Of course.

If one is saying that not creating someone is better, they are essentially saying that there would be future innocent beings who would deserve to not be harmed (and they will be harmed to varying degrees), so it's better to not create them (even though they do not exist yet). In this case, one could also say that potential/future people also deserve happiness, so it is better to create them (even though they will only start deserving the good once they exist).

You don't seem to care about understanding others, which is tragic.

If one simply wants to assume that the negatives would always outweigh the positive even if innumerable people (whose perspectives one doesn't share), then it's no wonder that they would gleefully ignore anything contrary to what they believe.

The point was that if the value of preventing harms persists even if nobody exists (yet) to benefit from it, then it's also good to create positives regardless of whether or not someone is feeling deprived. Since it seemed like you believe that it's good to not act in a way that leads to a manifestation of harms, I thought that it would be reasonable to talk about the other side of the coin. I am sorry if I did not understand your position correctly.

If all one is saying is that non-existence is "neutral" (not good or bad), then in that case, I would say that choosing a state that (overall) can have more good than bad is better than a valueless one.

I believe that I grasped the essence of your arguments a long time ago. Unfortunately, an obstinate desire to single-mindedly focus on one aspect of existence can be deleterious.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/718987

"Yes. One needs to exist in order to be deprived of something Yes, where have I denied that?"

I never said that there was any denial. I was focusing on the point that if creating happiness requires prior deprivation, then preventing suffering should require the presence of satisfaction. Otherwise, all one has is an inconsistent framework.

Thank you for the discussion, everyone.

Beauty can be discovered in unlikely places :)

If one needs to exist in order to be deprived of something (and this is supposedly why the absence of happiness isn't bad), them one also needs to exist in order to gain from the absence of harms. I've tried my best to elucidate this to @Bartricks and others. However, people ultimately have to decide for themselves.

Name-calling is the epitome of intellect, after all. One could talk about crude deontology that might say that it's better to let trillions die instead of harming a single person, but let us move on. Utilitarians might also recognise that a society wherein people get what they deserve is likely to have higher well-being in the long run, since it would reward ethical people who help make the world a better place. However, those who wish to dogmatically adhere to the doctrine of unremitting and unrestricted pessimism might not care about the nuances of existence, which is unfortunate.

Since there is no evidence that most people dislike their lives, empty assertions and projections fail to demonstrate that utilitarianism leads to antinatalism. It certainly could someday, but it is not this day.

Driven by an unreasonable disdain for a particular view, a few individuals might mistakenly think that utilitarianism entails that suicide is good. However, this is an absolutely ludicrous assertion. Firstly, we have no good reason to ignore the innumerable positive experiences that people have which seem to matter more than the negatives for most people. Ending everything would hardly be a good way to increase happiness. Reckless procreation is indeed problematic. Nevertheless, it can definitely possess value if done in a reasonable way.

As expected, some people would rather deal with extreme thought experiments rather than the real world. Both forms of utilitarianism, negative and positive, can lead to absurd conclusions after a certain point. Those negative utilitarians who only care about reducing harms might have to say that a world wherein there are many people experiencing some harms along with a decent amount of benefits is worse than one in which the total amount of harms and people are less, even though the individuals have horrible lives. Crude deontologists should be fine with the end of countless innocent lives due to their uncritical attachment to a particular principle. Rational thinking about ethics requires thinking about various factors, including intentions, the gulf between theory and praxis, and consequences. Mindless procreation might not be a demand if non-existence has no negative/positive value and cannot be better/worse (as I tend to think). Additionally, too much of anything can be a problem. Practical limitations have to be kept in mind.

Anyway, this has been an interesting thread. I hope that you and the others present here have a pleasant day!

Trying to tell everyone that they should not procreate due to an alleged pre-eminence of harms is a pessimistic imposition. It's just that it's intellectual rather than physical. Natalism bestows benefits that antinatalism never can (except for perhaps helping some people who already exist).

Trying to create too many people can cause damage in the long run. This doesn't mean one should not do it at all whilst keeping practical considerations into account.

Any rational person who honestly analyses the complexity of the sentient experience should realise, I think, that saying that it's never acceptable to care about the value of the positives as long as there are any harms is as ill-advised as it gets.

People frequently decide for others in order to give them a good they deserve, such as saving someone even if there's a small chance that they might not like it. We don't see this as a problem because we recognise that the aforementioned case, whilst unfortunate, should not make us forget about the majority of cases in which people would appreciate being able to have a good they couldn't have asked for. If someone says that this isn't analogous to procreation because nobody needs to be saved, then one could also point out that neither can an act that doesn't violate existing interests be considered an "imposition". Universal antinatalism, in what some could call insidious paternalism, prevents the bestowal of positives that innocent sentient beings deserve (and if it's good to not impose even if nobody benefits from it, then there isn't a good reason to think that it's not bad to not create a positives irrespective of whether or not inexistent beings need it) and could mislead innocent people into thinking that they should avoid procreation because it's an ethical obligation, even if they become miserable due to this. It hasn't been shown that the prevention of the positives is acceptable in objective terms.

It is extremely saddening that people do have to go through severe harms and be forced to endure an existence they cannot find any value in. I hope that ideas such as transhumanism and the right to a graceful exit can help reduce both of these harms significantly. But, having said that, it simply doesn't make sense to ignore one side of reality altogether. It's incredibly myopic to essentially say that all the happy people that exist essentially didn't deserve to exist due to mere presence of the negatives. And if not creating someone respects their autonomy, it also diminishes it to a greater degree by not giving a good that cannot be solicited prior to one's existence. One's subjective perspective that conveniently misses the value of optimism and the presence of the negativity bias cannot be considered a valid justification for preventing all happiness. "Oh, you enjoy life despite suffering (perhaps more than me)? That's irrelevant, since you should not be here due to the fact that creation also entails some risks," is hardly a pleasant sentiment.

Unforeseeable benefits also matter. The person might think that a the individual would just get through life, but it's quite possible that they would have inestimably valuable experiences that would stem from their unique perspective, such as the joy that can come from the pursuit of knowledge and the happiness that is experienced by those who really care about meaningful relationships. This "known unknown" isn't as infrequent as some might think.

:ok:

Indeed, that is what I tried to explain. After all, if one needs absolute perfection in order to say that creation can be good, then why can't one say that creation is bad only if there is nothing but misery. Arbitrary double standards do not constitute good arguments.

Even deontologically speaking, it doesn't make much sense to disregard the value of bestowing happiness that would have ineffable value for countless sentient beings—and who would not be happy directly due to someone else being harmed and would also seek to help others. Extreme thought experiments can be created everywhere (lying or harm being wrong even if millions die). Yet, it will never diminish the potency of the good. Furthermore, it can be good to follow some rules (generally speaking) lest society descend into chaos.

Unless there is a greater good that can come from it, not giving benefits to innumerable sentient beings cannot be ethically justified.

Neither have I denied that the harms aren't undeserved or bad. However, please do try and understand that, despite being partially bad, creating someone isn't completely unethical (hint: it involves the positives).

They also get good.

Procreative act is also good because it creates a good. Since most people seem to have more experiences they value, the goodness of the act can be greater. More good and some bad is better than nothing.

I am not obligated to accept unreasonable claims. I didn't say that the action wasn't negative. However, it could be a lot more morally positive than negative if it provides a benefit, such as making someone learn good manners so that they can make others happy and also gain happiness from the respect they would get from others.

Procreation certainly has a negative element. However, if it's good to prevent the negative, it's also problematic to prevent the positives.

I am not admitting that I am not wrong (I think).

You don't seem to be paying attention, friend. haven't begged any questions. You are misconstruing my view. Creating undeserved harm is indeed problematic, especially for
an existing being who does not need the harm in order to live a decent life. A harm, howbeit, could be justified for the sake of achieving a greater good, such as pressurising someone to not behave in a way that would cause them and others misery in the long run.

However, if creating undeserved harm is bad, then creating deserved happiness is good. I believe that it's ethically justifiable to bestow that good, even if it's not complete.

I never said that I reject 3. I appreciate your interest in thickness. Non-sequiturs are a thing.

My "case" is that although innocent sentient beings do deserve complete happiness, it doesn't mean that creating them is wrong if they get anything less than total bliss. This is an unreasonable criteria for justifying procreation that I see no good reason to accept. Again, someone could also say that innocent people deserve happiness, and since it's only existence that gives them benefits, it's good to create them (unless their lives are permeated with nothing but misery).

None. I deny the claim that it's wrong to create someone if they don't get 100% of what they deserve.

I said that I think so in my previous comment. But, once again, deserving something doesn't mean that anything short of perfection is simply unacceptable, particularly when the alternative (non-existence) doesn't provide any benefits.

I don't think that you're nasty. The world still has many people who don't care about reducing suffering as much as they should. I can't speak for my family, but I suppose they would respect your compassion. I think that it's reasonable to conserve the positives.

Incessantly taking part in quizzes is tiresome :p

Yeah, I think so

The distinction between deserving and adequacy will always exist.

Of course.

I don't disagree with it. I disagree with the idea that not getting that absolute good makes everything else worthless.


However, not being able to give everything doesn't mean it's better to give nothing. Just as the fact that one hasn't lost everything doesn't mean that it's not bad that they lost a lot.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/718667

The quote in the comment.

It was from the OP. I have no interest in distortion, though I admit it's possible (I don't believe it has happened here).

I already did.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/718667

I cannot use the actual quote feature for some inexplicable reason, but the quotation marks should suffice, I think. Apologies for the inconvenience.

That an absolutely harmless state is necessary for creation to be ethical, but it would not make sense to say that nothing but negatives are required for saying that creation was bad.

I never highlighted what I said.

The problem can be found in the OP:
"They don't just deserve an overall happy life. They deserve an entirely harm-free happy life."

They certainly deserve happiness and if one is capable of providing them, it would not be ethical to not do so. My point is that, even if absolute bliss doesn't exist, it doesn't lead one to the conclusion that the positives that do exist do not give us a reason to create someone. It's not all or nothing. If one is going to set up an unreasonable criteria, then one may as well say that unless life is only negative, it's better to create someone.

I already mentioned it. One doesn't require absolute perfection for something to still be good. The mere presence of harms doesn't give us a reason to suggest that it's better to never try to create positives.

Non-existent beings aren't on a majestic bridge they want to stay on ;)

I didn't ignore the argument. There's a difference between something that should exist (ideally) vs. something still having more than sufficient value.

If one doesn't create someone, they aren't fulfilling their desires to not exist either. If the absence of the benefits is only bad if someone feels deprived, then the absence of the harms is only good if one feels relieved/satisfied due to their absence.

It's not for one person to disregard the (probably mathematically undeniable) fact that most people prefer existence in spite of facing many problems. If not creating harms is good for potential innocent beings, then it's also bad to not bestow positives. It's myopic to only think about one side of the coin.

I had a discussion on this topic with that comment's author a while ago here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/640059

I did. :smile:

One could argue that innocent people deserve to experience some positives, so, unless one's life is completely terrible, it would be better to create them. But since we don't require absolute negativity calling many acts of procreation wrong, I believe that there isn't a good reason to accept that perfection is a necessary for justifying creating a life that would possess a sufficient amount of positives.

The fact that many people experience benefits (happiness) that they can and do value (I am not saying that this is always the case) despite the harms means that it doesn't make sense to never give birth to innocent sentient beings who would experience the benefits. Good is better than absolutely nothing, even if it's not perfect. The alternative to absolute perfection is some/a significant amount of it, not its absence altogether (unless the harms are greater, which isn't always the case).

I did. Knowing and understanding are different things. The absence of perfection doesn't justify never bestowing a good. If not causing harms is good, then not creating positives is bad. And if creating negatives is bad but not doing so is merely neutral, then creating positives is better than a neutral state of affairs. Not everyone needs 900 grand.

Innocent beings might not deserve harm, but they also deserve benefits. Your premise isn't necessarily false, but I believe that the positives also matter (if one believes that an act that doesn't improve/degrade one's wellbeing can be good/bad).

Well, we should probably also take things such as the fear of death and optimistic biases into account. However, I don't think that being optimistic is inherently problematic as long as it doesn't ruin one's final analysis. Regarding the fear of cessation (I am not including the aversion to pain here), I think that it only demonstrates that people value life immensely and don't desire its end.

As for the intuition that preventing harms is more important, I think that this exists because most people do not need constant external intervention for happiness. As long as we don't cause significant harms to someone, people can live adequately valuable life. But since non-existent beings aren't in a state of affairs they cherish, I don't think that one should focus on just preventing harms instead of also trying to create positives.

I had a discussion on this topic a while ago here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/640059

I thought you might find it interesting.

Have a wonderful day!

Holistic empathy does not diminish the value of the bestowal of positives ;)

Additionally, innocent people also deserve happiness. Since most people do seem to prefer existence despite the harms, it doesn't seem right to solely focus on preventing harms.

They also deserve positives and the prevention of a one-sided perspective regarding value.

It's as solid as air. Nevertheless, it does highlight, directly or indirectly, the urgent need to alleviate suffering and stop reckless procreation.

Disagree with P. However, it can certainly be true in some cases, which is what we need to avoid as much as possible.

Most Buddhists don't accept universal AN. The ones I've talked to have said that this is because Buddhism also teaches that suffering can be ended by not being attached to things. Also, they think that rebirth would ensure that nothing we do ends everything. Nirvana, then, will ultimately depend upon the individual.