The fascism within us all. — ZzzoneiroCosm

That's heavy. The light side is that most of us just want to belong.

However, if I'm correct, everyone is drawn to them like a moth to a flame. — Agent Smith

I think it's mainly philosophical types who are drawn to them, some to slay them like dragons and some to peep through them like they're doors to somewhere else.

I see you have no idea how to make an argument. — Jackson

I see you're a troll.

It's in the SEP article. Since you weren't aware of Aristotle's stance on knowledge and regress, I thought you might appreciate the accompanying explanation.

Read this.

No, not what he said. But I forget his name. — Jackson

Aristotle: Knowledge does not require an infinite regress of questions.

Very little to nothing is self evident. As one philosopher said, if anything was self evident there would be no philosophy. — Jackson

I think the philosopher said that if we argued for everything, we'd fall into an infinite regress after the first step.

If I do not agree it is not self evident. — Jackson

What isn't?

Not really. Opining is not an argument. — Jackson

Some things need no argument. They're self evident.

To each his own.

All sunsets are beautiful.

"Beauty is truth, truth beauty,
That is all ye know on earth,
and all ye need to know."
-Keats

1. Grelling-Nelson paradox is a true paradox in the sense both a proposition and its negation is true.

If so,

2. The LNC must be done away with (1 & the LNC are incompatible) as an law of the thought (a counterexample exists). — Agent Smith

The LNC is the reason we're interested in paradoxes. If you do away with it, we'll just accept contradictions as normal.

Could I be alive and dead at the same time? Of course! The towering human intellect falls in a ditch.

It's better to leave paradoxes in the closets we keep them in. Leave the LNC alone.

It's a ruse to call a society governed by mass manipulation a democracy. — ZzzoneiroCosm

But the average person wants to be told what to eat and wear, how to trim their useless lawns and how to make up for their sins.

They want norms. They want the security of the sheep.

have an idea of what a painting should look like before i start. — Jackson

Where does that idea come from?

Do some digital art. You can save iterations along the way.

Creation of what? — Jackson

The act of creation goes on until it reaches a stopping point. Sometimes that stopping point is arbitrary. We could go on, but we don't. Sometimes we're surprised by the way things turned out.

The question, "creation of what?" could be asking why you stop at a certain point. How do you know when to stop? How would you answer that?

I think it's about creation.

What do you think it's about?

I occasionally come across people who are still devoted to Trump. Many of them are otherwise intelligent people. I haven't asked any of them for an explanation.

Yes, I understand English. — Jackson

Excellent.

Not until six pages in does Nagel even define what "like" means. Footnote 6, "Therefore the analogical form of the English expression "what it is like" is misleading. It does not mean "what (in our experience) it resembles," but rather "how it is for the subject himself."

This always troubled me. It seems his whole idea of "like" is vague or inchoherent. — Jackson

If I ask you what it's like to visit Las Vegas, would you understand what I'm asking?

Indeed, the notion that contradictions are false is the ordinary notion through the centuries of the subject of logic. And it facilitates the ordinary notion of entailment. — TonesInDeepFreeze

If you're talking about the LNC, only one interpretation of it says contradictions are false statements. Another interpretation is that it's impossible to believe a contradiction. But I think we're off topic now. Again, thanks for the explanations.

Anyway, languages (not just formal languages) have both syntax and semantics. Models are the ordinary semantics for languages in predicate logic. And logic itself is not just the study of proof but perhaps even more basically the study of entailment. And entailment is semantical in the sense that 'truth' is determined by the model theoretic semantics for a language. — TonesInDeepFreeze

It's not intuitive to me that P & ~P is necessarily a false statement. I think it would be better to say it's a meaningless statement. Could it be that predicate logic is handling meaninglessness by calling it false?

That is incorrect. No matter about models, if you have inconsistent axioms, then you derive Russell's paradox. Then, it is merely an additional note, not confined to Russell's paradox or unrestricted comprehension, that any inconsistent axiom is perforce a non-logical axiom. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I understand, thanks for explaining that.

Per the method of models (the Tarski method by induction on formulas), every sentence is either true in the model or false in the model but not both. And per that method of models, the negation ~P of a sentence P is true in the model if and only if P is false in the model; and P is true in the model if and only if ~P is false in the model.

Now, suppose a contradiction P & ~P were true in a model. Then P would be true in the model and false in the model, which is impossible. — TonesInDeepFreeze

This means that if we adopt the method of models, Russell's Paradox is impossible. What are the consequences of not adopting that method?

But a sentence that yields a contradiction is false in every model — TonesInDeepFreeze

I've never understood why this is so. It seems like an artificial definition of "false" Does it make sense to you?

You lost me.

What's the model where an instance is false?

The Cantorian paradoxes are not a failing of logic. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I agree.

It would be false in some models if it were formalized as a first order sentence, — TonesInDeepFreeze

What would that sentence be?

the pre-formal principles it uses are non-logical, — TonesInDeepFreeze

In the sense that these principles are untrue in some models? That doesn't make any sense to me. How can a principle be false?

Cantor didn't have axioms. But of course he did use non-logical principles even if not formalized as axioms. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Does this mean you're sort of stretching the idea of non-logical axioms to address the problems associated with naive set theory?

It appears that axioms were created specifically to block the path to Russell's Paradox. There isn't any logical basis for accepting that blockade.

A non-logical principle is one that is not true in at least one model. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Did Cantor's original set theory have non-logical axioms?

Rather, adding certain non-logical axioms results in contradictions — TonesInDeepFreeze

Could you give an example of a non-logical axiom and explain what makes it non-logical?

Plato would say that absolute and relative are two sides of the same coin.

Is anyone here a consequentialist who would care to argue? — RolandTyme

Consequentialism hasn't failed in this case. It doesn't provide moral guidance here because there is no moral way forward in the realm of war. The actions that take place in war are for the sake of survival.

Theism offers an explanation for our existence, atheism offers no explanations of its own, a weaker position. — Gregory A

Why would the lack of explanation be a weakness?

Absolute truth cannot exist, — Angelo Cannata

Is this also a relative truth?

"Is this due to sexism, socialization, natural interests; or what do you think?"

What is a philosophy degree good for? Maybe the answer lies down that path?