Yes it is circular. It's a self-referential definition, as I described. And that's a huge problem for the concept of "rights" in general. The definition of any specific right is always having to be reinterpreted because of that circularity. It's not a rigorous definition because every time that it reflects back on itself in an unwanted way, the definition has to be adjusted to the situation. This is why it's not a real definition, it is intentionally allowed to be adaptable because a rigid definition would run into problems. — Metaphysician Undercover

Self reference does not, in-itself make for circularity. Eg, the moral relativist might coherently say that there are no objective normative truths and no objective metaethical truths except this one. That references itself but is clearly not circular. Likewise, it isn't circular to say that one's freedom of movement does not include blocking someone else in such that they cannot move. Especially given that other people's choices are not the extent of what defines what choices belong to a person.

Dan, you continue with the very same trickery, to turn things around. Anger is the consequence here, not the cause. The question is whether a choice which causes another person emotional distress is one's own choice. I believe that causing another person emotional distress, such as anger, is just as morally relevant as causing another person to lose one's property, through theft. In fact, I would go even further, to state that I believe that the reason why things like theft are morally relevant, is because they cause emotional distress. If theft did not cause emotional distress, no one would care about it, and it would not be designated as bad.

I am starting to think that you are being ridiculous. Instead of listening to the problems of your ill-fated theory, you have gone into denial about its problems, and are now resorting to trickery in an attempt to get around the problems. — Metaphysician Undercover

You haven't raised problems, you have raised misunderstandings. You might well be right that people migth not think theft was bad if it did not cause emotional distress, but they would be wrong. What is wrong would still be wrong even if all the world thought it right.

Also, you were the one who brought up anger causing immoral actions. I was simply pointing out that this isn't so. That isn't a dodge, that is addressing another thing you said.

This is blatantly incorrect. When I choose to say something to you, this is a choice of what to do with you. When I engage you in this way I am anticipating a response. The act of engagement is not about itself, it concerns the eliciting of a response. The intent of the act is to get a response from you, therefore it is "a choice of what to do with you". This is even more evident in my example of education, which you seem intent on ignoring. "To educate" is what you do to another. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, no it isn't. You don't do things "with me". You say some words and you might well hope for a response, but I might also walk on past. Unless you're chasing me down and tying me up, you haven't decided what to do with me.

Your principles are arbitrary. You assign greater moral value to a person's property than you assign to a person's mental well-being. Stealing a person's property is "morally relevant", but causing a person emotional distress is not "morally relevant". Not only are your principles arbitrary, they are completely backward from accepted moral philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

They are not aribitrary, they are based on the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. It is certainly true that I am going against accepted moral philosophy but accepted moral philosophy is wrong.

No, this makes no sense at all, for the reasons explained above. One's emotional well-being, and mental stability is of the highest value. Therefore emotional distress is a consequence which is of the highest degree of relevance to determining the morality of an action. As I said above, the reason why stealing one's property is morally bad is not because it leaves you without a specific object, it is because it causes emotional distress. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you actually mean it doesn't make sense in that you don't understand, or do you just not agree?

That is not the issue. "One's own choice" is defined as a choice concerning what to do with one's own mind, body, and property. It is not defined as a choice which does not prevent someone else from making one's own choice. The latter is not a definition, it is a fallacy of a "circular definition", a self-referential definition. And I've already explained to you why the choice to steal your car is just as much a choice concerning my own mind, body, and property, as are the choices which lead to beating another in a competition.

Anyway, I explained to you how hurting another emotionally may lead to anger, or other feelings which could result in an attack on the person, or some other vengeful activity. So I do not think you have any argument there — Metaphysician Undercover

First, it isn't circular to suggest that the limits of rights (or freedoms) should be where they abut upon those same rights (or freedoms) of another.

Second, anger doesn't "result" in attacks on other people, or other vengeful activity. People are morally responsible for their actions even when angry. Anger doesn't "make" people act violently, they choose to.

Again, you misrepresent the issue. It is not a matter of whether teaching a person "reduces someone's ability to understand and make their own choices", it is a question of whether the decision to teach a person is a choice about one's own mind, body, and property. Clearly, the choice to teach a person is just as much a choice concerning someone else's mind, as the choice to steal a car is a choice concerning someone else's property. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you choose to say something on the street corner, that thing might affect me, but it is a choice of what to do with yourself, not what to do with me. If you steal my car, it is a choice of what to do with my stuff. As I said before, whether someone is affected by your choice is not the appropriate measure of whether that choice is yours to make or not. Certainly, if they were affected in a morally relevant way (by which I meant their ability to understand and make their own choices were reduced/protected/etc) then that would affect whether it was morally justifiable to make that choice whether or not it was yours (though the choice whether to steal my car or not is pretty clearly not yours).

Sure, there are other options, like making an arbitrary distinction like you have, which as I explained, has principles weighted by your personal preferences. You think for example, that stealing a person's car has more moral significance than educating a person does. I think it is very clear that the opposite is true. Stealing a person's car has a one time, flash-in-the-pan effect on the person, which is very minimal in the scale of a person's lifetime, but educating a person has a lifelong effect on the person. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have not made an arbitrary distinction, but a principled one.

I spent a long time, at the beginning of this thread, trying to explain to you how any choice which a person makes limits that person's options, therefore restricting the person's freedom. Now you seem to be starting to understand, expressing how another person's choice may limit one's freedom. To fully understand this principle you need to recognize that a person's own choice limits one's freedom even more than the choice of another does. — Metaphysician Undercover

All of that is incorrect. A person's freedom (their ability to understand and make their own choices) is violated when those choices are made for them against their will (such as my choice to have my arm broken or not). It is not violated/restricted/reduced if I choose to break my own arm. In this second case, my freedom is exercised.

Oh sure, earlier you refused to distinguish between the choice, and the action which follows from the choice. Now, when it serves your purpose, you separate the act from the choice, to say that emotional distress does not contribute to the goodness or badness of the consequences of an "act". However, it is simply trickery, sophistry, to dismiss emotional distress in this way. Anger clearly contributes to the choices a person makes, producing consequences which are bad, bad actions. Therefore it has moral value in relation to choices. I am surprised that a person of your intelligence level would resort to such a sneaky trick, just to try and support a failing theory. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's no trick here. Again, I think you have misunderstood. Actions (or choices if you prefer), in any consequentialist framework, are judged by their consequences. What I am saying is that emotional distress is not a consequence which is relevant to determining the morality of an action (or choice). Does that make sense?

As for anger, it might contribute to someone making a bad choice. It might also contribute to someone making a good choice. Either way, the anger itself is not morally valuable. The consequences of that choice (or action, if you prefer) are what make it good or bad. Specifically, whether it protects or violates the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices.

As the examples we've discussed demonstrate, your goal is to impose a very arbitrary, and not at all well defined distinction between different types of "effects on others". Based on this ill-define distinction, you say that some types of choices belong to a person (are one's own), and other types of choices do not belong to the person (are not one's own). Your claim, that these "limits" are "pretty clear", is blatantly false. As evident from the examples, the proposed limit is arbitrary and weighted to your personal preferences. For example, when I damage your property (steal your car) this is weighted towards "not a choice which belongs to me", but when you damage my ego (beat me in a competition), this is weighted towards "a choice which belongs to you". — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you really want me to explain why stealing my car prevents me from being able to make choices about what to do with my stuff, but beating me in a competition does not, or are you just being facetious?

Please refer back to our earlier discussions about how education, and the establishing of habits of thinking, is a means by which people exercise considerable influence over the minds of others. The effects which education has are very significant, therefore choices made to educate others ought not be classed as one's own choice. Furthermore, any time that a person asks another for assistance, this would not be based in one's own choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

But just like when you said this the first time, you're just wrong that habits and education reduces someone's ability to understand and make their own choices (though miseducation of the kind that leads to people not understanding their own choices would obviously be morally relevant).

The issue is, that since we live in a communal world, then once we start to apply your proposed principle of distinction in a consistent way, we end up with very few choices which are actually "one's own". This leaves the question of why do you want to protect the ability to make such choices. How are such choices at all valuable? — Metaphysician Undercover

You aren't simply applying it in a consistent way, you are insisting on applying it either in such a way that our own choices can't affect others at all or in which any choice that you make with your own mind (which is presumably all of them) are your own choices. These are not the only options, and neither is one I would endorse.

You appear to be totally neglectful, and ignorant of the temporal nature of choices, which was discussed earlier. Choices relate to future possibilities, we must consider the past as determined. After you've had a bone broken, you cannot choose not to have it broken. You can wish that it did not happen, but such wishes must be separated out from, and dismissed as irrelevant to, the decision making process of a healthy mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's a few issues here. First, what choices one has access to and what choices one ought to have access to are not the same thing. Second, the choice is taken from me in the moment of arm breaking. It's no use saying that I don't have the choice once you've taken it from me, that is precisely the problem.

In Christian ethics, the separating of the past, from decisions toward the future, is very important, and this manifests in the confession/forgiveness process. "Jesus died for our sins" is a proposition which allows us to separate ourselves from the mistakes of the past, and move forward with a clear conscience. — Metaphysician Undercover

Christian ethics also relies on supernatural entities which almost certainly don't exist, human sacrifice, and eternal punishment, often for "crimes" which harm no one, so you'll excuse me if I don't take my cues from that.

Like the beginning of your post, this at the end, is also blatantly false. Emotional distress is of immense moral importance. Anger for example is a contributing factor to a vast array of immoral acts. The angry person may act in a vengeful way, and this would mark a turning from making "one's own choices", toward choices which do not belong to the person ( even by your standards). Therefore it would be very foolish to dismiss emotional distress as not morally relevant. For example, if I injured you (broke a bone in the other example) this may send you into a condition of emotional distress (anger), and even though you maintain the ability to understand and make your own choices, you start to make choices which do not belong to you (revenge). — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, we are getting into trouble because I am saying that the emotional distress is not morally relevant in the sense that it does not have moral value or disvalue that contributes to the consequences of an action being good or bad, are you are reading that as saying something else. Hopefully I have cleared up that misunderstanding.

I have explained why the choices to be protected should be restricted to one's own choices. I don't think it is vague to say you get to decide what to do with your own mind, body, and property. I think the limits of that (eg, your mind, body and property, not mine) are pretty clear.

You breaking my bone very much affects my ability to understand and make choices about my own body, such as whether I want my bones broken. You causing me emotional distress by, say, revealing a secret I would prefer stay hidden, does not. It is not my choice to make to keep the secret hidden. Pain is kind of a weird one, and one I discuss in my thesis somewhat but I'm not sure I ever perfectly nailed. It's a relatively minor issue though. Emotional distress, on the other hand, just isn't in itself morally relevant. If someone is made sad, or happy, it doesn't matter morally. What matters is whether they are able to understand and make their own choices.

The choice to have ones organs crushed (as in your example of being hit my a car) belongs to me, and by taking the ability to make that away from me, you have acted wrongly. The choice to not lose a contest does not belong to you, so I have not taken your ability to make choice away from you. A choice can indeed affect others while still being one's own choice. Because these are your own choices, mostly these won't affect someone in a morally relevant way, (though it is possible that they could and then there would be a genuine moral conflict). You being unhappy about losing a competition is not morally relevant because your happiness is not morally relevant. Only your ability to understand and make your own choices. Winning the competition was not your choice to make, and me beating you in it certainly would not constitute me taking away your ability to make your own choices.

I really do not understand what you could possibly mean by "higher moral value" here. Perhaps you could explain. Suppose I\m watching the approach of a tornado. I see that it misses all the houses in the neighbourhood, and rips through a forest instead. You say that there is moral value in this situation. Can you explain what you mean? Is it because the tornado could have killed people, but didn't? I could have got hit by a bus yesterday, but didn't. Does that mean there is moral value in the consequences of the bus not hitting me? Does any situation which can be judged as either negative or positive have moral value? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, in the sense that it has higher moral value than some other set of consequences that could have occurred. Consequentialism is all about judging the consequences of actions by their moral value in order to determine if that action is right/wrong/permissible/etc. You can't judge the "actions" of the tornado, because it isn't a moral agent, but you can certainly say that the set of consequences which has occurred is morally better (more moral value is realized) than the set of consequences which would have occurred were it not for the tornado changing its direction.

But the example does not concern your ability to make your own decisions, it concerns the question of whether deciding to use your car in this situation is a choice which belongs to me or not.

Or, are you now distinguishing whether a choice belongs to me or not, by how it affects others' ability to make their own choices? That's what it appears like. If my choice doesn't restrict your ability to make your own choices, then the choice belongs to me. That would be very problematic. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. When I said that me giving consent to allow you to borrow the car makes it morally permissible to do so, that is not me saying that it makes it a decision which belongs to you. The use of my car is a decision that belongs to me, because it's my car. Which is what I said previously. I then made an offhand remark about the difference between borrowing and stealing a car, and how this is due to the difference in whether my ability to understand and make my own choices is restricted/violated or simply exercised. These are seperate points.

Again, it appears like you are defining "one's own choice" in relation to whether the choice restricts the ability of others to make their own choices. This would lead to an infinite regress without ever determining what it means to make one's own choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not accurate to say that is how I am defining one's own choices.

Sure, but in order for this principle to have any meaning, and to be able to be brought to bear on any real situations, we need to know what "their own choices" means. First you said that these are choices which concern one's own mind, body, and property. Then you allowed that in some situations, such as consent or agreement, choices concerning another's mind. body, or property also belong to the person. Now you seem to be saying that so long as the choice doesn't restrict another's capacity to make one's own choice, then the choice is one's own choice. This gets me no closer toward understanding what you mean by one's own choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

I did not say the second and am not saying the third. The choices which belong to a person are the ones concerning what to do with one's own mind, body, and property. I did not say, and do not think, that in cases such as consent or agreement, choices concerning another's mind, body, or property belong to anyone other than that person.

OK, so we've gone around a big circle. Let me get back to the issue as it was then. In general, choices which are judged as morally good, are not choices which belong to the person at all, if this means concerning one's own mind, body, or property. This is because morally good choices are about the mind, body, and property of others. So, how do you justify wanting to protect choices which belong to the person? And please, don't go off on a tangent again, speaking about how choices which belong to the person may affect the body or property of another in an accidental way, because the morally good acts, which we want to consider, are when we intentionally act in a good way. Why have a principle which promotes protecting the ability to make one's own choices, when a much better principle would be to protect the ability to make morally good choices. Neither of these principles is about protecting freedom of choice, so that idea is just a ruse anyway. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure what you mean by "morally good" choices here. I am presenting a theory of what morally good choices are, specifically the ones that protect the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. I have posited that this is the best candidate for a measure of moral value because it is applicable to all persons and bases moral value on the very features that make us moral agents in the first place.

Also, it is about freedom, specifically the freedom to make your own choices. That is not in any way a ruse.

This example is not comparable. Pushing the kid is an intentional act, whether or not the intent is to kill the kid. Since it is an intentional act, the perpetrator is held accountable. If it was done as a joke, and the possibility of death was completely unforeseen, then the punishment would likely be less than if it was a planned murder. Regardless, the joke and the murder are both intentional acts. In you other example, the tornado does not act intentionally, so the consequences of its activities are not judged for moral value.

If this is what you really believe, that the consequences of inanimate activities can be judged for moral value, then it constitutes a significant difference of opinion between you and I. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean yeah, those consequences can still be judged for moral value in the sense that they can be consequences that are morally good. It doesn't make sense to say the tornado "acted" rightly, but the consequences that occur, the situation which results, has higher moral value than what would have occurred in the situation where the tornado destroyed your house.

See, your principle of "a choice which belongs to the person" is exactly as I say, based in moral judgement. When the choice is to do something "morally permissible" with another's body or property, then it qualifies as "my own choice". When the choice is to do something not "morally permissible with another's body or property, then it does not qualify as "my own choice". Therefore, just like I told you earlier, your goal to protect persons' ability to understand and make their own choices, is not a goal of protecting freedom at all, it is a goal of protecting moral restraint, i.e., to choose only what is "morally permissible". — Metaphysician Undercover

That doesn't follow at all from what I said. My ability to understand and make my own decisions isn't restricted by me freely making a decision to allow you to use my car. Rather, it is exercised.

This is not true. You now admit to allowing that choices of what to do with another's body or property also qualify as choices which belong to you. This consists of things like a shared game, consensual sex, using borrowed property, etc.. It seems like so long as the choice is to do something morally permissible, it is one's own choice. So it is becoming more and more clear that your principle is not to protect the ability of people to understand and make their own choices (to protect some sort of freedom), but to protect the ability to understand and make choices which are morally acceptable (some sort of moral restraint). — Metaphysician Undercover

That is neither what I said nor what I meant. Consenting to sex is a choice that belongs to you, but having it is not (in the sense that if no one is keen to participate in that activity with you, your ability to understand and make your choices has not been restricted.

No, I was a little surprised that a theory which claims to protect one's freedom of choice, is really a theory which only supports morally permissible choices. I'm not too surprised now, because I brought this to your attention, at the beginning of our engagement. I thought I'd give you a chance to explain yourself though, but we're not getting anywhere. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is a theory of what choices are morally permissible, but that all flows from whether those choices protect or violate the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. Making their own choices is (usually) morally permissible, but not all morally permissible choices are choices which belong to the person making them.

You aren't saying the same thing though. Before, you said that choices which belong to a person are choices concerning one's own mind body and property. You continue to assert that, but your examples show clearly that choices concerning the mind, body, and property of others are also choices which belong to the person. This appears like inconsistency, but it's not necessarily. If we surmise that your principle is really "the ability to understand and make choices which are morally permissible", rather that "the ability to understand and make one's own choices", then the appearance of inconsistency is resolved. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you are reading things I'm not writing. You seem to be finding additional meaning between my words that I'm not putting there and, I submit, isn't there at all. For example, I haven't said that choices concerning the mind, body, and property of others belong to the person at all. I think if you'll look back over those examples, you will find I didn't make that claim and didn't use those words. I certainly talked about choices involving the minds, bodies, and properties, of others, such as when those choices might be morally permissible and when they might not be. I also talked about things like sex, in which I said that the choice that belongs to you was to consent to such an act, but that the choice to have it with someone (in the sense mentioned above in this post) was not yours. It is not yours specifically because it requires the body of another person. This inconsistency isn't between my views, it is between what I am writing and what you are reading it to mean.

We have a deep difference as to what constitutes "morally valuable" In my understanding, what provides moral value to the consequences of an act is the intent of the conscious agent. If you remove the necessity of intent, then choice is only relevant in an accidental way. This would make it very difficult to justify your principle that choice is the best measure of value. If we can produce morally good results without making choices, why should we protect the ability to make choices? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the moral value in the consequences does not require intent. This is very much the point of consequentialism. Whether you meant to push the kid out of the way of the bus or whether you just thought it would be funny to push a child over, the consequences are just as good. I've already explained why I think we should use the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices as the measure of value, and that reason wasn't because intent is necessary to result in good consequences.

As I said, all decisions to act, or do anything at all, are choices about what to do with one's own mind, body, or property. That someone else's property might also be involved is accidental. This includes my decision to steal your car, as an example you said was not a choice which belongs to me. It now appears to be a choice which belongs to me because I am using my own body and tools. However, now you insist that stealing is not a choice which belongs to me because there is no consent. You really have provided absolutely no principles to distinguish between a choice which belongs to a person, and one which does not. — Metaphysician Undercover

It isn't a choice which belongs to you because it is the choice of what to do with my car. It doesn't "accidentally" involve my car as you put it. It is precisely about what happens to my car, specifically whether I keep it in front of my house or you take it and sell it for scrap metal. It's not that complicated.

You simply introduce these terms, "consent", "agree", and you act as if whatever it is which is referred to by them magically converts a choice which appears to be one which does not belong to a person into one which does. We are talking about the ability of a person to understand and make one's own decisions. How does you giving me consent to borrow your car, affect that ability of mine, in relation to my choice to use your car without your consent? You are making no sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

Consent doesn't "covert" the choice from belonging to one person to belonging to another. In the example given, the consent is the relevant choice to participate in a game or contest. What you have quoted there doesn't include anything about consent and cars. That being said, if you did obtain my consent to use my car, then that would make the use of my car morally permissible because I have made the choice that you can use it and it is my car, so you haven't taken my ability to understand and make those choices which belong to me away from me through your use of it (which you would have in the case where you stole it)

You have not been clear at all. First, you insisted that "one's own choice" was a very special sort of choice, such that if I chose to steal your car this is not my own choice because it was a choice which involves your property. Now you insist that all choices I make which involve my own mind, body and property are my own, even if they involve your body or property as well. This implies that any choice I make, to do anything at all, including stealing your car, is my own choice, because it involves doing something with my own body and mind. But now you've arbitrarily added a constraint, "consent", or "agree", as if this makes a difference. How many other arbitrary constraints are you going to add, to mold and shape this concept "one's own choice", to suit your purposes? Will you make a new exception every time a situation comes up which your principles cannot deal with? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't insist that. The choices which belong to you are the choices of what to do with your mind, body, and property. That doesn't mean that because you murdering something "involves" using your body, it is your choice to make. Whether or not your murder someone isn't choosing what you do with your own body, but with theirs (and their mind).

Sorry, are you really surprised that in a theory that focuses on the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices, that what those persons agree or consent to is relevant to what it is morally acceptable to do to them?

I haven't been making exceptions, I have been attempting to quash the strange ways you have interpreted my theory. But it is like playing whack-a-mole. I keep trying to clarify the same points and you keep intepreting that as me claiming something different and often bizarre. Without wanting to sound like too much of a jerk, I think if you look over our previous conversations with the assumption that I have been saying the same thing the whole time, they would make more sense to you.

When judging the consequences of an action, you can say they are good or bad in a moral sense there something morally valuable being increased/decreased/promoted/protected/restricted/violated. The tornado wasn't "right" to turn away, but the outcome was good.

I haven't changed my mind at all. All of these choices are choices about what to do with the mind, body, and property of the person making them, not that of others. What you seem to be missing is that choices about what to do with one's own mind, body, and property can affect the interests of others without in any way restricting their ability to understand and make choices regarding their own minds, bodies, and property. This isn't a different definition. I have been saying the same thing the whole time, and it is the same thing you will find in the primer you read or sources referenced in it that explain this in greater depth.

That was not my definition, that was how you incorrectly interpretted my definition. The choice to steal a car isn't yours because the car isn't yours. The choice of what to do with my car is mine because the car is mine. The choice to play a game with me isn't per se yours, but the choice to agree to play a game with me, to play games with those who will play them with you, is yours because it is a choice of what to do with your own mind and body (maybe property depending on the game). If I don't want to play, like in the case of you taking my car, you don't get to make that choice for me. But if we are both choosing to participate in the game, we are both making choices about what we do with our own minds and bodies, and that's no problem.

Again, it's always been the same definition. You just seem to be having trouble grasping it. I feel like I've been pretty clear, so I must wonder if it is in some way intentional.

I am not "admitting" anything, let alone "finally" given that all of this was in the thesis that I referenced in the initial primer. What I am arguing for is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. That is limited in the sense that it only concerns persons' own choices, not all choices, but that isn't even slightly the same as "moral restraint". It is very much freedom.

You keep talking about which choices are morally acceptable as if that is something we can know in advance, but the whole of a normative theory is to determine what choices/actions are morally acceptable (and unacceptable, obligatory, supererogatory, etc). It is fair to say that choices which are not morally acceptable shouldn't be protected, but what determines whether a choice is morally acceptable is down to its effect on the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices.

I disagree. The moral value is in the act itself. Consequentialism measures the act by the outcome, but it does not place the moral value in the results of the act. The outcome is judged as an indication of the intent. The tornado has no intent, there is no moral value in the outcome of its activities. The "good" in not having the house destroyed is a different sense of good, like "good fortune". This sense of "good" is judged by a scale other than a moral scale. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it is a good outcome in the sense of a morally good outcome. One we should aim to acheive. If we could have turned the tornado, we should have. Consequentialism tends to derive the right (the morally right action to perform) from the good (the thing which has value), so while it isn't right that the tornado didn't destroy your house because that implies moral agency, it is good.

We were not talking about restricting choices, we were talking about the type of choice, the ability to make which, deserves protection; one's own choices. I asked you why the ability to make these choices merits protection. If the choices concern only what belongs to the person, then what good are they? The tornado example is clearly not relevant. Also, in your other example, choices concerning a contest are not one's own choices, by your definition. A contest concerns others, so this means that the choices are not one's own, and that example is no good either. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, I understand what you are taking issue with now, but you're just wrong. My choosing to enter those contests that will have me is a choice that belongs to me. There are a bunch of choices like this, such as choosing to have sexual intercourse with someone. The whole thing isn't one person's choice, but each person chooses to consent to such an act and this choice belongs to them. Entering contests is not much different. You don't get to choose to enter a contest that won't have you, but you can choose to sign up, to do your best to win, etc.

Again, my point with the contest analogy was that choices that belong to me (or you, or anyone) can indeed affect others, and that's not a problem. If I own a piece of art that I have on display, but one day decide to destroy it instead, that affects others, but it is still my choice to make. Your claim that choices that belong to a person can't affect others is just wrong from the off.

I mean, I think we are likely to get tied in knots with this since you still seem unclear on what I am saying, but fine, I'll say something about why the ability to understand and make our own choices is the best candidate for moral value. I'm not going to go over everything, but I'll give what I think is the best reason:

If we assume that morality applies to all free, rational agents, then it seems that what we want is a measure of moral value that applies to all free, rational agents. The ability to understand and make choices fits this bill, as it essentially the ability to exercise one's free will, rationality, and, in a sense, agency. If we don't include measures which make up part of this one (such as just being able to understand choices), then it is essentially the only measure of value which applies to all moral agents, possible as well as actual.

As for why it should be constrained to their own choices, rather than any choices, this is more of a modus tollens. If we considered all possible choices, then this would lead to constant moral conflict and may render the moral theory unable to be action-guiding. Given that that is rather that moral theories are for, where the ability to understand and make choices should be protected is limited to choices over things that a person owns, specifically their mind, their body, and their property.

There, that is why I think this is the best candidate for moral value: it applies to all moral agents and allows for morality to be action-guiding.

I would say the correct moral theory is the one that's true. I was using "correct" to mean true. Happy to sub in the word "true" there if you prefer.

I think you're probably wrong about no one being happy if we all cared about our everyone's happiness, but I also am not making that assumption. I was merely using it as an example of an assumption that underlies a different moral theory.

To say the tornado acted in a morally good way would be a category mistake. To say the outcome, that of not having your house destroyed, is morally good, in the sense of having high moral value, is entirely sensible. To say that it was a morally good thing that happened that the tornado didn't destroy your house is also sensible.

We haven't discussed "consent" at all. But, by your definition of what constitutes a choice which belongs to a person, consent from another would not suffice to convert a choice which is not one's own into one which is one's own. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nor would it need to? I'm not sure what you are taking issue with here.

This is contrary to your definition of "one's own choice". You defined this as a choice concerning only what belongs to the person, one's mind, body, and property. A contest is something public, so choices concerning a contest are not one's own choices. Whether or not your choice restricts my ability to understand and make my own choices, is not an accurate indication as to whether or not your choice is your own choice. There are many choices which are not one's own choice, and so they have an effect on others, but the effect is not to restrict another's ability to make one's own choices. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure what you are saying here. You said that protecting only those choices that belong to a person means that any choice that affects others must be restricted. I am pointing out that this isn't the case and giving an example where this is clearly not the case.

A good candidate for a measure of value is one that is likely to be correct. In order to consider what is most likely to be correct, we make some assumptions, or theory selection criteria. For example, utilitarianism selects happiness based on the assumption that whatever humans pursue for themselves they should also pursue for others based on the additional assumptions that not doing so would be irrationally making an exception of yourself and doing that would be immoral, and that humans all pursue their own happiness. As I've pointed out before, this doesn't mean that right choices have to make the person making them happy, just as my theory claiming that the measure of value we should use is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices means that right actions need to be one's own choices. There is no conflict here.

Moral value and praiseworthiness are very different things. When a tornado changes course and doesn't destroy someone's house, that is morally good, but the tornado isn't morally praiseworthy. When it comes to judging actions, it would be more accurate to say my theory judges them as right, rather than praiseworthy, since whether we should praise something is another action that we would need to evaluate the consequences of. I did in fact explain how to judge whether actions are right or wrong, permissible, impermissible, obligatory, or supererogatory in the primer you read.

I mean, there is a sense in which we affect others by like breathing air that touches their stuff, but it is reasonable to assume consent to this by them taking their stuff outside with all the people who need to breathe. And, as we have previously discussed, quite a lot of the things you think of as restricting someone's freedom just don't. For example when you say "When we take into account the fact that anytime an intentional act has an effect on others then it is not properly called "one's own choice"" this is just wrong. There are lots of intentional acts one could make that affect others but are entirely that person's own choice. If I beat you in a contest, I have affected you with my choices, and in ways you would presumably prefer I didn't, but I haven't restricted your ability to understand and make your own decisions. It wasn't your choice whether you won the contest or not, so my denying you that opportunity doesn't affect you in a morally relevant way. These restrictions you are worried about are of your own invention.

As I have said, I am happy to answer why I think that is the best candidate for moral value, but I would like to ensure we are on the same page first and that you understand what I am claiming before I explain why I am claiming it. As for "How do you justify the value of this type of choice, "one's own choice", when this is not even the type of choice which produces good acts?" That is simpler to answer - that is a complete non-sequitur. The fact that these choices are not the ones which are often not the ones which are morally praiseworthy has nothing to do with whether it is a good measure of value. Just like choices don't need to be enjoyable ones in order for the utilitarian to think they morally good, choices don't need to be our own in order for the freedom consequentialist to say the same.

I would agree that the freedom to choose X includes the freedom not to choose X, but that isn't an issue here because that is entirely consistent with the idea that only freedom over those things which belong to a person ought to be protected. The freedom to speak includes the freedom to stay silent, the freedom to live includes the freedom to die, etc.

Again, you seem to be getting worried about the word "freedom." Feel free to just say "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices" if you prefer, as that is what I mean by "freedom" here.

No, I would say that we should judge the morality of choices by reference to their consequences and that the measure of goodness/badness of those consequences is how ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is protected/violated. I feel like I've said this many times, and you are still attempting to interpret what I'm saying to mean anything other than what I am saying.

It sounds like you are saying that it is not coherent to say that a person is free to choose X but not free to choose Y. Or free to do what you like with X (in this case, your own mind, body and property) but not with Y (other people's).

Maybe it would help me if you told me what you think it is I am claiming as simply as possible. Then maybe we can get to the bottom of where this misunderstanding is coming from.

I would say that morality is about how persons ought to be or act in a universal and objective sense, though I would concede that if you wanted to use "ethics" to refer to that and "morality" to refer to the norms and codes that exist, that would be fine too. This is very much a discussion about my attempts to discover the correct moral theory and solve the problem of how to weigh persons' freedom to make different decisions against one another.

In your temperature analogy, the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is not like the boiling point of water or the freezing point of water. It would be more like the average amount of kinetic motion per atom (not a perfect analogy here, but certainly closer). Which is to say, it's the thing we are using as the measure of value.

To your second point, that doesn't answer my question. Is you issue that your don't think freedom can be valuable because you don't think it is coherent to talk about being free to do something but not free to do something else?

Are you assuming that morality aims at humanity's goal, role, purpose, or telos generally? Or are you assuming that consequentialism requires the starting assumption that utilitarians make that we humanity aims at a goal and that goal has moral value? I would reject both of these assumptions. Further, I would say that morality is about how persons ought to be or act, not just humans, so it should encompass all possible persons/moral agents.


It would certainly be true that different entities would value choices differently and could plausibly own slightly different choices (a species with two bodies for example), but the ability to understand and make choices is really just the ability to use one's free will and rationality, which are both necessary conditions for moral agency. So this measure of value does only happen in some entities, but it happens (or can happen when it isn't being violated/restricted) in all and only all entities that are moral agents, so I'm not sure that is really a problem.

I'm not sure what you mean by relative in this context. Relative to what?

Also, I'm not sure I'd describe freedom as an attribute. It's not necessarily wrong, it's just... not terribly precise. I would say that "freedom," as I'm using it, refers to the ability to persons to understand and make their own decisions. So yes, certainly something that belongs to an entity with agency. But I'm not sure why you think that means there can't be a solution. Could you fill me in on the reasoning from one to the other?

The ability to make those choices is the measure of value that determines whether actions are right or wrong. That isn't the same as those being the "ideal choices". Is it possible I am misunderstanding how you are using the word "ideal"? I took you to mean that you thought that one's own choices were morally the best, though this is unlikely to be the cases as they don't, by themselves, often protect or violate one's ability to make one's own choices. If you meant that they were "an ideal" in the sense that they were a principle or a concept to be strived for, then I think that is probably also wrong, but perhaps less so.

Think of it this way. The ability to understand and make choices constitutes use of our rationality and our free will, which are the things that make us moral agents in the first place. It is the ability to put these things to use which I am suggesting is valuable, and I am restricting this to only over those choices that belong to us rather than those that do not on the principles that this allows for morality to be appropriately action-guiding, not result in constant conflict, and align with our intuitions somewhat. I am not having any difficultly understanding the measure of value under discussion.

Also, as to your post replying to Punshhh: Are you suggesting that the freedom to do absolutely anything is valuable? Your freedom to, for example, torture a child to death? Not just to make the choice to, but to actually do so without the police stopping you? I do not agree. Am I wrong in how I am reading this? Are you in saying that no kind of freedom can be valuable perhaps? Or just that freedom to make certain choices cannot be valuable but not making any further claims? What exactly are you suggesting here?

If protecting the ability to make such choices is the standard whereby other choices are judged as good or bad, than this type of choice is named as the ideal choice, the one which all others are measured against in relation to their capacity to enable that type

No it isn't. The whole idea of these choices being "the ideal type" is an invention of yours. It is not reflected in anything I have said. I suggest that you are interpreting all of this through the wrong lens.

This is where the inconsistency lies hidden. You want to protect freedom, because you think that it has some value. However, freedom allows for both good and bad acts, and what you really want out of personal freedom is good acts. So valuing freedom is inherently inconsistent with valuing good acts because freedom allows bad acts As a sort of compromise to "freedom" you posit a "type of freedom", which is the freedom to make one's own choices. This is a type of choice which is generally neutral, removed from good and bad. But, like I already explained, this is not a type of freedom at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are ascribing motives to me which I do not have.

It's a highly compromised, restricted sense of "freedom", specifically formulated so as to make it appear like there is a type of freedom, which the protection of, would be consistent with the desire for good acts. In other words, if true freedom was what your principle sought to protect, this would not be consistent with cultivating good acts, because freedom allows for bad acts. So you posit a false freedom, the freedom to make one's own choices, which is not any type of freedom at all, because it consists of a very restricted, narrow and limited, range of choices

It is a type of freedom consistent with all moral agents having the same freedom, which is surely the type that we should want in a consequentialist moral theory.

Then you state that one's own choices are neutral choices, to ensure that protecting one's own choices would not result in bad choices, in which case this ability ought not be protected. Therefore you end up with an extremely contrived sense of "freedom" which you are seeking to protect, the freedom to make choices which are neither bad nor good, i.e. choices which are morally irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

They are neither good nor bad because they are your choices to make, and the only good or bad choices are those that take that same freedom away from others or protect it.

And, if this is supposed to be a form of freedom, what kind of freedom is it really. Is it the freedom from moral principles? If we all made only this type of choice, then we wouldn't have to concern ourselves with good or bad anymore. Is this the ideal? — Metaphysician Undercover

It is the freedom to understand and make your own choices. Not the freedom from moral principles, the freedom from things that would prevent you being able to understand and make your own choices. Also you seem to be trying to find some buried ideal, but I think I have explained the moral philosophy fairly clearly. There isn't a hidden value under the hood.

You have specifically designed what you call a "type of freedom", the freedom to make choices which belong to oneself, in an effort to make the value of "freedom" consistent with the value of morality. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know what you mean with the value of morality. This is what I am suggesting has moral value.

Now I would like to see you justify the value which you assign to this "type of freedom" — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, I'm happy to, but I'm not moving off of this topic while you are still misunderstanding the measure of value under discussion. If you don't understand the measure of value, then I think any conversation about why it is our best candidate for a measure of value is likely to be doomed from the off.

One's own choices often aren't really good or bad. If I choose to key my own car, that isn't good or bad, it just is. These choices certainly aren't "the ideal". What is important is the ABILITY of persons to understand and make their own choices. Their freedom. That is what needs protecting. Since most choices of my own choices don't protect that freedom or violate it, they are generally fairly neutral actions.

Again, I'm very happy to discuss why I think the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is the best measure of value we have available, but I really want to make sure you have understood what that is first. I don't want to move on if we are just going to be back here in a few posts time with you suggesting that I can't call choices that don't belong to the person making them good or something similar. That is not an implication of anything I have said, and it is not my position. Those words don't belong in my mouth, and I'll thank you to stop trying to put them in there.

There isn't two scales or value systems. The thing which makes any action good or bad is the extent to which is protects or violates the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices.

If you add one to zero, you don't get zero. You get one. Similarly, something not having intrinsic value doesn't negate the value it produces through its consequences somehow. The value of the action is in the consequences it produces (consequences which protect or violate the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. The choice being made doesn't need to be valuable for it's own sake in order to be good. It's good because it produces good consequences.

I'm happy to answer why this is the best measure of moral value (though I think it is covered in the primer), but I'd like to make sure we have pinned down the misunderstanding you seem to be having with the measure of value first.

No, the goodness and badness of an action are determined by the extent to which that action protects persons' ability to understand and make their own choices/violates persons' ability to understand and make their own choices. It isn't that only your those choices that belong to you can be good. In fact, they mostly can't since whatever choice one makes that concerns only those things that belong to them, it will presumably be permissible. It is the protection/violation of the ability to understand and make these choices that determines whether an action is good or bad.

It is the measure of moral value, the goodness or badness of this choice is precisely because of how it affects persons' ability to understand and make their own choices. Just like if the person shot a lion that was about to eat someone, it isn't that shooting lions is intrinsically valuable it is good because it protects the ability to understand and make their own decisions of the person who is about to be eaten. This isn't contradictory, it's consequentialism.

At no point am I saying that their choices are themselves morally valuable, I am saying that they can be good or bad because they produce consequences that are good or bad. And those consequences are good or bad precisely because they lead to the protection/violation of persons' ability to understand and make their own choices. Please see my above examples of different kinds of consequentialism for a clear explanation.

It's not contradictory at all. Moral objectivism vs subjectivism vs whatever else is about what kind of things moral facts are. To be a moral objectivist is to say that moral facts are objective. That doesn't mean there are any. Similarly, we can sensibly say that all facts about the length of unicorn horns are objective and that all the claims we make about unicorn horn length are intended to point at objective truth, but there aren't any unicorns, so there aren't any unicorn horns, so all of these claims are mistaken. Unicorn error theory, as it were.

That being said, I am a moral realist, I was just pointing out that moral objectivism doesn't entail moral realism.

It's been moral value all along. What is morally valuable (or rather what is the measure of moral value) is persons' ability to understand and make their own choices. It isn't about whether you value your ability to do so or not, or whether that provides some value to your life, the claim is that the extent to which that ability is violated or restricted determines the goodness or badness of the consequences of some action (and therefore the morality of that action).

No, there isn't a contradiction there at all. It's the ability to understand and make some decisions that ought to be protected, but not the ability to understand and make others. That is entirely coherent.

Again, you are getting caught up in things being valuable "to" people. What I am claiming is that the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is the measure of moral value. The thing which makes the consequences of an action good or bad. It is not about what is valued by people, it is about what matters morally, objectively, universally, whether or not we care about it.


I'm going to draw a comparison with two other types of consequentialist theory so that it is really clear what role the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is playing in freedom consequentialism.

In preference utilitarianism, the measure of moral value is the satisfaction of preferences and the lack of dissatisfaction of preferences. This is what is what determines the moral value of consequences, their utility. Now, if a preference utilitarian had to choose between five people losing their sight and one person losing their life, then the right thing to do (according to their theory) is whichever satisfies the most preferences/dissatisfies the least. It doesn't matter if the preference utilitarian doesn't have a preference for either one occuring, because the people who are going to lose their sight and/or life sure do, and their preferences matter morally.

In classical utilitarianism, the measure of moral value is happiness and the lack of unhappiness (or pleasure and the lack of pain if you prefer). This is what determines the moral value of consequences, their utility. Now, if a classical utilitarian had to choose between five people losing their sight and one person losing their life, then the right thing to do (according to their theory) is whichever leads to the greatest overall happiness minus unhappiness. It doesn't matter that the person in question is made neither happy or unhappy by making the decision, because the people who are going to lose their sight or lives are going to be made happy/unhappy by it, and their happiness/unhappiness matters morally.

In freedom consequentialism, the measure of moral value is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. This is what determines the moral value of consequences. Now, if a freedom consequentialist had to choose between five people losing their sight and one person losing their life, then the right thing to do is whichever protects the most freedom (or perhaps the most important freedom? This is very much the problem that I haven't solved yet. How to weigh freedom over different things in such a way). It doesn't matter that the choice in question doesn't require protecting, because the choices of the people not to lose their sight or lives do, and their ability to understand and make their own choices matters morally.

Does that clear things up?

The position is that moral facts are objective facts. That leaves open the possibility of moral realism or moral error theory. It may be that there are no moral facts at all. I don't think this is the case, but it isn't ruled out by the claim that moral facts are objective facts.

You surely can't only be realizing that I'm an objectivist now. And less yelling into the aether and more determining what moral truths if any there are to be had.

First of all, it isn't a matter of what is of moral value "to you" it is a matter of what is of moral value. Second, I very much restricted it to only the choices that belong to the person in everything I have said up until now, including the quote you have just made. Their "own" choices.

I think the problem might be that you are thinking of things having "moral value to you" or "to me", but that isn't the case. Your choice to not be eaten by alligators has moral value. Objectively, universally. It's not a matter of who it has value to. The reason I should save you from the alligators is because it protects your choice not to be eaten by them (assuming you aren't trying to get eaten by alligators). The choice to save you from alligators doesn't itself need to be protected. It is right because it protects a choice that ought to be protected and doesn't violate other choices that ought to be protected.

I didn't say it wasn't a restriction. It is a type of freedom, specifically one restricted to only those choices that belong to a person. We can absolutely base morality on whether this type of freedom is restricted.

This is not a vicious circle at all, rather it is a misunderstanding on your part. I say that a person's ability to understand and make their own choices (which I have always maintained are the choices that belong to them) is the measure of moral value, the thing that determines whether the consequences of an action are good or bad. Actions that protect that thing are good, actions which violate it are bad. The action of saving you from alligators protects this thing (the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices, in this case yours to continue living), so it is good. That's not a contradiction, that's the difference between determining a measure of value which is used to evaluate actions and evaluating an action.

No, everything you just said is incorrect. There aren't two systems of value at all. I think you have gotten very much the wrong end of the stick again, but somehow it's an entirely different end than you had before. I'm starting to wonder what shape this stick is. Let me try to explain again.

What is of moral value is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. The extent to which this is protected or restricted/violated determines whether some set of consequences is good or bad. For example, if I steal your car, then i have restricted your ability to understand and make choices regarding your car, which you own, so this is bad. If I save your life from an alligator, I have protected your ability to choose whether you want to live, so this is good.

When I said that only some choices are morally relevant, I meant that we only need to worry about protecting and not restricting persons' ability to understand and make their own choices, not choices that don't belong to them. For example, my ability to understand and make the choice to steal your car is not one that needs to be protected, because it is your car.

Essentially, as happiness and lack of unhappiness is to utilitarianism, the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is to freedom consequentialism.

1: In the example given not the chooser, just a person. But it doesn't make any difference which person it is. Any one of the subjects is a fine answer here.
2: Morally good to bad. Not for anyone. Good or bad objectively.
3: The freedom is lost and/or gained by the people whose eyesight or life is preserved or lost. Again, in the example we were talking about not the chooser. Any one of the subjects is also a fine answer here.
4: I'm not sure I totally understand question four. When I say the "ability of persons to understand and make their own choices" I mean that person's choices, the choices that belongs to the person whose freedom is being discussed. It's possible that any one of the subjects is a fine answer here, but I'm not entirely sure what you mean by the question, so I'm not sure.

Yes, it would be reasonable to say that the choice being made has no moral value (at least, no intrinsic moral value). But it is morally important because it affects the freedom of the subjects involved.

I mean, I think I'm being clear and using plain language whenever possible.

I think there is basically some ambiguity in the term "moral value" as it is being used here. So I'll try to be as clear about what I mean as possible:

The choice between whether one person loses their life or five lose their sight is morally important because it leads to consequences which are good and/or bad. They are good and/or bad due to the gain and/or loss of freedom (by which I mean ability of persons to understand and make their own choices) involved.

Hopefully that is nice and clear. I think it is a fairly simple concept, but I think some confusion in the discussion between myself and MU has led to it looking a lot more complicated than it is.

Yes, the person's ability to make this decision is not inherently valuable. However, the value is in the choices that belong to the people who may lose their sight/life. Again, to compare to another form of consequentialism. The decision whether to flip the switch in the trolley problem isn't valuable according to utilitarianism. The world wouldn't be missing out on any value were you not able to make that decision because no one was on the tracks in the first place. Rather, the value is in the lives of the people being saved. Likewise, the value here is not in your ability to make a decision regarding other people's freedom, it is in those people's freedom.

You seem to think that I am claiming that only choices which belong to a person have any moral content, which is not at all what I am claiming. What I am claiming is that the measure of whether consequences are good or bad is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. In the case given here, with persons' eyes or lives on the line, the decision of which to save has a great deal of moral content/weight/import because it has consequences for the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. It isn't because the choice itself is morally valuable that we should care which option is picked, it is because of the consequences.

No I mean, the choice that belongs to the people whose eyes and lives are at stake is valuable because their eyes and lives belong to them.

At no point do I say either explicitly or implicitly that a person "only has freedom to make decisions which belong to the person". What I have said is that the measure of moral value is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. This ability to understand and make one's own choices, which I call freedom is to freedom consequentialism what happiness is to utilitarianism. It is thing which determines the value of consequences. There are a great many decisions we need to make which are morally important precisely because they affect the freedom of others.

Again, I have been saying that decisions which belong to other people are valuable all along. What I have been saying is not valuable is one person's ability to make choices which don't belong to them. I can see why you would disagree with me given the bizarre view which you think I have been espousing. I would suggesting reading back over some of what I have said now that isn't what I said or meant and I think you will see that some of the disagreements probably melt away.

By "value scale" do you mean any moral principles at all, or do you mean something else? Those two definitely are relevant, as both make the application of moral principles relevant. That isn't what consequentialism is and there isn't really a conflict there.

Again, the choice of the persons' whose eyesight or life is at stake is the measure of value that makes the consequences of them losing their eyesight or life against their will morally bad. The decision between one happening and the other is morally important because it leads to bad consequences, not for the person making the choice, but for other people.

I'm not quite sure where to begin with your first question. Imagine asking the same question of a utilitarian only pointing out that making the choice itself doesn't make them happy, so why should they care. What you are doing is much the same thing. The choice to continue using one's own eyes, or to continue living, are both valuable, and we are faced with a choice between protecting one or the other. Choosing between one set of consequences and another, both of which will result in some people being negatively impacted in a morally relevant way. This is not a ruse, it is exactly the kind of thing moral theories deal with.

Your second point is again, completely misunderstanding everything I have said up until this point. I do wonder whether it is intentional. First, me explaining how I was using morally relevant in a specific context and pointing out that it is not the same way you were using it in your objection is quite the opposite of equivocation. Second, and more importantly, you are conflating the measure of value and the moral decision. Again,it is as if you are claiming that a utilitarian shouldn't care about a decision (no matter how important) if it doesn't make them happy. That is beside the point. There are other people in the world. In this case, it the freedom of the people whose eyesight and/or life is in the balance that is important, but the decision is important because it leads to one of them being protected or not.

To your third point, it is completely and obviously not true that if a choice as no inherent moral value, we cannot evaluate it using moral principles. First, determining that it has no inherent moral value requires evaluation using moral principles. Second, it might have instrumental value. Third, it might have disvalue. Fourth, under most consequentialist theories, moral decisions don't themselves have inherent value, but they can still be evaluated inasmuch as they lead to consequences which have moral value (this isn't really the same as having instrumental value in terms of being able to make the decision being instrumentally valuable). Also, there is a lot of moral value at issue here, specifically value of persons to decide whether they want to continue seeing/living that we are deciding between.

A person's eyes are something that belong to them, as is a person's life. Of course neither belong to the person making the decision, though I think you may have misunderstood when you say that they therefore aren't "free to make the decision". Assuming that the people all want to keep their sight and their life, then the person making the decision is faced with a choice between protecting the freedom of some people to make one kind of choice, or protecting the freedom of some other people to make a different kind of choice, and they must decide which they should protect.

Again, I haven't said that a free choice is the right choice. I have said that only the freedom to make certain choices ought to be protected. You seem to keep getting caught on words that you insist I am using in ways that I'm just not. In this case, the person's choice between people dying and people losing their eyesight isn't something that belongs to the person making it, so them being able to make that choice is not inherently valuable. If they weren't able to make that choice (say, because no one's sight or life was in danger) then that wouldn't be a bad thing. But none of that means they can't or shouldn't make it or that such a choice is not morally relevant in the sense that you are using the term. When I was saying that someone's ability to understand and make a certain choice wasn't "morally relevant" I meant that their ability to understand and make that choice did not have inherent moral value, not that the choice did not have moral content and could not be good, bad, right, wrong. I'm fairly sure I explained this earlier.

No I don't think someone else influencing my choice makes it no longer mine.

But to your core question of how this could be an issue, let's return to the example I gave before of saving one person's life or several persons' sight. In both cases someone's freedom over those choices that belong to them will be violated, and we are seeking to choose the better option. The question is, how do we decide? How do we determine how many people's sight is worth one person's life. This is comparitively a fairly simple example, but I think it demonstrates the issue quite well. How do we well how many persons' choice to continue seeing is worth one person's choice to continue living.

A choice that belongs to someone can be thought of as a choice of what to do with something that belongs to that person, specifically their mind, body, and property.

The issue isn't with determining which freedom of an individual that individual should value over any other. The issue is with deciding how to balance different people's freedom to do different things against each other. Such as the blindness vs death example given. I really think this discussion would go smoother if you read more of the primer I wrote to begin with.

I'm not sure what you mean by finding either strength or weakness in belonging or how we would find that. Also, I'm not sure why how often people's freedom is restricted would determine the extent to which that choice belongs to them.

No, it is freedom of choice, rather than rights, as I've already explained many times. Yeah, I agree that it is very easy to resolve conflicts between choices that don't belong to someone and those that do, but this isn't the problem I outlined in the initial primer. I was concerned with how to weigh different amounts of freedom (over those choices that beong to people) against each other. For example, how many people's eyesight is worth one person's life if we are in a position to only save group or the other. This isn't resolved by what you suggest. Further, I'm not sure how you tell which choices people have a "more absolute right" to. If there was a clear and simple way of doing that, then that would go some way towards solving the problem (though it still wouldn't solve it completely as there is still the issue of how much of one (in terms of number but also in terms of duration and possibly even intensity) is worth how much of another. We might think that people have "more of a right" to live than to see, but that doesn't tell us how many of one is worth how many of the other.