Well, as I've said, if we are honest and clear-headed I think it should be clear what some of these moral principles are, which we can manipulate logically. And the fact is that we can create valid logical inferences with moral propositions. Honestly I don't see your resistance to this as any more than a prejudice. — darthbarracuda

The principle of mathematics can be logically proven by what we see in reality. You can't group objective morality in the same group. The only thing you've mentioned as grounded in reality about objective morality is that there is a command from a-far, which you haven't demonstrated, and the conscience argument.

Just because people can be mistaken in moral beliefs or moral perceptions doesn't mean morality isn't objective. People disagree about things all the time. Doesn't change anything. — darthbarracuda

As I've stated before "If your brain were to activate hormones that make you feel bad when you murder because that kind of process was useful for your ancestors to survive, that doesn't make it objectively true that it is morally wrong to murder." Conscience is not proof that it is objectively wrong to murder.

You don't "hear" the calling of the face of a victim? You don't "hear" the inner voice of your conscience telling you to do something? You don't see morality as a system of imperatives, something we must do based on something that is higher than our own empirical desires? — darthbarracuda

Just because your "conscience" tells you something is right or wrong doesn't mean that it is objectively morally right or wrong. If that were the case then if my friend conscience tells them to donate 50% of their money then that implies that it is objectively morally good to do that. But other peoples' conscience tells them to donate 25% maybe. You can't get to objectivity from conscience. That's nonsense. It could just be a psychological mechanism that our brains developed because those without empathy didn't pass on their genes and cooperation was promoted by evolution. You can't get an objective morality from that. If your brain were to activate hormones that make you feel bad when you murder because that kind of process was useful for your ancestors to survive, that doesn't make it objectively true that it is morally wrong to murder. Also, there may be people such as psychopaths who may not even have this conscience you speak of.

You do need a framework if you're going to explain what it is about my explanation that you find wanting. Otherwise it's just you denying anything I say as "unconvincing" without any dialectic argument. I need to know what you think is wrong with my argument. — darthbarracuda

You are laying out your argument for why there is objective morality and I'm clearly quoting you and explaining in each instance what I find wanting in your explanations.

By the same way we know 2+3=5 and that triangles have 180 degrees, we can know that gratuitous suffering is bad and inflicting needless harm onto others wrong — darthbarracuda

We can know 2+3=5 because we can take 2, add 3, and see that there are 5. We can create a triangle and measure the 180 degrees. These are objective facts. We can develop proofs for mathematics that are sound. But we cant say that it is objectively true harming others needlessly is objectively morally wrong. Show me the proof for that. I've already explained why conscience doesn't work for that.

I am only saying that morality oftentimes takes the form of a command-from-afar. I'm providing a phenomenological description of our experience of morality. — darthbarracuda

You originally said "Morality is given to us in the form of a command-from-afar, as something we ought to do." So tell me, why should I believe that there is this command coming? Explain to me where it is how you know there is a command, where is it coming from, and why should I believe that it is objective? I don't hear this command.

But why haven't you been convinced yet? What's the argument against what I've said? I want to know what the metaphysical framework you're coming from is. — darthbarracuda

I don't need any framework. I am unconvinced that there are an even number of gumballs in the jar. So now it is up to you to explain why there is and I will be convinced if I don't see any holes in your reasoning. So you provide your moral framework since you're the one asserting that morality is objective.

You misunderstand me. Essentially I am saying that if you deny objective morality than you ought to deny that mathematics is also objective. Consider how both operate through intuitive principles that can be applied through logical reasoning. Both can be rationally argued for - at least, we do believe that someone can be right or wrong about mathematics, so why cannot someone be right or wrong about morality? — darthbarracuda

Someone who says one gumball plus two gumballs = three gumballs can be proven right because if you actually have one and add two, you end up with three. It's reliable and consistent for practical knowledge. Someone who says "murder is morally objectively wrong" why should I believe that that's right? So far all you've said to support this is that there is some command, but haven't explained how you know there is this command.

I'm hesitant to answer this. I'm only describing what it's like. It's a command from the Other, whether that be God, a victim's face, or whatever. — darthbarracuda

Why should I believe that there is a command coming from anything? I lack a belief in that.

Again I'm describing the experience of perceiving something as having moral content. Do you doubt that we do, in fact, see things as objectively right and wrong, good and bad, even if they aren't actually?

The point I'm making is that the perception that something is good or bad, right or wrong, is intuitive in the same way it is intuitive that a triangle has 180 degrees. It's synthetic a priori. — darthbarracuda

I personally don't see things as objectively morally good or bad because I haven't been convinced so yet. Also, just because something feels intuitive doesn't make it true. I can intuitively think that what I see in a magic trick is true, but that doesn't mean it is true.

Ah, you come from the utilitarianist point of view - if you can't convince them, why tell them what you think, right? But of course if you value something, you want the others to value the same thing, which is why you'd tell them to act the way you think is right. — BlueBanana

I don't like to label myself as having a point of view so I can't really speak for that.

Now of course this is all speaking hypothetically as if there were no objective view.
If a psychopath values murder and another person values to not kill. And then a thousand other people come along and decide say they also value to not kill. Then they make the rules. So that would mean that the people who have the power and similar values will then implement their rules and it'd be like a might makes right.

Morality is given to us in the form of a command-from-afar, as something we ought to do — darthbarracuda

A command from who?

Perceiving something as having moral content is intuitive and self-evident, requiring no further explanation — darthbarracuda

It does require explanation because it's not intuitive and self-evident. If it was we wouldn't be having this conversation. You can't just say I'm right because it's obvious. You have to explain that.

Hmm... when I imply that he wouldn't care or have any reason to, and you ask me why he would care, how should I answer the question?

Also, I don't think the dictator would intrinsically value killing. For him it'd only be means to achieve safety, success, well-being, or whatever. — BlueBanana

I ask this because I find it interesting that when someone says murder is wrong then, it's only because they subjectively intrinsically value something. But if anyone can intrinsically value any act then there doesn't seem to be good reason to tell someone that they shouldn't do something. You'd essentially be saying don't do it because I subjectively value it.

↪darthbarracuda
Wait - the burden is on those who believe it to be objective. — BlueBanana

Thank you

But it's the burden of the agnostic to clarify why they are agnostic, so the moral realist can know what to focus on, no? Certainly agnosticism has to be motivated by something. — darthbarracuda

I lack the belief because I haven't been presented with an argument that convinces me morality is objective. So do you have one?

Okay. Just to be clear, dictionary definitions are not always the best tool to go to for philosophical things. How atheism is defined colloquially is not how atheism is used in rigorous philosophy. — darthbarracuda

If it's not used the way the dictionary defines it then fine, define it how you want. I'm not gonna argue about the semantics of a word. You understand that my position is the lack of a belief, we don't need any labels that carry baggage.

Okay, so you are agnostic on this and want people to convince you that objective morality is true? — darthbarracuda

Yes, because I lack the belief that morality is objective.

No, it's not. It's belief in the lack of something, which does obviously include the lack of belief in that something, but a lack of belief is agnosticism, not atheism. — BlueBanana

I told you not to go there. But since you went there:

Definition of atheism
1 a : a lack of belief or a strong disbelief in the existence of a god or any gods

To get back on the track because I think this point is rather interesting... subjective morals can still have intrinsic value, can't they? And objective ones could lack that as well. — BlueBanana

Possibly. But then I would ask you why would a dictator care if you intrinsically value to not kill if he intrinsically values murder if it's only subjective.

Lacking belief in God does not mean you believe God does not exist just as lacking a belief in an even number of gumballs does not mean you believe there are an odd number of gumballs. Lacking a belief in objective morality does not mean you believe morality is subjective. I'm not seeing the issue here. — darthbarracuda

Lacking a belief in god does not mean that I believe god does not exist - this is correct.
Lacking a belief in an even number of gumballs does not mean I believe there is an odd number of gumballs - correct.

Lacking a belief that there is an objective morality does not mean that I believe morality is subjective - correct.
Because like I've said many times now, originally I was asserting that it was subjective. But I don't know how clear I can make it, that I've changed my position since I made this topic. I've mentioned it so many times in my responses and even made an edit in the original post.

I am not asserting that morality is non-objective.

It makes perfect sense. That's what happened.... — bloodninja

That's nonsense. The earth didn't change from flat to round in this case. It was always round, but we were wrong. Because it being round affecting our lives.

I have never heard your type of reasoning.

True, but that is someone makes the claim about their number. This is more about social norms and interpreting what's said between the lines than logic, but basically starting the thread questioning the view expresses the opinion of the OP in a very different way than replying to a thread where the view was claimed to be true. — BlueBanana

Like I've said many times, I originally was asserting that morality is not objective, but since then I've changed my position because I realized I couldn't back up the assertion. People are still asserting that morality is objective, however, so that's up to them to back up.

But that's just agnosticism, not agnostic atheism towards their number being even. — BlueBanana

That's how lay people like to use the word but technically atheism is simply a lack of a belief. Atheism and agnostic are not mutually exclusive. Look I'm not gonna argue about semantics of the word atheism, that's a waste of time.

My position is this. There is a claim that morality is objective. I lack that belief similarly to me lacking a belief that there are an even number of gumballs. That does not mean that I believe that morality is not objective or that there is not an even number of gumballs. So if you assert that it is objective, back it up.

Don't misconstrue this as the same thing as the equally-silly notion of an "agnostic atheist", where atheism is just assumed-to-be-true-unless-proven-wrong. That's precisely not how philosophy works. We don't just assume things are right or wrong. We don't assume anything, we start from the basics and work from there. And the basics are definitely not that physicalism is true, God does not exist, and morality isn't real. — darthbarracuda

An agnostic atheist doesn't assume God is not real. It lacks the belief in a god.

If you ask me if there is an even number of gumballs in a jar, just because I lack the belief doesn't mean I assume that it is not even and therefore odd. How could I say that it is even with out a reason to think so. How could I say it's not even (and therefore odd) if I don't have any reason to believe that either? I am unconvinced both ways.

Similarly if you can't convince me why morality is objective, I have no reason to believe it. It doesn't mean I believe morality is not objective either.

Not unless you question the view and to do that you have to have the opposite view, and then the burden is on you as well. — BlueBanana

Questioning a view doesn't mean I have the opposite view. If you tell me that there is an even number of gumballs in a jar, I can question your view. I'll ask you okay show me how you know. But just because I haven't been convinced that the number is even, that doesn't mean I believe it's odd either.

And if it's objective it's intrinsic, if it's not it can still be intrinsic. Therefor, the only way to come to the conclusion that nothing is intrinsically wrong is to take the premise that morals are subjective. — BlueBanana

Like I said, I've already found some holes in what I was originally saying so I've re-evaluated and changed my position. I'm not asserting anymore. The burden of proof is on you.

That it's my subjective opinion that killing people has an intrinsic negative moral value. — BlueBanana

Please explain.

If there is a general scientific agreement that the earth is flat then it would be true that the earth is flat. — bloodninja

And if they later re-evaluated and agreed that the Earth is actually a sphere then what? You're telling me that they would say the earth used to be flat but now its a sphere because we changed our mind? How does that make any sense?

Ok I will jump through your hoop. What would count for objectivity? My claim would be others in agreement. It all depends on this. A philosophical term for this is intersubjectivity. — bloodninja

Under these definitions if everyone was in agreement that the earth was flat, then wouldn't it be objectively true that the world was flat?

That's argumentum ad ignorantiam. — BlueBanana

You'd be right if I asserted that morality was non-objective but I'm not asserting that. I'm not asserting it to be objective or non-objective.

Why is objective morality needed for moral actions to have intrinsic value? Subjective values can have intrinsic value. — BlueBanana

If there is a dictator killing people and you tell him to stop because his murdering is immoral. He asks you why he should listen to you, What makes it so bad? What is your argument to the dictator?

My position on this has changed in my more recent responses. I just made an EDIT on the original post at the end to clear up the confusion.

If morality was merely one's subjective preference then there would be nothing normative in it. What makes morality significant is the fact that it has strong normative force, in other words, that it provides us with an 'ought' by which we feel compelled to act. It can only provide this because we take it as something bigger and more objective than our subjective preference. Moreover I think it is clear
that you have the burden of proof in this case, so it is you that has to justify your position, not us. — bloodninja

I decided to no longer use the word preference because I think it was misleading for my point. The burden of proof is on you however because I am taking the position of being unconvinced that morality is objective or non-objective. I am not making assertions so if you claim that it is objective, that is up to you to support.

I would explain that murder was not our way, but there are no arguments to give for why it would also be an ought for their way of life because they have a completely different way of life and different way of organising their shared worlds. If they had any respect for beings other than themselves then they might respect our way of life and reach a compromise. If not then I guess there would be conflict. I think our shared way of life is as deep as it goes regarding morality. — bloodninja

So if there is an isolated group of humans that have a completely different lifestyle and have never made contact with the rest of the world, would you tell them murder is objectively wrong?

What makes intellectual dishonesty a subjective moral? — Noble Dust

I didn't assert that. You asserted that it is objective moral so it's up argue that.

Also I'm not really sure I understand what moral means in this context so this may be just a big understanding lol.

What you prefer depends on your genetics, the time and place in which you live, your pre-natal experiences, your early childhood, and later experiences. None of these things are under your control, and your preferences aren't freely chosen. Parents and society strongly discourage preferences that are not compatible with the prevailing morality. Society goes to considerable inconvenience to make sure that children prefer what we wish for them to prefer. — Bitter Crank

When I was using the word preferences, I never said that it isn't controlled by many factors. I have stated a few times now that they may have been socially conditioned, etc. But just because they aren't fully in control doesn't mean that at that point in time your preference is not your preference, regardless of what caused it to be your preference. I also think that by using the word preference I was not explaining my position very clearly so I'll avoid using it now.

People create their moral code for many reasons. Socially conditioned, beliefs about what is right or wrong, etc.. But if someone asserts that stealing is wrong, why is it objectively wrong? That is up to you to argue since I am taking the position of not asserting that it is objective or non-objective.

But I wanted to point out one more thing. "Intellectual honesty" is an objective moral. And no, it's not a "subjective preference", because this suggests "intellectual dishonesty" would be an equally valid subjective preference. — Noble Dust

I don't understand. I thought objective morality was about what one ought to do. What makes intellectual honesty an objective moral?

This doesn't sound quite right, since it's question-begging. Why should morality, in the absence of any argument that demonstrates it to be objective, be seen as not-objective? Why shouldn't the opposite be the case? Why shouldn't you have to demonstrate the morality is not-objective? After all, morality certainly seems to appear to us as "objective", as a command-from-afar, an imperative, something we must do out of free will. — darthbarracuda

The claim is that morality is objective. If I take the position of not believing that morality is either objective or non-objective, then the burden of proof lies on someone to demonstrate that it is objective. And in the absence of any argument for it that is convincing, I think it is unfair for me to say that any action is objectively wrong even if that feels uncomfortable to me.

I don't think I have to argue for my position because it is a lack of belief of objective morality. And one has to make an argument that something nonphysical exists, not the other way around. That would be like you telling me that there is an invisible unicorn in the room and telling me to prove that it isn't there.

Yet I will press you on this - is this really what we mean? Do we really think something is moral or immoral based on our contingent preferences? Because it seems obvious to me that the two statements are not equivalent in any sense. One is a moral imperative and the other is non-moral supplication. — darthbarracuda

They are different types of statements. When I was saying preferences I was meaning it to include what one's "conscience" tells them but I think me using the word preferences was misleading and caused confusion. I may have been misusing the word. The point is people create a moral code for many reasons. That's obviously true. The question is what makes the statement "murder is objectively morally wrong?"

I am just unconvinced that it is objective. I'm taking the position that if someone were to ask me "why is murder objectively morally wrong," I would say I don't know. I won't tell them that it is, but I also won't tell them that it isn't. So that is up to you argue for since I am not asserting that morality is objective or non-objective.

(My position from the original post has changed a little bit because I have found some holes in what I was originally, and I thank you all for that).

Regarding Emotivism, which is being expressed by some of these responses, there seems to me to be a crucial difference between "I don't like liver" or "Boo, Liver!", on the one hand, and "Torturing children for fun is wrong", on the other. — Mitchell

I agree there is a big difference in those statements. One is an expression of what one likes and one is an expression of what one considers to be morally wrong. So now I ask you why is torturing children for fun wrong? What makes it objectively wrong?

But again, you're just asserting this. Why is value merely subjective? — darthbarracuda

I have re-evaluated. In the absence of any argument that rationally demonstrates that there is an objective morality, let alone how that morality would judge actions, it is not being intellectually honest to say that any action is objectively good or bad. I'm open to objective morality, but still haven't seen a good argument for it.

The difficulty with this, of course, is that "right" and "wrong" seem to not obviously equate to "like" and "dislike". Whereas subjective preferences are one thing that we know frequently, rightness and goodness seem to be non-natural, indefinable things. Which is partially why I said I think the choice is between moral realism and error theory. Rightness and goodness just can't be reduced to subjective preferences. Either morality is a real thing or it's a "cobweb of the mind" (to use Kant's phrase). — darthbarracuda

I apologize that I'm not too familiar with technical terms in philosophy. I am still learning.

I agree right and wrong aren't the same think as like and dislike. My point is that we claim to say something is right or wrong based off of our preferences. If I like to live in a stable society, I may say murder is wrong. But when we say something is immoral, we're using the standard of our own personal moral code which is based off of our like and dislikes. Or maybe it's because it was socially conditioned and any other moral code is too uncomfortable. Or maybe it seems intuitive because of the person's genes. Or maybe the person themselves beleives something is objectively right or wrong.

It's often probably a case of many of those reasons. But it has to be demonstrated that there even is an objective morality. And then to judge murder as wrong objectively, we would have to then know how that objective morality would judge the act of murder.

Sure no problem. By derivative I mean that preference is not original, or at least not more original than morality. In other words, morality is something we are born into and then we develop preferences for, based on our personalities in conjunction with our particular socialisation. In this sense preference is derivative, and morality is more basic or original than your "subjective preference" — bloodninja

The morality that people grow into seems to me to just be an expression of everyone's preferences. They may themselves think that murder is objectively morally right or wrong. And people that grow into it may adopt the same kind of thinking. It has to be demonstrated though that there is even a reason to believe there is an objective morality before we can even begin to judge any actions by it's standards.

I think it might help you to distinguish between intrinsic and objective. There might be no intrinsic morality while at the same time morality might be an objective fact. This is basically my view. Morality just is objective conformism. Conformism is not intrinsic but is an objective fact nonetheless. — bloodninja

If there was universal consensus, you can say that it is objectively true that everyone in the world thinks that murder is wrong. But that doesn't mean there is an objective standard we can use to judge whether it is right or wrong. If aliens come along and don't think that, what would you tell them? You can show them how it is useful to think that it's wrong to murder, but that doesn't mean that it is wrong to murder.

Maybe I haven't been clear. What I am arguing is that individuals' and societies' moralities are based on subjective preferences. — SonJnana


That's very clear; that's the assertion I've been critiquing. — Noble Dust

I understand what you're saying. I re-evaluate my position. In the absence of any argument that rationally demonstrates that there is an objective morality, let alone how that morality would judge actions, it is not being intellectually honest to say that any action is objectively morally good or bad. I'm open to objective morality, but still haven't seen a good argument for it.

So is survival the goal, in your view? — Noble Dust

Survival is the goal for many people's moral codes. But even if every individual agreed on a moral code, and they may think that it it is objectively wrong to murder, that doesn't mean that it is objectively wrong to murder. It only means that their is consensus.

I re-read your original post and I think I understand it better now. Could you explain a little further what you mean by saying it is a derivative?

True, it is my personal preference that stealing is, for the most part, wrong, but I didn't decide this on my own. I was born into a society that is culturally structured around this norm (among many others) so I couldn't help but become normalised by it like everyone else.

Do you see what I mean? I'm saying that you have it in reverse. Our personal preferences don't ground morality, rather, morality becomes our personal preference. — bloodninja

This means that other peoples' moral code based on their subjective values based on their preferences becomes normalized into you. So your preferences become more like the preferences of society's. Maybe it's simply because it's what you get used to and it's too uncomfortable to live any other way so you prefer to live that way. That doesn't seem to be a problem to what I'm saying.

I do them because I feel morally bound to do them, even though I don't want to do them and I would prefer not to do them. Why? Because morality is not our personal preference. — bloodninja

You say it is not your preference... however it is your preference. It's not black as white to say I either prefer to do something or not. There can be multiple reasons in conflict for wanting to do something or not. For example, maybe you donate a lot of money because you feel morally bound to do it even though you say you prefer not to. However, you chose to live by a moral code, which was based off of your values. Your values (wants, needs, desires) may have been socially conditioned or whatever, but the point is that you prefer to live by that code and you prefer to then donate because you feel satisfied in following through with your code and maybe also because it makes you feel good to donate.

Just because you have conflicting desires and you may prefer not to donate for some reasons, you still do it because in the end, you prefer to do it for other reasons that outweigh. I don't think it's fair to say that you do something because your morally bound even though you don't prefer to do it. When you make your decision, you choose to act on your moral code because you prefer that decision over the alternative of not acting on your moral code.

You've yet to show why or how or to what extent morality is a subjective preference; all you've done is describe morality as a subjective preference. — Noble Dust

Maybe I haven't been clear. What I am arguing is that individuals' and societies' moralities are based on subjective preferences. And that there is no rational way to say that any moral code is objectively better than another. When our laws and moral codes change over time, we can only say that they are changing. There is no objective standard to judge them off of to say that they are improving. We can say our society has changed it's rules so that now it is in a better position to survive, but that doesn't make any individual action any more or less intrinsically good.

1 and 2 point to one thing - we have common values. If so it's interesting, to say the least, to inevestigate the reason why this is so — TheMadFool

It is true that many people have common values, but just because even if everyone has similar values because they all prefer to live in a stable society where they are all happy, that doesn't make it any more objective. That would be like saying if everyone like vanilla ice cream best, that vanilla is the best ice cream. It's still subjective, but maybe consistent with everyone's wants, needs, desires.

1. We all want to be happy
2. We all want to avoid suffering

So, to some degree, morality, which is based on 1 and 2, is objective. — TheMadFool

This is actually not true at all. Many people actually want power in the world but don't act on it because they don't want to go to jail. It is true humans have empathy for biological reasons throughout evolution. But my point is that everyone if every single human agreed on how they want the world to be, that would only mean that there is a human consensus of morality. But that doesn't make an action any more intrinsically right or wrong. It only means that everyone's wants, needs, desires are the same or similar so that everyone's preferences are consistent with each other.

True, it is my personal preference that stealing is, for the most part, wrong, but I didn't decide this on my own. I was born into a society that is culturally structured around this norm (among many others) so I couldn't help but become normalised by it like everyone else. — bloodninja

That just means that your wants, needs, desires, etc. were socially conditioned which lead to the preference you have today for wanting to the world to be a certain way. If I live in a society where girls shave their legs, I might become conditioned to find girls with shaved legs attractive. Based on my needs, wants, desires that are conditioned, I prefer to be with girls that shave their legs. If you live in a society where certain things are normalized, you might then prefer that society. If you are either socially conditioned or genetically predisposed to like vanilla ice cream, that doesn't make you preference for vanilla ice cream any less of a preference.

I do them because I feel morally bound to do them, even though I don't want to do them and I would prefer not to do them. Why? Because morality is not our personal preference. — bloodninja

The fact that you feel morally bound to them means that you have a preference for that moral code. If you get wronged, you might want to punch the person in the face. But if you decide not to because you think it is immoral, it's because you have a preference to live in a society where people shouldn't punch others in the face. So you create your moral code based off of your subjective value of wanting a stable society (because it benefits you), whether it was socially conditioned or not, and therefore don't punch them.

And also keep in mind even if you truly care about others' well-being and have a moral code that values it... when you choose to live by that moral code, you are still doing it for your benefit. By seeing others' happy you get what you want and it makes you feel good.

Perhaps man had no choice in the matter, if he wanted to survive nature and not have to constantly fear harm from some less civilized neighbors he was forced to become social and form communities and in doing so to create laws, and culture, institutions, a civilization. Wouldn't this entail that any actions, or laws that don't foster a safe, equitable, orderly society are intrinsically wrong, because they jeopardize man's survival, which is the purpose of living in a community. — Cavacava

You could say that any actions or laws that don't foster a safe, equitable, orderly society are wrong because they aren't consistent with your or the majority of society's values which may an expression for wanting to survive (preference). But you can't say they are intrinsically morally wrong - you have to demonstrate that. And there hasn't been any argument that has done that in my opinion.

So you assert, but why should I believe this? Why should I believe that what seem to be truth-apt, cognitive statements like "murder is wrong" ultimately derive from non-cognitive, meaningless non-truth-apt, particular preferences? — darthbarracuda

I didn't say its not cognitive. I'm saying that you can't say that any moral code is objectively better than other. Or at least, there is no reason to believe that there is an objective morality where we can say killing is wrong because it's wrong. We can only say killing is wrong because we value a stable society, biological survival, or whatever you value. But the value is subjective.

Everyone has moral codes for what they think is right. The question is whether or not there is an object standard to say one moral code is better than another.

If someone kills someone, what do you do? One might say you shouldn't kill them back because that will destabilize society and hurt biological survival. Someone else might say you should kill the person because they deserve to die because that is fairness. How can you objectively say biological survival is a better code than fairness? It just comes down to one person wants to see a world that is more fair, whereas one person wants to see biological survival. These are conflicting moralities and there is no objective way, as far as I know, to say one is better than the other.

When I say morality being subjective preferences, I am saying that any person's moral code is to suit their preferences of how they want to see the world. They want to see a stable society so they say killing is wrong. That doesn't mean killing is wrong because it's intrinsically bad. It just means that its immoral to someone because not beneficial. And that is based off their preferences because in this case they prefer what is beneficial to them - a stable society in this case.

I was refuting the other person because they were arguing that objective morality is based around biological need for survival. I was only saying that is subjective. By showing showing a different moral context, it's easier to see why you can't just say biological survival is obviously the context for objective morality. Someone else could just throw out another context that they think morality should be based around. But these are nothing but subjective preferences for what they want to base morality on.

Moral judgments are reasoned in a society because the people have a preference for living in a society. The people reason that we should condemn murderers because they pose a threat to the individuals. The majority of individuals agree that they want to mutually benefit because they have a preference for living that way.

You can't really tell a dictator he's morally wrong. You would only be saying that because you prefer to live in a society where everyone benefits, not just the dictator. But why should the dictator have a moral obligation to listen to your moral code which simply based off of your moral code which was created for your own wants, needs, desires.

If one truly cares about the well-being of others, the person prefers to see others happy. So they value well-being and create a moral code around it. That's all.

Even if everyone in the world agrees on what is moral, it is because they all agree to set a code that is consistent with all of their preferences. If one person agrees, it is simply one person has different values than the majority because they may have different preferences for how they want to see the world. But it isn't objective because there is no right or wrong outside the subjective moral code that people create because they prefer the world to be that way.

I want to clear this up in case there is misunderstanding. I am not saying that if one person believe X and one person believe not-X that both X and X-not are true. I am saying that there is no objective morality to begin with. You can only say that it is that X is consistent with one person's subjective morality while X-not is consistent with the other person's morality.

I'm also not arguing that this viewpoint I'm expressing is better for a certain cause. In fact, it might have some consequences that will destabilize society. I'm just trying to be intellectually honest here.

Judging an action as morally wrong is entirely different than judging an apple pie to be good. — darthbarracuda

Judging an apple pie to be good is because you have preference for apple pie. Judging an action to be morally good is simply saying it is consistent with your morality code, which is based off of your subjective values, which expresses preferences (wants, needs, desires, comfortableness). Essentially, ones moral code is just their preferences.

Parasitic organisms don't know they are causing harm to another conscious entity. There is no morality involved when the organism isn't capable of assessing possible rightness or wrongness of an intentional act. — CasKev

There are no known cases of it, but I think you're missing the point I was trying to get at. You say that helping others survive in the CONTEXT of biological survival is good. I agree with that. In this case the word "good" means beneficial to the cause of biological survival.

In the CONTEXT of harming others, stealing is good. In this case the word "good" means beneficial to the cause of harming others.

The point is that basing morality on the cause for biological survival is subjective. One might say morality should be based on the cause for fairness. So if someone murders one might say the murderer deserves to die. The causes for biological survival vs. cause for fairness, these are nothing but moralities based on subjective values. You prefer to see biological survival so you choose to base your morality on that, subjectively.