Whatever you're going on about, it has nothing to do with the hard problem.

You have fallen prey to the Who gives a shit logical fallacy. — T Clark

:lol: You said a mouthful, Cuz!

:blush: I just worked 52 hours in the last four days due to the little triple pandemic of COVID, flu, and RSV knocking out our department. What's your excuse, Skippy?

Hope you're doing well!
— frank

Well, thanks! (although one of the reasons I had stopped posting for six months was because of this debate, I am continually mystified as to why people can't see through Dennett.) — Wayfarer

Dennett has a minority viewpoint. Don't sweat it. :grin:

There's been very little discussion of the actual issue. — Wayfarer

True. It's good to see you. Hope you're doing well!

I just don't see what the big deal is. I think it's just one more case, perhaps the only one left, where people can scratch and claw to hold onto the idea that people are somehow exceptional. — T Clark

Since Chalmers imagines that once we have a working theory of consciousness, we'll be able to predict what it's like to be a bee, this clearly has nothing to do with human exceptionalism.

Chalmers is one of the most influential philosophers of our time. Seems like you'd be more interested to discover what his views actually are.

He's not suggesting that information processing gives rise to subjectivity. He's point out that it's two different things. There's functional consciousness such as seeing, and there's the experience of seeing.

Computers can see and process visual information. There's no accompanying awareness, though. Providing a scientific explanation for the experience that accompanies function: that's the hard problem.

Isn't this what they call the hard problem - How does manipulating information turn into our experience of the world? The touch, taste, sight, sound, smell? — T Clark

No.

. After all, what is it that is "extended"? — Constance

That's what we want to know. Chalmers is a good start if you're interested in the philosophy behind developing a scientific theory of consciousness. He explains the difference between functional consciousness (the easy problem) and phenomenal consciousness (the hard problem.). He's very well versed in theory of mind and the amazing success science has had so far in explaining functionality.

agree. Objects such as lecterns cannot exist in the world independently of their properties, as objects in the world are no more than the set of their properties. — RussellA

You're pushing Hume's bundle theory. Fine. Kripke isn't saying that objects exist independently of their properties. That would just be ridiculous.

Chalmers proposes that things like neutral monism or the extended mind would help us get closer to a theory of consciousness. He's flexible. But strictly speaking, he's part of the analytical tradition, so the physicalism you're speaking of is not essential to analytical philosophy.

I proposed that if in this actual world, all the properties of Hesperus disappeared, then Hesperus would also disappear. — RussellA

Since an object with no properties is beyond imagination, it's not so much that Hesperus would disappear as that we're no longer talking about a possible (or the actual) world. We would just talking nonsense.

This is not what Kripke intended by specifying rigid designators. He was just adjusting some old assumptions about necessity to allow for our use of hypotheticals.

So Banno and MU on the same thread are double trouble — Metaphysician Undercover

Yep. :scream:

: S knows P is the issue. One cannot disentangle P from justification, and it really looks like P and the justification are the same thing — Constance

The beginning of a theory of consciousness would just start with guessing at what kind of system could produce the experience of gazing straight ahead, being aware of sights and sounds in a seamless unity.

I think you're focusing more on the philosophy of propositions?

Then, working with a physical model seems hopeless. I actually suspect that the brain does not produce conscious experience, but rather conditions it. Experience exceeds the physical delimitations of the physical object, the brain. Call it spirit?? — Constance

You're basically describing the hard problem, the point of which is that science needs to grow conceptually in order to have the tools to create a theory of consciousness.

I don't debate MU, and I don't debate you, for pretty much the same reason.

I'll respond when you're inserting your own garbage in Kripke's mouth, for the reason I mentioned.

It wasn't for your benefit. It was in case someone reading along was thrown by your bizarre interpretation. I was confirming that you're intentionally veering from Kripke's thinking and inserting your own untenable views.

That's right. It's what some call an explication. — Banno

I agree that you have some reading comprehension issues.

order for science to do this, there must be in place at least some working concept of epistemic relations that is grounded in observational discovery. I can't imagine. — Constance

Integrated information theory is a stab at creating a theory grounded in direct experience. It's a beginning.

In the case of the demonstrative, "This lectern might not have been wood" can be understood in two ways. On the one account, this wooden lectern might have ben replaced by some other lectern, which was not made of wood. On the other account, this very wooden lectern might not be made of wood, and an inconsistency occurs, since we would have a wooden lectern that was not made of wood. — Banno

That's not what he said.

So the first is the better option. The demonstrative rigidly designates the lectern. — Banno

No, it doesn't. As he explains in the passage you quoted, it doesn't even make sense to say the lectern could have been made of ice. It's not even imaginable.

But as regards Banno, I would ask you if you think that his thinking is significantly removed from the vicinity of Davidson and Anscombe, who he admires, and who are certainly not naive realists. — Joshs

I don't know. Probably doesn't matter.

You said unit.

Wait a minute. You didn't understand Kripke when we started. Why are you trying to assign shit?

Banno may or may not be emotionally attached to naive realism and uses his intellect to find ways to ignore challenges to it and deny others the right to entertain those challenges. His strategy is to somehow use language as a foundation while simultaneously denying that foundationalism of any kind is appropriate. Thus he can't really allow any ineffable components because that screws with his foundation.

Josh's foundation is some sort of ever evolving change. Where Banno abhors privacy in a sort of neurotic way, Josh abhors stasis. And this is the central conflict. Josh needs part of the world to always be slightly out of reach, unknown, unexplained, etc. He needs an open window for his foundation of Becoming, so he's fond of the ineffable.

The rest is really kind of ad hoc.

:razz:

The thing about a lifeworld which allows someone in it to cotton onto a rule in one of its discursive practices.

Then generalise that to an arbitrary judgement, perception or practical activity. What it is about (the relationship between us, the world, and what we make of it) that lets us cotton onto it and renders it cotton-on-able.

And keep that it's "shown in the doing". Showing is the giving that makes given-ness. — fdrake

This makes as much sense forwards as backwards.

Can you explain the long term consequences of this war?

A = A is central to Leibniz's project, although I've dropped a lot of that in the bit bucket apparently.

take him here to be saying that the argument (1-4) applies when a and b are proper names and F a property. — Banno

Yes, you're right.

Didn't Kripke mention Leibniz's law? Although I've thought A=A was Leibniz's law since I read a book about him. Don't know how I got that confused.

A=A is the Principle of Identity. — Banno

Oh. I thought that was Leibniz's law.

is not Leibniz's Law. — Banno

(2) is Leibniz's law: A = A.

The necessity we're talking about is with regard to the truth of statements. Some statements are necessarily true, some are contingently true.

Note that I won't debate this with you. It's explained by Kripke in the essay, and that's the scope of his interests.

Would you call someone who had almost no use for formal logic , and thought ‘ truth’ was a confused idea an analytic philosopher? — Joshs

If someone described truth as a confused idea, I'd say they're not any kind of philosopher. Want to start a thread on it?

Rorty is just an ontological anti-realist. There's a whole spectrum of that including various hard and soft options. It's all analytical philosophy, though. If you want to read an article about it, it will be an analytical philosopher you're reading. Nothing particularly reformed about it, I don't think.

What does "if two objects have all the same properties, they are in fact necessarily one and the same" add to "if two objects have all the same properties, they are in fact one and the same" — RussellA

I'd say necessity is implicit in Leibniz's law. He's just making it explicit because he's about to challenge the notion that apriori=necessary, and aposteriori=contingent. He's going to show that there can be a statement that is known aposteriori, but is necessarily true.

You're asking what earth shattering consequences follow from Leibniz's law. Kripke is just setting the stage to show off a contradiction. That's all. Keep going.

If x and y are identical, that means x and y are two different names for the same object.

Like say John's nickname is Tweezer.

x is John
y is Tweezer

now plug that into the argument.

We can say what we like, and define what we like, and while that will change how we talk about things that won't change whatever "stuff" is. — Moliere

He makes the point that what we're doing is epistemology. It's about truth.

But given that it is not made of ice, it is necessarily not made of ice. — Banno

Correct. Not being made of ice is an essential property of the lectern. The basic idea here generalizes.

Wow!