I aim to cause alarm, rather than playing 'abide with me' while the ship sinks. — unenlightened
Not to worry — some guy on the internet says everything will be fine!” — Mikie
There’s still the hothouse earth scenario, — Mikie
Listen to experts who study extinctions:
If I'm to say, what do I think is the biggest contributor to the potential for human extinction going towards the future? Then climate change, no doubt.
— Luke Kemp — Mikie
There’s very good reason to believe this could cause human extinction, — Mikie
So it is pretty bad, though not literally the end. — Manuel
Yes, and we can't predict, a-priori, how bad it will be on top of the already burning ocean, so it's a kind of Russian roulette. — Manuel
One of the advantages to anarchic organizing, like the conversational model I proposed, is that organizations don't outlive their use. — Moliere
It's just funny to me comparing the reality of anarchy with anarchists (endless communication and meetings and collective decision making) to the picture (propaganda of the deed, revolution, CHAOS). — Moliere
Living anarchically is a form of organization unto itself, and is usually more about who is going to wash the toilets and take care of the chickens and buy the groceries and distributing out the tasks in a collective manner. — Moliere
I’m not so sure of anarchism yet but I definitely wish to promote self-government and the rule of people over their own lives. The problem with democracy, from Plato onward, is that the state is always assumed in its realization. It might be that democracy is a one-to-one ratio with anarchy, hence why Plato and later conservatives thought it would lead invariably to some kind of anarchy. — NOS4A2
. Suppose a given institution remains democratic after a year, is that a falsification of the "Law"? Perhaps we shoudl wait ten years? If an institution remains democratic after a hundred years, do we consider the law falsified? Any institution that remains democratic is not a falsification, since it can be claimed that it still will become an oligarchy. Hence the supposed law is inherently unfalsifiable. — Banno
So putting it simply, even if we accept that there is a trend in democratic institutions towards centralisation of power, humans can choose to work against that trend. — Banno
The sphere of the utterance thus includes that which in every speech act, refers exclusively to its taking place, to its instance, independently and prior to what is said meant in it. — Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death, The Place of Negativity, pg 17
Pronouns and the other indicators of the utterance, before they designate real objects, indicate precisely that language takes place. In this way, still prior to the world of meaning, they permit the reference to the very event of language, the only context in which something can only be signified. — Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death, The Place of Negativity, pg 17
In the Second Replies, he adds:
"First of all, as soon as we think that we correctly perceive something, we are spontaneously convinced that it is true. Now if this conviction is so firm that it is impossible for us ever to have any reason for doubting what we are convinced of, then there are no further questions for us to ask: we have everything that we could reasonably want. … For the supposition which we are making here is of a conviction so firm that it is quite incapable of being destroyed; and such a conviction is clearly the same as the most perfect certainty. (AT 7:144f, CSM 2:103)
These passages (and others) suggest an account wherein doubt is the contrast of certainty.As my certainty increases, my doubt decreases; conversely, as my doubt increases, my certainty decreases. The requirement that knowledge is to be based in complete, or perfect certainty, thus amounts to requiring a complete inability to doubt one’s convictions – an utter indubitability. This conception of the relationship between certainty and doubt helps underwrite Descartes’ methodical emphasis on doubt, the so-called ‘method of doubt’ (discussed in Section 2). — SEP on Descartes' Epistemology
Perhaps what I now think about the wax indicates what its nature was all along. If that is right, then the wax was not the sweetness of the honey, the scent of the flowers, the whiteness, the shape, or the sound, but was rather a body that recently presented itself to me in those ways but now appears differently. But what exactly is this thing that I am now imagining? Well, if we take away whatever doesn’t belong to the wax (that is, everything that the wax could be without), what is left is merely something extended, flexible and changeable. What do ‘flexible’ and ‘changeable’ mean here? I can imaginatively picture this piece of wax changing from round to square, from square to triangular, and so on. But that isn’t what changeability is. In knowing that the wax is changeable I understand that it can go through endlessly many changes of that kind, far more than I can depict in my imagination; so it isn’t my imagination that gives me my grasp of the wax as flexible and changeable. Also, what does ‘extended’ mean? Is the wax’s extension also unknown? It increases if the wax melts, and increases again if it boils; the wax can be extended in many more ways (that is, with many more shapes) than I will ever bring before my imagination. I am forced to conclude that the nature of this piece of wax isn’t revealed by my imagination, but is perceived by the mind alone. (I am speaking of this particular piece of wax; the point is even clearer with regard to wax in general.) This wax that is perceived by the mind alone is, of course, the same wax that I see, touch, and picture in my imagination – in short the same wax I thought it to be from the start. But although my perception of it seemed to be a case of vision and touch and imagination, it isn’t so and it never was. Rather, it is purely a perception by the mind alone – formerly an imperfect and confused one, but now clear and distinct because I am now concentrating carefully on what the wax consists in. — Descartes, Second Meditation
See! With no effort I have reached the place where I wanted to be! I now know that even bodies are perceived not by the senses or by imagination but by the intellect alone, not through their being touched or seen but through their being understood; and this helps me to understand that I can perceive my own mind more easily and clearly than I can anything else. Since the grip of old opinions is hard to shake off, however, I want to pause and meditate for a while on this new knowledge of mine, fixing it more deeply in my memory. — Descartes, Second Meditation
Given that I read what I was going to read concerning Descartes "Rules for the Direction of Mind", I'll instead go directly to the Meditations, so as to be able to contribute more directly, instead of relying on memory. — Manuel
he does not start to prove the existence of the self, but to “prove” anything, to be certain in any regard. He has merely retreated to here. — Antony Nickles
You see how strange it is that knowledge is innumerable and that there are people who know more? — Moliere
If you know what you're looking for, inquiry is unnecessary. If you don't know what you're looking for, inquiry is impossible
In comparison to the set of real numbers is it a bigger or smaller infinite? — Moliere
It could be that knowledge is innumerable, which I suspect, but then how do we get to comparing people who have more or less? — Moliere
It isn’t enough merely to have noticed this, though; I must make an effort to remember it. My old familiar opinions keep coming back, and against my will they capture my belief. It is as though they had a right to a place in my belief-system as a result of long occupation and the law of custom. It is true that these habitual opinions of mine are highly probable; although they are in a sense doubtful, as I have shown, it is more reasonable to believe than to deny them. But if I go on viewing them in that light I shall never get out of the habit of confidently assenting to them. To conquer that habit, therefore, I had better switch right around and pretend (for a while) that these former opinions of mine are utterly false and imaginary. I shall do this until I have something to counter-balance the weight of old opinion, and the distorting influence of habit no longer prevents me from judging correctly. However far I go in my distrustful attitude, no actual harm will come of it, because my project won’t affect how I act, but only how I go about acquiring knowledge.
So I shall suppose that some malicious, powerful, cunning demon has done all he can to deceive me – rather than this being done by God, who is supremely good and the source of truth. I shall think that the sky, the air, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds and all external things are merely dreams that the demon has contrived as traps for my judgment. I shall consider myself as having no hands or eyes, or flesh, or blood or senses, but as having falsely believed that I had all these things. I shall stubbornly persist in this train of thought; and even if I can’t learn any truth, I shall at least do what I can do, which is to be on my guard against accepting any falsehoods, so that the deceiver – however powerful and cunning he may be – will be unable to affect me in the slightest. This will be hard work, though, and a kind of laziness pulls me back into my old ways.
Like a prisoner who dreams that he is free, starts to suspect that it is merely a dream, and wants to go on dreaming rather than waking up, so I am content to slide back into my old opinions; I fear being shaken out of them because I am afraid that my peaceful sleep may be followed by hard labour when I wake, and that I shall have to struggle not in the light but in the imprisoning darkness of the problems I have raised." — Descartes, First Meditation
I think that is the key, in the end. Rather than wasting time devising a collectivist system that ought to deliver the rule of the people (an absurdity, as Michels shows), which in practice is oligarchy, the people just need to go rule themselves. — NOS4A2
Exactly right. Democracy is only achievable outside of representational government. And I do not think we need to go backwards in order to remove the shackles of another’s rule. In the meantime I guess we can pretend it is democracy, protect our “democratic institutions”, and go on as if we’re not serfs for the time being. — NOS4A2
“It was a tenet of the old aristocracy that to disobey the orders of the monarch was to sin against God. In modern democracy it is held that no one may disobey the orders of the oligarchs, for in so doing the people sin against themselves, defying their own will spontaneously transferred by them to their representatives, and thus infringing democratic principle. — NOS4A2
Religion certainly served pragmatic functions in many societies. It can serve to legitimize the state (e.g., the deification of Roman emperors), it can act as a check on absolutist states (e.g., Saint Ambrose forcing Emperor Theodosius to wear penitent's robes and undergo chastisement after the massacre at Thessalonica), it can act as a legal arbiter (e.g., Saint Augustine mentions much of his time being sucked up by arbitrating property disputes, estates, etc.), it can help solve collective action problems when pushing for reforms (e.g., the central role of churches in the US Civil Rights Movement, and earlier, the Abolitionist movement), and it can help provide public goods in low capacity states (e.g., churches were the main source of welfare programs and education for the lower classes in Europe for over a millennia).
Civil society organizations and the state can also provide these goods. What makes religion and philosophy unique is their ability to give people a narrative about the meaning and purpose of life, an explanation of their inner lives and the natural world.
This is something religion aims at, but also philosophy, and the two can be quite close in this respect. A world view based on Nietzschean overcoming requires that the world be valueless and meaningless for the human to become great by triumphing over this apparent emptiness. A world where man is essentially evil and always on the verge of extinction is required for the somber rationalists to triumph over the immanent disasters by building a just structure in the world despite the opposition of the legions of the selfish. Marxism also is able to offer a religious-like, all encompassing vision of the purpose of human life, one which also ends in salvation.
This is ultimately where I think the instinct to hold on to and defend dogmas comes from. They become like blocks in an arch, kick them out and the edifice collapses. — Count Timothy von Icarus
However, I have for many years been sure that there is an all-powerful God who made me to be the sort of creature that I am. How do I know that he hasn’t brought it about that there is no earth, no sky, nothing that takes up space, no shape, no size, no place, while making sure that all these things appear to me to exist? Anyway, I sometimes think that others go wrong even when they think they have the most perfect knowledge; so how do I know that I myself don’t go wrong every time I add two and three or count the sides of a square? Well, you might say·, God would not let me be deceived like that, because he is said to be supremely good. But, I reply, if God’s goodness would stop him from letting me be deceived all the time, you would expect it to stop him from allowing me to be deceived even occasionally; yet clearly I sometimes am deceived.
Some people would deny the existence of such a powerful God rather than believe that everything else is uncertain. Let us grant them – for purposes of argument – that there is no God, and theology is fiction. On their view, then, I am a product of fate or chance or a long chain of causes and effects. But the less powerful they make my original cause, the more likely it is that I am so imperfect as to be deceived all the time – because deception and error seem to be imperfections. Having no answer to these arguments, I am driven back to the position that doubts can properly be raised about any of my former beliefs. I don’t reach this conclusion in a flippant or casual manner, but on the basis of powerful and well thought-out reasons. So in future, if I want to discover any certainty, I must withhold my assent from these former beliefs just as carefully as I withhold it from obvious falsehoods. — Descartes, First Meditation
Nice pick on the Gnossiennes. More romantic and less modern in a weird way, in comparison to the more popular Gymnopedies, which I love as well. Both equally great to my ear. — Noble Dust
You for some reason reminded me of this underrated and very unknown English composer of the time: — Noble Dust
What a brilliant piece of reasoning! As if I were not a man who sleeps at night and often has all the same experiences while asleep as madmen do when awake – indeed sometimes even more improbable ones. Often in my dreams I am convinced of just such familiar events – that I am sitting by the fire in my dressing-gown – when in fact I am lying undressed in bed! Yet right now my eyes are certainly wide open when I look at this piece of paper; I shake my head and it isn’t asleep; when I rub one hand against the other, I do it deliberately and know what I am doing. This wouldn’t all happen with such clarity to someone asleep.
"Indeed! As if I didn’t remember other occasions when I have been tricked by exactly similar thoughts while asleep! As I think about this more carefully, I realize that there is never any reliable way of distinguishing being awake from being asleep.
"This discovery makes me feel dizzy, which itself reinforces the notion that I may be asleep! Suppose then that I am dreaming – it isn’t true that I, with my eyes open, am moving my head and stretching out my hands. Suppose, indeed that I don’t even have hands or any body at all." — Descartes, First Meditation
Still, it has to be admitted that the visions that come in sleep are like paintings: they must have been made as copies of real things; so at least these general kinds of things – eyes, head, hands and the body as a whole – must be real and not imaginary. For even when painters try to depict sirens and satyrs with the most extraordinary bodies, they simply jumble up the limbs of different kinds of real animals, rather than inventing natures that are entirely new. If they do succeed in thinking up something completely fictitious and unreal – not remotely like anything ever seen before – at least the colours used in the picture must be real. Similarly, although these general kinds of things – eyes, head, hands and so on – could be imaginary, there is no denying that certain even simpler and more universal kinds of things are real. These are the elements out of which we make all our mental images of things – the true and also the false ones.
These simpler and more universal kinds include body, and extension; the shape of extended things; their quantity, size and number; the places things can be in, the time through which they can last, and so on.
So it seems reasonable to conclude that physics, astronomy, medicine, and all other sciences dealing with things that have complex structures are doubtful; while arithmetic, geometry and other studies of the simplest and most general things – whether they really exist in nature or not – contain something certain and indubitable. For whether I am awake or asleep, two plus three makes five, and a square has only four sides. It seems impossible to suspect that such obvious truths might be false. — Descartes, First Meditation
