Seems there is still something that bothers me and I had to continue a bit further...
All of the following thoughts are based on a distinction between two different standpoints from which we evaluate the personal identity. On the one hand we can be looking at the persons we compare from the side as a third person, and on the other we can compare persons from within the subject's point of view. This distinction, of course, I did not contrive myself, I saw it mentioned by Mr. Simon Blackburn in his book for introduction to Philosophy "Think", in the very section dedicated to "the brave officer" argument. I did not pay enough attention to it the first time when I read it, and it's only after the
@Cuthbert's insertion of "[my]" in his previous reply, when I (maybe) truly grasped it. In fact I only hope that I understood it, and it is quite possible that all of the following thoughts are plain wrong. But I have no other way to test that, except to post it all here and to wait for your judgements.
So, there it is:
I think the personal identity, as defined by Mr. Locke, regarded as a relation, has different properties when applied from the two different standpoints, mentioned above. Precisely, when we apply it from third person standpoint, then the relation is transitive, and when we apply it from the subject's standpoint, then it is not transitive. Therefore, I think, we have to consider them as two different relations.
For clarity and brevity only, in the following propositions I'll call the comparison which we apply as third person observers "impersonal sameness (of a rational being)", and the other one "self sameness (of a rational being)". For clarity again, when two persons A and B have "impersonal sameness", I will say that "A is the same person as B", and when they have "self sameness", I will say that "B identifies itself with A".
So, first, to claim "impersonal sameness" between A and B, in Mr. Locke's terms, we as objective third person observers need to know that the contents of their consciousnesses are the same. From this we can safely conclude, that "impersonal sameness" is a transitive relation, i. e. from "A is the same person as B" and "B is the same person as C", it follows that "A is the same person as C". In this case Mr. Reid's conclusion "that the general is the same person with him who was flogged at school" (i.e. "A is the same person as C") could be valid, if his previous conclusion "that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general" (i.e. "B is the same person as C") was also valid. But "B is the same person as C" is not valid here, because as third person observers, we objectively see that B's consciousness is not the same as C's, for the former is aware of the flogging and the latter is not.
So when we regard the personal identity as "impersonal sameness", it seems that "the brave officer" argument cannot be valid.
Second, to claim "self sameness" between A and B, in Mr. Locke's terms again, we have to look from B's point of view, as a subject, and see that she/he/they are conscious of A's thoughts and actions (regardless of the contents of A's consciousness). In this case, when we regard the personal identity strictly as "self sameness", Mr. Reid's conclusion "that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general" (i.e. "B is the same person as C") is valid. Although, I think, it would be more precise to put it as "he who was made a general identifies himself with him who took the standard" (i.e. "C identifies itself with B"). Alas, when comparing from the subject's point of view, we cannot jump freely to the next of Mr. Reid's conclusions "that the general is the same person with him who was flogged at school" (i.e. "A is the same person as C"), because the personal identity, when regarded as "self sameness", does not posses the property of transitivity. This can be proved by reducing to absurdity like this:
Let's suppose all the things that are supposed in "the brave officer" argument, also let's regard the personal identity as "self sameness", and let's suppose that it is a transitive relation. That would mean that if the soldier can identify himself with the flogged boy, and the general can identify himself with the soldier, then the general will be able to identify himself with the flogged boy. But that is a contradiction, because the general "had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging". Therefore the "self sameness" is not a transitive relation.
So when we regard the personal identity as "self sameness", it seems that one of the suppressed premises in "the brave officer" argument, precisely that the relation is transitive, is untrue.
It seems to me, that the only way in which "the brave officer" argument looks valid is when we are inconsistent in our standpoint and the two different personal identity relations are mixed in the same inference process.
That was it.
What do you think of it?