OK thanks again to anyone who offered help, or asked thoughtful questions. I'm going to try to start over in a new thread, which will hopefully touch on morality.

Thanks for your question. I just want to answer it, and then I'm going to start a new discussion that will hopefully touch on the subject of morality because I really like it. You asked whether I see any possibility of moral values changing over time. I do not see moral values and duties changing over time, if they are objective. For example, if the value of Liberty is objective, then liberty as we understand it–if we can both agree on a simple Websters definition–that Liberty is the same in today's world as it would be in a world in which everyone is in chains, and they all think that being in chains is liberating. Now about moral duties, let me ask, do we have a binding moral duty to protect children from those who wish to harm them? Would that duty exist in a world in which no one seemed to care about children? I look forward to more discussions with you, but I'm going to start a new thread somewhere else. Thanks again!

thank you! I really appreciated your help

Oh wow! This thread is still going! Let me apologize if I could have started this more carefully. May I propose that we start over? I will start a new thread similar to this one—perhaps I will simply begin with a question in the tradition of classical philosophy.

If you in the middle of an important discussion with someone here, please continue, but I won’t be checking back. Thank you to everyone who participated! I received many helpful comments. Keep seeking the truth, and be loving and kind to one another—just in case morality is objective. ;-)

I offered the idea of a maximal being as a way to think about God, if you will allow it. Please understand that I am open to ideas, and I do not mean to confuse the issue. It is part of a different argument, the ontological argument, which argues that a maximally great being exists. But again, that is an entirely different argument.

What might you suggest to make "that than which no greater can be conceived" meaningful and coherent? — Thorongil

In a nutshell, there cannot be anything greater than God. If something or someone greater were to exist, then that would be God. For example, no being could know more, or love more, or have more creative power than God. Now let's bring it back to morality, which is the topic at hand. Is it better to be all-loving or partially loving? God is seen as a being of maximal love. Do we not all apprehend love? Or when there is an absence of love in people? Do you apprehend love at least as clearly as you apprehend your car keys? In other words, do you believe morality is objective? I'm honestly asking.

t0m,

Thanks for the response. You gave me a lot to sift through, but I can appreciate your "ability to question and doubt". My entry into philosophy was spurred by a period of intense doubt. I was a Christian at a very young age, and I believed strongly, but anyone who has been around knows what life can dish out, and after my share of hard knocks, I began to question things. Suddenly, I was hit with the same feeling that probably hit Sartre and Nietzsche: emptiness and despair; the fear of the black void, if you will. I became truly terrified. I sincerely hoped that God existed, but I asked myself, had my last thirty years up to that point been a waste? Had I been following some sort of false hope, or even worse, a lie?

So I immediately started searching for answers. What I found is that, for a sincere seeker of truth, reason leads away from dread or despair, and towards hope, love, and even something beyond all of it.

Now, let me attempt to answer a couple of your concerns:

"All punishment and reward is finite." Yes, that is true on atheism. If atheism is true, then our lives would be limited to the physical, and constrained within our physical bodies; there would be no life after death, and thus no reason to be concerned with any notion of rewards or punishments beyond the grave. Of course, that assumes atheism is true. On the other hand, God's existence would allow for other possibilities; for example, eternal life. If life were to extend beyond the physical world of objects, then reward and punishment might also extend beyond that world.

"How does God make morality objective?" St. Anselm saw God as the greatest conceivable being. Simply put, if one were to conceive of a great being, and you could imagine anything greater or better, then that would be God. So God, if he exists, would need to be maximally great. Classical examples of maximally great attributes would be things like omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, moral perfection, and personal existence. If God were indeed morally perfect, then objective moral values would be grounded in his character. By his very nature, he would command what is right, and give what is good. So if God exists, morality would not merely be a subjective set of social conventions produced through socio-biological evolution, but instead, morality would be objectively grounded in the nature and character of God.

Do we not still have our terrible freedom? Would we not make the same calculations? All believing in God, we could still debate the legitimacy of his moral authority. If we throw infinite punishments into the mix, then we arguably just have a fearsome tyrant. Moral action would only be "objective" in this case by being undeniably and even immeasurably prudent. — t0m

First, your question is about free will. My argument doesn't even address that. The question I am addressing with this argument has more to do with the nature of morality. It is at least possible that morality exists independently of human beings. Many philosophers (including Plato) believe that moral values could exist as abstract objects. Furthermore, some see certain moral truths as necessary. For example, consider the statement, "malice is good". There is no possible world in which malice would be truly good. Furthermore, there exists a possible world with only moral truths such as "malice is bad", and "kindness is good".

Second, you seem to have confused punishment with morality. Moral values do not always carry obligations. For example, it may be good for you to start a non-profit, but you are not obligated to start a non-profit. It may be good for you to take a humble job, but you are not obligated to do so. Because moral values do not carry obligations to act, consequences are irrelevant, and therefore punishment need not be considered when discussing moral values. Actions come in when we discuss moral duties, but even then, the question is about the nature of those duties, and whether they stem from objectively grounded values, or subjective experiences.

If you are interested, I hope you will refer back to the argument, and read a few of my responses to different people. I believe I have illustrated it fairly well. Thanks again.

However, examine God and you'll see it's not really as strong as initially thought out to be (Euthyphro's dilemma). It seems that both theists and atheists are in the same boat. — TheMadFool

Please see my response to Thorongil...

Also, I'm aware of the Euthyphro dilemma... — cincPhil

Objective morality is something that appeals to me but your post implies that the universe, without humans, is amoral. So, doesn't this defeat your claim that there's an objective morality? — TheMadFool

I'm not sure what led you to that conclusion. On the contrary, objective morality, if it exists, would be independent of humans beings. That's the definition of an objective reality. It's quite plausible to me that moral values could exist in a universe without human beings. Consider other objective realities, such as stars, planets, and cars, the world of physical objects, or truth. Certainly truth and planets could exist without humans. In fact, some philosophers might say that truth exists necessarily. Similarly, philosophers have thought of moral values like love in this way (Plato for example).

I didn't think you were, but I'll work on my communication skills for next time. Thanks for the challenge!

What part of the argument are you having trouble with?

Are moral values really dependent on human beings? It seems to me that would make them subjective. If they are objective, as many philosophers think they are, then they must be independent of human beings; in other words, some things are bad or wrong even if people are oblivious to them. See the Nazi example at the beginning of the discussion.

Your use of lioness and grizzly is quite perplexing to me, as I have said repeatedly that mother nature is morally neutral. However, I think I understand what you mean by "involuntary elements". On naturalism, only natural causes are considered, and naturalists tend to be determinists. As an oversimplification, everything I do, I do either to avoid painful stimuli, or for the survival of my species. So I might face pain to save a child because the child will advance my species, and the need for species advancement overrides my need to avoid pain. But that's just premise (1). On atheism, morality is not objective. It's just a kind of herd morality that arose as a product of our socio-biological evolution.

I don't know that it's possible to come up with a set-in-stone cost-benefit analysis that would determine what action to take. :) It's simple enough to determine that the child ought remain free and unharmed, however. The trolley problem, for example, seems to show that moral actions in general are not decidable. Implications for the hypothesis that there are objective morals? — jorndoe

I wasn't commenting on how we come to know right from wrong. I was merely trying to give you an example of a situation in which the right action is clear. Of course, it is not always clear. As you point out, the trolley problem serves to illustrate that sometimes the right action is not clear; sometimes all we have are bad choices. Another example of this is the movie, Sophie's Choice, in which a mother at Auschwitz is forced by the Nazis to choose which of her two children will live. However, these situations need not undermine our belief in objective morality. Neither the person on the trolley nor Sophie is morally culpable for his or her actions. At the trolley tracks, who has tied the people to the tracks? At Auschwitz, it's the madman Nazi "doctor" who is guilty of murder. The moral truth in both scenarios is clear: a murder has been committed, but the person who is forced to make the choice is not responsible for its outcome. Now, you could say that the trolley situation was just a coincidence I suppose. You could say that the people on the tracks just happened to be there, but even if that were true, then the situation is at best an unavoidable accident, but it seems to me that there is some sort of ill-will or bad actor behind it. I mean, what kind of person invents a scenario where people are tied to tracks and your only choice is to run them over? Is this the Joker vs. Batman? At any rate, I have asserted that moral values and duties are objective, and therefore, true or binding. And to say that some situations are difficult does not seem to undermine that.

What do you believe? Do you apprehend at least a loose set of objective moral values, such as love, freedom, equality, tolerance, etc? Now, what if society as a whole decided to replace them with greed, narcissism, bigotry, and malice? Does that mean that those things are good? In what possible world is malice good? Don't some values seem necessary, like love for example?

Nothing comes to mind when I hear this definition. — Thorongil

Time to get creative. I think I'll be happy as long as you don't posit a flying spaghetti monster.

Well, I'd like to know what your moral theory is based on, if not happiness. — TheMadFool

I don't want to try to describe a complete set of ethics. I am open to examples of what is good and what is right. The question I would put to anyone is what basis do we have on atheism for believing that goodness and rightness have any meaning at all? On atheism, it seems me, we are just animals, and anything goes. You don't try to read morality into the animal world. For example, lions kill each other, mate with their relatives, and kill cubs when they take over a pride. However, no one is making a moral judgment that lions are bad, incestuous, child murderers, are they? Or take the example of child torture. Forgive the extreme example, but did you know that certain cultures practice ritual genital mutilation of children? On atheism, it seems to me, that these people are merely being taboo, but why believe that there is anything inherently wrong with that? Animals do all kinds of things that are taboo to us, so why believe that our morality is superior to theirs? To do so is to succumb to an unjustified bias about our own species. What makes us the seat of objective moral reality? On atheism, we are just an advanced species of primate that evolved relatively recently on a speck of dust called Earth, lost the vast ocean of a dying universe, and yet somehow, we are beset with delusions of moral grandeur. So that is premise (1) in a nutshell.

Premise (2) says, "But wait! Morality really is objective!" Is it wrong to torture a child? Any sane person knows the answer, and I would agree: "Of course it's wrong to torture a child!" We have an objective moral obligation to love children, and to protect them, not to hurt them. Is it wrong to rape, or may I "forcibly copulate" as the male great white shark does? Again, only an insane person would say "I forcibly copulate as the white shark does". Is it wrong to kill my fellow man? The chimpanzee does it. Why not his primate cousin, homo sapiens? Again, it seems obvious to any sane person that each of us has a binding, objective obligation to respect human life, and to not take it just because one feels like it. That is (2) in a nutshell.

I would agree that moral values are mind-independent. But the objection is that if God is a mind, then moral values are not mind-independent. However, on this view, the distinction between mind-dependent and mind-independent realities collapses. Everything becomes mind-dependent. Even things like galaxies, the moon, people, and cars, which are models of objective reality, become subjective on that view. But then the intuitive distinction of mind-independence vs. mind-dependence goes out the window. That is why I prefer to say, "Independent of human opinion." It avoids this confusion about mind-independent realities.

We can assume that anyone likes freedom by default. (Including non-humans.) This informs morals.
We can assume that anyone dislikes harm by default. (Including non-humans.) This informs morals.
Liking and disliking are subjective.
Thus, morals are subjectively informed (in part at least).

Suppose I see someone about to hurt a child; it is clear that he is attempting to kill or capture that child. I don't have a weapon, and I'm not totally sure I can subdue him with my bare hands. But I know that if I step in, the child will at least get away; the child will be spared. Should I let the child die because I dislike pain, and I want to live? Similarly, should I let the child be captured beacuse I do not wish to relinquish my own freedom?

I didn't say anything about happiness. Do you really think of love in this way? Do you really think that love hurts? Or is it when we fail to love purely that we hurt each other? Can you imagine a pure, high love that is greater than our attempts at it?

For God, I might use St. Anselm's concept of a maximal being, "a being than which no greater can be conceived."

Also, I'm aware of the Euthyphro dilemma. The question is: is something good because God wills it, or does God will something because it is good? If the theist says that God wills something because it is good, then Plato is right, and moral values are independent of God; they are not based in God. On the other hand, if you say that something is good because God wills it then that would seem to make good and evil arbitrary. God could have willed that hatred is good; then we would be morally obligated to hate one another, which is insane. Some moral values like love seem to be necessary, and therefore, there is no possible world in which hatred is good. So the claim is that this shows that the good is not based in God.

I think this is clearly a false dilemma because the choices are not of the form "A or not-A", which would be inescapable. The alternatives are of the form "A or B". In that case you could simply posit a third alternative C, and escape the horns of the dilemma. I think there is a third alternative: God wills something because he is good. God himself is the paradigm of all goodness, and his will reflects his character. God is by his very nature good, loving, fair, kind, generous, etc. Therefore, he could not have willed hatred to be good. That would be to contradict his own nature.

So God's commands are not arbitrary, but neither are they independent of God. Instead, God himself is the paradigm of goodness.

Thanks MadFool. Let me ask your question back to you. Can you give me an example of an objective moral value that changes? For example, can the value of love be sometimes good, and sometimes bad? Or is it always true that it is good for us to love?

On atheism, I would agree with you: morality is simply a product of human experience over the course of evolution; it's nothing more than a kind of herd morality. On that view, I see no reason to think that moral values and duties are objectively binding in any way. And if they are not objectively binding, then they must be subjective.

If morality is dependent upon environmental factors, wouldn't it be subjective?

Also, herd morality and evolution is just what the atheist espouses. Think about premise (1). If atheism is true, then how can morality be objective? That's the question.

I used to doubt, but not anymore.

On atheism, it is as you say, that morality is a product of socio-biological evolution. But let me be clear: I'm not arguing that belief in God is necessary for people to be good. I agree that atheists often live good and decent lives–lives that would put mine to shame. I'm arguing that if God does not exist, then morality is just an evolutionary spin-off. It's a kind of herd morality, but it's not really true in any objective sense. As a theist, don't you see God as the foundation of objective morality?

This strikes a personal cord with me. I've done things I regret. I've hurt people. And I know that if God did not exist, then I would embrace my animal instinct, you know? I would live like the animal that I am. I would rob banks, and maybe worse. I would see no reason not too. I would laugh at any atheist who practiced morality because there is none. Nature is morally neutral. For example, when the lion kills the zebra, it kills the zebra, but it doesn't commit murder. When a great white shark forcibly copulates with a female shark, it forcibly copulates, but it doesn't rape. On atheism, what obligations, if any do we owe to other homo sapiens? If we are just animals, then what makes us so special? Why think that we have any moral worth? That is premise one, in a nutshell.

Forgive me. I don't mean to accuse. My argument is not about what atheists believe. It is about the nature of morality.

On atheism, you don't read morality into nature. Nature is red in tooth and claw. To quote Richard Dawkins, "there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but pitiless indifference."

Now, which premise do you deny? Are you really willing to deny the objectivity of moral values and duties? See my reply to TheMadFool

To say that a moral value or duty is objective is to say that it is true or binding irrespective of human opinion (regardless of what anyone thinks). For example, to say that the Holocaust was objectively wrong is to say that even if the Nazis had succeeded in winning WWII, and brain-washed or exterminated everyone who disagreed with them, so that everyone in the world believed that Naziism was right, it would still be wrong.