Thank you!

Now you are getting into metaphysics, I was told that this shan't be done for this discussion. — schopenhauer1

I don't think abstract object implies any ontological commitment. It just means it's not a physical thing, but it's not a mental object like if you're picturing a flower in your mind. An abstract object is something I could be wrong about, for example if I say that 2 squared is 5.

@Pierre-Normand
Hi! I was hoping to get some clarification from a professional. Did Frege think propositions were thoughts? Abstract objects, but basically thoughts?

I'll leave you to it. — Leontiskos

Uh, ok. Thanks.

@Leontiskos

Again, Soames explains Frege this way:

"In general, when we want to refer to the thought expressed by a particular sentence, we use an expression such as "that S" or "the proposition that S". The use of the expression indicates that something is being said about a thought (proposition)." ibid pg. 22

Your quote nowhere says that for Frege a proposition is a thought. Do you realize that? — Leontiskos

I think pretty clearly says that. What did you think a proposition is for Frege?

As opposed to what? — schopenhauer1

Exactly. I think Leontiskos and I are talking about different Freges. :grin:

I will simply note that, yet again in misrepresenting Frege, you provide no source for your claims. — Leontiskos

"The first point I want to call attention to is that according to Frege, truth is a property of thoughts or propositions in the sense discussed in chapter 1. For Frege, sentences are vehicles for expressing information. The thought expressed by a sentence on a given occasion is the information content carried by the sentence on that occasion. When one assertively utters a sentence, typically one says or asserts the thought expressed by the sentence on that occasion. Thus for Frege, assertion is a relation between an agent and a thought." --Understanding Truth, Scott Soames

When he mentions the first chapter, Soames is talking about an examination of the relationship between utterances, sentences, and propositions, with the goal of explaining why the concept of a proposition is indispensable. Did you have some source that conflicts with that?

When Frege talked about propositions, he was talking about thoughts. Those who find that language distasteful probably shouldn't be discussing Frege at all.

You appear to be agreeing that we can't have unasserted propositions in real life, even if the assertion is only hypothetical or potential.

"Does a strong formalism such as Frege's invalidate whatever can be said or thought about p in ordinary language?" By "invalidate" I mean "render meaningless/useless/incoherent" or, for short, unthinkable, despite what we may believe at the time about our alleged thought? — J

I think the most fruitful framework for discussing that question would be one that starts without ontological commitments, with something like ontological antirealism.

But whether p is T or F is another story; context won't tell you. — J

Right. Context is just part of discerning what proposition is in play.

I still don't see that this follows. Can't you have a mistaken or in-part inaccurate understanding of what truth is, and discover in the course of my lecture what the "truth about truth" is? You seem to be saying that you wouldn't be able to recognize the "truth about truth" unless you already had the correct understanding of what that is. But couldn't the lecture process itself provide the necessary enlightenment? i.e., in the course of listening to me, couldn't you find yourself agreeing with me and simultaneously realizing "Ah, of course, I now see why I believe this to be true"? — J

I'll post Frege's words, and the way Soames formulates it:

"But could we not maintain that there is truth when there is correspondence in a certain respect? But which respect? For in that case what ought we to do so as to decide whether something is true? We should have to inquire whether it is true that an idea and a reality, say, correspond in the specified respect. And then we should be confronted by a question of the same kind, and the game could begin again. So the attempted definition of truth as correspondence breaks down. For in a definition certain characteristics would have to be specified. And in application to any particular case the question would always arise whether it were true that the characteristics were present. So we should be going round in a circle. It therefore seems likely that the content of the word ‘true’ is sui generis and indefinable." — Gottlob Frege, “Der Gedanke. Eine logische Untersuchung,” in Beitrage zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus 1 (1918): 58–77, translated into English as “Thoughts” by P. Geach and R. H. Stoothoff in Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy ed. B. McGuinness (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 351–72, reprinted in Propositions and Attitudes, ed. N. Salmon and S. Soames (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 33–55, at 36.

The argument suggested by this passage can be reconstructed as a reductio ad absurdum:

A. Suppose that truth is definable and that the definition is as follows: For any proposition p, p is true iff p is T.

B. If (A), then to inquire (establish) in any particular case whether a proposition p is true, one must inquire (establish) whether p is T.

C. Therefore, to inquire (establish) whether p is true, one must inquire (establish) whether p is T.

D. To inquire (establish) whether S is to inquire (establish) whether it is true that S, which is to inquire (establish) whether the proposition that S is true.

E. Therefore to inquire (establish) whether a proposition p is true, one must inquire (establish) whether the proposition that p is T is true, which in turn requires one to inquire (establish) whether the proposition that the proposition that p is T is itself T is true, and so on ad infinitum.

The argument can be continued in two different ways, one emphasizing circularity and the other emphasizing regress.

Circularity

F. Since deciding whether a proposition p is true involves deciding whether the proposition that p is T is true, the definition (A) of truth is circular.

G. Since adequate definitions cannot be circular, truth is indefinable.

Regress

F*. So if truth is definable, then deciding whether a proposition p is true requires completing the impossible task of deciding the truth values of infinitely many distinct propositions.

G*. Since we sometimes can decide whether a proposition is true, truth is indefinable. — Understanding Truth, p. 21

There's a fair amount of discussion after this this passage. This source may require a university IP.
I'm not sure: here

I think the upshot of the argument is that the concept of truth has to be innate, or that it's an aspect of communication. We can analyze it out and contemplate it, but the longer we do that, the less sense it will make.

Stephen King said that fiction is a way of expressing truths that couldn't be conveyed in any other way.

Seems to me that "The cat is on the mat" is about a cat and a mat. — Banno

In a raw sort of way. Maybe that's enough.

So the human mind finally gets a part to play in the speculations? That is pretty exciting.

Then we agree that there is a difference between what a sentence is about and what is done with it? — Banno

I might not be understanding what you're asking, but I believe that in order for a sentence to be about something, it has to be used. Meaning is found in use.

o it'd be neat to set up a system where we seperate out the judgement about our expressions from what they are about, so we could work through any inconsistencies in their content apart from their force. — Banno

If you're talking about an artificial environment that's pimped out with a foundation of axioms, then yes, you probably could do that. If we subsequently want to bridge that to ordinary language we'll probably end up with Chomsky and an innate human language which can be identified by analysis of the world's languages (to see what words they all contain.) I figured that wouldn't be your cup of tea.

Folk seem too keen on claiming that one cannot understand what a statement is about without deciding if it is true or false. — Banno

I don't think anyone has made that claim. You probably need to understand the truth conditions, but not whether it's true or false.

But philosophers have been regularly thinking outside the box for millennia. That's not what Wittgenstein was talking about, is it? Wasn't he talking about speculating where nothing can be known?

What's perhaps salient here is that we can understand what a statement is about, and indeed, what it would take to make it true or false, while not knowing if it is true or if it is false, and certainly without having to make a judgement as to it's truth. There have been plenty of examples hereabouts - "the grass is green", "the cat is on the mat". — Banno

If you understand what "the cat is on the mat" is about, it's because you're providing a phantom context for it. The OP alludes to this. There just is no proposition where there is no context of utterance. You can easily invent that context though, and voila: you have a proposition.

There's a famous incident where an English colony in North America disappeared without a trace. They're called the "lost colony." The people who came back looking for them found a tree that was supposed to be used for emergency communication (in case they were attacked by the natives.) But the previously agreed upon code hadn't been used. Instead there was one word carved into it: "Croatan." Ever since then, people have tried to understand what the lost colony meant by it. Croatan was an Algonquin chieftain. Did they mean that Croatan killed them all? Or did the crops fail and they had to go live with Croatan? You see, to sort out any meaning in the communication, you have to imagine the context in which it was uttered, in other words, you have to imagine it being asserted, whether it actually was or not.

But one can utter a sentence without expressing a proposition. And without making a judgement as to the sentence's truth. — Banno

Definitely. :up:

although I think you can remove the assertion in "real life" too. — Leontiskos

Can you give an example of that?

It's fairly clear that assertion is integral to a proposition. The question is: what does it mean to separate them? By what means does Frege do that? If it's by way of a stipulated logical domain, yes you can separate them. In real life? No, you can't.

Sentences or maybe utterances, depending on how you'd like to slice it. It's not obvious to me you can utter a sentence without uttering it in a particular way, which would include something like force.

I would love not to talk about propositions at all, so I'll leave that to you. — Srap Tasmaner

Frege, the godfather of abstract objects, dealt with propositions, so we're going to be mixing quiche and spaghetti if we don't talk about them.

An utterance is just sounds or marks. Literally, nothing else. A sentence is a grammatically correct sequence of words, but a sentence has no specific meaning.

A proposition is expressed by an uttered sentence. A proposition is along the lines of content.

George points to a whiteboard that has the number 2 written on it. He says, "That's a prime number.". He has expressed the proposition that 2 is a prime number. He did that by uttering the aforementioned sentence.

If this doesn't work for you, you've probably got a strong inclination for behaviorism and meaning skepticism. Frege is not your philosopher.

Another way to look at it: if you're not sure whether assertion is something we add on — Srap Tasmaner

Add onto what? Are you thinking of a sentence or a proposition? If it's proposition, just examining what that is will indicate why assertion is integral.

Who are you quoting? Certainly not Frege. Assertoric force does not depend on the hearer. — Leontiskos

Please quote Frege on this issue.

"Berlin" correlates to "2+2" (or "4") and "Berlin is a city" correlates to "2+2=4." — Leontiskos

You need context to make that distinction. If I ask you what the weirdest city in the world is, and you say, "Berlin", you have expressed a proposition. It's all about context.

I was thinking this morning that skunks are assholes. My nostrils were filled with their defensive stink at the time, their last FUCK YOU to a world that left them smeared across the highway. They invade small-time poultry operations and bite the heads off the chickens. They don't eat them, they just bite their heads off. Who does that?

Maybe better than starting a thread, would you want to log into the Internet Archive and read some pages from Scott Soames' book on truth?

It's a safe website. Once you log in, you can borrow books. The pages relevant to Frege start on page 21. The previous section covers some issues about truth bearers: sentences versus propositions. That's fairly important for understanding Frege.

Does this amount to pointing out that any definition of “truth” would have to be true, thus opening up the regress? — J

No. It's basically that truth is integral to the act of assertion. If you give a lecture explaining what truth is, and I'm your audience, I have to already understand what truth is in order to discern what you're doing, that is, telling me the truth about truth. Therefore you can't teach it to me. It's part of my computer's BIOS. It's in my firmware.

I'll see if I can start a thread to go through it.

Forgive my extemporising. — Banno

:up:
In a way, the OP is asking about the extent to which meaning is use. In what circumstances can we drop use and still have meaning? This is assertoric force:

'assertoric force follows if a proposition expressed by an indicative clause is presented as relevant in a context made up of a subset of the hearer's factual assumptions."

You can already tell from that definition that assertion is generally going to be involved in the meaning of a proposition because you need to know context to discern what proposition is being expressed. Math is is different situation though. It has a semi-stipulated character, in part to avoid a paradox arising from Frege's work. This tells us that when we're talking about Frege, we're talking about a perspective that sees math as a matter of description, specifically of the contours of the human mind: of thinking. In the light of that, it becomes more interesting to consider his thoughts about separating sense and use.

More extemporizing.

This is the sentence in the OP that stood out to me:

An assertion can be displayed, perhaps as an integral part of a proposition, without being an “actual assertion. — J

I believe it follows from Frege's view of truth that assertion is integral to propositions. Think of the scrap of paper that says "Berlin.". Any effort to read it as a proposition will immediately conjure situations in which someone is asserting it. The mind is wired to look for purposeful communication.

When a logician separates assertion from proposition, meaning becomes unstable. The only source of stability is the potential for assertion.

I think that like Davidson, you have reinterpreted Tarski for your own purposes. No shame in that.

Ok. Whatever else you might think about truth, it's pretty hard to disagree with Tarski. Is that what you want to do? — Banno

You don't get Tarski unless you understand that his truth predicate doesn't mean anything. It's not the truth we talk about in ordinary language. Don't equate Tarski and the T-sentence rule. The latter has become a philosophical gadget in a variety of projects.

We disagree about the value of Tarski's work. You don't need Tarski to play around with the T-sentence rule, though. I think that's what you're doing.

I'm happy to be shown otherwise. — Banno

He has a pretty rigorous argument for indefinability. I think J wanted to see it too.

The point of misinformation in Russia is to have people just stop asking. It's like there's no truth anywhere.

Imagine that you're a character in a novel. All of a sudden you start commenting on the nature of the novel you're in, and how wonderful the author is. You're breaking the fourth wall and in a way it makes sense, but mostly it doesn't. You're using language that's relevant to the world you know, but you're talking about a world you can't know. It's like that.

We could explore Frege's argument for the undefinability of truth if you're interested. It shows an infinite regress opening up if we insist that truth is teachable.

An alternate but kindred argument would be:

1. In order to express or discern a proposition, you have to understand what it means.

2. Meaning is found in truth conditions.

Therefore, communication requires understanding truth. So it isn't teachable. You can't define it in the sense of explaining it to someone who doesn't already know what it means.

I think we often frame our interactions with the world as if we're communicating with it. For instance when we're seeking something, we imagine that there is some unexpressed proposition that specifies the location of the lost object: it's located at x.

This would be a way of explaining why we sometimes lift propositions out of the domain of human speech. Sometimes it's the world speaking. There's a sort of connection there between truth and being.

Didn't Frege believe truth is a concept that's too basic to define? It's just impossible to express a proposition without already understanding what truth is. There's no meta-cognition needed.

Unfortunately the crazy ones have convinced young people that there is no future for them. — Agree-to-Disagree

Eh, the world is always ending. We endure.