It's not that it's complicated, but that scientific analysis generally takes place on a different level - that of the scientific analysis of objects, forces and energy. The question of the role of the observer is not complicated in that sense, but it's also not an objective question. That's why it evades scientific analysis - not that it's complicated or remote, but that it's 'too near for us to grasp'. — Wayfarer

The role of the observer in the quantum mechanical sense is complicated. What you are doing is simplifying the question by making some assumptions about what an observer can be. To use your previous reply to me, it is begging the question, as those assumptions are not necessary.

When you interact with others on the forum, you are not interacting with physical objects, but with subjects and their ideas. It is vastly different to how you interact with physical objects. — Wayfarer

First of all I am interacting with light from my computer screen, I am also interacting with the plastic keyboard. Ideas are not flowing directly from your mind to mine. I cannot directly tap into your consciousness. The last bit is not a realist position on my part - I cannot inhabit your consciousness the way I do mine regardless.

However I am assuming that there the ideas in the post by wayfarer come from a conscious being. But there is no good reason for me to assume this if I question whether the screen before me is real, and the light coming from it is real. It seems to me that wayfarer is also not real, just a projection of my consciousness - my consciousness is the only one that I experience specially.

Take some practical examples of fractals - snow flakes, or the center of some flowers. They are not infinite.

Now as to your previous question of why fractals occur at all, I'm not sure. I would guess it is something to do with how things form. Say a branch forms 1/3 the way off another branch (due to genetics, let's say). Then off the new branch another branch forms 1/3 the way, and so on. Hence the fractal. But it is not infinite, and it won't be exactly 1/3 of the way every time - sometimes it might be slightly more or less. It will only be an approximation of a fractal.

The necessity of acknowledging the existence of the observer, who is outside the equation, so to speak, is telling us something about the nature of reality. — Wayfarer

Yes

And what it is telling us, is not necessarily something amenable to scientific analysis. — Wayfarer

I am undecided on this. What it is telling me is that it is a fiendishly complicated issue at hand and I am not sure I have the correct tools to interrogate the problem. There are suggestions on how this may be interrogate using science, with quantum computers for example - I believe there is a post in this thread about the very thing. However I have not yet been able to wrap my head around this proposed experiment.

I myself am accustomed to the ‘constructivist’ approach - that the reality which we naively take for granted as simply something given, something external and separate from us, is in some fundamental sense constructed by the mind - your mind, my mind. — Wayfarer

I am not of this approach, partly because every time I explore it I find that the logical end to this approach is solipsism. The way i interact with you is no different to the way I interact with other physical objects. Thus without some form of realism, I have no reason to believe that the photons leaving my laptop screen in your posts, have anything to do with another consciousness. If I question whether the photons are real, then I should question whether wayfarer is real in the same way. It is only my consciousness that I inhabit differently, and so the natural conclusion down this path would be that I only exist. But I reject this. Perhaps this is a discussion for a different thread though.

ut the realist attitude begs the question, insofar as the question is ‘does the object exist in the absence of any observer’? Whereas, the existence of objects for the observer is not in question. As idealist philosophers, such as Bernardo Kastrup, will argue, the fact of the experience of an objective domain is never at issue. What is at issue is the question as to whether that domain is really mind-independent. As Descartes said, we can doubt the veracity of any experience, but we can’t doubt that we are subjects of experience. And we can say that without begging any question whatever. — Wayfarer

You are quite right that the existence of objects for the observer is not in question. But the original post I replied to a few days ago was going beyond that. It was suggesting that the objects do not exist if the observer is not observing. That is begging the question in that it is assuming that realism is wrong.

So saying that objects do not exist when you do not look at them, is begging the question just as much as saying that objects do exist when you do not look at them.

You do notice the "realist" assumption lying behind this, when that is precisely what is at issue. In other words, it begs the question. — Wayfarer

Absolutely, I made assumptions. But it no more begs the question than an idealist position or any other position on this issue, including the one you were arguing for.

However I want to add something. Realism in quantum mechanics does not always mean the same thing as in philosophy. We know almost for certain that local realism is not true. What is meant by realism here? It refers to there existing objects with certain defined properties separate to interacting with them - this does not seem to be true. But it is not at all clear that interaction requires consciousness, however too often I see people making that jump as if it were required and necessary based on quantum mechanics.

‘There would be no objects with shape and appearance, because shape and appearance are created by minds’. But that is part of a larger argument. Context is important. From a naturalistic perspective of course it is true that objects exist independently of observation, but here we’re discussing the metaphysical issue suggested by ‘the observer problem’ — Wayfarer

My reply was very much to do with the context being discussed here.

In the context of the role of observers in the MWI, and the role of observers in quantum mechanics generally, there is no requirement for that observer to be a mind or have consciousness, or to be able to distinguish shapes or colors. The observer simply needs to be able to interact - something rocks, gasses, and moons can do. In the context of this discussion, even if all life in the universe was extinguished, the parts of the universe will continue to interact with other parts, and the lack of consciousness will make little difference.

That at least is the counter position to your previous argument.

The moon (where 'moon' symbolises 'any object') does not exist outside your consciousness of it. However, neither does it not exist. The universe/world/moon/whatever is a featureless, undifferentiated and meaningless aggregation of matter-energy which is only differentiated into separate objects, with features and locations - which comes into being - in the mind of the observer. — Wayfarer

One counter to this is that there is differentiation even without consciousness. True that there would be no conscious beings to conceptualize the universe, or out it into words and write about it on a forum. However structure would exist in how some parts of that universe can interact with others. This is the crux of the position that a conscious being is not needed to collapse a wavefunction - any interaction can do it.

I don't think there is a universal law that require the universe to be composed of fractals. Rather I would put forward some parts of the universe are fractals as a consequence of other laws (current laws of physics, or some kind of unified law we don't know of yet, or something else).

I would agree with that.

Could you expand on that?

There's a habit of thought where we come to see things with respect to that thought a lot. So with Popper you have this account which supposedly solves the problem of induction as well as the problem of demarcation, and lays out a rationality that scientists should follow in their theorizing.

It's all very interesting, only it doesn't look much like what scientists actually do. — Moliere

This is why I much prefer Kuhn's description of science over Popper. What Popper describes is what a lot of scientists would like science to be in an ideal world, but it is completely impractical. It cannot be achieved in reality.

While Kuhn better describes what scientists actually do in reality.

That doesn't mean I think Popper's description has no merit. I think it has merit as an ideal, not as what scientists can practically do.

Exactly.

The difficulty is that ends and means are only separable in the limited mental intentionality of the individual. — unenlightened

Indeed. They are not two categorically different things.

I think you are flitting between two similar but different systems - one with pruning of observations and one without.. Addressing the system you described in the post I am replying to, which does not prune:

1. We observe that past societies had moral rules that helped cooporations. These took many forms, including humans sacrifice, murdering and raping the outgroup, etc.

2. What was observed in 1. is what was morally normative in that society.

3. Consequential definitions of morality combined with the limitation that behaviors to achieve them solve cooperation problems, include the human sacrifice, murder and raping of the outgroup.

Of what use is this? Perhaps dictators and gangs have got it right morally, since they are very strict about cooperation?

It doesn't help with us solving today's moral issues, because of the is/ought problem. The above says nothing about would ought to be done - if it did it would be advocating gangs and dictators. But it doesn't advocate for anything, because it is a review of what is.

I look forward to it. I will be busy for a couple of weeks, but I will read it with interest.

Incidentally, this kind of topic is the reason I got into philosophy during the pandemic in the first place. So even though I think your analysis is flawed, it is a topic I am interested in - how we can use moral philosophy to practically affect changes for the better, and how science can be used as an effective tool in this aim. I think science has an important role, but not in the way you describe.

I think 2. and 3. in your list are conditional on context. What is the end? What are the means? How much good/bad does your end achieve, in your moral framework? How much good/bad do the means achieve, within your moral framework?

Based on the context specific answer you may keep 2 and 3 in that order, or swap them.

I.E for some moral dilemmas the order will be 2, 3. For others it will be 3, 2. It depends on the specific situations.

In terms of the title of this thread, there is no general moral rule that the ends justify the means, nor that the ends do not justify the means. It depends on the specific means and specific ends for the specific context.

I can see I need to do a better job of explaining how that evolution happens. Thanks for pointing that out. — Mark S

Yes, and I'll be happy to read your expanded explanation.

At the moment, this is what I see you doing, in order:

1. Observing what "is" through scientific methods
2. Pruning what you observed to remove the things you don't like and leave only those you like based on your values.
3. Presenting this as what "is" and claiming scientific methods. However it is not a scientific observation, it is a pruned version filtered by your values. You have already introduced imperative oughts here, but done so through the back door.
4. Deriving an "ought" from what you presented as an "is" in step 4. This runs into the is/ought problem

So really I see you making 2 mistakes. What you present as an "is", is not actually an "is." And then you try to derive an ought from an is.

If I may make an almost facetious analogy:

1. You take a raw chicken
2. You cook the chicken
3. You present this cooked chicken as a raw chicken
4. You blow on the chicken
5. You say that blowing on the chicken has cooked the raw chicken.

The thing is blowing on the chicken did not cook the chicken, and what you presented as a raw chicken was not a raw chicken in the first place.

The more important moral norms are, in my view, pretty much universal for merely pragmatic reasons and this ties in with Kant's deontology (which is a kind of non-particular consequentialism writ large). Any society that condoned lying, theft, rape and murder could not survive, let alone thrive. — Janus

This is true for how the in group is treated in different societies. But many societies that thrived had no problem murdering, stealing and raping their outsiders.

Which is one reason among many others that I find it problematic to base morality on an observation of what society did.

The other obvious problem is the is/ought difference, but even ignoring that sledgehammer throws up the above issue - many societies survived and even thrived with some moral values you or I would find abhorrent.

Edit - i am not even sure this is true for the ingroup. Here is an excerpt from wikipedia about a society that was very successful, and yet murdered their children:

"The Inca culture sacrificed children in a ritual called qhapaq hucha. Their frozen corpses have been discovered in the South American mountaintops. The first of these corpses, a female child who had died from a blow to the skull, was discovered in 1995 by Johan Reinhard.[9] Other methods of sacrifice included strangulation and simply leaving the children, who had been given an intoxicating drink, to lose consciousness in the extreme cold and low-oxygen conditions of the mountaintop, and to die of hypothermia. "

I wouldn't want to base my morality on that.

I thought that superposition is a fact and not just a hole in our knowledge. In other words the coin is heads and tails and not that it's either heads or tails, only we don't know which. — Agent Smith

You thought correctly. And importantly this is a testable hypothesis that has been experimentally verified.

Could MACS and either form of consequentialism be contradictory? I have not yet seen how they could be, but this looks like new, unplowed ground to me. There may be many surprises out there. — Mark S

There is no contradiction as they are operating in categorically different spheres. But I think you also said this, so no disagreement here.

First, bare consequentialism has an implied over-demandingness feature: that it is moral for one person to suffer a huge penalty, of either increased suffering or reduced well-being, so many can gain a tiny benefit. The new consequentialist/cooperation morality requires moral behaviors to be parts of cooperation strategies and “cooperation” implies a lack of coercion. The absence of coercion in moral behavior implies that the over-demandingness as so-called ‘moral’ behavior has been eliminated. Moral principles without over-demandingness are more likely to be judged morally normative as “what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people”. — Mark S

I don't think MACS achieves what you claim it achieves. MACS is just as susceptible to the problem you outline. MACS would show human coorporation often has an out group that is excluded. It does not rule out causing massive harm to a few in order for the many to coorporate - this has been pointed out to you in the previous thread I think.

Second, bare consequentialism can lack innate motivational power because it is an intellectual construct. But the moral ‘means’ of the new consequentialist/cooperation moral principles are innately harmonious with our moral sense because these cooperation strategies are what shaped our moral sense. This innate harmony provides motivating power to incline us to act morally even when we have reasons not to. — Mark S

I don't think this holds. In fact my observations of "what is" recently, suggests that MACS would motivate those already motivated, and not motivate those already not motivated. Try to motivate an anti-vaccine person by bringing out more scientific studies. I think you will fail more often than succeed. And that failure would be because the motivation is values driven rather than technocratic.

I prefer “what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people” after Bernard Gert's definition in the SEP as my basis for what is morally normative, an imperative ought. — Mark S

My bad I made a typo in my post. Both my points were about instrumental oughts, but I incorrectly wrote imperative oughts in my first sentence. That point was:

"Instrumental ought are really just conditional oughts. So it doesn't solve any problems, just kicks the can down the road to the condition. And an ought is still required on the other side of the condition."

That man is struggling to breathe. Science tells me that IF I want to save his life I ought to put an oxygen mask on him. But if there was a moral disagreement on this issue, it would not be about the scientific principals behind mask usage, but whether saving that mans life is good or bad or worth the consequences. In which case your instrumental ought really doesn't help.

Each one of those people you killed has a father, brother, mother, wife, husband, son, daughter or comrade who now lives for revenge.... even if they have to fight their way through 100 strangers to get to you. — Vera Mont

Yes I agree, and that is the point I was trying to make to the other poster. The means are themselves ends. The 100 people John killed are not merely means that he can pass through to his end. Each of those people are ends in themselves.

I think we are on the same page on this issue.

:up:

My goal was good, but not sure about my subgoal...

Non.But we are going around the mulberry bush, so best leave it there I think.

Ah I see your problem.

Well I gave a number of examples. John want to save one person - Mark. This is an end, do you agree?

To do so he kills 100, this is the means to his end, do you agree? Each time he kills someone, he says "for Mark!"

He now comes to you and wants your advice - does his means justify his end. What do you say?

No I'm asking you.

Your list suggests the goal carries more weight that the sub goal. My point is why? Most of your replies have been to repeat the list which doesn't help!

So is your list based on utility? If not what? Why are bad bad subgoals not as bad as bad goals? Does it matter if the goal or subgoal causes more harm?

Ok, so killing 100 innocent people justifies saving my daughter. (this is hypothetical - I don't have a daughter only a son. Otherwise I wouldn't feel comfortable using the example! :) )

Yes, and that is what I too am discussing. Perhaps I should simplify further. Here is a new example:

I want to save 1 person - my daughter. That is my end.

To save her I need to kill 100 innocent people. That is my means.

This is number 2. in your list, yes or no? Good ends (save my daughter), bad means (kill 100). This is number 2.

I'll continue in the next post, but I thought I'll take it step by step to avoid confusion.

Instrumental ought are really just conditional oughts. So it doesn't solve any problems, just kicks the can down the road to the condition. And an ought is still required on the other side of the condition.

And even then I'm not even sure instrumental oughts are oughts. Rather they are a way of trying to shoehorn the word ought in disguised behind an adjective.

not 1 but 0.9999... — Banno

Which interestingly are equal in mathematics - there are proofs for that equivalency.

Ok, let me refresh on Mark and John.

Mark killed 500 to save 100. John saved 500 to kill 100.

Since you just repeated your list, i assume that you are deferring to your list.

Mark is 2.
John is 3.

So I guess you would consider Mark as morally preferable to John. Do you agree?

That is a different example though.

In Mark and John's example, who is better?

At best your new example would show that the list is not fixed and is context specific.

Let me expand and clarify.

There is a guy called Mark. Mark really really wants to save 100 people over there. That is his goal. in order to do that he has to kill 500 people, but oh well, he really wants to save those 100 people.

Mark is a 2. in the list kind of guy - his goal was good, his sub goal was bad.

There is also a guy named John. John really wants to kill 100 people over there. But in order to carry out that plan he must first save 500 lives.

John is a 3. in the list kind of guy - his goal was bad, but his subgoal was good.

Your list places Mark as morally better than John. Why? Your list places the goal as carrying more moral weight than the subgoal - why?

Right. Using this in your previous ordered list, and the second and third item in particular:

2. Bad subgoals, good goals
3. Good subgoals, bad goals

According to your list, 2. is better than 3. Now let's flesh that out with a hypothetical example:

2. killing 500 (bad subgoal) to save 100 (good goal)
3. saving 500 (good subgoal) to kill 100 (bad goal)

Do you agree with the above order - that 2 is better that 3? Your list suggests the goal always carries more moral weight than the subgoal - why?

Could you elaborate on that?

Yes, but that was not my question.

Rather I was arguing that killing Mr X is an end in itself. And the saving 100 people are also ends. They are all ends - even the means are ends. So you are just weighing up different ends based on some moral theory.

It doesn't answer my question - are the means also ends in themselves? It seems to me means are often (perhaps even always, but I'm not sure) ends themselves.

In which case the question becomes "Am i justified to cause some ends (a,b,c) in order to get other ends (x,y,z)."

1. Good means, good ends
2. Bad means, good ends
3. Good means, bad ends
4. Bad means, bad ends — Agent Smith

But aren't the bad means bad ends in themselves? If I can save 100 lives by killing 1, that is good ends (saving 100 lives) with bad means (killing someone). But also the killing of that someone is a bad end in itself.

So when heat death occurs - when energy drops to zero, time effectively stops (all motion), which is analogous to actualised energy reverting back to potential (as energy cannot be created nor destroyed, only change from one form to another). Potential energy woukd be the start state and the eventual return end state dictated by this fundamental law. — Benj96

This is a misunderstanding of entropy and theory of heat death of the universe.

Heat death is not energy dropping to zero. There will be just the same energy in a heat death universe as in the current universe. Heat death is the potential dropping to zero (or free energy dropping to zero).

There will be just the same amount of energy, but that energy will have no potential to do work ever again. So it is exactly the opposite of what you describe.

Of course there is the caveat this is a theory, we don't know conclusively if the universe will end up with heat death.

I also see a large component of moral norms being a common framework for a group to coorporate. of course there are many different ways in which people can coorporate, leading to different cultures having different and sometimes arbitrary moral norms. So I agree on that.

Where I find difficulty is in how that helps resolve moral disagreements.

You and I are standing on the edge of a cliff. I say that my moral values lead to the concussion that I should throw you off. You say "hold on a moment, let me talk to you about what is." I listen patiently, thank you for the interesting insight into what is, but since you have given me nothing about what I should do, my should from earlier remains and I throw you off.

How does the "is" help with disputes about "should" and "ought?"