Wouldn't it be more a cause for wonderment if it created referential transparency?

Then the Superman of Lois' beliefs could be relied on to share all his properties with the actual fictional one? — bongo fury

It depends on how you explain belief. A behaviorist would say that what we call belief reduces to certain actions. Since Clark is Superman, we can substitute all day long, because there is no hidden object in Lois's head. There is no opaque reference. The behaviorist goes with the de re reading:

Normally, we understand such ascriptions in the way that does not, which is why we reject (2b), but if cajoled enough (“look, she does believe Clark can fly, she just wouldn’t say it like that”), we may switch to a reading that allows substitution. In the usual terminology, this is called the de re reading, contrasting with the more common de dicto reading, which disallows substitution. Other terminology for this reading is relational, contrasting with notional; transparent, contrasting with opaque; and wide scope, contrasting with narrow scope. We turn now to explaining what distinction these labels attempt to mark. — IEP

As I mentioned, it's been said that God is like a coffee cup. The handle is an analogy. The mind is the index finger. In other words, the mind can only grasp God in a limited way.

Analogy in the knowledge of the mysteries of faith. The Fathers of the Church always emphasized the inability of the human reason to discover or even to represent adequately the mysteries of faith, and insisted on the necessity of analogical conceptions in their representations and expressions. St. Thomas, after the Pseudo-Dionysius and Albertus Magnus, has given the theory of analogy so applied to the mysteries of faith. (Cf. St. Thomas, Summa, Theol., I, Q. i, a. 9; Q. xxii, a. 1; In Librum Boëthii De Trinitate Expositio.) The Vatican Council set forth the Catholic doctrine on the point. (Cf. Const., Dei Filius, cap. iv; cf. also Conc. Coloniense, 1860.) (1) Before Revelation, analogy is unable to discover the mysteries, since reason can know of God only what is manifested of Him and is in necessary causal relation with Him in created things. (2) In Revelation, analogy is necessary, since God cannot reveal the mysteries to men except through conceptions intelligible to the human mind, and therefore analogical. (3) After Revelation, analogy is useful to give us certain knowledge of the mysteries, either by comparison with natural things and truths, or by consideration of the mysteries in relation with one another and with the destiny of man.

Thanks for the response. I don't have anything to add.

But I’d ask for a small step back from you as well in some form of confession that your original post with it’s reference to lobotomies and belittling caricatures of Christianity might have been a factor in the hostility on the thread. — Fire Ologist

Sure. All cards on the table, the inspiration for the OP was the fact that there were two open threads attacking the OT, one on the basis that some of the folktales in it don't seem possible, and one complaining that the OT deity seems vengeful. I was like, did you guys think the NT makes sense? Because it doesn't.

As for whether I'm responsible for the hostility of others, that's a complicated question. Everybody gets stressed, and sometimes a certain attack is the last straw. Emotional immaturity takes over, and a counter-attack is inevitable. That aspect of humanity shows up at the heart of the message of Jesus. He was saying that you don't have to let other people control you in that way. You're free. When someone attacks you, just stop and see that they're just like you. Maybe they have taken on the last straw, and they're passing it on to you. Break the cycle. Stand up out of that web of grief and rage. You do it by the grace of God. You do it through love. One of the advantages of this is that when you drop your own rage, you can see people more clearly for who they are.

Bless those who persecute you; bless and do not curse. 15 Rejoice with those who rejoice, and weep with those who weep. 16 Be of the same mind toward one another. Do not set your mind on high things, but associate with the humble. Do not be wise in your own opinion.

17 Repay no one evil for evil. Have[e] regard for good things in the sight of all men. 18 If it is possible, as much as depends on you, live peaceably with all men. 19 Beloved, do not avenge yourselves, but rather give place to wrath; for it is written, “Vengeance is Mine, I will repay,” says the Lord. 20 Therefore

“If your enemy is hungry, feed him;
If he is thirsty, give him a drink;
For in so doing you will heap coals of fire on his head.”

21 Do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good. — Paul in Romans 12:14-21

Or, the frank-approved MSG version:

Don’t hit back; discover beauty in everyone. If you’ve got it in you, get along with everybody. Don’t insist on getting even; that’s not for you to do. “I’ll do the judging,” says God. “I’ll take care of it.”

20-21 Our Scriptures tell us that if you see your enemy hungry, go buy that person lunch, or if he’s thirsty, get him a drink. Your generosity will surprise him with goodness. Don’t let evil get the best of you; get the best of evil by doing good. — MSG version

@Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm curious if we can start over without hostility or mistrust. If you will, read the following from the New Advent Catholic Encyclopedia, and see if you can understand how a person would get the impression that the Catholic Church holds the Trinity to be beyond human understanding. There is definitely some ambiguity to the concept of mystery, and that's mentioned here. Mystery is not synonymous with incomprehensible. The very fact that they point this out demonstrates that some have taken the word to mean that, but it goes on to say that everything we know is incomprehensible if you dig deeply enough. So the Catholic Church does warn that the mystery at the foundation of all things is unknowable. On the one hand, a believer can be said to know the Trinity, because it has been revealed, but on the other hand, the Trinity is above finite intelligence. We can only grasp it by using analogies. We can't directly understand it.

In conformity with the usage of the inspired writers of the New Testament, theologians give the name mystery to revealed truths that surpass the powers of natural reason. Mystery, therefore, in its strict theological sense is not synonymous with the incomprehensible, since all that we know is incomprehensible, i.e., not adequately comprehensible as to its inner being; nor with the unknowable, since many things merely natural are accidentally unknowable, on account of their inaccessibility, e.g., things that are future, remote, or hidden. In its strict sense a mystery is a supernatural truth, one that of its very nature lies above the finite intelligence.

Theologians distinguish two classes of supernatural mysteries: the absolute (or theological) and the relative. An absolute mystery is a truth whose existence or possibility could not be discovered by a creature, and whose essence (inner substantial being) can be expressed by the finite mind only in terms of analogy, e.g., the Trinity. A relative mystery is a truth whose innermost nature alone (e.g., many of the Divine attributes), or whose existence alone (e.g., the positive ceremonial precepts of the Old Law), exceeds the natural knowing power of the creature.... — New Advent Catholic Encyclopedia

In this passage, there is an attempt to refute Christian Rationaists. Notice

The existence of supernatural mysteries is denied by Rationalists and semi-Rationalists. Rationalists object that mysteries are degrading to reason. Their favourite argument is based on the principle that no medium exists between the reasonable and the unreasonable, from which they conclude that the mysterious is opposed to reason (Bayle, Pfleiderer). This argumentation is fallacious, since it confounds incomprehensibility with inconceivableness, superiority to reason with contradiction. The mind of a creature cannot, indeed, grasp the inner nature of the mysterious truth, but it can express that truth by analogies; it cannot fully understand the coherence and agreement of all that is contained in a mystery of faith, but it can refute successfully the objections which would make a mystery consist of mutually repugnant elements. — New Advent

In other words, they're drawing a distinction between incomprehensibility and inconceivableness. At first glance, it doesn't seem that such a distinction is supportable. Don't these two words mean the same thing? When the topic is mystery, the answer is no. A mystery is incomprehensible, but not inconceivable. They're denying that the Trinity is a contradiction, but they admit that it's superior to reason. Another way to say that is that it is beyond reason.

I think it's probably the case that the reason the word "contradiction" is rejected is that this makes it sound like the Trinity is impossible. Though the "mind of a creature cannot, indeed, grasp the inner nature of the mysterious truth" knowledge is available through analogies. An analogy is like the handle on a coffee cup. Your mind is the index finger that holds the cup by as much as the finger can grasp.

Allow me to risk being idiotic, but perhaps part of the solution lies in thinking "Lois believes that Superman can fly" is not a property of Superman. It's a fact that you can say, but it's not a property as such.

Seems more like that statement is about a property of Lois lane — flannel jesus

Yes, I misspoke. Leibniz's Law gives us the expectation that we can substitute t1 and t2 in the Identity Elimination Schema (here)

The schema itself isn't an expression of Leibniz's Law.

I'm going to be examining an argument that says language is required for rationality. It's going to be rejecting the idea that dogs have beliefs, specifically because we have no way to be sure what they believe.

If referential opacity is drawn into the argument, which it is, then it's fair to tinker with the gears in that object.

You stipulated that she does. I trust you. If you now want to bring that in to doubt, go ahead, but I don't much see the point in doing so. — Banno

I don't think it's a stipulation in that context. We know what Lois believes because we know the story. It's from the narrator's point of view. That isn't available in real life.

Another angle on the same question would be: how do you ever know what other people believe? If it's charity, do you extend that charity to dogs? Why or why not?

How do you know Lois believes it?

Perhaps a slower reading of the article is called for? — Banno

True. Davidson uses referential opacity to make his case that language is required for rationality. So I was just contemplating the background of propositional attitudes.

In the example of Superman, we know what Lois believes because it's a fictional story and we have a God's eye view. That Lois believes Superman can fly is not a speculation, it's one of the central columns of the story. I'm thinking we'd want to keep that in mind when using referential opacity as an element of an argument. It's going to be dragging that God's eye view in with it.

Referential opacity occurs between contexts. Indeed, it can be considered part of what defines a context. Getting the scope right clears up the mess. — Banno

Look at this example.

a. Superman is Clark Kent. Major
b. Lois believes that Superman can fly. Minor
c. ∴ Lois believes that Clark Kent can fly. a, b =E — IEP

We aren't really worried about how we know what Lois believes, whether it was from observing her behavior, or she told us, or we have a mind-reading machine. We just know that she believes Superman can fly. There's a magical thing about belief: that it causes referential opacity.

But if we attribute propositional attitudes to a dog, do we still get referential opacity? We can't substitute a dog in the above =E because we aren't likely to just know specifically what the dog believes. We're just guessing from a afar, and so all our attributions will have extensional definitions, right?

a. The number of planets = 3 squared
b. It is contingent that the number of planets = 9
c. ∴ It is contingent that 3 squared = 9. — IEP

This substitution failure results from the fact that the number of planets isn't a rigid designator. It's a singular definite description.

I agree. But I would say that if my interlocutor had been Kierkegaard or Nietzsche or Heidegger or Plato, etc., a fairly fascinating discussion might have fallen out of the OP. None of them would have felt threatened by the question. They all would have listened to what I actually said instead of responding to demons in the ether. Or maybe that's just how those figures loom in my mind.

:grin:

A little more formally, the rule of inference =E can be stated as:

Identity Elimination Schema

Major: t1 = t2

Minor: ϕ(t1)

Conclusion: ϕ(t2)

Here t1 and t2 are expressions which refer to entities (for example, proper names of people or cities). ϕ(t1) is a sentence containing at least one occurrence of t1, and ϕ(t2) is a sentence that results from replacing at least one occurrence of t1 in ϕ(t1) with an occurrence of t2, eliminating the “=” of t1 = t2. Recurring ti presumes that ti is univocal throughout, and recurring ϕ presumes that the sentential context ϕ is not altered, syntactically or semantically, by the replacement. If these uniformity conditions are not met, then the inference scheme is being misapplied, and it is no wonder that false conclusions are derivable. For example, in the inference “The man behind Fred = the man in front of Bill; the man behind Fred saw him leave; therefore, the man in front of Bill saw him leave,” the context “saw him leave” is not uniform, since substitution of “the man behind Fred” by “the man in front of Bill” changes the reference of “him” (Fine 1989:222–3; Linsky 1967:104).

In discussing the problem with apparent substitution-failure by using =E, many examples will be drawn from the fictional story of Superman, treated as if it were true. In the story, a child from the planet Krypton, Kal-El, is sent to Earth, where physical conditions cause him to acquire superpowers. Wearing specific clothing (red cape, blue jumpsuit), Kal-El prevents disasters, rescues endangered innocents, and foils would-be perpetrators of crimes, such as Lex Luthor. People call Kal-El “Superman” when talking about Kal-El’s actions of this kind.

But Kal-El also takes a day job as a reporter, using the name “Clark Kent.” A coworker, Lois Lane, treats him with indifference in the office, but has a pronounced crush on, as she would put it, Superman, unaware they are the same individual.

The problematic examples discussed below involve ascriptions of mental states to Lois (or occasionally Lex), arrived at by applying the rule =E to the major premise “Superman is Clark” and a carefully chosen minor premise. Lois has a crush on Superman (minor premise), so, by =E, Lois has a crush on Clark. But this latter seems false, and would certainly be rejected by Lois herself. Also, Lois believes that Superman can fly, but does not seem to believe that Clark can; she hopes to see Superman again soon, but seems not much to care when she next sees Clark; she would like a date with Superman, but apparently has no interest in one with Clark; and so on — IEP

I agree that it's not my job to tell other people what kind of relationship they should have to religion, but somewhere short of actually getting offensive, challenging a belief can shed light. Maybe it doesn't shed light on strict philosophical issues, though. Maybe it's more about psychology.

Superman is not Clark Kent. — T Clark

He's not?

“The image of homo religiosus is that of a man who craves to flee from the concrete, empirical world and escape into the realm of eternal being.” — Hanover

This got me wondering if I'm homo religiosus or not. In my case, it's not that I crave to flee from the concrete, it's more that my homebase is in timelessness, but you can't live that way. You have to tune your psychic radio to the practical.

Are you homo religiosus?

Because unless it was asked with a humble spirit and the open mind of someone who is truly curious — Fire Ologist

I betcha I know more about Christianity than you do. Let's quiz each other and you have to answer without looking it up. You first.

But “self” is a mystery, no? Any discussion of this mystery is going to be full of contradictions, (because the concept of self-identity is perilous if not illusory and really not coherent and not a conversation about any “thing”.) — Fire Ologist

Yes. Kierkegaard said that faith is like floating in water that is 70,000 fathoms deep. Sometimes having faith in yourself defies all logic.

That wasn't very Christian, Timothy.

You cannot prove such a God since you cannot discuss it! — MoK

That would make it more difficult, yes. :razz:

According to Aquinas, God's essence is ineffable — MoK

It's ineffable, but it's totally logical?

What does?

So Augustine claims the Trinity is beyond human understanding. Which part did he think was incomprehensible?

Deep in our hearts, the light of God is shining
On a soundless sea with no shore
---- Rumi

Whoever wants to be saved should above all cling to the catholic faith. Whoever does not guard it whole and inviolable will doubtless perish eternally. Now this is the catholic faith: We worship one God in trinity and the Trinity in unity, neither confusing the persons nor dividing the divine being. For the Father is one person, the Son is another, and the Spirit is still another. But the deity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is one, equal in glory, coeternal in majesty. What the Father is, the Son is, and so is the Holy Spirit. Uncreated… infinite… eternal… And yet there are not three eternal beings, but one who is eternal… Almighty is the Father… And yet there are not three almighty beings, but one who is almighty. Thus the Father is God; the Son is God; the Holy Spirit is God: And yet there are not three gods, but one God….not three lords, but one Lord. As Christian truth compels us to acknowledge each distinct person as God and Lord, so catholic religion forbids us to say that there are three gods or lords. The Father was neither made nor created nor begotten; the Son was neither made nor created, but was alone begotten of the Father; the Spirit was neither made nor created, but is proceeding from the Father and the Son. Thus there is one Father, not three fathers; one Son, not three sons; one Holy Spirit, not three spirits. And in this Trinity, no one is before or after, greater or less than the other; but all three persons are in themselves, coeternal and coequal; and so we must worship the Trinity in unity and the one God in three persons. Whoever wants to be saved should think thus about the Trinity. (Anonymous Athanasian) — Athanasian Creed

You are falsely representing the Catholic Church by claiming that the Catholic Church holds that the doctrine of the Trinity is illogical. You have been misrepresenting the Catholic Church over and over throughout this thread, beginning with the very first post. — Leontiskos

I disagree.

I don't believe Augustine thought of the Trinity as something humans can understand.

Augustine’s goal is not so much to understand the Trinity and communicate this to others, but rather to say some things that will deliver a small shred of understanding, which may entice the reader to pursue the experience of God (434–7 [XV.6.50–1]). Because of this dim view of what humans are equipped to understand, much of the book is actually about how to talk about the Trinity, rather than about the Trinity itself. We may at least confess the correct doctrine, even if only later we come to understand what we’ve been saying. — SEP

Augustine suggests that the standard creedal term “person” (Greek: hypostasis or prosopon; Latin: persona) is adopted simply so that something may be said in answer to the question “What is God three of?” (224–30 [VII.3], 241 [VIII.1.1], 398 [XV.1.5]) The term “person”, he thinks, signifies a genus, but it is one for which we can provide no species. In contrast, “divine essence” names neither a genus nor a species, and functions somewhat like a mass-term. It is supposed to be one in the items which share it, and to make them, in some sense, numerically one (Cross 2007). — SEP

In other words, the tools used to deny contradiction, person and essence, didn't mean anything to Augustine, other than to draw the triangular schematic in words. It doesn't make sense to say it's three persons and one essence, and Augustine knew that.

So consider taking the Catholic Church at its word, and accepting that the Trinity is beyond comprehension. It's not logical. Does that really mean we have to rule it out? Think about it. — frank

Does anybody want to take a shot at this question? If it's illogical, does that mean it's impossible? Or would limiting the world to my own concepts be a kind of idealism?

I believe that what is logically impossible is impossible. — Leontiskos

That's what I thought. This is why you think drawing attention to the logic of the Trinity is an attack on Christianity: because you think if God is a trinity, and trinity is illogical, then God is impossible.

Folks around here routinely dismiss the law of non-contradiction, and therefore I don't see how they are going to manage to disprove the religious doctrine du jour with some firm and unchanging truth. — Leontiskos

I'm pretty sure @Banno doesn't care about disproving any religious doctrine. He's interested in the methods theologians use to reach their conclusions, but even that isn't a very strong interest for him. For the most part, @Banno couldn't care less. He's just good at creating interesting discussions.

So consider taking the Catholic Church at its word, and accepting that the Trinity is beyond comprehension. It's not logical. Does that really mean we have to rule it out? Think about it. :smile:

hasa diga eebowai! — flannel jesus

:lol:

The trinity is three entirely seperate personages, not a single entity. They have a common purpose, and they're referred to as the godhead. Such is true Christian theology. https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/comeuntochrist/article/do-latter-day-saints-believe-in-the-trinity

When you say "the Christian narrative" and then start going on about the Nicene Creed which was arrived at 325 years after Jesus' death, you're just taking about your peculiar brand of modified Christianity. — Hanover

This is me and Hanover riding around trying to convert people to Mormonism.

Is it really so odd to think that in the Source of all created being there is a reality that transcends the distinctions commonly found within created being? — Leontiskos

Do you believe that anything that defies logic is impossible?

This isn't an attack, it's setting out dogma, in it's original sense, and instead of saying "this is what you ought believe", asking "why ought you believe this?" — Banno

Right. There were versions of Christianity that didn't hold Jesus to be God, but they didn't survive.

As @Count Timothy von Icarus pointed out, it's heresy to suggest that God is a category that the three hypostases belong to, as dogs, cats, and mice belong to the category of mammals, rather, each hypostasis is fully God. They're separate, but they're One. The origin of this scheme is Neoplatonism, and it's mystical. It defies logic, and this has been recognized for the last 1600 years.

The doctrine of the Trinity was articulated by the church fathers in the councils of Nicea (AD 325) and Constantinople (AD 381), which penned the Nicene Creed. We will see that Nicene Trinitarianism teaches the Trinity is three hypostases and one ousia, terms often translated as three persons and one essence, substance, or being. These terms, in their ancient Greek context, indicate that the Trinity is three subjects who share a single nature. However, this formulation naturally raises the question whether Nicene Trinitarianism is monotheistic. In affirmation of Nicea’s monotheism, we will see that all three uses of the word “God” in Christian theology are singular, despite the Trinitarian plurality of subjects. Hence, Nicene Trinitarianism is rightly labeled monotheistic, even though it is a unique type of monotheism. We will then look at three important differences between God and creatures that must be kept in mind for a proper understanding of Nicene Trinitarianism. These are (1) the divine subjects are not spatially or materially separated the way created individuals are; (2) the divine subjects, unlike created individuals, are distinguished by their relations to one another and not by material accidents of size, color, or location; and (3) because the divine subjects are differentiated by their relations, they, unlike created individuals, have no autonomous existence apart from one another. — CRI

What's odd is that you think the crazy shit you're whipping up is a straightforward account of Catholic doctrine, but this has already been pointed out to you quite a few times. — Leontiskos

Set me straight then.

It's odd that you think a straightforward account of Catholic doctrine is an attack on Christianity. smh

frank said so. How could it not be true? — Leontiskos

Well, it is true.

Where are these premises coming from? I don't know of any Catholic theology which says, "Father = God and Son = God..." — Leontiskos

That's the Trinity, dude.