Okay but there are times the king of america does exist and even times you are the king of america. There are certainly references which make that true such as choosing monarch in civilization as america.

I was replying to him. I don't know what that refers to. I said term which includes adverbs.

How can you parse the phrase "king of america" without a referent at all? I feel it's necessary to emphasize that the referent does not need to be material but if you don't know what a king is or what america is or what they are when conjoined (a linguistic conception, a monarch of america game simulator) then you can't meaningfully decide whether it's true or not.

I said term which includes any part of speech or phrase.

If it has no reference then how can you predicate anything about it? It needs something to build off of. For instance the queen of england has a material reference where the queen of france has one as well but in the past etc. In any case the queen is the object which is more accurately understood through predications.

"Intelligently" is a goofy term with no real reference and is really non-propositional.

That's the whole point. You don't need an *empirical* reference but you do need some reference otherwise it's a meaningless non-proposition.

It's weird how atheists slobber for that finish line sometimes.

No your objection doesn't work because you still have to speak of them all as existing.

Whichever object that would be understood as objectivly, relativly or subjectivly interpretable fundamentally. I'd say it's impossible to interpret any object as subjectively and trivially they all have some input and can be better understood as predicates from your subjectivity.

Yeah but you can't interpret the object as anything but a series of predicates away from your subjectivity.

Yeah that's what I do. I like that approach. I see no other way than to talk about them as they are.

He's lugubrious
Reads all the way from John to Publius.

Everyone is a philosopher as we all seek wisdom in whatever we're doing. Thieves want to be more successful etc etc so the term is really useless.

I don't disagree. I think I was trying to say all of them could effectively be spoken about under one system but can only ineffectively be talked about separately.

Also, speaking about a dog entails an animal but that doesn't mean you're fundamentally speaking about an animal.

A lot of philosophy distinguishes between the two but in any case, whatever you want to call it, predication inherently implies more particular and more universal claims and those can't all be conflated into a subjective disposition or you lose any meaning to connect or speak about anything except yourself at all (nevermind accuracy or degree).

I can understand that position. I would say math that was valid 3000 years ago is still valid today without any losee of truth.

Science involves more induction issues the more empirically-laden you make it.

I think a good example is deciding to hang out with friend a because they are funny and deciding to hang out with anyone because they are funny. The subjective position would seek the funniest person adjacent to you where the relative position would seek person a for their funnyness.

I would replace love with being closer to God entails more positivity. So if you grow closer to God then you get more positive results.

I would think to solve the crisis we would have to treat the brain as an object within its own right. Then we can analyze the nature of it, and what thoughts/interpretations are derived from it, more accurately.
In any case these thoughts and beliefs all entail objects anyways which are referenced from the objects (if you misinterpret the object then some consequence arrives).

I don't think I disagree. Even through our built-in "studio", it doesn't seem possible for us to ever approach atheism.
In any case you entail something by even speaking of it so to say "God doesn't exist" is contradictory in a sense like saying "nothingness is blank".

You can walk back your position but the point is if science can't refer to supernatural entities then everyone should figure out what means we are to do so so we can analyze these positions.

I wouldn't be so brave to preclude them so easily particularly how necessary God is for their work.

I'm not sure what you're referring to. The social constructs which are the sense of the logic symbols can perfectly refer to an external object. This happened with Einstein theorizing black holes.

One doesn't need an experiment to do science otherwise pure physics is thrown out the door (and the higgs boson, as well as general relativity and all science shows this is not true).
There's actually an issue with requiring an experiment or reference to a material object. It makes physics and math circular.

Sure but it can't ever tell what it is except that it's a natural phenomenon. The position was, since science cannot intuit any supernaturalism then any reference to science can never disprove supernaturalism.
EugeneW then took it a step farther and said we need a new body of knowledge to speak of these things.

The epistemological positions (belief, know, makes you hungry when you read it etc) have nothing to do with the ontological position (does God exist). Already there's an issue with the framing of defining a position by one's belief. It introduces nothing except you don't believe and, in any case, would preclude almost everything about atheism including arguments against theism (which require an ontological position).

What don't you accept about his proof? It's valid.

Frege's sense and reference distinction might help. For instance commentary can be written about God in particular ways and still refer to God in other commentaries (e.g. Aquinas can quote Augustine and still be speaking about the same catholic trinitarian conception of God). So a proof can have overlap as a sense with another sense assuming a similar reference.

It would have to propose a supernatural entity from which to derive other supernatural entities from or it would have to prove supernatural entities derive from natural ones. Neither of these claims you would assert physics should/does make and no definition of physics I'm aware of includes them. Physics simply can't verify nor negate supernatural entities. It doesn't say whether supernatural entities exist or not just that physics is limited to natural objects (particularly defined).

That "intellectual minority" would preclude Aristotle, Plato, Newton, Godel etc. In any case it doesn't speak to the propositions.

But the domain of science can never speak about the supernatural deductively. It can only speak about its own limits and not even conclusively.

You can't deny a God-like being doesn't exist if you accept his proof is the point and the op is about atheism.
Also I'm clearly not interested in talking about my religion with you lol

I'm not entirely sure how to mince that as those conceptions of God you mentioned were all universalist (they allow membership of all) and against tribalism.
In any case, the validity is in a God-like being and that's the baseline here. Anything after that is tangential to this point.

I think you're using more idealist or epistemologically-demanding metaphysics for your conceptions of universal vs relativist (= subjectivist).
In any case, math problems are "universal" to man while logic is universal to man but math is a proper subset of logic and even if you're not willing to grant that, calculus is derived from arithmetic operations at least partially (you must use arithmetic to write calculus). In any case there's clearly more structure than "universal/relativist/subjective" unless we use human perception as the standard which necessitates relativism to speak of these things even if it isn't an accurate way to express what these objects domains are.

I'm not sure what you're saying. You're saying God must be all positive properties? That's in definition D1. If you're saying a particular conception of God then the proof is a God-like being which is valid in most mainstream religions such as christianity etc. It wouldn't be those conceptions exactly but it would be valid for them which is just to place it on the table.

It would imply that if the universe came into being (entailed) and it was epistemologically graspable, and that a scientific explanation couldn't explain it, that something else can. In any case this would rid science of the burden of dismissing theist claims.

I said "more universal" not universal itself although I think taken to any other degrees it eventually implies a universal domain and, through the same criticism of "objectivity", we can claim the most universal domain is effectively the universal domain for all intents and purposes of what object is involved.
Now I was going to justify that by saying the subjective domain is probably the most particular a human or conscious being can go and then build up from there to say there are inherently more universal domains as relativism necessitates the subjective domain to be more particular than the external domain it's examining but you seemed to make equivalent relativism with subjectivism. I was wondering if you had a justification for that.

It says a particular domain and I think that inherently implies a more universal domain.
It also uses a particular object inside that particular domain (for ethics the moral agent) and the particular context is derived from the more universal context.

This being said I think the better way to word it is objectivity doesn't deny relativism. I would argue relativism requiring an external object commits it to "objectivity". Would you agree with either?