Hello stressyandmessy! Thanks for sharing your argument. I am going to do my best to lay it out in standard form.

If Pascal's Wager shows that not believing in God is something to fear, then people who believe in God because of Pascal's Wager believe in God for the wrong reasons (fear).
Pascal's Wager shows that not believing in God is something to fear.
Therefore, people who believe in God because of Pascal's Wager believe in God for the wrong reasons (fear).

This argument is valid, yet I do not believe it is sound. Premise 1 seems incorrect. To start, fear is only part of what Pascal's Wager shows. You laid out the four scenarios that Pascal's Wager reveals. (The scenarios are below this paragraph for reference.) It is true that if you believe in God because of 2, then you probably believe in him out of fear. (Scenarios 3 and 4 give reason to not believe in God.) However, if you choose to believe in God because of scenario 1, you do not believe in God because of fear but because of hope. Perhaps, it is a matter of perspective. Let's say the net value of believing in God is 5, and the net value of not believing in God is 1. I should choose the Net value of 5 either way, but I can choose 5 because it is the better option or because 1 is a worse option. Both are true, but the first reason is because you want to experience net value 5 whereas the second reason is to avoid net value 1. In the case of Pascal's Wager, choosing to believe in God so that you can go to heaven is hope-based, whereas choosing to believe in God to avoid hell is fear-based. For these reasons, Pascal's Wager can show that not believing in God is something to fear, yet people who believe in God because of Pascal's Wager do not always believe in God for the wrong reasons (fear). Therefore, premise 1 is false.

1. If God exists and the person believes in God they will go to heaven and receive infinite pleasure.
2. If God exists and the person does not believe in God they will go to hell and suffer infinitely.
3. If God does not exist and the person believes in God they have some disadvantages in life because they are restricted to a certain life.
4. If God does not exist and the person believes in God then they do not have to live a restricted life.

Hi Makayla,

First off, thank you for sharing.

You made some excellent points; however, I have a few objections. My first aims at the validity of the argument. You claimed, “One would never inflict unnecessary suffering upon someone they loved.” However, the word ‘unnecessary’ is not used any other time you use the word suffering. As a result, I find it safe to assume that you mean both necessary and unnecessary suffering when you speak of suffering in the other premises. If that is the case, I can say: one would inflict necessary suffering upon a person they love. At this point, I can conclude that there is no contradiction between God simultaneously loving humans and causing them to suffer. As a result of these concerns, the conclusion that Christianity is false does not follow. I do think, however, your argument can be adjusted. Here is my proposal.

If Christianity is true, then God loves everybody.
If God allows unnecessary suffering, then God does not love everybody.
God allows unnecessary suffering.
God does not love everybody. (MP 2,3)
Therefore, Christianity is false. (MT 1, 4)

This argument has the same conclusion; however, it explicitly asserts that God allows unnecessary suffering rather than any suffering. Another way to adjust the argument is by simply removing the word unnecessary from premises 2 and 3. The question you have to ask yourself is this: Can one inflict necessary suffering on a person they love? If the answer is yes, you need the word unnecessary in premises 2 and 3; if the answer is no, you can remove the word unnecessary. I encourage you to keep the unnecessary, and I will explain why. Premise 2 of that argument would say If God allows suffering, then God does not love everybody. I give the objection that God can allow necessary suffering and still love people. To start, it seems that if something is needed then it should be allowed and in fact obligatory. Necessary in this sense means required to contribute or sustain overall goodness. When one loves another person, they want to contribute and maintain their overall goodness. If there was a case where a person must suffer to sustain or contribute to overall goodness, then a person who loves that person should allow them to suffer. For example, if an alcoholic is suffering major withdrawals, the suffering will contribute to overall goodness in that person's life. It follows that a person who loves the alcoholic should not give them more alcohol but rather allow them to suffer so they can live a better life. God acts in this way as well; he allows people to suffer because it is necessary for promoting their flourishment. For these reasons, I think it is best to include the word unnecessary in your premises. However, that begs the question of whether or not God does allow unnecessary suffering or if all suffering leads to promoting our goodness? I will leave you with that question to ponder.

Hi Agent Smith,

I think your argument can be laid out like so.

1. If the most powerful person, the most knowledgeable person, the most moral person exist, and they can form a triumvirate, then a relative God exists.
2. The most powerful person, the most knowledgeable person, and the most moral person exist, and they can form a triumvirate.
3. Therefore, a relative God exists. (MP 1,2)

While this is a valid argument, I do not think it is sound. Premise 1 especially seems objectionable. God's intentions and actions are good, and therefore a relative God's intentions and actions must also aim at goodness. Just because a triumvirate includes the most moral person in the world does not mean the actions and intentions of the triumvirate will be moral. The difference is that God's qualities- omnibenevolence, omniscience, omnipotence- are cohesive. What I mean is that they are always in agreement with one another, and therefore the intentions and actions of God are always good. The specific two qualities that must agree are morality and power. If they disagree, then the triumvirate will still act evilly. Take the following example. Say, Albert Einstein, Mother Teressa, and Hitler all existed simultaneously. Let's say they were respectively the most knowledgeable, moral, and powerful people in the world. If the three created a triumvirate, they would be considered the relative God. However, Mother Teressa and Hitler are likely not in agreement on actions to take. Because Hitler is the most powerful person in the world, he has the power to override Mother Teressa's desires. As a result, Hitler will act in an immoral way. These actions go wildly against the nature of God, making the triumvirate far from a relative God.

I think an adjustment could be made to the argument, specifically to premise one. You could either change it to:
1. If the most powerful moral person, the most knowledgeable person, the most moral person exist, and they can form a triumvirate, then a relative God exists.
Or,
2. If the most powerful person, the most knowledgeable person, the most moral person exist, and the moral and powerful person agree and they can form a triumvirate, then a relative God exists.

These adjustments to your argument ensure that the powerful person will aim to act morally, meaning the triumvirate can aim at good just as God does.