Maybe. But it is what you asked for. Where have I gone wrong? — Ludwig V

If I were to see a small blip on a radar screen showing me an airplane, would that be an airplane or a representation of one?

More precisely, the concept of flower is an intersubjectively constructed object. Its objectivity is thus a socially constituted ideal. We judge error and illusion in perception in relation not to a world as it is in itself but in relation to our constructed idealities, which, being relative, can always be other than how we now constitute them as objectively existing. — Joshs

This just seems doubtful. I would expect that an infant sees what I see when it looks at a flower, despite it not having any sense of what is socially agreed upon. This concept would apply cross-culturally as well, lending support to the idea that we reach out to the flower to pick it not due to some inter-subjective, socially agreed upon basis, but because we think the flower it out past our hand ripe for picking.

Do you really think there is an image of the flower in your mind? Is that image the phenomenal state you refer to, or is the image distinct from the phenomenal state? — Ciceronianus

I have a phenomenological state that seems to me to be elicited by an external stimuli, but I know that it can be elicited without it because people dream and some people have hallucinations elicited by brain injury, direct brain stimulation, drug use, or perhaps some sort of mental illness.

I say all this because I do think it to be an image that is distinct from the flower.

The phenomenological state is the full brain state, which would include the image, the smells around me, my hunger, my thoughts of getting home in time for dinner, my slight headache, and whatever other fleeting thoughts that might be within me.

Despite there being all sorts of more elementary components you might be able find within a phenomenological state, the conscious state presents as a holistic event. I typically refer to this idea as the transcendental unity of apperception when I'm hanging out with my friends.

How about Banno's flower? It has four petals, a definite height and flowers at a particular time of year. — Ludwig V

That's just a restatement of naive realism.

You may have determined something about Banno's flower, but I didn't determine anything about it. I couldn't make head or tail of what you were going on about. — Ludwig V

Then re-read it and see if you can better understand what I said.

The photo is an accurate representation of the flower as seen with UV light. your asking if it validly represents the flower is confused. We can ask, quite validly, if the filter cut out sufficient red light, or if the emulsion might have emphasised some frequency a bit too much. Such considerations do not stop the photo being of the flower in UV light. — Banno

Any inconsistency between the flower and the perception is defined as distortion. If the radio transmits a song filled with static, we don't say the static was part of the song. We say the song was distorted by the static. If you ask if I'm hearing the song, my answer is I'm hearing parts of the song and parts of other things as well, but, to the extent the song is X, I'm not hearing X. I'm hearing all sorts of other things.

What holds true of hearing the song holds true of all perceptions of things. We have to determine which part of Object X I am sensing against those perceptions I am having of things imparted upon Object X if we want to distill what Object X is. What is the undistorted X?

My position is that it is unknowable because the perception necessarily is filled with all sorts of distortions from within me and from the environment. Pragmatically, I live my life dealing with distortions of varying degrees, but the thing is not the distortion.

Neither. They are photos. And both. The flower has structural features that cannot be seen in visible light, but can in UV. We now understand bee behaviour better, because they seek out these structures due to their sensitivity to UV. Context. — Banno

What the bee can sense is that which assists in its survival, regardless of whether it bears any resemblence to the flower.

Either the flower is red or the flower is white. Either the flower has certain structural features or it does not. What is different about color in that it can vary from perceiver to perceiver but not change the fact that it's the same flower but if the structural feature of the flower is different from one flower to the next it's a different flower?

That's an affectatious way of saying that you don't see the flower when your eyes are closed. — Banno

If I have an image of the flower in my mind after I close my eyes, I experience the phenomenal state of the flower with my eyes closed. If I open my eyes and that elicits a flower experience, then I then have that experience. Phenomenal states are brain created, often elicited by our senses, but not always.

Great idea for lyric too! — schopenhauer1

I should weave that in to the upcoming short story contest.

Accurate for what purpose? — Banno

Accurate for reflecting what is really there, with the term "really" being used in the sense you use the term "real" in the terms direct realism and indirect realism. If we concede a pragmatism, then idealism works as well.

Valid in what argument? — Banno

I wasn't speaking in terms of maintaining the validity of a syllogism. I was speaking in terms of the photograph being an accurate representation of the flower.

The image is not arbitrary, but is determined by the reflection of UV and the subsequent filters and film used. — Banno

You do not see the UV light. You see the photographic representation of the flower of how it might look to someone who can see UV rays. What you see is a representation of a flower, which is then represented to you in your consciousness.

Anyway, which one is the flower, A or B? Both? C? I just want to know what color it is. If I'm colorblind, is it black?

It is a loaded question, but because it supposes the nonsense of "phenomenal state of the flower in my consciousness". Poor philosophical theories produce poor results. — Banno

I do have a phenomenal state in my consciousness and it goes away when I close my eyes, but the flower remains. It seems like two different things. Is it not?

I rather doubt that your scenario is even likely, so I don't feel any need to decide that question. — Ludwig V

The point wasn't to determine the liklihood of how a forgery might or might not occur, but it was to point out that a forgery is a purely subjective determination. It's a judgment, having nothing to do with the physical composition of the object, unless the perceiver dictates it does. Two entirely similar US dollars, exactly the same in terms of ink, paper, and design can be different only in terms that one is forged and one not and that will affect the value of each. A forgery is a forgery due to the intent and authority of the maker, not due to the quality of the item.

I would say the object, the environment and me. However, whatever we say about these cases does not justify asserting that the same difficulties apply to everything we see. — Ludwig V

Give me a concrete case then of an object that is unimpacted by the perceiver so that you can say object A is described as having the qualities of a, b, and c in all instances.

We determined Banno's flower is not one such object and it seems your fish is not either. What then is that object you refer to?

That doesn't follow. Take the example of forged money (notes or coins). Some money is forged. Some money is genuine. Both those statements must be true, or the distinction between them collapses. So one cannot ask of all notes and coins whether they are all forged. One can ask of each note or coin, whether it is forged. But when it has been established that a given note or coin is genuine, the question is empty. — Ludwig V

The forgery example makes clear the significance of subjectivity. That is, the distinction between a true dollar bill and a forged one does not come down to a discernable physical difference between the two because it's possible to create an exact replica. A perfect forgery would still be a forgery. Distinctions in the physical appearance might count as proof of the forgery, but the true distinction is what the authority declares to be real. If I forge a dollar bill and the king is so impressed he declares it real, then it is real.

But the more telling question is this: In @Banno's example, he presented two pictures of the same flower. Which one is the accurate depiction? If we say that Flower B is the correct depiction, do we then say that Flower A is an incorrect version? I don't think we do. My assumption is that you would say that both A and B are correct depictions, just under different conditions.

Consider another example with Flower C, which is a photoshopped version of Flower A, that makes it looks larger and more colorful. Would we not all say that Flower C is not an accurate depiction of the "the flower"? What then makes A and B correct depictions but not C? That is, why is "the flower" under conditions C not a valid flower but the conditions that prevail upon A and B allow the flower to retain its validity.

And "the flower" is the complicated entity that somehow prevails throughout the conditions regardless of what they are.

I'd suggest that what makes us want to say that C is a fake is that we've added something to "the flower" which neither A nor B contains. This distinction collapses, I'd argue, because there's no meaningful difference between the arbitrary changes we impose by photoshopping as there is with regard to the arbitrary changes we might make to the external environment or to our own ability to perceive.

That is, what it means for A and B to be the same but only under "different conditions" but not for C only makes sense if we abitrarily decide which conditions are invasive enough for us to allow "the flower" to still persist.

Perceptions can be manipulated in a number of ways: (1) by manipulating the external environment by changing the lighting, the temperature, the air pollution level, whether it's suspended in air or in a glass of milk, and all sorts of ways; (2) by intentionally changing it by photoshopping it, drawing on it, cutting its leaves, etc; or (3) by changing the perceiver, by altering someone's consciousness, optic nerves, or putting rose colored glasses on the perceiver.

The question then becomes: once I have the phenomenal state of the flower in my consciousness, which one of those still represents the flower? Keep in mind, the question is loaded because it uses the word "represents" which indicates "the flower" is noumenal and has been subjected to all sorts of conditions from within and without that makes us question whether this representation is an accurate one or whether we have been so deceived to see it not as it is.

That is, this is indirect realism, with the italics to indicate we are not questioning whether our perceptions are of something external and real (i.e. not figments of our imagination), but we are questioning whether we have a blurred, photoshopped, or deteriorated version. That I might see a flower as a gorilla under certain conditions only means I am denying direct realism, claiming that the flower does have anything within it that makes it inherently gorilla-like. I see whatever I do as an interplay of the object, the environment, and my subjective way of seeing things, which is why Descartes was correct in asking whether his perceptions were reliable measures of reality.

Interesting to note if in the US this will cause more critique or not in the democratic party. — ssu

It will split the Democratic party and hand Trump a victory.

With a bit of help, we can see UV. — Banno

Doesn't this example show the opposite of what the OP hopes to prove, namely that we have no reasonable basis to challenge the veracity of our senses?

If for millions of years we saw the flower as X, but now we learn the flower more truly appears as Y, can't we conclude for all things what we learned from the flower, namely that things as we sense them are not as they truly are?

If X is a perception inconsistent with reality, then the thesis of the OP (i.e. we have no reasonable basis to challenge the veracity of our senses) is disproved.

Once we establish a basis for our skepticism regarding the veracity of our perceptions in one instance (as we just did from your flower example), we'd then logically need to do the same for all perceptions, which leads us to Descartes, the person I feel the OP most wants to avoid.

What an I missing?

Which is merely to say that we're human beings. One might say the same of any living creature. Are they "blind" as well? We must be omnipotent, be God then, in order not to be "blind"? It seems a rather unusual way to use the word. — Ciceronianus

If there is something we do not know, then by definition, we are not omniscient. Your question, as I took it, was why we should ever doubt the accuracy of what we see before us, and that should we so doubt, we do it disingenuously.

You attempted to deal with a very simple case in the OP where you acknowledged that our vision did report to us information that could mislead us into thinking that a person grows in height as we move closer to them, but you correctly pointed out that our vision isn't the only thing that informs us of the world, but that our intelligence does as well. That is, I know you don't get physically larger when I get closer to you or that the straw in the glass of water doesn't actually bend even though it looks that way because I am able to noodle all that in my head and realize such perceptions need to be interpreted by me and with that I can figure out the world in which I live.

I then took a more complex case dealing with a person who might be truly blind to portions of reality incapable of sorting out what the world truly were like as in the case of the approaching subject or the bending straw. That then resulting in efforts to interpret "blind" very narrowly, as in surely someone who needs glasses knows when he's not wearing them that the world isn't actually blurred. I then explained that blindness is any sort of inability to sense things as they are, which is obviously the case because we all know that what we smell isn't what a dog smells. We can also imagine that there are sensations that no organism can detect.

The point of all of this is responsive to what I think is the larger inquiry, and that is whether folks like Descartes are foolish to question that which no one has a basis to question. I think the above discussion does provide such a basis.

course, people will generally make concessions of weakness, fault, or deficit when it comes to small or trivial things.
But they are unlikely to believe (much less openly admit) they might be blind in some way that matters. — baker

I'm pretty sure the vast majority of people admit they can't smell an intruder like a dog.

seems unlikely that many people believe this. — baker

We are in fact "blind in some regard" whether you believe. You can't see ultraviolet, hear high frequencies, taste certain flavors, feel minute variations, or smell certain smells.

I think it's unlikely that the nearsighted and the blind will conclude that all are nearsighted and all are blind. — Ciceronianus

I think it's unlikely that we are not blind in some regard we don't know about.

Well, does the fact that they appear blurred to you with your glasses off persuade you they are or may be blurred? — Ciceronianus

My perception of the apple is blurred without the glasses. If I never had glasses, I would assume the apple and the blurriness were one in the same. My assumption is that there are other distortions between the apple and my perception that are not correctible or that they are correctible by means I don't yet know about.

When did you last believe, and treat, people you see across the street from you as if they were only, e.g., 6 inches tall because that's how they appeared to be when you saw them, and thought that they became 6 feet tall when they crossed the street to speak to you? — Ciceronianus

I got an eye exam the other day, and it was relevant how I saw things, with an objective standard being assumed that I varied from, so I was prescribed glasses to bring my vision into alignnment with what was thought to be the standard.

My vision wasn't so skewed that I saw objects in ways that would suggest a neurological problem (like not adjusting objects properly for distance), but I assume that could also be the case.

That's a pragmatic example of when it matters.

Philosophically it matters because it suggests an interpretative function of the eye apparatus and the brain and how that interplays on the object itself to the extent we may question whether our perception is a match with reality. I would presume that with my glasses off, I do not see objects as they are, but more as they are blurred.

The rapes were cotemporaneous with the 5000 missiles, that's true. The rapes are not the reason Israel invaded Gaza, though. The rapes are the thing that upset you the most. They're the reason you cheer on the invasion and sanction the attack on civilian men, women, and children. Right? — frank

The rapes were the result of their actually sending soldiers over and invading the country. It established a much higher risk to personal safety of the citizens than did the missles. It brought the battle to an entirely different level, just as when the Israeli boots hit the Gaza siol.

That you think I cheer or whatever you're saying is just your incorrect interpretation of my position in order to fit your narrative that this has to do with vengence. It doesn't.

I didn't think I needed an argument. Hamas fired 5000 missiles at Israel. That is why Israel retaliated. That is why the west, with Joe Biden in the lead, is supporting Israel's offensive. If it just been a few cases of rape, infanticide, and kidnapping, today would be a normal Monday. — frank

It's obviously a myriad of factors, but the paratroopers marked an actual boots on the ground invasion which certainly gave Israel a basis for the attack, even absent the 5000 missiles. Whether the 5000 missles alone would have raised security concerns high enough to necessitate the current invasion, I'm not sure. In any event, my statement that this invasion has much to do with the real security issue that needed to be resolved when the women were raped was hardly ridiculous.

You made me stop talking to you. — unenlightened

Very well. But, so you know, my objective wasn't just to be contrary. I find your position as absurd as you find mine. Worldview difference maybe.

That's just ridiculous. — frank

That's not an argument. That's just a wrong evaluation. The invasion of Gaza absolutely had to do with the invasion by Hamas, which was, as I recall, the murder of children, raping of women, and the kidnapping of the elderly and the young. Had that not happened, today would be a normal Monday and not one with Gaza under heavy attack (although they are paused momentarily).

Sure. Hitler's Mein Kampf, on the other hand, is very well thought through and supremely reasonable. He was just trying to defend Germany. For real. Read it.

I still think you know what you saying is wrong, you just can't keep your from saying it. — frank

Your inability to keep straight that there are moral justifications and pragmatic justifications is where you have gone wrong. A vicious murderer can be rational. I've already conceded that and that was the point of the video that was provided, to establish that it is not irrationality that drives people to evil decisions, but that it is a lack of moral reasoning that does. The reason Dahmer did as he did isn't because he lacked the abilty to do otherwise, but it's because he thought out a vile plan and did it. Had he an ounce of moral reasoning, he wouldn't have.

I'm not sure why this is difficult to follow.

You know, I really believe you don't. That is the tragedy.

But "Hamas made me do it" is pathetic. — unenlightened

I'm sincere regardless of whether you believe me.

The cause of the attack on Gaza was the Hamas invastion that preceded it. The cause of your shooting an intruder was the intrusion.

[1]Dude said they're a peaceful people, I pointed out not really.

[2]Do you know the why word for the average majority that makes up a set is mean? And why Mean also equates to a nasty hateful individual? Why is it that the word Villain means to come from the Villa where the masses come from? — Vaskane

Comment #1 says something about Jews. In particular you said that they are a murderous people. Comment #2 says something about everybody.

You did not say "Jews are not a peaceful people, but, then again, no one is, just look at the word "mean" and "villa."
You also did not say something about Israel. You said something about Jews.

Strange that tough minded Israel doesn't follow such a policy. All a matter, I have to suppose, of whose child it is whether it is or isn't moral to sacrifice them. — unenlightened

It's immoral to sacrifice children in the advancement of a political objective, which is what makes Hamas immoral in their doing that. Israel is also trying to protect its children by exchanging Palestinians who have actually attacked and murdered Israelis for the return of its innocent children.

The party guilty for the death of the children are those who drape themselves in the children while attacking, not the person protecting themselves.

I don't see the moral equivalence you're trying to draw.

The rape of a Jewish woman has nothing to do with the defense of Israel. — frank

Of course it does. Israel doesn't want its citizens raped again, so they are dismantling their enemy's ability to do that.

The point was that reason is not the anchor of morality. It can support either moral or immoral behavior. Therefore, assuring yourself that you're reasonable is not the way to make sure you aren't about to become a Nazi. — frank

I'm just not agreeing that there isn't a rational basis for ethical reasoning, even if the source of decisions rests additionally in the emotions. If you're an ethical emotivist, that's just a difference between the two of us. I also am not conflating pragmatic reasons with ethical ones, which is what I think you're doing here. I get that Jeffrey Dahmer had his reasons for his vile acts and that he wasn't entirely irrational else he could not have carried them out. I do not think, however, that he had any valid ethical reasons for why he acted as he did.

You were earlier indicating that you reserve the right to work out the moral solution to a thought experiment, but now you say it's beyond you and we need to outsource these judgments to the special few? How do you choose these best and brightest if you don't know right from wrong yourself? — frank

I'm not interested in these meta-meta discussions that lead us to the place that none of us have a view from no where, so we all are biased and there is not such thing as objectivity. We function very well with all our baggage and are able to make decisions daily is the best I can say.

I would encourage you to rethink the link between morality and reasonableness. Look at this: — frank

The video doesn't address what we're discussing.

There are (1) ethical reasons and (2) pragmatic reasons. If I want to steal your belongings that you are not watching over and I can do this without any possibility of being caught, there are a variety of ethical reasons not to do that. For those reasons, I will not do that.

There are a number of pragmatic reasons I should steal your belongings, namely that I will get some cool shit for free. I will not do that, though, because the ethical reasons prevail over the pragmatic because I wish to be an ethical person. But, sure, if I steal under the cover of night in full disguise in order to avoid detection, I am being rational in the sense I've arrived at ways to achieve my pragmatic (yet unethical) goal.

When I say I am looking for a reasonable basis for making an ethical decision, I am not interested in the pragmatic, but I am interested in the ethical. I fully understand that Stalin might have been very rational in the sense that he formulated reasons for his brand of evil, but he was entirely unreasonable if he thought that the basis he provided for his actions were based upon ethical reasons and not just pragmatic ones.


take over Canada by invading and pillaging, there are numerous ethical reasons why that is wrong. For that reason, I will not do it.

Or because Jews are not murderous people. They are used to be being minorities in countries and having to keep their heads down
— BitconnectCarlos

They killed their own people in which they came from the Canaanites, to gain Israel the first time. And have held plenty of wars in their time. — Vaskane

Are you making the argument that Jews are in fact a murderous people from time immemorial? Is it something in the Jewish blood or culture do you suppose that makes them such animals?

The world is usually more complicated than trolley-like thought experiments make it out to be Start with doing what's right and then you might see that there are alternative courses of action that weren't obvious at first. — frank

I'd say the opposite and argue that usually the world is more complicated than black and white, particularly in situations involving war where there are many competing interests. We typically try to find our best and brightest to resolve our ethical and legal issues due to their complexity and nuance.

You may also see that you wanted to simplify things because what you really wanted was revenge, not defense. — frank

Bias of the decision maker is always an issue in every decision, which requires that person making the decision to be self-aware and have the proper temperment, but I don't think it is impossible to make decisions where your own interests will be affected.

To be able to sustain your argument that the decision was based not upon ethical reasons but upon personal vendetta, you would have to show that the ethical basis provided for the decision was not reasonable, as opposed to just presenting a vague concern over what the hidden motivations of the decision maker might be.

They are used as weapons of war. If you don't use them, then my original point stands, that the virtuous put themselves at a disadvantage by renouncing immorality. Once we have agreed that far, we can argue about what acts in particular we might find it seemly to renounce in all circumstances, and what killings and maimings of innocents we can tolerate while still enjoying our moral superiority in difficult situations. — unenlightened

It's not a renouncement of morality when you have to resolve a moral dilemma in a real world situation. A dilemma arises not when you have to choose between being moral or not (e.g. should I lie and get the job or not?), but when there are two equally compelling choices based both upon equally justified bases (e.g. should I throw a person into the sea to keep the boat from sinking or do we all have to sink?).

In the scenario posed, the question is whether we can shoot a child who is being used as a human shield in order to save our city (or, in the alternative, whether we can invade a hospital in order to remove an enemy military base underneath). We have two competing moral rules: (1) protection of the innocent vs. (2) protection of ourselves. I've resolved this issue by prioritizing my own safety and the safety of my city, and I do think that justifiable under various ethical theories, particularly Utilitarianism. I place a higher duty on the protection of those closest to me as well, meaning I do have a higher duty to my children, my family, and my general community. I also think it's necessary to ask what it would mean to allow the enemy to prevail in the conflict in terms of the suffering that would result from that.

To offer a legal analogy, we don't consider it an abandonment of the law when courts are called upon to interpret the interplay of laws and resolve conflicts in laws. That's just how law works and that's how ethics works.

I've perused the link offered. Why should I take this interpretation of monetary compensation as authoritative? — javra

You can arrive at your own interpretation, but I was offering one that those who are committed to using those words as a guide to living actually use it.

I brought it up because in the context we're speaking against the backdrop of the war in Israel is that some might believe the Israeli response is motivated by an eye for an eye mentality. As you noted, that might require a 1:1 ratio, as if to imply an Israeli response is inconsistent with Jewish morality. My point was that an eye for an eye response to life is inconsistent with Jewish thought regardless of ratio

So how ought it to be properly interpreted? You take out one of my eyes and I take out both of yours, kind of thing? Or something else? — javra

In an entirely unpredicted way:

https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/479511/jewish/What-Does-Eye-for-an-Eye-Really-Mean.htm

These biblical interpretations tend to pull in so many sources, you're never safe to assume they are used in a literal way.

As a slight interlude: The ethical dictum of "an eye for an eye" strictly upholds a 1:1 ratio of retribution as moral. So both a 100:1 or a 10:1 ratio would be misaligned to it, and thereby immoral.

Just wanted to say it. — javra

No it doesn't. Your literalist, four corners reading isn't consistent with how those who actually use that document for moral guidance interpret that passage of Leviticus.

of society hitherto owes its origins to the splendor of those barbarians mighty enough to carve their will through blood and declare what is "Good." — Vaskane

You've misread if you've read a moral subjectivity into what I've said. Morality is contextual, not subjective. All matters must be considered, including the net result of not aggressively defending and what that would mean to the now defeated previously moral nation and what would happen to those citizens.

Say there was a situation where one of your loved ones was being used as a human shield by villainous entities. Would you still say it's ok to blow the shields up for the purposes of defense? — frank

You don't turn to the least objective to ask what is most objective. That is, a judge who has an interest in the outcome of the case cannot sit on that case. So, might I be irrational in that circumstance? Likely.

I would, though, place 100% of the blame of the death on the enemy, and would find them additionally immoral for forcing a moral person into a situation where he had to kill an innocent person.

Don't claim the moral high ground and the right to murder, rape torture etc. Virtue has a price. — unenlightened

I didn't. Rape, murder, and torture isn't necessary for the protection of one's society. I do impose a duty on a society to defend aggressively in order to protect the civility within its own walls from the barbarism outside its walls. That is the case even if that aggressive defense allows for some acts that may be moral violations within its walls.

While it's understandable that someone steeped in the traditions of inside the walls will protest the actions of those protecting the walls, that protest is not a special right, but it's only a privilege provided by those protectors.

Protection has a price.

Where we differ most is my assertion that protection is a virtue.

I don't think that follows. What I'm indicating is that you have priorities of rules, with self preservation over the unethical at the top. That is, if an evil band of murderers exposes your peace loving society to death, oppression, subrogation and the like, and you have the ability to stop it, you must, even should it means devastation to the peaceful members of the murderous invaders.

To proclaim yourself super-moral for allowing the murderers to take over your society when you had the means to stop it makes your morality not just unsustainable, but, I'd submit evil and not moral at all.

As I've also noted, the morality I've described is what prevails in most every nation. To the extent that is now challenged is what poses the greatest risks today to those countries. We cannot civilize ourselves to literal death.

This means that bad people always have the advantage of playing by the rules when it suits them, and cheating when that suits them better — unenlightened

But this is what I'm challenging, which is that you can have an ethical ethics system if it gives advantage to those you consider unethical.

Ethics is not a suicide pact.

It's worthy to note that no one abides by such an intellectually concocted theory anyway, which is why nations go to war with minimal philosophical hand wringing when threatened or attacked.

You have 2 competing rules:

1. You have the right to defend yourself.
2. You are forbidden to kill the innocent.

Your question is what happens when the killing of the innocent is required to defend yourself, which is often the case in war.

You conclude you must allow yourself to die if the killing of the innocent is required, but that doesn't follow. That conclusion only follows if you choose to negate Rule #1 by prioritizing Rule #2, but you provide no basis for that choice.

I'd submit the opposite as you have, and hold that self-preservation is of the highest priority, meaning you have the right to kill the innocent to save yourself, meaning I prioritize #1 over #2 when there is a conflict.

This conflict betweenv#1 and #2 is an ancient one, resolved by distinguishing between (1) killing and (2) murdering. Note that the Biblical prohibition is not correctly translated as "thou shalt not kill, " but it is "thou shalt not murder." That is, that set of ancients saw a need to distinguish differing sorts of killing.

https://coldcasechristianity.com/writings/the-difference-between-killing-and-murdering/

The concept of self defense being a duty (not just a right) also has roots in secular Western philosophy, meaning pacifism for the sake of protecting the innocent among your enemy is itself immoral.

https://www.dcs.training/the-moral-right-to-self-defense/#:~:text=In%20summary%2C%20we%20have%20the,doesn't%20befall%20innocent%20persons

Anyhow, I'm going to let Hanover have the final say in our debate if he wants it and bow out of the thread for a while. I'm saying this here to make it harder for me to be tempted to post more because I think I've said enough for now. — Baden

I too will bow out for the time being, leaving with this final comment to ponder: quidquid Latine dictum sit altum videtur.

Try again, specifically tell me why they had to suffocate the babies to death and also kill other children. Details please. We're talking about you justifying the killing of babies. You'll need to actually make an effort. — Baden

Palestinians report 4 babies died in the hospital. Assuming that valid information, I assume it occurred as the result of power outages or other events secondary to the IDF"s attempt to remove Hamas from the hospital, or maybe they died of things unrelated to the war.

The IDF did not intentionally suffocate babies, and to the extent babies died collateral to the war efforts, responsibility rests with those who brought the war front to hospital, not the IDF. I don't justify killing babies, which is what I said before, which makes Hamas all the more despicable because they are responsible for that.

31 babies were evacuated, lending support to IDF"s claims they are doing all they can to reduce innocent casualties, which is extraordinary in comparison to what other nations do.

On the other hand, Hamas intentionally killed babies by their very hands, not as collateral damage, but intentionally and purposefully. That menace has to be eradicated, and the government of the Palestinian people cannot be removed without Palestinian casualties. That is always the case with war. The citizens suffer for the decisions of their government.