Disagreeing with Davidson about Conceptual Schemes The basic idea in Davidson's paper is fairly straight forward. That folk have different points of view can make sense only if there is some common framework from which we might notice the difference. But if we have such a common framework, then by that very fact, aren't we working in the same conceptual scheme? Doesn't the difference now become that of a disagreement within a conceptual scheme, and not between conceptual schemes?
And if that is the case, then any plurality of conceptual schemes reduces to at most one. — Banno
But this doesn't rule out varying conceptual schemes between say, humans and aliens. It just says that if there are such differences, we wouldn't be able to detect them. But consider this scenario, taken from the plot of the movie
Arrival:
Aliens arrive and begin teach humans their language. But eventually, one woman discovers that the aliens have a completely different view of time. She realizes this because through association with them and their language, she has developed the same perspective on time they have. Yes, their language is now translatable to her, but what she's discovered is that
in the past there was a conceptual rift.
I think in the same way, we could speculate that people in the past were missing some of the concepts needed to understand the world as we see it. In other words, Davidson doesn't really rule out scheme-content duality, he's just criticizing cases where people assert the existence of a rift, and immediately show that there is no rift by offering the translation. It remains possible that there could be aliens who have untranslatable languages.
Our beliefs are tested against the world, not against competing conceptual schemes. — Banno
The information
@Pierre-Normand provided calls this into question. Davidson has been criticized for rejecting any rational influence of the world on our beliefs. I'll flesh that out after I've understood it better.