes escalating into full-scale military conflicts, we should give START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) and SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) a second look at least. Maybe we're onto something and just don't realize it.

...that's your problem, right there. — Banno

Correctamundo! It appears that weapons, though meant to wage war, have a paradoxical utility as keepers of peace. The ongoing arms race in the world today is actually geared towards maintaining peace as fragile as it is when achieved in this manner. I wonder what the underlying logic is. Is it that one side hit upon the idea of weapons and the other side simply copied the behavior or was it a Newton-Leibniz kinda story, simultaneous invention? Perhaps both, god knows.

remove all the weapons from all of those countries which are obsessed with military development because in the long run could be dangerous. — javi2541997

See my reply to Outlander.

To all

It seems there's a hidden "benefit" to weapons precisely because they're made for war. To limit or eliminate weapons although this might bring peace, it actually doesn't give us any justification for why we should all shake hands, hug, and drink beer at a bar. In short the peace achieved by reducing/abolishing arms doesn't solve the real problem which is mutual animosity among the tribes of men. If we could get to the bottom of this rather troubling mystery, the mystery being the constant itch for a fight that infects us all, we could bring real peace to our world. That would mean all the extreme violence that we subject ourselves too and, more importantly, the excruciating pain we experience from it, serve as painful reminders to put our house in order which in my book means getting to know the roots of our violent nature. Too bad that some of us have to lose our lives in this process marked by, as some say, "crimes against humanity". I just hope the survivors have it better than our lot.

I think you might be drunker than I at present so, I'm just going to let someone else point out the many.. many flaws in your presumptive logic. — Outlander

The drunk man always protests that he isn't drunk or that, in your case, someone else is "drunker" than him :joke:

G is unprovable in A.

And G does not say

G is true and unprovable in A — TonesInDeepFreeze

Godel's Incompleteness Theorems

I'm quitting the discussion. Thanks for your valuable comments.

Stupid questions — 180 Proof

What is your criterion for stupidity?

You said,

Here by 'provable' and 'unprovable' we don't mean absolutely unprovable (i.e. not provable from any set of axioms) since there are no absolutely unprovable formulas. Rather we mean unprovable in whatever theory is in question (let's say it's PA for simplicity of exposition). — TonesInDeepFreeze

That means, correct me if I'm wrong, given an axiomatic "theory" A, and Godel sentence G = the theorem T is true and unprovable in axiomatic theory A".

G is claiming that T is true in A i.e. my objection that that's impossible since it's unprovable is valid. T isn't true in some other "theory" like you seem to suggesting when you say "Rather what we mean unprovable in whatever theory is in question" but in A.

To be frank, language does have the capability of self-reference. It just commented about itself in the preceding sentence. Your post and replies to them are also instances of self-reference i.e. language talking about itself. I suppose grammar wouldn't be possible without this ability.

You mentioned Ineffability and if you follow the link, you'll be lead to a page which discusses the issue but if you notice the focus is on religion and religious experiences. A quote for you:

An example (of ineffability) is the name of God in Judaism, written as YHWH but substituted with Adonai ("the Lord") or HaShem ("the name") when reading. — Wikipedia

It's something right up your alley I suppose 3017amen.

Anyway, that the most obvious example of an ineffable is religious in character is telling, don't you think? What's the nexus between religion and ineffability and by extension language? There's the tower of babel, a legend about how god sowed the seeds of confusion among people by making languages mutually unintelligible which suggests that language is a powerful tool at least when it comes cooperation, capable of even god-level feats. Why else would god go through all the trouble of confusing us? On the flip side, we have the divine itself as ineffable, HaShem. Thus we have two ideas about language: one, as a very powerful tool, capable of grasping the divine and thus the tower of babel and two, as not-powerful enough to comprehend the divine. What gives? I think this is tangential to the OP though but it makes zero sense insofar as the link between language and the divine (ineffable) is concerned.

Look, I'm not a mathematician and so you may find my comments rather strange but there seems to be an issue with Godel's theorems that your reply to my reductio ad absurdum argument highlights.

You said:

Here by 'provable' and 'unprovable' we don't mean absolutely unprovable (i.e. not provable from any set of axioms) since there are no absolutely unprovable formulas. Rather we mean unprovable in whatever theory is in question (let's say it's PA for simplicity of exposition). — TonesInDeepFreeze

Sentences are not true or false in a theory. — TonesInDeepFreeze

??? :chin:

I'll leave it to you to connect the dots.

You are completely confused about this subject. — TonesInDeepFreeze

You maybe right but you didn't answer my question. Why? Please reread your reply to my question and my response to it.

Here by 'provable' and 'unprovable' we don't mean absolutely unprovable (i.e. not provable from any set of axioms) since there are no absolutely unprovable formulas. Rather we mean unprovable in whatever theory is in question (let's say it's PA for simplicity of exposition). — TonesInDeepFreeze

I'm not so sure but I don't think the problem has been solved. The Godel sentence, G = This theorem, T, is true but unprovable in the axiomatic system A. G makes the claim that T is true in A and not some other axiomatic system. For that, it's necessary for T to be provable in A.

1. The theorem F1 is true AND the theorem F1 unprovable (Assume for reductio ad absurdum)

2. IF the theorem F1 is unprovable THEN we don't know the truth value of theorem F1

3 The theorem F1 is true (1 Simp)

4. IF the theorem F1 is true THEN we know the truth value of theorem F1

5. We know the truth value of theorem F1 (3, 4 Modus Ponens)

6. The theorem F1 is unprovable (1 Simp)

7. We don't know the truth value of theorem F1 (2, 6 Modus ponens)

8. We know the truth value of theorem F1 AND We don't know the truth value of thoerem F1 (5, 7 Conj)

9. False that the theorem F1 is true AND the theorem F1 is unprovable (1 to 8 reductio ad absurdum)

:chin:

he sentiments about the paradoxical nature of this problem. Let's say I'm sad about something, Am I sad because my logic of his or her word formulations are making me sad, or is there an existential angst (my will) that proceeds the intellect thus making it so?

Even if by considering Keats, we can receive or even associate feelings of joy (in this case) with Truth, how does our feelings of truth manifest? Language only? Is our truth ours and ours only? What is Truth?

Say I'm an engineer and design an award winning novel structure through the language of mathematics, how should I feel about that? It seems like that particular (engineer's) language conveys a purpose or meaning.

It seems as though, we should add into the database here, that the logic of language may just be a means to an end... (?)

Since we human's like to dichotomize things, does the logic of language come before feeling, or does feeling come first? Do words invoke feelings, or do feelings invoke words? — 3017amen

These wouldn't be limitations of language because language can't be used to discover its own limitations.

I've been trying to wrap my head around this for a long time and though I've read it being stated clearly as true I still don't understand how something can be "true" and "unprovable". Truth has to be established i.e. it has to be proven and if something is "true" then necessarily that it's been "proven". Then the Godel sentence becomes, "proven" (as true) AND "unprovable". Isn't this a contradiction?

I sense a paradox here. It would be rather difficult if not impossible to use language to comment on its own limitations. Isn't that like asking a person who's given a faulty weighing scale i.e. it doesn't measure weight accurately and then asking fae to come up with a detailed report of how inaccurate the weighing scale give him is using only that weighing scale? A mouthful, I know. Sorry, my English ain't so great but it does sound very Zen! It should be Koan for Zen Buddhists who are linguists.

Maajid Nawaz

Too, one of the aims of judicial punishment short of execution is to give criminals an opportunity to see the error of their ways and reform.

Anyhow, what have philosophers meant by “reason/right reason” in contradistinction to passions/appetite, and what does it mean to live according to right reason? — MichaelJYoo

Reason, as per the prevailing wisdom in philosophical circles, is the faculty that ultimately decides proportion/appropriateness. If this sounds like art, you're on the right track.

Take logic for example and the choice seems appropriate since we're discussing reason. A good argument's conclusion is proportionate to the evidence.

Likewise, when even hate, the worst passion, is in proportion to what causes it, that's right reason in action. Of course, whether hating itself is worth it is a different story.

I suppose what I'm driving at is the aesthetics of it all. Beauty has been interpreted in terms of proportion (ref: the golden ratio) and that's, in the context of this post, the be all and end all of right reason.

I don't quite get the relevance of memory in the equation. Suppose this hapless person does remember every detail of faer horrific crimes and still transforms into a classic good guy, the problem of how we should judge this person still remains; after all, this person has changed faer ways and that's exactly the sticking point in the original scenario in which fae suffers amnesia.

This can mean several things and I am not sure what your intent is. My experience is that good arguments often do not change minds. I think there may even be psychological studies on this for anyone who cares. Isn't it the case that people have emotional reasons for beliefs and this shields those beliefs from facts or arguments. — Tom Storm

"...good arguments often do not change minds". Thanks for the warning. I believe everyone knows that logic (argument) alone doesn't quite do the job of convincing people. That's why rhetoric is a subject in its own right.

I sense a paradox: People get emotionally involved with the beliefs/claims/propositions that they espouse and support. The nature of this emotional relationship is that people don't want to be wrong or, conversely, they wan't to be right (about their beliefs). The problem is the more attached people are to their beliefs the more difficult it is for them to see the flaws in their beliefs, flaws which if they didn't mind examining could lead to the truth and then they would be truly right about things. The paradox is this: people want to be right and thus they take offence when others contradict their beliefs. However, to be truly right they shouldn't take offence when others contradict their beliefs because it's possible that they could be wrong. In essence, people want to be right; after all, they get emotional when told they're wrong, but the problem is that once you get all emotional about something, you feel you're right no matter what. Feelings are a problem for logic because though the relation between feelings and truth starts off on the right foot (we feel good when we're right), somewhere along the way, our feelings betray us (we're right no matter what the evidence says).

So what if their position is proven wrong? Will they poof out of existence?

What's in it for you if you prove someone else's position wrong?

Remember, this thread's theme is Philosophy vs. real life! — baker

The point of logic is to make sure that we're on the right side of the line dividing truths and lies.

this a deep topic — javi2541997

I say this is a "deep topic" because we have a question, "what moral/immoral actions can I, when alone, commit?" but it excludes the very essence of morality as is currently understood viz. we need at least two people for morality to make sense. Perhaps, the question is meaningless but who knows? To my knowledge, no moral theory has a good enough explanation why suicide is immoral despite insisting to no end that it is.

Physics is a matter of perspective in how energy is manipulated. This Universe we see is only one form of physics we know of and we can only conform or accept by what we can observe.

So to say Physics never change is conforming to it's Status quo to what we can witness.

The same goes with morality and reality. It is only define or real if you can observe it. — SteveMinjares

I'm only surprised by the fact that a system (all matter and energy) governed by immutable laws gives rise to another subsystem (us and our morality) that doesn't seem to be so.

If arguments would indeed have the power you speak of earlier, then how do you explain that there's plenty of people who aren't swayed by arguments? — baker

They who "...aren't swayed by arguments" don't know what an argument is. The way a debate with arguments proceeds is, to my knowledge, all about what must be true given certain assumptions and/or claims and how that, on occasion, is denied, the resulting contradiction proving the incoherent nature of an individual's or group's position.

I do not see anything immoral of being lonely. — javi2541997

In line with what I already said, the notion of morality is fully predicated on social existence; after all, morality is, at its core, how we treat an other. The issue of the morality/immorality of being alone then boils down to two questions, maybe more:

1. What kind of immoral/moral action am I committing by removing myself from the social equation?

Well, I won't be able to do any good at all since I'm alone and I need someone else to be good to.

The beauty is I won't be able to do bad either for the same reason. Reminds me of prisons and hermits and how that's a method of forcefully isolating criminals from the rest of society.

The conclusion: Both a morally upstanding hermit and a criminal are isolated i.e. are living lonely lives and both for the exact same good reason - not to harm/injure/hurt others.

2. What kind of moral/immoral actions can a person do when alone, isolated from others?

Well, that, for me, is a deep topic - we have to, quite literally, construct, from scratch, a moral theory that doesn't involve groups/communities/socieities i.e. a morality that deals exclusively with what a person does to faerself and not others. Perhaps, if nothing else, such a "selfish" morality will provide insights into a vexing issue for the modern world viz. the rising suicide rates.

I thought "freedom" had a very specific definition. The freedom reportedly guaranteed or ensured by the state are in particular domains like religion for example, excepting of course the rather vague freedom to pursue happiness. That basically blows the lid off the responsibility of government - a government's primary function is to provide and protect our liberty but only in those areas that are liable to infringement of course.

I once saw the spirit of a man in a rock in the Philippines, just out of the corner of my eye. Have you ever experienced anything like that? — The Opposite

For better or worse, I feel I lack the "ability" to see supernatural phenomena - I just don't have it in me, you know, that particular mindset that I suppose makes a person susceptible to experiences of such kind. I'm a skeptic with a capital S and it probably affects my mind in ways that prevent it from appreciating the very possibility of the supernatural let alone actually experiencing it.

Is it made of something physical or not? — The Opposite

The consensus seems to be that what can be perceived through our senses (sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch) is regarded as physical/material. The way it is with perception and reality is that it ain't necessary that all the senses be activated to determine whether something is material/physical or not. So, we're happy to conclude that a microwave in our kitchen is material/physical even if we can't smell/taste the microwave because we can see it, feel it with our fingers, and hear it too. Similarly, a woman's perfume is considered physical even though no one in faer right mind ever tastes it; that we can see it inside a bottle, hear it slosh around, and can feel it on our skin is enough to infer that perfume is material/physical.

Contrast the above rule of thumb for deciding the material/physical nature of things perceived through the senses with hallucinations. One simple test to determine whether what one is seeing with one's eyes is a hallucination or not would be to engage the other senses. We could for example try and touch whatever it is that we're seeing and if the result is negative i.e. we can't touch that which we're seeing, the chances are high that what we're seeing is a visual hallucination. A similar argument could be made for hallucinations in other sensory modalities - tactile hallucinations, auditory hallucinations, gustatory hallucinations, etc. One way, ergo, of ruling out hallucinations (perception without stimuli) is to bring into service senses other than the one whose perception is in question.

Now, wind is felt by our integumentary sensors and even heard by our ears but no, it can't be seen or tasted or smelt i.e. wind excites only a part of our total sensory apparatus (skin and ears) and the other senses can't be pressed into service for they don't pick up anything. How do you know then whether wind is something material/physical and not a hallucination? Of course it's true that the physical effects of wind are well-documented: trees sometimes grow along the direction the wind blows, we can see objects like paper, plastic cups, sand, moving with the wind, geologists have studied wind erosion, to name a few. So, wind can't be a hallucination as it has an effect on objects that can be observed and confirmed, something that would've been impossible if wind were a hallucination.

Last but not the least, I recall watching a horror flick where a ghost, a spirit, "touches" a living person and the latter "feels" it on her hand but, intriguingly, can't see (or smell or taste) anything. As far as our sensory system is concerned, there's no difference at all between wind and a ghostly "touch".

It seems to me that morality's greatest enemy is the contradiction of thought. Our moral code becoming inferior when faced with a circumstantial paradox. To sustain our defined set of morals, we must perceive our reality around us by having a flexible state of mind. Be capable to think in multiple dimensions and acknowledge a paradox by its very nature, is to challenge "status quo". The status quo is what we believe to be morally righteousness as a "static state", never changing.

That is the illusion, the false belief that the rules of morality will never change. — SteveMinjares

Another paradox: The laws that govern the universe at the most basic level - physics - never changes (at least not up until now) i.e. exceptions to the laws of nature haven't been observed and so-called miracles are mostly hearsay and remain unverified and yet we, though we emerge out of the interaction of these immutable laws, experience exceptions like the ones your thesis that it's a "...false belief that the rules of morality will never change" depend on. How is it that a fixed set of inviolable laws all matter and energy operate under produces beings like us and an ideology like morality where no such fixed inviolable law can be discerned?