And counter-rational things. I think this idea of god undermines the notion that the universe is rational also — Pantagruel

How?

There is a different quality to thinking than to perceiving. For example, one cannot decide to hear something or not, but can decide to think about something. — Heiko

Indeed there is and thank you for pointing that out but what's its relevance to the topic? What about ear plugs and closing one's eyes or blindfolds?

Here's what think. From a set theoretic perspective:

Consider the following set:

List A: {>}, {zero}, {dog}
List B: {a, %}, {9, cat}
List C: {living mammoths}, {x such that x = x + 1}

The numerical abstraction from the sets in list A is one-ness.

The numerical abstraction from the sets in list B is two-ness.

The numerical abstraction from the sets in list C is zero-ness

So far so good.

At this point, I'd like to draw your attention to language, specifically the English language because everbody seems to know English, and look at English from the perspective of your favorite word processor.

Take the sentence, "this is good" and take note of the spaces between the words. Spaces have no meaning in English, at least none like letters and words do. Their function in English to help distinguish individual words and that's about it. Space (in English) is linguistically nothing if only in the sense that they lack meaning similar to letters and words.

From a word processor's point of view it's an entirely different story. Space is treated, like letters and symbols, as a character. Spaces in a word processor take up memory - it's a thing, a something, in the world of a word processor. In other words, nothing has been raised to the status of a letter.

If one, for the sake of argument, regards a word processor's point of view as an abstract nevertheless fully legit theory, it can be said that word-processor-ily nothing is a character as much as "a" or "8" or "#" is.

Let's go back to list C, the empty sets. Each set has no elements which is just another way of saying the sets "contain" nothing. This compares to thinking about nothing at the same level as English views spaces in sentences. When we start to look at space as a character like a word processor, treat nothing as a number in its own right the magic happens.

The first premise is a veiled ontological assertion. Among all beings, there is some being which is the greatest being. That being is God. It doesn't prove god's existence so much as define it. — Pantagruel

Point!

I'll get back to the issues you raised here but this just in on my news channel :smile:

How would an anti-theist make sense of the ontological argument? To an anti-theist, who equates god with a tyrannical despot, a non-existet god would be greater than one that exists and "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" would be, herein lies the rub, a non-existent god.

To counter the anti-theist, the proponents of the ontological argument would have to weave an "an offer we can't refuse" into God's greatness - god would have to be so great, so so great that even anti-theists would accept God with open arms and willing hearts.

This leads us to a point where we have to discuss the God-tyrannical despot notion. Is it possible, at some level, to make "an offer that they can't refuse" to anti-theists, make them change their minds so that "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" is a god that exists?

Why is god a tyrannical despot, ergo undesirable, in the eyes of anti-theists? Well, I suppose it has to do with God's omniptence. Omnibenevolence and, to some extent, omniscience, would function as the checks and balances on omnipotence but God wouldn't be God unless God has free will. If so, God's omnipotence becomes a liability for he can resist and run counter to his omnibenevolence and omniscience i.e. God can do "bad things" - it's not an if question but a when one.

Add to this the definition-defying proposition that omnipotence be removed as an attribute of god. This just won't do; after all what good is omnipotence if unaccompanied by power necessary to translate it into reality. Omnipotence is a necessary attribute of God, not to mention the fact that omnipotence follows naturally from omniscience.

This makes it impossible to make "an offer they can't refuse" to anti-theists. In other words, God's tyrannical despot image is here to stay. To doctor this image is to do violence to the very essence of God. If this be true then, the ontological argument can't convince anti-theists for to them "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" is, well, a non-existent God. :chin:

"Cogito" is the first person singular form of "cogitare". — Heiko

:up: :ok:

What I actually wanted to say is that you cannot easily exchange thought for awareness as it might change the argument. — Heiko

The crux of Descartes' argument is that if an action is being performed then, for him, necessarily the existence of a thing performing that action - thinking, ergo, thinker.

Come to think of it, there's something else wrong with Descartes' cogito ergo sum. It's backwards. What comes first in an existential sense? An action or an actor, a doing or a doer?

Consider first the matter of a not-real or hypothetical world. There are actions like (switch off your religious side and forget your encyclopedic knowledge of superhero lore for the moment) levitating, resurrecting from the dead, becoming invisible, shrinking to ant-size, etc. are actions that, well, precede the existence of anything that can actually, in real-life, do them.

However, in real-life, in the real world, an actor (a doer) exists before actions (doing). In other words, in the real world, you wouldn't and you couldn't speak of an action without there being an actor capable of that action. In other words, every action in the real world comes prepackaged, so to speak, with the implicit acceptance of the existence of an actor.

In other words, Descartes can't claim the action thinking if he hasn't already assumed the existence of a thinker. If this isn't the case then Descartes' would have to admit that thinking doesn't necessarily mean that there's a thinker but if he does that his argument doesn't work. To conclude, Descartes' has assumed the very thing he's trying to prove. I think this error in Descartes' logic is exposed in the English translation of cogito ergo sum viz. I think. Therefore, I am. The I seems to be inseparable from, is part of, is presupposed in, thinking. I'm not completely sure about this. Thanks to Descartes and his radical skepticism. Mind if you take a look at it and get back to me.

OK, but here ordinary language clashes with ontology: "be" is classified as a verb, yes, but then does it make any sense to affirm that X causes - or else is an agency for - its own being (let's avoid the God's causa sui issues, please). For example, does the phrase "I am" entail that the "I" addressed causes - is an agency for - its own being? — javra

Well, as I see it, the English translation of cogito ergo sum viz. I think. Therefore, I am, is slightly inaccurate. My research, for what it's worth, shows that cogito ergo sum actually means: Thinking. Therefore I am.

Descartes' argument in syllogistic form (there are 2 arguments actuallly) would look like below:

1. If there's thinking then there's a thinker that exists [Argument 1]
2. There's thinking (cogito)
Ergo
3. There's a thinker that exists [Argument 2]
4. I am that thinker that exists
Ergo
5. I exist (sum)

Cogito ergo sum!

My issue is with premise 1 and I've already said what I wanted to say. Your point concerns argument 2. Descartes identifies with the thinker (supposing he manages to get past the hurdle that this thread is about viz. that actions don't necessarily imply an actor or that doing doesn't mean there has to be a doer). I don't see a line in Descartes' argument where he claims that "...is an agency for - its own being". The being/existence is inferred from an action/the doing of something - the thinker, according to Descartes, follows logically from thinking.

To know and to perceive are both ambiguous terms in ordinary language. We can get into this if you'd like. Knowledge by acquaintance, or else by experience - such as in knowing oneself to be happy/sad or certain/uncertain in manners devoid of inference - for example. Or seeing that apple one imagines to be: the perception of imaginary givens. I'm thinking so doing might deviate too much from the topic, though. — javra

Let's look at the issue of awareness from a different angle. In my humble opinion, if one is aware, necessary that one doing something with one's mind e.g. thinking, perceiving, etc. If you disagree, you'll need to describe awareness in terms on non-action i.e. you'll have to show that awareness doesn't involve an mental activity but that, as I mentioned in the post preceding this one, is the definition of non-awareness. This puts you in the position where, if you stick to your guns, you'll have to admit that awareness is the same as non-awareness. That's a contradiction, no?

In a state, like Texas? Or in a state of being then exists some given that is in that state of being. And who on Earth is describing this given that is as an entity?! Concepts matter here. — javra

Read above.

But where did the ego get introduced? Where is the step from "There is something." to "I am aware of something."
The nature of being could be self-fulfilling, self-sufficient. — Heiko

That "could be" is the key phrase. It brings into question the soundness of Descartes' argument.

Thanks for your comment. If I catch your drift, your claim is that God isn't good because "...a human person is worth more than bacteria" and the death of thousands in a tsunami, a natural evil, just to feed bacteria isn't morally justified. Ergo, my argument that natural evil serves as a method of providing corpses and even living bodies (for parasites/infections) of any organism, not just humans mind you, that become the means of survival for other life forms is flawed.

The basic idea behind the "...a human person is worth more than bacteria" is that humans possess something that bacteria (representing all non-human life forms) don't. Whatever this something is, it becomes the reason for claiming "...a human person is worth more than bacteria". If I were to hazard a guess, 1) consciousness/sentience and 2) the ability to suffer are at the top of my list of differences between humans and bacteria. I know that both these abilities (sentience and capacity to suffer) exist on a continuum with no clear and distinct cut-off point between sentience, suffering and non-sentience, non-suffering but assume there is one and that on one side of it is humans (sentient and able to suffer) and on the other side, all other organisms (non-sentient and unable to suffer). Note, I haven't said anything that, even if we have doubts on the matter, we don't see in everyday practice - the rule of thumb, the unspoken rule, is no animal is worth a human.

So far so good.

Firstly, recognize that the two criteria I mentioned above viz. 1) sentience and 2) the ability to suffer are missing in other life forms is an unfounded assumption. How do we know that? Is there any proof that bacteria are not sentient or that they don't feel pain? Granted that current scientific knowledge doesn't support the claim that bacteria (representing all non-human life) are sentient or that they can feel pain for the simple reason that they lack a nervous system but that's speaking from a standpoint of what we know and overlooking the much bigger what we don't know. Our ignorance is greater than our knowledge by many orders of magnitude. In short, if we factor in our ignorance, any claims that bacteria are not sentient or that they don't feel pain is symptomatic of an illness we all have encountered in our lives: know-it-all-ness (to think that one knows everything when actually one doesn't). I'll mention but not discuss the problem of humans mistreating some non-human life that do possess a nervous system (possibly sentient and capable of feeling pain) which is clearly immoral by the very standards that we ourselves have set. If all this says anything it's that humans haven't quite figured it out yet i.e. our ignorance seems to play a bigger role in our behavior than our knowledge or, worse, we simply don't give a damn about what we know or what we don't know or about what's good or bad and all this highfalutin talk of morality, sentience, the ability to suffer is nothing more than a sham designed to make ourselves feel better about our mistreatment of non-human life. Basically, there's no solid reason for the claim "...a human person is worth more than bacteria"

Secondly, The belief that "...a human person is worth more than bacteria" entails/requires that we must, if faced with beings worthier than us just as we're worthier than non-human animals, be ready to accept anything and everything such beings do to us. After all, these beings, yet hypothetical but not impossible, are, will be, by our standards, worthier than us. Supposing such beings are called Val, the sentence "...a human person is worth more than bacteria" will change into "...a Val is worth more than humans" and that'll open the doors, presumably to hell, for humans - it'll spell our doom.

Thirdly, essentially continuing along the same trajectory as the first and second points and summarizing them, take the allegedly ubiquitous moral rule, the so-called Golden Rule - treat others as you would like to be treated. I don't know how far this is true but it's a moral code that's found in all cultures and civilizations. Its premise is, and this is key to my argument, to put yourself in the other person's shoes i.e. to assume you are the other and think on how you would like to be treated. In the context of this post, you are, if you follow the Golden Rule, to assume that other non-human life forms possess sentience and are capable of feeling pain and then to tailor your behavior according to that assumption. In the context of worth as expressed in your statement "...a human person is worth more than bacteria", you are to assume that bacteria are as worthy as a human person - that is the Golden Rule. It appears that, Golden-Rule-wise, it's necessarily immoral to think/claim/assume that "...a human person is worth more than bacteria". God is, hopefully, still good!

First, "aware" is an adjective, not a verb. As such, it's a state of being; not a doing. — javra

Well, you threw me off with the statement:

being an "aware-er" — javra

Come to think of it, even if "aware" is an adjective - a state of being - you still must rely on the premise that asserts that being (verb) in that state implies something that can be (verb) in that state.

I don't aware; I am aware. — javra

Definition of aware (courtesy Google): having knowledge or perception of a situation or fact. In other words awareness consists of the actions knowing (verb) and perceiving (verb).

Also, what's the proof for the premise If in a state (awareness) then exists something that is in that state (the entity that's aware)?

This leads us to the following puzzle...

What's really getting me worked up is that it was relatively easy to invalidate the reliability of the world (possibly not real) as a good source from which to build a set of premises to be used in, transferred to, the real world. When that happened a critical premise for cogito ergo sum viz. all doings have a doer which would've proved the Cartesian premise "if thinking then thinker" goes out the window.

The only reliable source to build premises from is one's own experience but that consists of only thinking or, if you prefer, awareness. To make the case that there's a thinker or a thing that is in a state of awareness, we need the following premises:

1. Thinking implies thinker
2. Awareness implies something that is aware

Since both propositions 1 and 2 require the support of the statement "doing implies doer" which we know could be false we're unable to prove these premises. There's only one last option for us - turn to our own experiences to build a proof for statements 1 and 2 is our own actual experiences but these involve only thinking and awareness and if I claim that these actions (verbs) implies the existence of a thinker and something that is aware I'm assuming precisely what needs to be proved. Circulus in probando.

What I say is that if the existence of colors is not dependent upon the existence of light in the environment, rather colors always occur when there is an eye-brain system, then colors are a product of some state of an eye-brain system, and not necessarily a product of light — Harry Hindu

Isn't the eye a just a fancy light-detector?

Our observations always include a bit of information about ourselves. This is why the eye doctor is able to get at the state of your eye-brain system by asking you to report the contents of you mind when observing an eye chart. — Harry Hindu

I share your sentiments on the issue. The mind seems to have an agenda, probably because of it's driven to comprehend, make sense of, the sense-data (is this correct usage?) and this manifests as "...a bit of information about ourselves." in the picture of reality that the minds constructs from the sense-data. This is all conjecture of course so put on your skeptical hat. It probably sounds ridiculous and downright funny but kindly indulge me.

An eye-chart, to my reckoning, is sense-data poor in the sense it has very little variation, has minimal complexity, and doesn't/fails to activate parts of the mind dedicated toward detecting certain specific patterns in the visual data. On the other hand, a more natural setting, outdoors or a city perhaps, and also those times when shown an optical illusion, that which I refered to as the mind's agenda, becomes more apparent, more visible. Mind you, I'm not disagreeing with you here. I'm simply contemplating scenarios in which that you referred to as "...a bit of information about ourselves" can be isolated, magnified, or both to make their study feasible.

@David Cleo

Naive realist means an unreflective assumption that the world is pretty much as it appears to us humans. A direct realist would be aware of the various critiques of naive realism, armed with counter arguments in favor of the world looking at least somewhat as it appears to us, without there being some sort of mental intermediary. — Marchesk

Short and sweet. Just the kinda thing I was looking for. Thanks a million.

Is it fair to say then that the naive realist would simply conclude that color (black needs special treatment - I'll get to that in a while) is a feature of reality and that it's a property of objects and their interactions with light?

Coming to the "color" black, my intuition is that this comes close to a category mistake. Perhaps "misnomer" is the more apt word but put that aside for the moment and consider the fact that an important distinction exists between black and all other colors: all colors except black are perceived as photons hitting our retina; black is the absence of photons. This, to me, means that black is either not a color or, if one is not sympathetic to such a point of view, that it needs a category of its own in the color domain. The former option seems the most reasonable one to me.

Anyway, darkness is basically black but this comes from a person who's taken the time to analyze the matter seriously enough. It appears that the darkness = black identity is not an obvious one. Why else are there two words viz. "dark" and "black" and why is it that they aren't interchanageable? "It becomes dark around sevenish" is easier on the tongue and ear than "it becomes black around sevenish" and "the box is black" feels more natural than "the box is dark". This feeling of appropriateness of the words "black" and "dark" suggests that our ancestors, those who first coined these words, failed to make the connection between darkness and blackness and made a distinction where there's no difference. Just a theory, unsubstantiated, take it with a grain of salt.

And here's where it gets interesting in my humble opinion. I mentioned in the paragraph above that the darkness-blackness distinction is one without a difference. If so, the false distinction is all mental, exclusively mind and has nothing to do with the external world. In other words, the mind is capable of creating certain conceptual frameworks for reality that aren't true per se but also not completely false. But wait, it gets better (I think!?) To understand that the darkness-blackness distinction is a mistake takes logic, something all mental, all mind.

In essence, I don't believe that reality is, in any way, untruthful or that it possesses mechanisms to distort its impressions on our senses. I believe it's What You See Is What You Get (WYSIWYG).

The same can't be said of the mind as the case of the blackness-darkness distinction without a difference proves. The mind seems capable of, for some odd reason, distorting reality, imposing its own agenda as it were on reality. All in all, if you ever get fooled by reality, you know whom to blame.

Darkness is blackness, and black is a color. — Harry Hindu

Hi Harry Hindu. There's something that I want to run by you. It's got to do with the "color" black. I don't how to put this into the right words but I'll give it my best shot. I know there are more colors in existence than I can name so I'll stick to the so-called primary colors - last I checked these colors in the right combination can produce all other colors. So, for the purpose of this discussion, assume the primary triplet of red, blue, and green are all colors.

Anyway, Let's put the colors together in a cute little set, like so: colors = {red, green, blue, black}. Prima facie, it all seems fine. We aren't saying anything out of the ordinary here, right?

A little bit of highschool physics brought to bear on the set and the "color" black sticks out like a sore thumb - unlike the rest of the colors in the set which are reflected light, black isn't, black is the absence of all reflected light. In simpler terms, for all colors except black there are photons emanating from the colors that strike our retina. Isn't this a fundamental difference in property? Doesn't it mean black, in being so unique, isn't a color or if one doesn't take kindly to such a proposal, that black needs its own subcategory under the rubric of colors?

What say you?

Your view of “human nature” as something that exists as a “fixed” and “unalterable” structure of perceptual cognition easily falters under the mounting history of a fluidly changing cognitive and societal existence. Our “nature” wasn’t always as it exists today. As such it cannot be “fixed”. — JackBRotten

Well said. I've always wanted to, when and If I get the time and provided I still feel as enthusiastic as I was on the day the idea popped into my mind, categorize philosophy, among other things, into dynamic and static.

If a philosophy is dynamic then its constructed in way that it changes, adapts rather, to what time and the world throws at it. Dynamic philosophy keeps up with the latest fashion trends in philosophy, never becoming outmoded, forever relevant so to speak.

A static philosphy would be one that's insensitive to changing times, it's rigid and inflexible, it lacks any adaptive features, its liable to lose its relevance in a couple of years and decades, and some timespans may involve even thousands of years. The point is, it's not a question of if but when they join the club of dead and buried ideas.

That is, God, in His infinite mercy and justice, would not damn even the worst sinner to eternal punishment. — robbiefrost

We have been discussing the argument for/against Purgatory in my philosophy of religion class and the gist of the argument for purgatory is along the lines of Hell being a difficult thing to remedy with an all-powerful and all-good God and that Purgatory is a way to solve this dilemma — robbiefrost

Well, it appears that the people running the show have finally come to their senses. Given our relatively short lifespans and the fact that no matter how evil a person is fae can't be infinitely evil, what in the Sam Hill can a person do that would justifiably invite eternal punishment? Hell doesn't make sense but I can't say the same thing about purgatory. Also, if the people incharge are aiming for more realism in their beliefs why not just take that to its logical conclusion and close up shop and call it a day? Makes me wonder what all this small tweaks and fine adjustments will lead to in, say, a thousand years or so? Arguably, something unrecognizable to our eyes.

Imagine a world, Zor, with beings that do possess free will.

Is it possible for God to predict the actions and hence the future of Zor and Zorians?

If yes, then it isn't necessary that God's ability to predict the future of Zor and Zorians implies that Zorians lack free will.

If no, then God isn't omnipotent (he can't predict the future of Zor and Zorians who have free will).

But, God is omnipotent.

Ergo, yes its possible for God to predict the actions and hence the future of Zor and Zorians even if they have free will.

Hence, it's not true that God's ability to predict the future of Zor and Zorians implies that Zor and Zorians lack free will.

The same logic applies to scenario in which God knows faer own future. You tried to slip in the condition/caveat that God isn't omnipotent but if that's accepted we're no longer talking about God and your argument fails.

And here, unfortunately, neither does nothing. :roll: — jgill

I'm in a bit of a mess right now. Can't seem to wrap my head around something in another thread. Thanks for the comment. Take care and Good day.

For what it's worth, my two cents...

I remember, vaguely, a forum member stating not that human nature exists/doesn't exist but that the very notion doesn't make sense. Unfortunately, I seem to have forgotten faer argument.

My own beliefs on the issue follow...

It appears that a certain conceptual framework, to wit, a quantitative one, is being applied to humans to give legitimacy to the concept of human nature. For instance, if some one claims that human nature includes characteristics like loving, noble, friendly, discreet, and so on, the implicit assumption is that all these need to be qualified with the adverb "generally" or the phrase "most humans are" i.e. any and all accounts of human nature are statistical arguments, quantitative.

If so, let's do what should be obvious viz. look at human nature from a qualitative perspective. When we do this, we see that for every possible characteristic present there's an opposite of that characteristic present too. If there are humans who are loving there are humans that are hateful, for those who are noble there are the ignoble, friendly people are offset by hostiles, the discreet have to put up with the rash, and so on. To make the long story short, human nature, from a qualitative standpoint, doesn't make sense for every trait seems to be paired with an anti-trait and these cancel each other out leaving nothing by way of a residual trait/anti-trait, of this interplay of opposites, that we can then call human nature. The bottom line is that, qualitatively, there's no such thing as human nature.

@TheQuestioner Firstly, it would be very disheartening if we don't have free will. Secondly, you claim that the current state of our world is inevitable and then use that to claim we don't have free will. However, to know that the current state of our world is inevitable you must first know that we don't have free will but isn't that what you're trying to prove here? Begging the question.

For my own sake...

MY ARGUMENT
1. We don't have free will (premise)
2. If we don't have free will the current state of our world is inevitable (premise)
Ergo,
3. The current state of our world is inevitable (conclusion)

YOUR ARGUMENT
4. The current state of our world is inevitable (premise)
5. If the current state of our world is inevitable then we don't have free will (premise)
Ergo
6. We don't have free will (conclusion)

As you can see premise 4 is problematic because to claim it means that you've already proven and accepted that we don't have free will (see MY ARGUMENT, premise, line 1) but that's exactly what you're trying to prove (see YOUR ARGUMENT, conclusion, line 6). Begging the question! Circulus in probando!

What, then, is an example of a trivial truth? — Tristan L

Nothing springs to mind!

Meaning Constancy Assumption (MCA) that we need in a key way when arguing, not the Law of Identity, right? — Tristan L

A rose by any other name smells as sweet. For what it's worth here's how I see it...

The Law Of Identity: A = A. In my book, A can mean anything, from letters themselves to entire theories however complex about the world. The essence of this law, what it boils down to, is that if a meaning, whatever that may be, is assigned to a particular symbol, that assignment of meaning must remain the same for the duration of an argument or narrative. Meaning Constancy Assumption seems to be logically equivalent to The Law Of Identity. I have nothing more to say.

The rest of your post went over my head. Above my paygrade for a meaningful reply. Thanks for the engaging conversation.

instead, we as first-person points of view are aware of any such inference, and are thereby, QED, aware beings. — javra

You've made an inference from "...are aware..." to "...aware beings." For this to work you need the premise 1. All doings are things that have doers to be true. If this premise is false the statement 2. Some doings are not things that have doers will be true and that means it's possible that just because we "...are aware" [doing] it doesn't follow that there are "...aware beings [doers]".

You'll need to prove each doing that you come across has a doer individually and your inference "...are aware..." to "...aware beings" is one such case. How are you going to build your case? You can't use premise 1. All doings are things that have doers because it's no longer reliable, drawn as it is from the world, a world that could be not real.

a The only option left for you is to construct the required premise from your own experience of yourself and the truth of that key premise of your argument viz. if "...are aware..." then "...aware beings" has to turn on the only truth you know viz. "...are aware..." and that isn't sufficient to build the key premise because I've demonstrated the truth of statement 2. some doings are not thing that have doers and that means if "...are aware..." then "...aware beings" doesn't have to be true. Basically, you can't prove your key premise.

You may ignore what I've written below and even above if it suits you. It's for my own clarity that I've fleshed out the argument. There's a certain part in my refutation that's troubling me.

Your argument:

1. If "...are aware..." then "...aware beings"
2. "...are aware..."
Ergo
3. "...aware beings"

First things first, from the fact that the world we exist in could be an illusion/not real, it follows that the inferences drawn from it may not be valid in the real world. Ergo, one such inference, the proposition all doings (actions) have doers (actors) could be false. If this is the case then premise 1. If "...are aware..." then "...aware beings" could be false (not false but could be false).

So, we need to prove/support premise 1. The only reliable source that could help you in proving premise 1 is your own knowledge of "...are aware..." You experience it and so you can't deny it. However, since it's possible that 1. If "...are aware..." then "...aware beings" could be false, that you know "...are aware..." is not adequate grounds to assert premise 1. That's the end of the road for your argument.

OA makes sense — khaled

The OA hasn't been refuted in a way that silences its proponents or satisfies its opponents.

Yea, but I'm not addressing this from that vantage of language realism, or some such. — javra

While I gave attempted to give a linguistic twist to Descartes reasoning it seems only incidental to the tale I'm weaving. The crux of the issue is, in my humble opinion, the hidden premise - doing ergo, doer - which, as I've learned, is derived from the world we're in, a world whose reality is in question. In short, whatever premise we construct out of our experiences in this world (reality questionable) is of dubious value for reasoning about the real.

Right, but - again - how do we conclude that thought is taking place? — javra

aware — javra

Well, I'm "...aware..." that "...thought is taking place..." but to infer that there's an aware-er we need the premise that says doing implies a doer in all cases of doing but this premise is, like it or not, derived from a pattern in the world we're in which Descartes admitted could be an illusion or not real and that casts a long shadow of doubt on the crucial doing implies a doer premise.

it doesn't validate the thinker of the thought; it only validates that thought occurs — javra

What bothers me is that, to reiterate in fewer words than the OP, the inference from action to actor - doing, doer [reading, reader; loving, lover; talking, talker, being, beer ( :joke: ) ] - is abstracted from a world that, Descartes himself acknowledges, could be not real. That, as far as I can see, invalidates the action, actor/doing, doer reasoning.

How does one know that thinking takes place to begin with? — javra

It's taking place alright. I'm thinking right now, so are you and everybody else too but as crazy as this sounds, we may not exist in the sense there may not be a thing doing the thinking.

Another issue regarding nothing is that in our discussion I made the remark that zero is the quantitative property of nothing. That just doesn't feel right to me...there's a part of me that says nothing can be said about nothing which, in my book, means it shouldn't possess any properties for properties are what provides the foothold that enables us to, well, speak of things. Nothing isn't, isn't supposed to be, a thing. This doesn't seem to make sense either for if nothing shouldn't/doesn't have any properties, then it can be said to have zero properties and again, math has, in some sense, spoken what should be the unspeakable.

Along the same line, your last post was about the properties of zero (additive identity, multiplicative annihilator, etc) and this totally contradicts our, my, intuition on nothing - it simply can't, rather shouldn't, possess properties for to posses properties is to be something and that leads us to the possible reason why the Greeks, mathematicians par excellence, were deeply troubled by the question,

How can nothing be something? — The Greeks

To the Greeks, zero didn't make sense.

"Nothing is bigger than infinity" means "There is no number which is bigger than infinity", the "nothing" there works as a quantifier. It doesn't mean "0" is greater than infinity, since 0 is a particular number.

But there is a 0 relating to the "Nothing is bigger than infinity" statement, equivalently "The size of the set of numbers which is bigger than infinity is 0"! — fdrake

You make complete sense and thank you. In a sense the two zeros involved - the regular (whole number) 0 and the 0 of "...the set of numbers which is bigger than zero..."- are about different things. One is itself a number and the other is aboutnumbers "...bigger than infinity..."

If you'll permit me to pick your brain a bit more, I want to ask a follow up question. I can understand that the zero in "nothing is bigger than infinity" is the cardinality of the set of numbers bigger than infinity. That zero counts the number of elements in the set of numbers bigger than infinity which is zero.

However notice the regular zero, the whole number zero, it represents or even is nothing itself, right? Zero is nothing or do you disagree? If you don't then the problem resurfaces because when I say "nothing is bigger than infinity" I can't be talking about any other number but zero. The literal truth being that there's nothing in "...the set of numbers which is bigger than infinity..."

Forget all I said...I left it there to show you my work, like a good student does. I believe I've figured it out. Zero is the numerical/quantitative property of nothing and isn't quite the concept nothing itself. When I say "nothing is bigger than infinity" I'm talking about the concept nothing and not zero, the number which is the numerical aspect of nothing. Thanks a ton.

@The mods: Kindly delete this thread. It's continued existence is no longer justifiable. Thanks.

Now that we're already discussing the topic of free will and the OP seems to be open-ended, I'd like to raise another issue regarding free will. It has to do with explaining it. Necessarily that all explanations are causal in character. To explain free will one has to find a cause for it. Right? In essence to explain free will we're actually looking for a cause for something that shouldn't be/isn't caused. Contradiction! How can there be a cause for an uncaused? In other words, two things:

1. Free will, if a causal explanation is what's required to understand it, can't be understood. It (free will) becomes inexplicable within the current paradigm of what constitutes an explanation.

2. We need, perhaps there's that person out there with an IQ that's off the charts, a new species of explanations, acausal explanations

I don't know how relevant this is or if it even makes sense but let's look at the free will issue from a different level in a manner of speaking. It's quite obvious that each person comes with a set of preferences (likes and dislikes) that fae didn't choose for faerself. Ergo, in that sense, we're not free. This can be read as our will not being involved in its, to use an industrial term, manufacture. Its features, particularly those which have a role in the way in which we think/speak/act were incorporated into us and they're at the controls, in the driver's seat and all we can do is go where they decide to go so to speak. That's that.

This is where it gets interesting. Zoom out, readjust the focus, reduce the magnification and think not of individuals, trapped as it were in a web of preferences they didn't choose and are under the control of, and get that 10,000 foot view and what will come into your field of vision is the entirity of humanity. Consider humanity, humor me, itself as an individual. What are its (humanity's) preferences? It (humanity) seem to have, if my analysis is correct, conflicting, contradictory, preferences. If you sample the behavior of individuals, you won't see a pattern in them that indicates the population, humanity, has predelictions, propensities, tendencies, proclivities (preferences). The saw one man's food is another man's poison best sums up the point I'm trying to make. I guess what I want to say is the super-organism that humanity is or is supposed to be evinces "preferences" that are mutually contradictory. There are two conclusions that follow:

1. The mutually contradictory nature of humanity, treated as a super-organism, means that opposing, antagonistic likes or dislikes cancel each other and what we're left with is an entity that has no preferences and thus must, in that sense, be free

2. Humanity, again as a whole, a super-organism, being capable of having preferences that are opposite in quality must mean that it's free for none of these preferences seem to exert a dominating influence, which if false would've meant that humanity is just another, though bigger, version of the individual with predelictions that it can't resist or counter but must be slaves to.

The starting point of WHAT? It has to be a starting point of something or other, which you haven't named. I can't put words in your mouth. Please state the starting point and state also this is a starting point of what. Thanks. — god must be atheist

1.Start. Nothing as in no propositions have been stated
2. P stated
3. ~P stated.
4. P & ~P stated. P cancels ~P and ~P cancels P. Result = No proposition left. Back to 1.

Now that I realize it, P & ~P, because they cancel each other doesn't amount to a proposition. A contradiction essentially means the person who utters/writes it isn't saying anything at all. If so, any other proposition wouldn't be constrained by the necessity of consistency as there's no proposition in the first place to be consistent with. This is why anything follows from a contradiction keeping in mind that what doesn't follow from a certain proposition is predicated on a resulting inconsistency.

The person must have had no chance of survival, as documented by medical evidence, and must have recovered only after they started praying to a specific person, thus implying the presence of “God/supernatural.” — Julianne Carter

This is as good as it gets I suppose. The principles active therein seem inspired by reason. Come to think of it, the logic of the Catholic Church is captured in toto by Sherlock Holme's signature principle of reasoning: Once you eliminate the impossible, whatever remains, no matter how improbable, must be the truth. And the detractors of Christianity claim that religion is irrational. :roll:

I suppose the issue, in the eyes of atheists, is that the Catholic criteria for miracles fall short of the mark because a key feature of a causal claim, I'm restricting myself to miraculous healing, is missing viz. persistence of the pattern otherwise known as repeatability Not all who pray are healed and that raises the possibility that a few instances of healing by prayer to saints could be mere conicidences.

ALL miraculous events are evidence for the divine.” That premise is too broad. Saying that all miracles are evidence for the divine makes it sound as though the miracles of the Buddha could be evidence of a Christian God, or vice versa — Julianne Carter

Well, I was trying to be as inclusive as possible. The divine I'm referring to here is meant to encompass all religions. Yes, there are differences between religions but it only takes a moment of thought to realize that all religions represent a yearning for, an intuitive apprhension of, a recognition of the possibility of, a world, a realm, a reality beyond, more magnificent than our own.

You’d have a harder time explaining miracles in Christianity, for example: the healing of paralytics, resurrection from the dead, and so on. Those things are outside natural and scientific laws — Julianne Carter

I've come to the realization that miracles are relative to knowledge. The person who knows less will see more miracles than the person who knows more. Quite naturally right? After all, the entire notion of miracles hangs on the failure to explain them within the existing framework of knowledge. Ergo, knowing more will explain more, knowing less will explain less. The camera is inexplicable to people of the iron age and will be treated as a miracle.

On the matter of healing miracles, I've already said what I wanted to say but to reiterate my point, it has yet to be established that they aren't just coincidences.

As for resurrecting from the dead, it all depends on whether people of the iron age had a medically sound definition of death. Heck, even into the 17th century and 18th centuries, people didn't know how to tell apart unconcsciousness and death - I believe graves were equipped with a contraption the person in a grave could use to ring a bell to indicate that fae was still alive although assumed to be dead and thus buried.

negation as cancellation — Alvin Capello

When you put it like that, it rings a bell. P, a proposition can be viewed as the denial of ~P on the basis that double negation returns the original proposition [P = ~(~P)]. And, ~P is the denial of P. The two do cancel each other because asserting the contradiction P & ~P means that P cancels ~P by denying ~P and ~P cancels P by denying P. It's like integer math with positive and negative numbers: +9 and -9 = (+9) + (-9) = 0.

The existence of the room demonstrates some creator: without it, there would be no room and no contents to be tidied, and I wonder if that might be another avenue for this analogy, because it could be extended via metaphor to the complex universe. The fact that the room is well arranged is not the only thing that suggests intervention. — Julianne Carter

Well, I was working from the premise that what's key to the inference of god is order which, many have argued, is a sign of intelligence. The room here represents the universe and had it been chaotic, the room itself, the universe itself, wouldn't give us sufficient warrant to conclude the involvement of intelligence.

I do, however, understand that your metaphor of the organized room is analogous to the perfectly arranged, life-conducive universe, which suggests the intervention of a creator (God). You state, “The argument from design for the existence of god is simply another instance of the above argument. — Julianne Carter

My intention isn't exactly to prove the existence of god but to reveal what I feel is an inconsistency, an inconsistency that has to do with our common sense, the faculty that we employ in our daily lives and it goes like this: Most people, when they see a well-ordered room immediately infer the existence of a person who was the cause of the order and no one objects to such logic because it, as we all know from our personal experiences, turns out to be true. Contrast this reasoning - this common sense logical inference that serves us well and almost 100% of the time to boot - to the objections raised by opponents of the argument from order (in the universe) for god. Those who disagree with this particular variety of theistic argument are, in essence, rejecting a form of reasoning that's being validated, right now, at this very moment, in one way or another in some part of the globe. What gives?

Reductio Absurdum makes a conjecture and follows that conjecture through until a contradiction is reached. The negation of the conjecture can then make a positive statement. — EnPassant

:ok: :up:

Dependability does not give you a countable thing. For example, I might know that the bus will be there in the morning, for me to step on. This is very dependable. But I cannot count the stepping on to the bus, as an instance of stepping on to the bus, until after it occurs. Likewise, regardless of how the calendar numbers the days, we really cannot count them until after they have occurred. — Metaphysician Undercover

By dependable I mean to emphasize the regularity, the essence of an objectively measurable length of time which then becomes the basis of a unit of time which in turn becomes the basis of sequencing time itself in regular intervals. The rotation of the earth takes approximately 24 hours and this is the basis for the unit of time we all know as a day. The future can be sequenced in terms of days. There's no necessity for the future to be real to sequence/count it. We simply decide, based on the unit of time that seems relevant to the events that we're expecting, to sequence it numerically.

I can't see how you can say that an order of time exists in the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

Imagine this. Suppose there are two events that are part of our future: both events are chemical reactions and event 1 is a chemical reaction that takes 1 minute to complete at which point a certain container of chemicals will change color to red, and event 2 is another chemical reaction that takes 2 minutes to complete and when that's done, a container of chemicals will change color to green. You take a stopwatch and at 0 you start both chemical reactions. Obviously the colors red and green in the container of chemicals are in the future at time 0 but you can sequence them as the first color you'll see is red and then only, second, you'll see green. The future that had yet to happen (one at 1 minute and the other at 2 minutes from time 0) was sequenced at time 0.

If you have two spatial lengths of one mile, there is no spatial principle which makes one of them the first, and the other the second. — Metaphysician Undercover

A distance of 2 miles is counted from a point which is designated as 0. This 0 is followed by a 1 mile mark and then a 2 mile mark. When you start walking from 0 along this distance, mile 1 is the first mile and mile 2 is the second mile.

To say that one is closer to you is not a spatial principle, it is a subjective principle — Metaphysician Undercover

I wouldn't say subjective because it seems to give the wrong impression that one is wrong because there's no objectivity in it. The correct word, in my opinion, is "relative". What's closer or farther is matter of one's location in space but that doesn't mean close and far aren't spatial concepts. Their definitions, as you already know, are in terms of how short/long the distance between you and things are.

But then such determinations are not objective and therefore cannot be any part of an objective concept of space. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here you're conflating the absolute/relative with subjectivity/objectivity. X's position and his spatial relations are relative in the sense they depend on his location in space and not subjective in the sense it's just a matter of opinion no matter where X is. The concept of space that X forms in his mind is objective in the sense that it exists for everyone and everything though it's true that the spatial relations within space are relative.

What I don't agree with is that one could make a conception of order through space alone. Take the Fibonacci spiral for example. This is the spatial representation of a numerical sequence. This appears like a totally spatial order, but it really is not, because it requires a very specific beginning. And the beginning, being 0; cannot be represented spatially. — Metaphysician Undercover

Read above.

Yes. See also Reductio Absurdum as a (dis)proof — EnPassant

I don't quite get you there...Mind elaborating a bit?

I wonder whether "spatial sequence" has any really meaning, or is it just a misnomer? If you had one, two, three, four or more distinct things with spatial separation between them, what would make you think that they form a sequence? I can see how one might say that they make a spatial pattern, but what aspects of the pattern would make you say that it is a sequence, if you are not inferring a temporal order to the things? — Metaphysician Undercover

I suppose, given that you don't mention if the separations between the things are themselves regular, I'd say that proximity to the observer can very well be the grounds of a sequence

I do not see how X would would refer to one mile as the first mile, and the other mile as the second mile without looking at the temporal aspect of his journey. You seem to think that X might somehow look back on his journey, remove the temporal aspect of that journey, and then refer to one mile as the first and the other as the second. But I don't think that makes any sense. If X could really look at that journey without the temporal aspect, why would he be inclined to order one or the other as first? — Metaphysician Undercover

I checked, and 1 mile means the first mile spatially - the 1 means the first length that's 1 mile long and mile 2 is the second length that's again 1 mile long, again spatially. In all this, I'm not at all tinkering with the temporal aspect of the setup. If X is intelligent enough he may immediately realize the temporal dimension of it all. However, given that he's travelling at speeds that regular bikes do, the duration to cover a two-mile stretch of road will not be adequate for any noticeable change that has to be put in a time-context to occur. All, I'm saying is that there's no necessity for X, the rider, to think of time in the given situation.

Understanding the human concept of time, or space, is completely different from apprehending the thing's existence. I think children apprehend time long before they apprehend space. Time is something very real and concrete to them, as they learn to wait to be fed, and they are given mealtimes, and bedtimes etc.. Space is very abstract. Sure, they recognize that there is distance between them and others, but is this really apprehending "space", as being made to wait is apprehending "time"? — Metaphysician Undercover

I suppose you're right on that score. Children probably do possess a circadian rhythm which regularly posts updates on the body's status into consciousness - telling them to cry when they're hungry and also when they need to be sung a lullaby to put them to sleep. What I'm referring to is conscious awareness of time and space in the sense that if a mind is alive to these concepts, you'll notice planning behavior that take into account knowledge of these aspects of reality. I've seen a 2 year old navigating space with the utmost ease i.e. they can plan their movements in space but I've never seen 2 year olds ask what time it is or that they to go to the toy shop at 4 on the dot. This is what I'm getting at.

My argument is that a temporal sequence is not arbitrary, that's the point. There is a real "now" which serves as the objective start, and this makes the true sequence not arbitrary. To the contrary, your assumption of a spatial sequence is simply false/mistaken, because there is no spatial principle which allows you to order first and second. Therefore you are claiming that there is such a thing as first and second, justified completely by spatial reference, but this is a false proposition. — Metaphysician Undercover

While I can't confirm your claim, I'll admit that I sympathize with it. I suppose that makes me a time absolutist like Newton but then we have this mountain of evidence gathered from relativity experiments that contradict your position and my intuitions on the matter for what they're worth. FYI, even if time is objective in the sense that there's, what you call a NOW, the alleged real beginning, it doesn't matter to X's conceptualization of time for however much time has passed since that beginning, the change in the condition of the apple occurs in a duration that he actually experiences in those days by the tree.

The confusion is in you naming the trees first and second, and asserting that this designation is done completely through spatial reference, without reference to time. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I said, the sequence is with respect to proximity given the possibility that X might not have a unit of measuring distance at hand.

Thank you for your contribution. They've been very helpful.

'Everything now depends on man: immense power of destruction is given into his hand, and the question is whether he can resist the power to use it — Jack Cummins

How true! I wonder what the context was? Nuclear Power?

Jung was writing in 1954 and was able to see the infernal possibilities of nuclear war. — Jack Cummins

There's my answer.

I share Jung's sentiment on the issue but my view on the matter is worse than his. Perhaps the global attention, sharp focus, on the atomic bomb, led Jung to make a bogey-man of nuclear power, not without reason of course. The real threat, however, is a process that had been set into motion nearly two centuries ago - unchecked, fast-paced industrialization whose engines ran/run/will run on fossil fuel. The danger of a nuclear winter pales in comparison to the specter of climate change for two reasons: 1) unlike a nuclear war or a major globe-encompassing reactor accident, things yet to happen, factors causing climate change were activated quite a long time ago, 2) while the dangers of a major nuclear misadventure or accident remain, by and large, fictional, the effects of climate change are being felt in real time. In short, it's too late to consider the question "...whether he can resist the power temptation to use.."...the "immense power of destruction..." Jung believes "is given into his hands" Humans have succumbed to the temptation, the whole nine yards of it, and, at this point, we're just waiting for the ax to fall even though the danger here - rapid and unchecked industrialization - isn't what Jung had in mind when he spoke those words.

Jung is saying that we all have a shadow side — Jack Cummins

This doesn't seem to be news and if it is then its old news. Established traditions both in the east and west, maybe even in the south, Africa, have viewed the universe, everything in it, including us and our psyche to be split into two, each half being the opposite of the other and every event being simply an outcome of this power struggle between the yin side and the yang side. Jung, if I remember correctly, was well-acquainted with the I-Ching and Daoism, the right place to start, the go-to guy, if one wishes to affirm and reinforce dualistic thinking. Care to expand on what this Jungian shadow is? Is it what rubbed off on Jung after his interaction with eastern philosophy or is it distinctly western in character and flavor?

To begin with I'm not a musician. I have a tin-ear and looking at the kinds of music that are popular these days I sometimes feel that it's a blessing in disguise. Please don't take this as legitimate criticism of musicians, it has to more to do with my tastes than anything else.

I've seen musicians - there are lots of them, the entertainment industry seems inundated with musicians of all shapes and size, playing every conceivable instrument there is. Yet, only a tiny fraction of them make it big and from my personal observations this requires both a high level of proficiency in a chosen instrument and, it doesn't need mentioning, a fair share of luck/fortune. This is probably because music is so subjective - as they say, de gustibus non est disputandum - and striking a chord with the audience, with the public - the ticket to fame and riches - seems to be a matter of sheer luck and, of course, flawless performances.

God really may be too real to be perfect. That's a great observation. But I don't really think in terms of worship. I'm not sure I can even understand what that means. The concept of unity, however, of every thing is an idea someone can use with meditation, light drugs like marijuana or nicotine, or just a good book on mysticism in order to gain a sense of spirituality about one's life. — Gregory

By worship, I meant something much broader than what the word itself means - things like whether god is too human in the sense has character flaws or is indifferent or is morally ambiguous or is not powerful enough wouldn't be awesome enough to worship. Worship here stands for those qualities that make god god, a being so magnificent, so perfect, so whole, that just the thought of him sends us down on our knees unable to do anything but worship, worship, worship. You could say that worship in the way I used it functions as an index of how majestic god is.

No, we're not on the same page at all, you're missing the point. If today is Jan 1 2021, then Jan 2 2021 is not existent, it has not yet happened, and therefore it is not a day which can be counted. The only days which can be counted are the days of the past, the real days which have occurred. So we start with Jan1, and since it is present, not completed we can assign 0 to it, as the starting point. After this, is the first day which has occurred, Dec 31 and the second, Dec 30, etc.. Therefore in our ordering of the days, Jan 1 2021 is prior to Dec 31 2020 — Metaphysician Undercover

You mean to say that the earth will not rotate on its axis or that the moon will stop revolving around the earth or that the earth will not go around the sun if it's in the future? These are the phenomena, fairly dependable I should say, on which a day, a month and a year are defined. If they will occur, there's a certain rhythm, a period, and these periods are days, months, years, all sequenceable i.e. we can assign numbers to them. I won't discuss this anymore. Thank you.

I suggest that the only reason you are inclined to say that the events further back in time are before the others is that you adhere to the convention of a linear time, which stretches from the past, through the present and into the future. My argument is that this is a mistaken model of time because it does not properly account for the difference between future and past — Metaphysician Undercover

The two of us are talking past each other. I already admitted that you're right and that I am too and, most importantly, there's no inconsistency we should argue about to decide who's right. I'm no longer going to discuss this. Again, thank you.

I wouldn't say that calendars are bogus, they are a convention of convenience. My argument is that such conventions of convenience can very often hide the truth when the reality of the matter is complex, and more difficult to understand, just like the convention of saying that the sun comes up and the sun goes down. — Metaphysician Undercover

Surely, you're not arguing that calendars are just a matter of convenience. All important events, in our lives and on a global level, are planned and executed based on them. If there were something wrong with them even in the slightest sense, it would stick out like a sore thumb - they would be too obvious to miss for the consequences would be worldwide chaos.

Do you not recognize that the difference between the possibility of something, and the actual existence of something, is a radical difference? This is the difference between future and past. Notice that you must live with what has happened in the past. Whether you like the event which occurred or not, it cannot be changed and you must live with the consequences of it. However, a future event which appears unpleasant, you can take measures to avoid, and one which you desire you can attempt to make happen. This is a radical difference, and acknowledgement of that difference seems to permeate all of our living activities. The past ensures that you are what you are at the present, but the future allows you to change. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not saying there's no difference between the past and the future and the present for that matter. The very definitions of these terms bespeak a real distinction among the three. However, numerically sequencing time is a different matter. An order in time that exists in the future will persist through the present and into the past i.e. given two events x and y, if x is before y in the future, x will be before y in the present and x has to be before y in the past also.

There is no god but Death, and Sleep is her prophet. — 180 Proof

:up: You da man!

I'm not sure if this off topic but my two cents worth is this:

Since you've compared Hinduism to Christianity, I'll try and stay within the limits so set. Hinduism too, like Christianity, subscribes to the notion of goodness in god, gods to be accurate. However, the two diverge when it comes to evil.

I can only guess here but from the bits of information I gathered, Hinduism views as a natural part, an aspect, of the universe, part and parcel, so to speak, of the cosmos and thus to be accepted despite how unpalatable that proposition is.

Christianity, on the other hand, treats evil as something alien to the universe, foreign to it, an external malevolent force, and thus an entity to rally against in order that it may be eradicated, destroyed, and at no point to even think of it as a fact of our universe we must learn to accept.

This critical difference between the two faiths comes to the fore when we examine their respective conceptions of what god is. Christianity's take on god as, like you said, infinitely good sits in contrast to the Hindu gods who are not assigned such an epithet.

At some level, in some respect, it's fair to say that the Christian god is too perfect to be real (idealism?) and the Hindu god is too real to be perfect (realism?). In the former case, one has to contend with the possibility of a nonexistent deity and in the latter case we're left to wonder whether such a deity is worthy of worship.