Under virtue ethics, you can ask what kind of person would keep a slave, and you can say that keeping slaves is indicative of vice. — Sapientia

What name would you give that vice? Edit: Perhaps justice is the virtue that is at issue? Hard to see one man owning another as being fair or just.

The flaw I see in virtue ethics, is that it is, or maybe just is usually selfish. It's amazing that none of the ancient virtue ethicists thought "isn't slavery wrong?"

I assume you don't mean that they're straight. But... philosophy of math is most definitely queer... I mean... really bizarre — Mongrel

Well, queerness is in the eye of the beholder, 8-) Quantum mechanics is pretty weird, too.

Using mathematics is the basis of comparison, since that was brought up prior as a point of comparison for queerness, I maintain that it is reasonable for a person to maintain that mathematical facts are not queer, while rejecting moral facts because they are queer. One need not accept the existence of moral facts simply because they accept mathematical facts, and they can still be rational while both believing this to be the case, and believing this to be the case because of the argument from queerness of moral facts. — Moliere

Sure, I can accept that. I suppose you could consider that I'm suggesting a premise: Moral facts, if true, would be just as weird as mathematical facts. It's not exactly something I could prove. But there are responses to the argument from queerness.

I am presupposing, at least for the purposes this thread, that objective morality and moral facts are synonymous.

The only thing I'm driving at is continuing to consider the question, "what if there were moral facts"? Would that be so strange? (I may have misread what you wrote- edited). And I suppose I'm asking: what would it be like, if moral facts?

Regarding rules. I suppose it depends on what you mean by rules. Are there mathematical rules? If so, they're definitely not arbitrary.

I doubt there is an agreed on terminology, but I know Pojman suggests a set of objective moral principals that are not arbitrary.

I think you said something like: assuming that moral statements are truth-apt, how do we know if any of them are true?

We basically make it up as we go.... with various fears and biases thrown in. If you want more than that, as I said... you'll have to lay out a theory of truth to work with. If you don't want to do that, I think you're stuck with the above answer. — Mongrel

If morality is objective, then we definitely don't make it up as we go. We are discovering or beginnig to understand what is the case about morality, in a way that is similar to the way man gradually began to understand math- that is my theory. Not sure if it holds water.

I still get the sense that the general feeling is "morality can't be objective, so we Must be making it up"

And that's what this thread is about. Can we know that morality Can't be objective? Is the entire argument really, "it's just too weird an idea to consider?"

I mean that when we justify a mathematical statement that it is more persuasive than when we justify a moral statement, and I also mean that when we justify a mathematical statement that people change their beliefs about math whereas when we justify a moral statement people do not change their beliefs about morality. They continue to believe what they thought before. — Moliere

Doesn't this presuppose that everyone is convinced by mathematical statements? And even if convinced, what's to prevent someone from refusing to understand, or even being contrary and spiteful in math? You may laugh, but I have seen examples of both.

I suppose it may be true that everyone who is subjected to a correct mathematical statement IS convinced... and suggest that if objective morality, then all who are subjected to a correct moral statement would be just as convinced. But, it doesn't follow that they would have to follow through and act accordingly. Knowledge of the correct math or morals, doesn't mean a person will choose to follow through with that knowledge in a way that changes their actions. Is that really all that surprising?

I don't know where you got the idea that if objective morality, and if people know what is moral, then they WILL act morally. What gave you that idea?

But, I think we can say when someone is bad at math, and if objective morality, we can say when they are bad at morals. I think I said as much earlier in the thread.

I also find the New Atheists to be profoundly anti-religion. I seriously doubt any of them can give or have ever given an honest appraisal of positive qualities of religion. Or any positive effects of any form of religion on the individual. They believe the only good religion is one that is extinct- not being practiced.

Just as the religious fundamentalist's vision of a utopia is one in which there is nothing but (their particular brand of) fundamentalists, the New Atheist's vision of a utopia is one in which there are no religions.

I have no problem thinking of New Atheists as being atheist fundamentalists.

I think I can sum up your questions/comments this way...
There are X's and there are Y's. X's exist in the real world and Y's exist only in the human mind. If there were no humans, would Y's exist? Can Y's be universals, if they only exist in the human mind (or perhaps, can anything concerning Y's be facts?)

(if this isn't your meaning, then it's still relevant to the discussion).

The thing is, it seems like I'm being told (by most people who talk about morality, or maybe just by people who are already sure that morality IS subjective), that they know the possibility of moral facts is inconceivable (and they claim that if there is anything that might be called "moral facts", then because we already know they only exist in the human mind, they're subjective anyway). I'm asking.. "are you sure? how could you know that?" I'm still not convinced that the possibility of moral facts (not pretend moral facts, real moral facts.. universal facts) is any weirder than any other facts...

And of course, that leads to: what is the demarcation between "the things that only exist in the human mind", and "the things that exist in the real world"? (it looks like some people just say something like "well, if they're too weird to be true, then they must only exist in the mind". Or maybe it's more like, "if they're too weird then they Ought only to exist in the mind, and Ought not to be taken seriously".)

And another relevant question may be, if we decide that Y's "only exist in the human brain", then can we tell anything about Y by examining humans, their behavior, and the human brain?

Have you ever tried to make a list of X's and Y's?

Here is a synopsis of Chapter 4: Knowledge and Opinion. (Adler's book: Ten Philosophical Mistakes). All this is from Adler's point of view, this is, as far as I can tell, what he believes about the subject at hand.

All men desire to know- Aristotle. Those who have knowledge about anything are in possession of the truth about it. We could be wrong in our claim to have knowledge, but have some truth. No such thing as true or false knowledge, and that's what distinguishes it from opinion, which can be either true or false. If knowledge turns out to be false, then it was obviously only opinion.

We can be absolutely certain about some things, but there are other things about which are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt, but still there Is some doubt. If certitude, then incorrigible and immutable, if even some doubt, then mutable and corrigible.

Given the above, how much knowledge do any of us have? Most would admit to having very little. The history of science shows that its open to change and correction. But, still we wouldn't label the great generalizations of science as opinions.

Adler speculates that there may be a certain types of opinion that could properly be called knowledge (close to knowledge without actually being knowledge). And then there would be another type of opinion, far removed from actual knowledge, that could properly be called mere opinion.

If the criteria for actual knowledge is so extreme (must be certain, incorrigible, and immutable), then it must come down to a small number of self-evident, necessary truths. If self-evident, then we cannot think of the opposite.

Is everything except self-evident and necessary truth to be considered an opinion? Yes and no. If we can relax the standards a bit, and appeal to evidence and reasons, then we can justify a claim that an opinion is actually true. By using "at the time" we are acknowledging it is open to correction or rejection at a later date.

Personal prejudices are mere opinion. Beliefs are mere opinions. "Belief" can be used in a way to suggest that we do both know something and believe it- it signifies we have some doubt.

But "Belief" can also be used in a way that is meant to signify a lack of evidence. If something is self-evident, then it is not a belief. Many, but not all, mathematical truths are knowledge (2+2=4 is given as an example of knowledge).

Personal opinions are mere opinions. But opinions that are known beyond a reasonable doubt because of evidence and reason, are rightly called knowledge.

Knowing is not like eating. When we eat something, we change it. When we know something, it remains as it was. (the observer effect in quantum mechanics is an exception). Apprehension of an object (real or imagined, or a concept) is not equivalent to knowledge. There is nothing true or false about an apprehension.

In another sense knowledge is like eating. Whatever is eaten is independent of the eater, before it is eaten. In the same way, knowledge exists independently of the knower. (more to follow)

The knowable is often referred to as "reality". Reality is that which exists whether we think about it or not. Reality may or may not refer to the physical. But, it must be public, not private. If knowable by one person alone, then it's not knowledge (it most be possible of also being known to others). Adler notes he will use "knowledge" to refer to self-evident truths and opinions when those opinions have sufficient evidence and reasons to outweigh contrary opinions. This is opposed to the concept of "mere opinion."

After considering my last post, and it's probably not what Hume had in mind, but perhaps he Was right. Even IF morality is objective, you're still no closer to getting an Ought from an Is. So, perhaps it is a universal truth. You can Never get an ought from an is.

(of course, if a universal, then it also means that Hume WAS Wrong when he says, "Reason is, and Ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.")

Just because you know math, there is nothing binding about math. No one can say "You Ought to do math well." And I suppose, in the same vein, if objective morality, then we're no closer to saying, "You Ought to be moral."

I am pretty good at math... It's kinda silly to let all that knowledge about how to do good math go to waste. And I usually don't think about them, but there are consequences that come as a result of my doing math poorly.

Again, if laws are any indication, our society does seem to want people to think about whether or not their actions are moral, so much so that it is willing to create severe consequences for those who don't also take them seriously. (and don't forget guilt and conscience). So, if objective morality, Ought you be moral? I guess that's up to you to decide.

But, I'm still considering the possible existence of moral facts, and the possibility that morality is, in fact Objective.

I am not trying to "blow my own horn" here, but everything seems a lot less personal, less petty and more rational with my philosophical mindset. — Mustapha Mond

I see something similar in my own life. Others may not notice much of a change, but I feel more calm, more centered. More and longer stretches of time wherein I'm "rational", perhaps? If we are pursuing wisdom, and wisdom helps us know how to act, then it follows that we should become better at knowing how to act.

But, I also know that it's a discipline, something I have to keep working at, if I want to continue to enjoy the benefits.

In the atheist groups I know of, if you bring up morality, you Will soon become entangled in an argument about religion. They don't seem to be able to separate the two concepts.

I also respect both sides enough to want to be truthful about the problems I see- so, if you're a Republican, I'll tell you the issues I see w/ Republicans, and if you're a Democrat, then I'll tell you the issues I see w/ Democrats.

8-)
Both sides do have good qualities (come to think of it, that phrase in itself may tick off a lot of people).

I was never convinced that utilitarianism could provide a comprehensive basis for moral philosophy, although elements of it are worthy of incorporation into more satisfying and comprehensive conceptions — John

I got depressed because people kept asking me (as a utilitarian) to consider the "best" reasons for killing other people.

Why don't utilitarians spend much time thinking about the best ways to help other people?
And the reality is, there is a correlation between utilitarianism and psychopaths. It was perhaps overblown by the media, but it IS there, nonetheless.

This is the post in question...

Anyway, I tried various denominations until about 3 years ago, at which time I started calling myself an atheist, and started looking for other atheists to hang out with. The ones I met were just too anti-religion for my taste. I'm also not impressed with the way that the atheists I've met approach morality- which looks to me very much like "religions invented morality, we don't like religions, and we won't be moral- so take that religious people!". I've since decided that the atheists who hang out in groups with "atheist" in the title of said group, aren't the type of people I want to spend much time with. (that's been my experience with the few groups I've spent time with... your mileage may vary). — anonymous66

I'd like to meet someone who is an atheist, and who shares my conviction that morality is objective. I do know of some atheist philosophers who argue in defense of objective morality, so that's a good start.

No. No it isn't. That is the attitude of a small minority. Most atheists are more sensible than that. I don't think that The New Atheists, for example, or those under their influence, would actually make that claim. They would likely dispute the claim that religions invented morality, and rightly so. And I can't see most people within that sort of group having an attitude reflected in the exclamation "we won't be moral - so take that religious people!". More like, "we reject your presumption of moral authority!" — Sapientia

I did talk honestly about my real-world experiences. I did meet some very vocal atheists who do see morality in a twisted way such that I don't know how they could strive for any kind of moral excellence. Also see my post where I mention Chris Hedges and the New Atheist movement. - From what I know and experienced of the New Atheist movement, I don't want anything to do with them. It's just fundamentalism, but for atheists.

I find most of the new atheists are engaged in 'straw God' arguments - they take what is the most caricatured version of the idea, namely that of young-earth creationists and reactionary fundamentalism, as being what is meant by 'God'. I never believed in the kind of God that they say doesn't exist, but I still don't consider myself atheist (although many of my Christian forbears might consider me to be that.) — Wayfarer

I have nothing good to say about the New Atheist movement.
Have you read anything by Chris Hedges, author of I Don't Believe in Atheists and When Atheism Becomes Religion: America's New Fundamentalists?

As someone who grew up as a fundamentalist, and then started getting involved with atheists who are fans of Dawkins and Harris (both leaders in the New Atheist movement), I can definitely see the similarities.

Here are some of the similar attitudes present in both the Radical Christian Right (fundamentalists) and the New Atheists:

• Us vs Them (atheists say all religions are bad, fundamentalists say all non-fundamentalists are bad).
• Evil is not something present in all humans, but rather evil is only present in the "other", the ones picked out for vilification. (see above)
• A utopian vision (if only everyone were to become Christians, or atheists, then the world would be a better place)
• Ignorance of world history. (including an ignorance of the history of religion)
• Hatred of Islam (or at least vilification of Islam).

Meta-ethics: moral realism 56.4%; moral anti-realism 27.7%; other 15.9%.
God: atheism 72.8%; theism 14.6%; other 12.6%. — shmik

If I were to make estimates of the culture around me, I'd say 90% are moral anti-realists. Of course, I haven't been spending any time in churches, lately. So maybe I should say 90% of those who don't attend church are moral anti-realists.

No moral calculus has the same force as actual mathematical statements when it comes to accepting their truth. — Moliere

I'm not sure what you mean by this. The same force? If math statements (essentially facts about math= facts about morality) are the same types of facts as moral facts, then they would, by definition, have the same force.

If objective morality, then we would know when someone Is immoral (like we know when someone is bad at math)... But, does anyone have the right to "force" another to Be moral? That's another discussion. I certainly don't think I have the right to attempt to force anyone to be good at math.

Just like no one could force you to "do good math", no one could force you to "do good morals". Presumably, there are benefits for those who are good at math. And there are presumably benefits for those who are good at morality. Our society seems to have decided that morality is important. At least when it comes to making laws. But, even they can't "force" anyone. (and no one forces you to stay in any particular society). They can "provide" consequences for those who don't see the benefits of being moral.(would you argue there are no consequences for those who are bad at math?) And then we can also consider that there are the feelings of "guilt" and the concept of "conscience", assuming one believes they exist.

A purported fact is something which is posited as being the case. — John

The reason I ask, is because it looked like you were asking, "what if there were moral facts that were determined by social considerations?" And I got the sense you were trying to sneak in some relativity, so that you were essentially asking, "what if there were facts, but they were relative to _____", and then asking, "would those still be facts?"

Think about math. Where did it come from? Is it present in the "real" world? Or is it just something that man made up..... did it essentially just spring up from man's brain?

There may be facts about what is universally approved and disapproved of by humans; well, at least by those humans that are motivated by social considerations and 'normal' levels of concern for others.

Would you call those 'moral facts'? — John

How are you defining facts?

I also want to add that, as I think I already said, mathematical theorems can certainly be falsified. — John

Hmmm. I don't know. Aren't you put in the position of just saying, "every time we test it, it works?" But, I haven't read anything by Imre Lakatos.

Seems to me that if moral facts, and if mathematical theorems are falsifiable, then moral facts would be, too.

I'm just repeating myself now. But the main points are, 1. is the possibility of moral facts all that strange? 2. Is the statement "you can't get an Ought from an Is", a universal, or does it only apply in certain cases? 3. Why falsifiability/verification? (and how to argue in it's defense?) 4.Is math itself even falsifiable?

I wonder if Hume would approve of Sam Harris' attempt to combine science and ethics? (I have very little respect for Harris).

How DO you label someone like myself who ticks off republicans and democrats alike when politics are discussed?

I recently switched from utilitarianism to virtue ethics.

No matter the specifics, I think we all agree that Hume was arguing against an objective morality, don't we? I think we can say he definitely rejected the possibility of moral facts.

I bet you cannot come up with any hypothetical scenario that could falsify it. — John

if I recall correctly, what I argued for earlier in the thread, is that math can't be falsified. I did point out that some philosophers claim it can be done.

I was out mowing my lawn and thought of something I wanted to get down before I forgot. Maybe Ought Is just always the wrong word to use. No one uses "Ought" when they're doing math. In the same we don't have to use "Ought" when we're "doing ethics". If X is immoral, then when one does X, one is being immoral (like when one adds incorrectly, one is not following the rules of mathematics). Of course, that doesn't work in societies when we're trying to create laws, unless there is agreement about what is immoral, and that it is a good thing to be moral. And like I said before, even if moral facts, then it doesn't necessarily follow that they are easy to determine (how long to figure out math? How long to figure out diameter of earth?).

She is a firefighter.
Therefore she ought to do whatever a firefighter ought to do.

This works because a firefighter is defined functionally. There is a function characteristic of a firefighter, and this is what it is to be a firefighter (telos and nature are one).

Or does it work? Discuss... — jamalrob

That's basically the reasoning that ancient philosophers used to argue for virtue (moral excellence). Man ought to do what is characteristic of a man. Man is rational, wisdom is the good, wisdom is that which makes man morally excellent. Why? Just look at nature...

Anyway. Facts are true statements. Moral statements are treated as if they are truth apt.

For all practical purposes, true moral statements are facts. — Mongrel

From where I'm sitting, I'm continually being told we can be sure there are no moral facts, that it's actually all "preferences". Why? Because, the argument goes, moral facts are too weird to be true.

And, the reasoning goes, you can't say, "because ___ is true, then you Ought to X",if X concerns morality, because we know there are no moral facts. But, you can say, because ______ is true, then reason Ought to be slave to the passions.

That just doesn't look like it's consistent to me.

I'm saying that I'm not so sure that moral facts are too weird to be true.

but that it is, within the limits of our definitions, (and what else do we have to work with?) verifiable as I described. — John

How are you describing "verifiable" in that case? It looks like you must mean, "it agrees with my intuition."

I think the swan analogy does work.
Q: How do you know all swans are white? A:We checked them all.
Q: How do you know that 2+2=4? A:Every time I perform the calculation, I get the same answer.

It's not really apt to say that I have "admitted that maths is intuitive" since I never claimed otherwise. — John

My mistake, I must have misunderstood. Can something be intuitive and falsifiable?

One of the rules that must be made clear in responding to The Willow of Darkness' posts are that (1) they are not required to 'make sense' (on account of 'making sense' is an arbitrarily imposed 'external rule'); and (2) The Willow of Darkness is free to take issue with any proposition, by any person, on any grounds which The Willow of Darkness sees fit, even if those grounds seem to be in direct contradiction to an earlier post by The Willow of Darkness. — Wayfarer

That just seems wrong to me in a way that is incrumulating. 8-)

I can place two oranges on the table, and then immediately see that there are two oranges. Then I can place two more oranges next to them, and directly see that there are now four oranges. I can repeat this experiment as many times as I like and the result, it seems obvious will always be the same; for the simple reason that objects do not appear out of nowhere; and even if they did that would not contradict the formula, if I really did put two oranges there both times. — John

2+2=4 isn't as easy to falsify as you think. You're basically appealing to our intuition. You're saying, "we all know 2+2=4, right?" The question you need to ask yourself, is again, "do we all know it because it's true... or is it true because we all agree?"

Remember the white swan problem? Find one black swan, and your theory is shot. You haven't falsified anything. You're just stating, "we all know 2+2=4, right?" "it seems obvious" doesn't work for ethics, why do you use the phrase when it comes to math? It's like you think there some "mathematical facts" out there in the universe somewhere.

But, anyway, I see you admit that math is intuitive in another post above.

I agree, I think that in the final analysis, both math and logic must be intuitive — John

I haven't read the work; but from various references to it I have come across I have formed the impression that it was an attempt to determine a set of logical principles form which all mathematical truths could be derived. — John

I got the impression they attempted it, because otherwise, math is only intuitive. Can you really falsify something that is intuitive?

No, I am not making that claim at all. Perhaps some things I could claim would be verifiable to me, in the sense that they are intuitively obvious, but would be impossible for anyone else to verify.

When it comes to what we experience, whether it is publicly verifiable or not, nothing is provable, in the sense of being deductively certain. What one person experiences is never empirically verifiable by others unless the experience is of something in the public realm. The exact nature of what I experience can not be known by you, for example, or perhaps even exhaustively known by myself. — John

Yeah. Facts and knowledge are weird, aren't they? We think we can verify/falsify the things we think we know. But, just try to prove it. And how to verify claims about verification?

There are claims about ethics in your argument. You are suggesting Hume's "is/ought" distinction isn't known to be a truth about ethics. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I don't know how you got that from my posts. And it seems to me that the only way you could know it is true, is if you know there are no moral facts. What I'm attempting to show is that the existence of moral facts isn't inconceivable, given the strangeness of all facts. I think I already said, "I don't know if there are, or how to prove it one way or the other."