So there is a thing that causes us to have congruent sensations of plastic cups but is not a plastic cup. — Banno

The properties experienced of the object are subjectively imposed. An object absent its properties is not describable. While that might not make you happy, it's the way the world works.

You're arguing against Kant, not me.
Tell someone who cares.The notion of the noumenal, and its various misunderstandings, are amongst the worst ideas ever had — Banno

The point that you don't care is irrelevant. My point was you weren't arguing against what I said, but what Kant said. Your declaration against Kant is relevant only to the extent someone was awaiting your final conclusory opinion about him relevant.

Here's the problem we were addressing: you claim that there are phenomena before each of us that are sufficiently similar that we can have a discussion about them, but that we can say nothing at all about what causes those phenomena - that we can talk about images of red cups, but not about red cups. — Banno

I've claimed the noumenal causative of the phenomenal. You're arguing against Kant, not me.

They are shared phenomena? SO now you are saying that my perception-of-cup is shared with you? That you and I both feel the pain in my back?

This conversation teeters on insanity. — Banno

So you've read my comments as suggesting that the sensory input required to illicit pain is conversation about pain?

This conversation isn't insane, it's just nonsensical interpretation. Interesting, though, how representations of reality are often muddled by differing ways we process.

The images on the screen are not the same. But they might be images of the same cup. Which is exactly what you cannot claim, since for you there is no cup. — Banno

Why must the image be of something real to be seen? We can't compare my randomly created image againstyour by discussing them online without submitting the images to one another?

Yes, you are right that your unshared phenomena drop out of the discussion, and what we can talk about is the shared world.

But that's my point; the beetle argument counts against our talking about the unshared mental phenomena you want to make central.

You are shooting yourself in the foot here. — Banno

They are all shared phenomenona. Pain, cups, flowers, the whole lot. If pain can be an shared without there being pains out there to measure against so can cups

Failure to commit. You want to talk about red plastic cups without committing to there being red plastic cups - isn't that right? — Banno

No. You so miss the point here. When we were talking of the image on our screen, not the cup. I was talking about the image on my screen, you of yours. How do we know they're the same image?

Substitute "screen" for phenomenal state, and you have the same answer.

The beetle would be to pretend that there was an unsharable mental object - perhaps, for example, an unsharable perception of something - that could somehow play a role in a language game. — Banno

Not "perhaps" That's the exact point.

Pain is the beetle, yet we talk of pain, never sharing our pain with one another.

When I say "I am in pain" how do you know what I mean if there is no pain we both can look at, but are limited to our phenomenal states?

If we can do this with pain, we can with cups?

But that would be to talk about what you choose to call the noumenal, which you insist we cannot talk about. — Banno

No. That would require that we talk about our respective phenomenal states.

If they were talking about their perceptions, then since your perception-of-Dell is distinct from their perception-of-Dell, you would never be able to talk about the same thing. — Banno

Is this not a violation of the beetle in the box thought experiment:

"That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation', the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant."

That is, we can talk about the thing without concern for what the thing is, which I took to be the punchline of what W was saying in regards to the irrelevancy of metaphysical analysis, but here you argue that it's critical we know that we have the same beetle in the box if we wish to speak of beetles.

Tha answer is blindingly simple: Both Banno's-peception-of-Janus and Hanover's-perception-of-Janus are of Janus; Janus exists independently of those perceptions, and it is Janus to whom "Janus" refers. — Banno

You're not following.

If we can discuss the differences between the two different cups we each see without the other seeing the other's respective cup, we are speaking only of our respective phenomenal state without access to the other's cup.

If there are discrepancies between the two images we could discover them by each of us describing what we see on our computer. — Janus

Exactly, which would enable us to similarly distinguish how our phenomenal states varied.

See https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/627569 — Banno

This is entirely non-responsive to my post.

Your claim was that if we spoke only of the phenomenal, we could not meaningfully speak because we would be speaking of different things. I would be speaking of the X in my head and you of the X in your head, so why even refer to both as X would be your claim.

I pointed out that we can and do speak of different things as if they are the same, regardless of whether we're talking about cups or just experiences of cups.

For example, let's talk about this:



It's the famous red solo cup.

Are we taking about the cup on your computer or mine?

The footprint and the flower are Hume, not Kant at all. See “constant conjunction”. — Mww

I've acknowledged that my claim the noumenal causes the phenomenonal was a departure from Kant. Kant wouldn't allow any claims be made of the noumenal.

Not sure who here you're claiming is Humean, but I've not implicated him because Hume denies causation entirely, a view I reject. I accept the idea that causation is synthetic a priori, without which an understanding of the phenomenal would be impossible.

I'd agree, though, that Kant says nothing about causation within the noumenal realm, but that's because that realm is beyond analysis. However, to the extent we wish to depart Kant and speculate upon the noumenal, we'd be required to impose causation upon it because that's what synthetic a priori truths do - they force a particular view on the world.

I'll also defer to others on this because it's also a precondition for any comment about Kant that someone explain how you've misunderstood him.

If they were talking about their perceptions, then since your perception-of-Dell is distinct from their perception-of-Dell, you would never be able to talk about the same thing. — Banno

How could what you say possibly be true, considering we are talking about the same thing, yet reading entirely different words. That is, the words on my screen are not the words on yours. They consist of different molecules and such. I trust my phenomenal state of your thoughts, as reduced to symbols, and transmitted in a way that accurately represents what you see in your head to what I see in my head allows this conversation.

How can you deny the layers of representationalism between you seeing a cup at your home thousands of miles from mine, your translating that into linguistic symbols, it being reduced to electronic impulses, it being transmitted through wires and airwaves, it being received and interpreted to my screen, and you still say we must see the same same cup to speak of the same?

Frankly, the approach you are adopting strikes me as singularly bad for your mental health. — Banno

Interesting psychological twist here. I suppose strict adherence to secular philosophy might lead to feelings of isolation and that might form a personal basis to choose certain theories, but that fear isn't on my radar, largely because at heart I'm a theist.

But should one day I snap, and find myself amid helicopter search lights and yelping hounds, it will be for something far more glorious than an errant choice of indirect realism as an explanatory theory.

Truth a religious concept? Tell me the truth. Do you really believe that? — Cartuna

As noted in a prior post to @Ciceronianus, he asked why the obsession with an evil demon, a world denying entity. But of course the Meditations was not a nihilist discourse. The evil demon was destroyed by God. It's a simple take on Descartes, but that's how the story ended.

The point here is that you've got to assert faith in something at the end of the day, and even if it's something as basic as realism, such is still faith.

Now why is that? Why shouldn't it be possible to see nature like it is? Why should nature hold secrets? — Cartuna

Because truth is a religious concept. You want to know how things really are? Believe in something.

When someone else asks what size Dell is, they are not asking about your perceptions, they are asking about Dell. — Banno

They are talking about their perception. They aren't talking about the cup. That they think the cup and their perception are the exact thing and therefore speak that way is the consequence of the naiveté inherent among naive realists.

It's an odd disconnect from reality, taught in first year philosophy. It's a test to see who amongst the students can see beyond such poor arguments to move to second year Philosophy. — Banno

The point of such debates isn't to prove an ultimate winner. The question of scientific realism is one pretty much accepted as unanswerable. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_philosophy#Metaphilosophy

I see the second year (and third year and on and on) as a chance to better hone one's logic and reason, and even perhaps to settle on theories that suit one's worldview. If these things were not debatable, they wouldn't be philosophy, but they'd be physics, biology, or something else.

. A thing-in-itself about which we can say nothing is vacant. Since we can say nothing about it, it cannot enter into our conversations. It's no more than word play, along the lines of the little man who wasn't there. — Banno

The significance of unobservables: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unobservable

Sure. But here's an important thing... those "phantom things" are not what we see, taste and touch; they are what our seeing, tasting and touching, at least in part, consists in. They are not what we see, but part of our seeing; not what we touch, but part of our touching; not what we taste, but part of what you have called the activity of touching. — Banno

Under this construct, there's a cup , and I impose upon it a certain shape and color, and then I have a phenomenal state. The cup is what we have imposed the shape and color upon. My phenomenal state is therefore a representation of the cup, with the shape and color added to it.

We then analyze precisely what the cup is. We determine it is the phenomenal state minus those attributes added by my acts of touching, tasting, and seeing. Since the cup is composed of only those things I can't sense, I cannot tell you anything about the cup because the only things I know about a thing are the things I sense.

How is this not indirect realism?

I think that risible. Shall we give your perception of the plane a proper name - "Fred" perhaps?

Better, surely, to think of the plane as an individual, and your seeing it as something you might do, rather than as an individual. — Banno

Perceiving is the act, perception is the thing. I can't think of the phenomenal state I possess of the computer before me as a verb and something that is happening anymore than I can think of the actual computer screen as something that is being done. There is molecular movement in every event in the universe and nothing lies still, so I understand my perception is occurring in an ongoing sense, but so is the computer screen.

We will name my perception of the computer screen "phenomenal state" and we will name the computer screen itself "noumenal state." The former we call "Dell," but the latter has no name because we don't know enough about who it is.

One is a plane. the other is something like an interaction between you and the plane. — Banno

This means: we have 2 things: (1) planes and (2) perceptions of planes.

(1) is the plane.
(2) is the plane + my interaction with it.

Am I right so far?

If the plane is the object and the perception is the object + my interaction with it, and I only know what I perceive, and I don't know which part of my perception is the added part and which is the plane part, then I don't know what the plane is. I only know what my perception is.

The logic follows right?

The notion of a thing-in-itself. This is a nonsense. — Banno

Then why did you talk about it above? You identified it as #1. If #1 is actually the plane + my interaction with it, it's #2.

This means when we speak of planes, assuming we don't speak nonsense, we speak only of what we perceive, and we make no claim about the airplane because we don't know how closely our perception matches the airplane.

But, should we deny there is an airplane absent our perception (i.e when the tree falls in the woods where no one is there to see it, there is no tree) we are no longer realists. The noumenal anchors us in realism. That the thing in itself is unknowable doesn't mean it's meaningless or nonsense. It serves the purpose of rooting reality in the world, not just in our head.

One is a plane. the other is something like an interaction between you and the plane. — Banno

Alright, we have 2 things: (1) the plane, and (2) (a) an interaction between me and (b) the plane.

What does #1 look like?
What does #2(a) look like?

My guess is that the only thing we know anything about is 2(a). I've said 100 times 2(b) is causative of 2(a), but I've also said the only thing we can know is 2(a).

#1 is a noumenal causative agent of #2, which is the phenomenal.

Your perception of the plane is not the actual plane. — Banno

What is the distinction between the two? Just location?

The fact that "none of this matters" would seem, to me, to establish something regarding its acceptability as an assessment of the world and out place in it. That it's incredible. — Ciceronianus

But lack of credibility and lack of relevance are different objections.

The question we're addressing is the probative value of evidence, which presupposes representations of "truth" whatever that may be, and which is the subject matter of this thread. That is, when I see something, of what probative value is my having seen the thing in terms of proving the thing exits? That is, does the evidence I possess prove the thing I assert, namely that the thing is as I say it is? It seems we need to know what the thing is if we seek to establish whether my claims about it are true.

The point made is that the blip can be used to refer to the plane in much the same way that word "plane" can be used to refer to the plane. — Banno

There is the plane and then there is the word "plane," so I'm counting 2 things here.
There is the plane and then there is the perception I have of the plane, so, again, I'm counting 2 things here.

Why must I use the word "plane" to refer to the plane, but I must consider my perception of the plane to be the actual plane?

More consistent would be that the word "plane" is the plane, but it's just another way of dealing with planes. That seems the @Ciceronianus approach (I think, and I'm truly not trying to misstate or put words in anyone's mouth.). This approach eliminates duality on all levels. There are just planes and they are however we experience them.

I'll entertain the idea of non-representationalism, but I think we need to do it consistently. That is, we have objects of unknown quality such that it's incoherent to speak of the thing in itself, so we therefore limit our "knowledge" of the objects in our world to how we interact with them. So, when we say "the plane is in the sky," the word "plane" is a direct experience of the plane equal to seeing it, touching it, licking it, and sensing it in every humanely possible way, just so long as it offers an understanding of the plane. The understanding of the plane is the plane.

I'm not sure this is realism, but I've at least formulated something consistent from all I've taken in here.

In short, we need not reduce the concept of “perception” to any other object in the world, whether faculty or organ. So why would we we? — NOS4A2

Because when one has a perceptual problem only that portion of the body that perceives need be addressed, much like when you are having a digestive disorder, treatment is focused upon the digestive system and not upon eardrum.

But why? If you can't see what a flower really is in the first place, why bother checking to see if you have an eye problem? — Ciceronianus

If my objective is to keep blips on the screen, then I'll do what is necessary to keep blips on the screen. That's a pragmatic pursuit.

If I want to know what the blips are and what the underlying structure of this whole enterprise is, I want to look behind the blip, find the airplane, look behind the airplane, find its structure. That's a metaphysical pursuit.

I'm saying all we have are representations. Blips are representations of airplanes and all you experience are blips. If we speak of representations, we must be admitting to a representation of something. That something is ultimately noumenal. That we cannot even speak of the composition of the noumenal is the definition of noumenal.

So you say why not just say that the phenomenal is all there is. I say because it's not. But I do agree, pragmatically, none of this matters, where "this" is 90% of what we talk about here. Of course, "this" is a referent; the antecedent is what actually is.

Do you deny a meaningful distinction between direct and indirect evidence?
— Hanover

No. — Banno

Very well, then let's work from here.

The blip on the radar screen is indirect evidence. If we were to challenge the accuracy of the statement "the plane has disappeared" based upon the radar screen feedback, we would look into the construction of the radar equipment and perhaps ask some experts in the field how could it be that there is an airplane in the sky, but not a blip on the radar. That is to say, the blip is not the airplane and we all know that, so before we start calling families and informing them that there will be one less plate to set at Christmas dinner, we check the accuracy of our indirect evidence. Before taking the radar apart, as I suggested, we radio the pilot. If the pilot responds, we now have indirect evidence of the airplane's continued existence, as generally pilots don't answer who are in disappeared airplanes.

If you claim to have seen the airplane in the sky, but it never lands and we can't find it, we might start to question what you saw, whether your interpretation of whatever you saw was actually the airplane. We might check your eyes, ask you how much you know about airplanes, whether you're schizophrenic, were drunk, or anything else that might have resulted in your misinterpreting the indirect evidence of the plane.

At some point, you might start denying the evidence is indirect, but that it is direct. For example, if you're sitting in the airplane and enjoying some of those really hard cookies, drinking from a small plastic cup. But, again, even then, calling that direct but the other examples indirect seems arbitrary. If it's not, then describe to me that bright line dividing the two, because your response to my question related to there being two different types of evidence was unequivocal. . You did previously claim the blip was direct evidence of the plane. That I don't follow.

I also don't understand the how the organism under your construct is a single holistic indivisible perceiver. Your objection to my claim that there are objects external to me is somehow an argument of multiverses or some such, isn't accurate. Admitting there are objects external to me is the only way to avoid solipsism . Humans possess parts that perceive and parts that don't, just as there are parts of us that digest food and other parts that don't. My point here is simply to say that should I perceive what I think to be a flower or airplane and there's some reason to dispute it, it makes perfect sense to check the health and accuracy of the perception equipment, whether that be running a diagnostic on the radar equipment or giving me an eye exam.

In the law, there is what is referred to as direct evidence and then there is indirect evidence. The latter is often referred to as circumstantial evidence. Me seeing you steal my car is direct evidence. Me seeing your fingerprint on my car is circumstantial. One is not considered more probative than the other. In fact, with DNA evidence, circumstantial evidence can be more powerful.

Do you deny a meaningful distinction between direct and indirect evidence? That is, the fingerprint is Banno as much as those two curious eyes that are your avatar are Banno as much as the old man in your mirror is Banno?

As if you could only talk about the dot, and not the plane — Banno

If the dot disappears, I think I'd say "the dot disappeared" as opposed to the plane disappeared because typically planes don't do that. I'd then radio the pilot to confirm the plane still exists. I'd do that because the dot isn't the plane.

The dot on the screen is the plane, much as the word "plane" in "the plane is airborne" is the plane - it's a way of using the dot, and a way of using the word. — Banno

"The plane", the dot, and the thing you sit in are all the same plane, right?

How does location play into identity? Not at all?

we don't see things as they are; if things in themselves are unknowable, then how do you know "that's exactly what happens". I posed this question earlier and you failed to respond—too difficult? — Janus

I can only describe the phenomenal.

But you are asking me where the line is to be drawn between these mooted internal and external worlds. — Banno

They aren't worlds. They are objects in the world. You deny objects?

both, or either. There's no essence-of-plane, just ways of talking about planes. Air traffic controllers do talk about the blip as the plane, and they are not wrong — Banno

You think they mean it's the plane or they mean it's a representation of a plane?

Again, is a "plane" a plane? I'm just not seeing a difference between a symbol and a thing the way you're describing it.

Notice the air traffic controller sits looking at his screen.

But do you sit, looking at your perceptions? No. You have your perceptions. The alternative is the homunculus fallacy, the little man inside your head looking out.

You've mislead yourself with the analogy. — Banno

This again.

Alright, where is the metaphoric computer screen properly positioned for my analogy to be correct? Is it at the watery surface of my twinkling eye or is it on the front surface of my closed eyelid? It seems you wish to eliminate the homunculus by saying the person begins at some molecular point and instantly perceives when the light of the flower hits my body, even if it means denying the science, which says that hairs and eyelids don't perceive. It's odd to me that I perceive a flower when my eyes are closed, but I suppose I do because bodies perceive, not parts of bodies. That's what I'm told at least.

We have all seen the cartoon picture of a homunculus sitting inside the middle of the brain looking at what's delivered to him, with yet another man inside that man's head ad infinitum. That is not what I envision. What I envision is a faculty within the brain that processes the impulses received from the various sense organs. I envision that because that's exactly what happens. Sever the optic nerve, you'll stop the input of data. And that's not to say the only way to elicit the perception is through sensory input. You can stick electrodes in the brain, drug me up, let me sleep, do all sorts of things to make flowers appear to me.

But back to the other part of my analogy that has gotten lost in this discussion. I'm referring to the blip. If I should see a blip when you see an airplane as we know airplanes to look, then properly understood, as you've presented it, that blip is the airplane. It's not a representation, correct? To say otherwise leaves us asking the age old question of what is the airplane in and of itself, wings and jet engines, or blips? As long as our perception enables successful navigation in the world, then we have truth. Do I have this right?

I say "yes", you claim that direct realism is the belief that the perception and the flower are the same thing, I point out that this is not so, that direct realism holds that one's perception of a flower is of a flower, not of an unknown.

Let's take it from there. You now start constructing direct realist men of straw. — Banno

It's not men of straw, it's naive realism I describe, but not the naive realism you accept. Very well. I see your post above, and I'm not sure what you're saying is any different from my claim that the flower is causative of the perception. To state otherwise would be idealism, a position no one here has so far held.

To say the pain from my stubbed toe is the road is an odd way of saying it, as I see that pain as evidence of the road, but speak as you may. The blip on the radar screen isn't quite a plane to me, but is a representation of it. What is the plane? The air traffic controller stuck with his head only on that screen might be inclined to think the blip is an airplane, but others might disagree. Those who would disagree would be those who have seen actual airplanes. Bristle as you will with the world "actual" here, but it does have meaning in this context when comparing the airplane you sit it in against that blip on the screen. Which is more accurate would be hard to say, as we don't speak of things in themselves anymore, so we don't know what a true airplane is other than that we can figure out how to interact with.

But to ask this directly, which is the better representation of the airplane? The blip or the plane you're in? Or, are neither representations, but only airplanes? Curious question, right? And what of the word "airplane," is that not also the airplane, as its creation was caused by the airplane? Why wouldn't the word be the thing under this position, or do you hold that as well?

You keep missing the point. The flower is not the perception-of-flower. — Banno

I'm aware there are flowers and perceptions of flowers. The flower is in the garden and the perception in my head, up until I blink, at which time it's just in the garden.

Do you agree with this?

Don't have to make it too complicated. Employ common sense and ban the open carry of assault weapons in public places. — Baden

Toting a shotgun across your back would be equally intimidating. Maybe only allow pearl handled revolvers. Old school shootouts are in order.

It's just difficult for me to accept that a "part of us adds" or a "part of us perceive", simply because such activities cannot be shown to be performed by parts. — NOS4A2

I don't see how you say this though. We can remove our arms, legs, many of our internal organs, and on and on and see that our ability to perceive is unaffected, yet when we alter our brain, something different happens. Our cognitive ability remains unaffected by damage to our sense organs, so it seems reasonable to conclude that my experience of the flower was not occurring in my eye. I also note that my sense organs do provide the stimulus to my brain because damage to the sense organ interferes with my ability to sense. If I put on red glasses, everything is red. I can then conclude that the lens within my eye offers its own alterations to the sense data being received.

This is just elementary stuff that I'm sure you fully accept, so I'm wondering why it need be explained and that there's this dropping back to some sort of holism that demands that every part of me is sentient and every part of me cognitive, from the hair on top of my head to the my toenails.

My hand picks things up, my nose smells, my mouth talks, my brain thinks. Organs each have functions, making up the complete organism, but each organ doesn't do everything.

His post, which did seem to come out of no where, started by describing his love of the Jew, which I was happy to hear because often "who do you hate" posts don't end that way. He then described those he hated, and it was women and some unidentified European ethnicity.

I'll admit that had it been Jewish people he hated because they'll never measure up to regular people and he further claimed he was unrepentant in that belief and any suggestion otherwise was absurd, I'd hope he'd be summarily banned. If he weren't, I'd feel unwelcome here.

So, think that one through guys, and realize mean spirited hateful statements have consequences beyond what you might think. This isn't the boys locker room. Everyone is welcome here. Excusing his conduct might seem kind hearted to him, but it wouldn't be to many others.

You’ll still be a living organism if you lose your pancreas or nose, at least with the aid of medication. The thing that perceives is, in every case, the living organism. The moment we eviscerate that organism, separate it into perceiving and non-perceiving faculties, there is no perceiving. A brain or faculty or any combination of disembodied organs in a vat cannot perceive. — NOS4A2

You can still be a living organism and not have the ability to perceive even without eviscerating it. You can simply fall asleep.

I'm not sure what you're trying to do here, but it seems like you're trying to decipher the essence of a perceiver, listing out what the essential elements must exist to perceive. Obviously you can remove some parts of the body and it still be able to perceive, so arguing that the perceiver is the entire organism isn't correct.

At any rate, to the extent it has bearing on what we're discussing:

"In 2011, Dutch scientists hooked an EEG (electroencephalography) machine to the brains of mice fated to decapitation. The results showed continued electrical activity in the severed brains, remaining at frequencies indicating conscious activity for nearly four seconds. Studies in other small mammals suggest even longer periods."

https://www.livescience.com/39219-can-severed-head-live.html

The science doesn't support a direct realist position. The direct realist position is a position that attempts to simplify the metaphysical debate by eliminating unknowables, like the fundamental composition of things. At best, it admits to a pragmatism by stating there is nothing gained by itemizing objects as unknowable (I see this as @Banno's approach). At worst, it insists the world really is as they say it is. I think that's what you're trying to do here.

We receive representations of objects and what those objects are without the representative quality imposed on them by us is unknowable. Who we are as perceivers is also not the whole indivisible person, but it's just part of us. This means part of us interprets, part of us adds, part of us subtracts, and part of us perceives. What this conscious perceiving thing is and how we have these phenomenological states is a complete mystery. We just know it happens, somewhere in the brain.