Unfortunately, if we do not at some point figure out how to manage an equitable redistribution of wealth and educate enough people to ensure it stays redistributed, hard economic realities dictate that there will be a vicious clash between "those who have literally nothing left to lose" and "those who stole the basic necessities of life from everyone else". — Pantagruel

But hasn't that happened over and over? In order to equitably redistribute wealth, a revolution would be required. Once the revolution is under way, there's a portion of the population already making their way to positions of power.

It's cyclic.

Probably this is due to a failure to recognize the true extent of the proletariat and a wish to belong to the sphere of the elite — Pantagruel

And egalitarianism is the club we use to kill the elite so we can take their place. :up:

Power is so intoxicating for some that they will hold on to it until they die. — ssu

Exactly. But they couldn't succeed if the population at large didn't want to be led, right?

Would it be easier if we accept our determinism and destiny? — javi2541997

Yes. I didn't mean to be expressing angst, though. It's just a thought that occurred to me about why the ideal of egalitarianism never seems to get far. It's not that our wills are being thwarted by greedy evil doers, it's that we naturally gravitate toward hierarchy and there are those who actively seek to turn events to their favors instead of waiting patiently for human spirit to manifest itself or whatever.

Would you rather be a rich pig or a poor horse?

"Latinx" is not even a word in Spanish. — javi2541997

Neither is ouisqui or junque. South Americans and Spaniards are so haughty about Tex Mex, but as Dr Frankenfurter explained, "We didn't make it for you!"

I think she's just saying that people who haven't read many philosophy books are likely to be more certain about various things.

frank
Oooh... the omnipotent American President and the godly powers that he has to fix things in the World. Or create every problem there is or has been. Right? :smirk: — ssu

Pretty much, yeah. :cool:

Depends on who wins the US presidential election in 2024, right?

read a lot of history of philosophy -- Copleston's and others as well as articles in various dictionaries, compendia and companions. — Dfpolis

I see.

I have heard of it, but not read Hegel, or been inclined to. I do not see him as an influence. — Dfpolis

Where did you hear of it, if you don't mind my asking?

This is a familiar idea. A number of philosophers have expressed the same sentiment. Like Hegel?
— frank
I'm pretty ignorant of 19th c. German philosophy. — Dfpolis

So you've never heard of the idea of starting with a unity that is subsequently divided into opposites?

am starting with the experience of knowing, in which things and thinking are united. The Fundamental Abstraction takes this unity, divides it, and fixes on things to the exclusion of thought. — Dfpolis

This is a familiar idea. A number of philosophers have expressed the same sentiment. Like Hegel?

:up:

Sure. Look to context to understand usage.

I was talking about the OP's article.

↪frank
You are dodging the challenge to your challenge in relation to reduction in regard to you saying, "whether a theory of consciousness is possible." — Paine

Sorry, I don't know what you're talking about.

Why does it have no bearing when the question of what can be reduced to a function is the center of both enquiries? — Paine

Function can be reduced (explained) by neuroscience. This is Chalmers' "easy problem."

Neuroscience has been pretty successful here.

That article is behind a paywall. One of the theories mentioned in the abstract is IIT. Chalmers has offered his thoughts about the pros and cons of that approach, specifically what he thinks it would need to accomplish it's goal. At present, it's only a broad outline. I'm failing to see what point you're trying to make.

Yes. How do you see that against the background of the essay presented by DF Polis? — Paine

His article argues that functionality can't be explained by examining the physiology of the CNS. Whether or not this is true has no bearing in whether a theory of consciousness is possible.

Both, I guess. He has not presented a theory to explain consciousness, but he is saying there could be one.

Isn't that what is being sought after or abandoned as a hopeless cause? — Paine

There are those who argue that a theory of consciousness isn't possible. Chalmers believes it is possible.

Yes. Are you posting that to agree or disagree with me?

Right, he does not have a scientific theory, that is, one that has stood the test of time. — Fooloso4

He's never proposed to have a scientific theory of consciousness. One would have to be almost completely ignorant of his work to think otherwise.

If you mean he declares it true then you are right, but he does endorse it in the sense of give support to it. — Fooloso4

He's arguing that it should be on the table in our quest for a theory of consciousness. He has also praised Dennett's ingenuity as the type of creative mindset we'll need to begin creating a theory. In other words, he doesn't think there is any viable theory of consciousness at this time. Therefore, there is none to endorse.

Toward this end, I propose that conscious experience be considered a fundamental feature, irreducible to anything more basic.

Yes. Again, this is what he thinks is required in order to lay the groundwork for a theory of consciousness. It isn't a theory in itself. You've misunderstood his intent if you thought so.

I have.

How can it be said the meaning is a property of the expression—its use, its context, its syntax, its content, its whatever—if Y could not derive from it its meaning, and if Z has not expressed anything? — NOS4A2

Some would identity meaning as an abstract object called a proposition.

I utter sentence S in order to express proposition P.

P isn't a property. It's an object in its own right. This approach has the advantage of starting the analysis from where we are instead of trying to build up to it from a location we can't occupy.

There's very little difference across the filters. Even Continental Europe scores 75% realist, 7% idealist. — Banno

Since the alternative appears to be some sort of solipsism, I think you'd get the same answer if you had a time machine and could go back through the history of the human race.

Chalmers doesn't endorse any particular theory of consciousness.

You're right. I was just taking the "lean toward" as being less than committed.

Setting the filters to all responses and all regions the percentage of respondents who endorsed realism exclusively was 76.37, hence only 1.5% endorsed realism and some other option. — Banno

Are you sure you're reading that correctly? Some chose "accept or lean toward" exclusively, some chose it inclusive of something else.

But I understand these are merely short quotations, though there seem to be quite a few along these lines. They strike me as a bit gloomy. But I don't mean to characterize all of his work. — Ciceronianus

Sure. Beware of people who are all clowns and balloons. There's likely something hiding in the shadows there.

And as I pointed out above, of greater significance is the fifty percent who would not commit to one of skepticism, idealism or realism. — Banno

In the article the majority voted for "accept or lean toward ". Lack of commitment is perfectly acceptable in a good philosopher.

Declaring the failure of reductionism seems premature. — Fooloso4

Could be. I think the prevailing view in philosophy of mind is non-reductive physicalism due to multiple realizability (there's no way to match up x-mental state to y-physical state).

know little about that VERY Melancholy Dane, Kierkegaard, but he seems more a theologian or commentator/apologist for religion than a philosopher. — Ciceronianus

He wasn't melancholy. He had a fearsome, biting wit, and his works are energized.

His most famous works are about identity.

:up:

I thought it was really cool of you to share it.

I just am not certain what part is completely external and what isn't. Quite hard to tease apart. — Manuel

:up:

It's fun to give the psyche it's own location, like it's in another dimension or something, but that dividing line isn't present in the content of experience.

Well, as portrayed by Aristophanes — Ciceronianus

He's hilarious. It's weird thinking of people being that funny so long ago.

before we became devotees of angst. — Ciceronianus

I see you're a big fan of Euripides. Because of all the angst in his plays. I'm being sarcastic. But in a friendly way.

In old-fashioned psychological terms, one needs to establish an unproblematically robust ego first, before considering a philosophy that negates or transcends it. — unenlightened

I can see that, and I agree. I've always admired people who have unproblematically robust egos. I'm not on a journey to get one of those, though. There's just no way to get there.

The brutal coldness of behaviorism and eliminativism is basically the same thing as the death of God. Waking up to a pile of myths in a world of floods and holocausts.

Remember that book that said the ego is the part of you that thinks you're all alone? For humanity, the death of god is the first step into the bright light of the human Ego. In eliminativism, the light goes out.

It occurs to me that a person with a strong ego may not be aware of the cold darkness because they're walking around with a hat with a bright spot light on it, illuminating the world with Nietzsche's anathema: hope. Thus the Marxism.