Right. Moral realists say statements about morality report facts.

The fact we're looking for here is not that people say X is wrong. The fact has to be that X is objectively wrong.

Who thinks this is realism? — hypericin

It's been explained repeatedly that in the context of this thread moral realism is more than truth aptness.

But aren't you alive because of antibiotics? I am.

Or even moral nihilism.
— frank

That is error theory? — Michael

Oh, I guess you're right. Error theory is that all talk of moral realism is in error, right?

I agree with that. It could be that error theory or moral subjectivism are correct. — Michael

Or even moral nihilism.

Are you saying that moral sentences aren't truth-apt or are you saying that moral sentences being truth-apt does not entail moral realism?

I'm not sure who would argue for the latter. Moral sentences being truth-apt also allows for error theory and moral subjectivism. — Michael

Moral statements being truth apt doesn't entail moral realism. If I hold that the truth predicate merely serves a social function, I can accept the truth aptness of moral oughts without any metaphysical implications. I may also reject scrutability of reference, so I don't think "ought" refers any more than any other word. This doesn't interfere with truth aptness.

My understanding of moral realism is that it is the theory that some moral propositions are true in such a way that if everyone believes that they are false then everyone is wrong.

Why can't a moral realist believe this and also be a deflationist? — Michael

A moral realist can believe that and be deflationist. The point is, she started out a moral realist. She did not arrive there by way of argumentation.

The argument in question (that moral statements are truth apt) just has no force to persuade. If you're a moral realist, it's probably because it fits your psychological makeup. There is no argument for it.

I'm going to repeat the two objections to the idea that value statements do not have truth value. — Banno

Nobody said moral statements aren't truth apt. The problem is that's doesn't lead to the moral realism as a conclusion if you're a deflationist.

At least they won’t be lonely. — NOS4A2

Nobody is ever truly alone. You have yourself.

you thought the experience of auditory inner monologue was a German thing? — flannel jesus

Well, I eventually decided that I would have heard of it if it was.

So you hear your own voice. — NOS4A2

The first person I met who had it all the time was German, and there's a German movie where you're hearing the inner voice of each person the camera travels over, so for a while I thought it might be a German thing.

"Regularly" have. I'm shocked it's not close to 100'/. tbh. Let's take an unscientific poll here. — Baden

I can if I want to. It's an odd sensation to turn it off and be aware that you're not letting it start again. It's like floating.

Honesty often makes you vulnerable. It takes some inner strength to embrace that vulnerability, and that's related to your values. For instance, if you've made a mistake and it could impact someone's well being, being honest shows that you care about others.

Sure, although I don't know how statements refer. — Michael

I don't either.

I think of moral realism as the thesis that moral propositions are truth-apt and (attempt to) refer to objective features of the world, and that some such propositions are true. — Michael

Moral anti-realists may also claim that moral statements are truth-apt, so what you have left to distinguish your take on moral realism is that it says moral statements refer to objective features of the world. If you agree to that, we can put the whole issue of truth to the side and just talk about how statements refer, right?

The proposition "Santa does not exist" is true because it corresponds to the state of affairs that Santa does not exist.

The proposition "1 + 1 = 2" is true because it corresponds to the state of affairs that 1 + 1 = 2.

The proposition "one ought not harm another" is true because it corresponds to the state of affairs that one ought not harm another.

I'm not exactly sure what it is you want. If you want to say that a statement is true only if it corresponds to some physical thing, then I would dispute that. Santa not existing and 1 + 1 equalling 2 are not physical things, and yet they definitely are the case. The moral realist will say that that one ought nor harm another is not a physical thing, and yet definitely is the case. — Michael

So we're dispensing with talk of the T-sentence and directions of fit, right? We're now directly addressing this argument for moral realism:

1. premise: Correspondence theory of truth
2. Moral statement M is true.
3. because of correspondence theory, M corresponds to a state of the world.
4. therefore, moral realism.

Do you agree with that? Correspondence theory is not rooted in physicalism. It was first expressed during the "age of essence" by Aristotle. It's blind to ontological commitments.

Edit: except that if you're a physicalist and you endorse correspondence theory, then for you, true statements are going to have to refer to physical things (or things that reduce to the physical.)

And the moral realist will say that it is a fact that one ought not harm another because what the proposition is referencing about reality is that one ought not harm another, and this is true. — Michael

I think what you need to carry this through to what is commonly imagined as moral realism is the correspondence theory of truth. Attempts to bypass that with talk of the T-sentence rule or directions of fit only obscure the issue because the T-sentence rule accommodates both realists and anti realists.

If you want to argue that because moral statement M is true, then moral realism, go ahead and advocate correspondence. That position has weaknesses, though

That sounds really interesting. It'll be cool to see what they come up with.

Engineering is not necessarily good preparation for such conceptual work. — Banno

I think the philosophy bug is something you're born with anyway. There are a number of philosophical problems in the realm of engineering. If engineers were prone to becoming stumped by them they wouldn't be able to work.

Interesting how much angst this simply issue causes folk. I supose it shows how deeply logical empiricism has seeped into the thinking of our engineers. — Banno

It sounds like you have an inferiority complex about engineering.

Or we could teach the new generation of palestinians how Israel is illegitimate — BitconnectCarlos

I think it's a sure bet that this will happen, and it doesn't appear that the US is going to tolerate Israeli occupation of Gaza. I don't believe Israel's position is as strong as you seem to think.

Yet as you said, usually there's that one disaster coordinator, and likely he or she has some other admin work too. — ssu

You shouldn't have more than one disaster coordinator. You need one voice in command.

But you did mention quite a lot of issues that make our society far more prepared to any other era. — ssu

Absolutely.

100% agree, but Banno thinks that moral facts do have a world-to-word direction of fit, and I am having a hard time getting them to explain (or perhaps I am just not grasping their explanation of) what that would even mean. — Bob Ross

I guess they're saying moral ought statements are true because we say they're true.

So has your hospital learnt as an organization something when the next lethal pandemic hits? — ssu

I don't think so. With this one, the pathogen was airborne. They gave maintenance the job of making every ICU room a negative-pressure room (to vent the virus out the window through a hepa filter.) This daunting job was done, and done really well, practically overnight. That demonstrates that the maintenance people had capable leadership and the commitment to excellence.

On the other hand, when it came time to start vaccinating the staff, I had to stand in line for four freakin' hours to get my dose. That shows that whoever was in charge of vaccinating was a moron, which was eventually admitted. It's not like War and Peace where no one is allowed to point out fuck-ups.

With Covid19 there was a huge amount that we learned in the first month. We radically changed strategies as people from around the world put their heads together about what worked and what didn't. It will be the same thing the next time around. We don't know exactly which supplies we'll need, what kind of transmission to plan for, and so on.

But it's not true that healthcare can't respond to emergencies. Every American hospital has a disaster coordinator and everybody knows what they're supposed to do if there's an industrial or weather disaster, or the ubiquitous mass shooting.

A true sentence is a statement that corresponds to reality: that’s a word-to-world direction of fit, not world-to-word — Bob Ross

Right. And word-to-world is what we'd need for moral realism. World-to-word moral truth would just be saying X is wrong because we say it's wrong. That's moral nihilism in a nutshell.

Unfortunately that may be or become too political. — ssu

I wasn't being political. I work in a hospital. I saw what happened.

Yes, Americans with their high hopes of being so independent and free will have debate long afterwards about this. — ssu

Probably not. Americans don't give a flip.

You see, even if covid would be as deadly as spanish flu, medicine has improved quite a lot in hundred years. — ssu

Covid pushed the American healthcare system a little beyond its capacity, in some places worse than in others, but everywhere, hospitals converted to focus almost exclusively on covid. There were supply shortages that affected every hospital, but in Texas, for instance, it was insane. Without the lockdowns, there just wouldn't have been any healthcare for a section of the sick population. They probably would have come to the emergency room and died in tents. So there probably wouldn't have been a whole lot of people dead in their front yards, but there would have been some.

But this view is compatible with platonism: we intuit the moral facts which are platonic forms. — Bob Ross

I think with most Neoplatonism, the divine intellect (of which the human intellect is supposed to be a reflection) is associated with goodness. Evil is just separation or distance from the Nous, sinking into matter. Goodness and truth are essentially the same thing, with evil being a kind of illusion. So you're right that in Neoplatonism one intuits the Good by virtue of the intellect.

But morality is often defined as some sort of code of behavior. It's rules. The Christian take on Neoplatonism isn't about rules. It's about love. "Love and do what you will" as Augustine said.

And the true feature of the world in this case is that A society of murderers cannot exist. They die out. — unenlightened

Given the destructive nature of humans, it does seem to some that human extinction would be a great good.

Ethical intuitionism & neo-platonism. — Bob Ross

How would an ethical intuitionist say moral truths exist? I'm somewhat familiar with Neoplatonism. Christianity absorbed it.

but there are non-theistic views (albeit probably still religious) which equally purport such claims and (I would say) with equal (if not more) plausibility. — Bob Ross

Like what?

I disagree. Both anti-realists and realists can attempt to understand why they became cannibals, and a moral anti-realist can condemn them as evil (if they want). — Bob Ross

Imagine there's a spectrum. On one end is the extreme moral realist view. On the other is the extreme anti-realist. Most of us swing between the two. When we want to understand the criminal, we put aside judgment in order to see the facts. When judgment is important, we become blind to circumstances that formed the sinner and we just condemn.

If you look closely at anyone who strongly believes in moral realism, you'll find a bit of a misanthropist. They're stuck on the realism side because their psyche is full of hatred and condemnation. The compulsion to condemn is so strong that they can't tolerate any notion of relativity. Or so it seems to me. :razz:

So they did so much damage because it was a surprise attack.

Oh I see...just playing devil's advocate, eh? What did you think of my responses? — Bob Ross

I wasn't playing devil's advocate. I was just saying that religion is the only legit moral realism. I think what you're saying is that religion doesn't provide for moral realism either. My point was that it does if it's your worldview.

For example, say we discover that Neanderthals did a fair amount of cannibalism (which they did). A moral realist will say this was immoral and our cousins should be condemned. Damn the Neanderthals for eating babies. It's in the nature of the universe that it was wrong and they should have known better. In fact, they would have known better if they had accepted Jesus as their lord and savior.

A moral anti-realist says Neanderthals aren't evil. Let's see if we can understand why they became cannibals. Was it climate change? Was it encroachment by those Homo Sapiens? What happened? And this is the grand payoff for moral anti-realism. It gives you space to understand. Moral realism gives you no such space. Understanding is the beginning of mercy and compassion, both of which are anathema to moral realism.

Ethical intuitionism is a form of moral realism, just like your theological view. — Bob Ross

I'm a moral nihilist. I think moral realism is an aspect of our cultural heritage, specifically religion.

Firstly, if the moral facts are in and of God’s nature, then God didn’t create them.If God didn’t create them, then there is something which is greater than God—which defies the standard Leibnizian definition of God being that which there is no greater being. Perhaps, to be fair, by “no greater being”, we are strictly talking about persons—but then, even in the case Christianity (and the like) are false then the greatest person is now (by definition) God. Irregardless, it seems (to me) to undermine God’s existence. — Bob Ross

Is there an argument for the bolded part? It sounds like you're saying that part of God is greater than God. That doesn't make much sense.

Secondly, if the moral facts are in and of God’s nature, then that warrants a (conceptual) exposition of (1) how they exist and (2) what they exactly are. To say “the moral facts are derived from God’s nature” just doesn’t cut it for me: how do I know those normative facts are morally signified? Is there a normative fact that one can derive subject-referencing norms from God’s nature? It seems, when one is faced with actually giving an explanation (of those moral facts in God’s nature), that they warrant an existence of their own...such as Platonic Forms. — Bob Ross

The idea is that moral facts exist as an aspect of God. This isn't an argument, by the way. It's a worldview. God is a hinge proposition. If you reject it, you reject moral realism.

hirdly, I don’t believe that the Bible, if granted as true, gives us any insight into how those alleged ‘moral’ facts that exist in God’s nature: it just describes various derived ‘moral’ facts which are predicated with “God’s nature is such that He is omnibenevolent”. — Bob Ross

Christianity uses the Bible as a touchstone. It's a living religion, so it doesn't reduce to scripture. It's made of history, the human psyche, and the lives of millions of people for the last 1800 years.

Interesting. Honestly, I find ethical intuitionism much more plausible than the Biblical moral realist account. — Bob Ross

Are you saying that ethical intuitionism is moral realism?

Again, your point, if there is one, is obtuse. — Banno

If you accept moral realism, it's not because of any argument. It's just built in to your assumptions about the world. There is no good argument for moral realism. That there are moral truths does not show moral realism. How many more words are necessary? :confused:

Good for them. — Banno

They say the same thing about realists. I mentioned this earlier. It's a matter of taste.

There are moral truths. — Banno

Deflationists agree.

Do we have to choose? Why not both, or either depending on what you are doing? — Banno

Sure. I don't think that flexibility gets us any closer to an argument for moral realism, though.

Well, there's a subtly here that I'm now not certain about -- between truths and facts, to give a name to the distinction, where truths might include more than features of the world or how it is and so can include statements like "One ought such and such", which then can be true, and understanding the difference between them and facts is through its direction-of-fit. But that doesn't disqualify them from being real, per se, because surely our actions and volitions are real? It only disqualifies them from being facts to the extent that we understand facts to only include statements with word-to-world direction of fit. — Moliere

I recently finished reading some Kripke and he used "fact" to refer to some detectable feature of the world. Sentences and utterances are definitely detectable. That someone assigned the property of truth to an uttered sentence is detectable. What does that mean, though? Is there supposed to be come correspondence between the so called true statement and the world? Or does truth just have a social function, as a deflationist might say?

At this point there's just going to be a rift between deflationists and truth realists. One doesn't have any force over the other. It just comes down to how far out on a limb of realism one wants to go, you know what I mean? It's along the lines of a matter of taste.