There are other things about Rand's philosophy that don't stand the test of time. The ideas that were associated with imperialism, nationalism, racism etc. were collective post-WW2 and prior. This was true in the Allied nations as well as the Axis nations. Now the collective ideas are anti-imperialism, anti-nationalist, anti-racist etc. Purported individualists now defiantly demonstrate freedom of thought by hard-lining on the old collective ideas. Any purpose behind her philosophy of countering a type of malevolent State through extreme individualism was short-sighted. Not least of which because forging an extreme ideology not only polarizes one side of the continuum, but has an equal and opposite effect in theory on the other end of the continuum. I side with individualism, but I prefer more of a centerist or moderate theory of individualism, that is not like Rand's or neoliberalism: one that coherently accepts a collective role for government and State, but ensures individual liberty and does not encourage excessive nationalism or communitarianism etc.

Trump superficially conforms to an Objectivist archetype, but is not objectivist in rationality or intention of his political aims.

what would you offer as your solution? — Benj96

Make it a completely legal process at every step. No detainment or forced treatment unless the person commits a serious criminal act, especially not at the speculation of potential harm. The view on reality should be that subjective experience is reality: the reality is the person is hearing voices and the reality is the psychiatric interpretation; the reality is the patient thinks he is God. There are a number of reasons for this, but the main reason from a philosophical standpoint, is it is not a good precedent to set that there is a standard of objectivity for the subjectivity of the underdog in a conflict while the favorite has different rules where his subjectivity is real (subjectivism). This is a philosophical challenge. There's more obviously, but I am interested particularly in why psychiatry takes such a powerful advantage against vulnerable and sick people. I think if it wasn't so keen on infringing people's liberties, people would be much more well behaved in dealing with them. I guess there are no lessons to learn from history about people's desire for liberty and their violent defense of it, and it is merely convenient that taking it away escalates and empowers them to force treatment.

There are some interesting points in your reply. There is a lot to argue against psychiatry. It represents quite a powerful influence and is connected to medicine-law-education. It is futurist, the suffering and death of people is brushed aside as progress. It features a type of objectivity, focused on a subject, but never turns it against itself. It has a 'realist' view on reality, subjective experience of the subject is not reality, but the psychiatrist's subjective experience is real. It is communitarian moving towards fascist totalitarian in nature rather than libertarian leading to laissez faire. It has a long history of persecutions (lgtbq, women, certain ethnicities during positivism etc.) that practitioners have no dissonance about. They go hand in hand with modern hyper-industrial capitalism serving the pharmaceutical companies. Police become diagnosticians, having power to immediately medicalize deviance just by bringing a detainee to the hospital. The medicine can cause psychosis and other mental disorder, so once treated a person is trapped. They represent a modern bureaucratic nightmare for someone trapped in the system which has legal powers but is not a legalistic process so legal help is useless. It operates in a society of weak social ties and the psychiatrist-patient relationship is a new frontier in alienating social relationships. Psychiatric discursive practices can spread into common speech creating a culture that marginalizes subjective-irrational-idealist etc. thought and action. They represent an implicit draconianism of severe punishment, sometimes lethal or harmful treatment, for minor deviances. Does not believe in the inviolability of body. Is functionalist in that individual disfunction has a positive effect on their group function, but they deny sociological functionalist theories such as anomie.

I think it is a key institution to criticize philosophically as an exercise in freedom.

How were Trump's claims of election fraud based on reason and facts?

It's possibly complicated, but I look at it as something fairly simple. At bottom I think people are basically irrational. With effort we can train our minds to think with skill, using logic and empirical methods etc. I see being dichotomously dual natured, irrational-rational, as being more plausible than being completely one or the other. There are other such things as individual-collective: no man is an island but everyone is an individual. So irrational-logical features this dichotomy, which is embodied in the ironic nature of Socrates' method of feigning ignorance, but then using logic and questioning. I conclude feigning ignorance is an irrational method for the simple reason that it uses deception. To lie is not a rational practice in most situations. That someone can behave irrationally, but think logically, is not nearly unprecedented. It is a regular occurrence to argue with anger, which is an irrational state, in a logical way. Just because two things are opposing doesn't mean they cant exist at the same time, or are unstable together.

Socrates used logic but was not rational in the sense that he was often challenging the basic ideas of Athenian society. It is fundamentally irrational to do something that can get you killed.

I'll attempt two definitions one "irrational" and another "rational".

Irrational: Rationality is conformity in thought and action to socially constructed regimes of truth that determine what is done and said as well as forms the basis for evaluating in a moral sense what is deemed true or false, right or wrong and good or bad.

Rational: Rationality is the objective, logical and empirical basis of thought and action that establishes norms for forming consensus on what is considered true or false, right or wrong and good and bad.

I sympathise (emotionally) with your position about rationality, and irrationality as the antithesis of philosophy. However, irrationality is too vast a field to be banished by broad strokes from philosophy. There is much to say on the topic from classical greek philosophy to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, but I will not appeal to irrationalism's role in the history of philosophical thought. My own fixation on irony which is reducible to discrepancy between idea and reality is irrational but it connects to postmodernism and the irrational definition that precedes this paragraph. A definition of rationalism that is relativistic or contingent is opposed to the expectations of objectivity and realism that would be found in a contemporary definition. To deny irrationality in philosophy would be to deny descent in the face of sanctions used to preserve the established rules. If objectivity is deindividuating, a subjective individual position appears irrational to a social group that has established norms based on this value.

I've always been attracted to the idea that things are not how they seem. I think it is possible that the material reality we observe is only one layer of 'information' that is somewhat akin to how a computer can only read code, but other kinds of information are invisible or unrecognisable to it. This doesn't deny material reality, but simply suggests the actual world is possibly unknowable to us given that any tool we build will be of stuff that we can interact with, and it with the same stuff. I find it possible there could be other kinds of stuff that is not 'meaningful' to the specie of matter that we interact with and as such perhaps see the actual world as an overlay of overlapping levels of noise that are only sound to themselves.

A variety of things. It can be considered a type of passion such as being persistent about an argument. It can be considered the opposite of reason. It can be a way of acquiring knowledge, such as by intuition, imagination or divination. It can be a type of position such as nihilist, solipsism, or sophistry. And more but the work-bell has just rung.

Edit: as in sophistry, using fallacies such as false appeals etc. but even these can be powerful. Taking an extreme position is also irrational which is ironic in the case of extreme rationality such as scientism. Naturally a moral position is irrational if one argues in the virtues of immorality or amorality. Anything analogous to mental disorder such as postmodernism=schizophrenia or using paranoia to delve into the hidden motivations, inspirations, intentions and consequences etc. of a particular position. Having a fixed idea is also an irrational problem in philosophy but this kind of obsession can result in getting lots of mental work done. My own fixation on irony is about something irrational because it is about a discrepancy between idea and reality. Work-bell again.

There are also irrational states such as being angry, or under the influence of drugs such as mescaline which some claim to have transcendental effects. Some forms of transcendence especially when the thing being transcended is the basis for rationality like experience in empiricism or the moral order in transvaluation. Thinking about philosophy idly is an irrational practice compared to methodical, disciplined work. There is much more actually but lunch is almost over.

So to attempt a definition of irrationality in isolation is difficult, but as the opposite or absence or negation of rationality is easiest. Rationality is not just one thing like logic, it is a number of things like objectivity, empiricism, following rules, being of sound mind, making sense, organized, following a method and more.

Well no. — Srap Tasmaner

— here I'm guessing — — Srap Tasmaner

That's my excuse.

As for their similarity, I can't find anything that connects these two in a special way. You say, e.g. "thinking ahead in anticipation of how my argument or idea will be countered by an opponent." Well, this applies to most two-player board games, but also to sports (tennis, box ... you name it. It applies even in courts between defence and prosecution. In fact, it applies to most confrontations between two opponents.

But most of all, chess resembles to war. It's actually a "war" game. And I believe it is based on war, since all chessmen are war characters or elements. So, if philosophy resembles to chess, as you say, it certainly also resembles to war. Which sounds too weird. — Alkis Piskas

This is the fun with metaphor, that a seemingly unrelated object is used to make a point or to superimpose some quality from one disparate thing onto another. In the case of chess::philosophy, the chess-pieces superimpose an order onto the components of philosophical thought, as well as a dialectical nature found in two conflicting sides. I'm not going to go through the analogies between form and content of the pieces and the philosophy, as this has been done. The other games you mention could be used as a metaphor as well, but I find this one a richer allegory.

Yes, chess is a war game, but philosophy in the dialectical perspective is about conflict. To say that philosophy is war would not be accurate, but drawing a comparison between something about war and something about conflict is not a stretch.

Both of your comments relate to the finitude of chess but the boundlessness of philosophy. A computer can easily calculate all the moves of chess, but philosophy is something like an

infinite semantical meta-game of 'hermeneutics' played without rigid parameters — 180 Proof

. Of course, this is the way chess is not like philosophy, it doesn't have unlimited content. But in the platonic vision I have of the analogical nature of 'reality' the forms of philosophy which are abstract ideals are represented in the chess pieces, but represent a possibly limitless amount of real content. Irrationality represents one abstract ideal but it is so many varied real things as logical fallacies, to intuition, to emotion, to divination, to imagination and so much more.

Maybe in an extremely technical sense it is a difficult question, but the simple semantic meaning of irrationality conforms to that simple formula.

Yes, ironically, I do not find chess interesting, but I find philosophy interesting and think the two are similar.

"it takes two to tango", "philosophy most often is a solitary activity (it can be done alone)" Tango=/=philosophy

Chess takes two players as well, but believe it or not, a person can play themselves (him and her etc.) at chess.

This is a terrible idea.

Chess is illuminating because it presents questions that may be decidable in principle but are not, for humans, in practice. The alternating reliance on calculation and heuristics, with the goal of grounding a decision under uncertainty, is very reminiscent of philosophy, which rarely gives opportunities for decisive arguments and must content itself with persuasion. And you still calculate whenever you can. — Srap Tasmaner

Of course, there are non-dialectical methods of philosophy that are not argumentative, but as you say this uncertainty surrounding the making of decisive arguments and resorting to persuasion has a lot to do with the fallibility of the subject and the weaknesses that are revealed when encountering another mind. An idea that seems well thought out to one person based on their (his and her etc) knowledge and capacities may be a very weak game to someone else more experienced or better able.

Q=B+C did I know? Yes, it is an observation I have made before. Does it fit here that rationality + denial (or its negation) = irrationality. I think it does.

That's the typical way ideas are presented. Consider that your opening set of moves. If your idea is well thought out to begin with, concept is supported by facts and reason, you have already questioned your concept, and can strongly deny that it is flawed. In terms of irrationality, you have an ability to think intuitively and imaginatively about the idea, and are ready to defend it with strong emotion but not too much irrationality whereupon you commit fallacy and lose. That is just using the pieces on the board. A well thought out idea is analog to a strong opening before the opponent comes in and you become reactive, potentially setting your pieces into disarray: your facts are questioned, your reason is denied, you are put on the defensive and your irrationality and questioning surround your concept, so are not attacking the opponent's concept. Will they be a strong enough defense or is your entire 'strategy' a weak overall argument that can fall against a Socratic method, or other philosophical method, many of which can not be represented by the pieces in the outlined chess set.

This post is meant to be fun, but there is a serious component in the metaphor of chess for philosophy. I have a sort of platonic perception of the forms and contents of things and the analogy of those to other seemingly unrelated things as sort of a phenomenon of forms and a noumenon of content. I look at the forms of the chess pieces as establishing a hierarchy of value and but the actual code or logic is noumenal. For philosophical forms like concept or irrationality there is an outward idea we get that is somewhat analogous to the forms in chess, and to a certain extent to the noumenal logic of both the pieces and the philosophy connected to them. It's easy enough to deny any relation to these two separate things altogether, but to me that some comparison can be drawn suggests to me that the material world is merely a very imposing distraction to an actual world of 'form' which is one level of informational reality and 'content' which in this case is the rules or code the analogous subjects. So I guess this post is a little bit of a lazy allusion to something more complicated, but I do appreciate the above comments and will address them in turn after work, as I am now on lunch break.

Im not sure how deep the metaphor goes but the pawn/fact is related to the concept/king. The bishop/ reason is attacking a fact in defence of the concept. So if the concept is 'utilitarian' and fact is 'happiness is good' reason attacking could be 'happiness is from using things, using is ethically bad or wrong, happiness is bad or wrong' or something. The bishop being on one colour going diagonally is just reflective of degree of restriction relative to, say, irrationality where there are less rules but obviously some rules or else it would be something else (another piece).

Definitely irrationality/ queen, to the extent of having a grandiose delusion of being the most powerful unit in the game but in practice so out of control i am vulnerable.

thanks,

Rationality=reason=logic=bishop

To claim that there is a reality about any text that is not interpretive is not in the established nihilist tradition. That there is a reality independent of the mind is one of the realist aspects of the psychiatric institution, that there should be concern that its discursive practices, for one, will narrow the scope of thought creating a normalization that slashes and burns through irrationalities that are harmless like intuition, nihilism, imagination, interpretation and other subjectivist phenomena. What I have posted here in the original OP may not be a high-quality post, but I believe it expresses a nihilistic distrust of authority, also irrational, and warns against acting upon influence of this authority. Personally, I found life absurd when I encountered the work of Camus for the first time and his message resonated with me, but there are other interpretations that are literal and not absurdist or nihilistic, such as institutional ones that will see the reality of the text as a characterization of nihilism reducible to a diagnostic category. Not as an existential condition through which we can appreciate the 'heroism' of the deviants that are detached from what is real.

", just calling you out on your conspicuously uniformed m misinterpretations of Camus and the other philosophers you've mentioned, misinterpretations on which you seem incorrigibly fixated, introbert.

I wouldnt take criticism of interpreting foucault from someone who shamelessly uses psychiatric discursive practices to defend realist tyrannical intetpretations

I see this post has aggro'ed you for some reason. Possibly it is because you think I have not given the author his due, in term of diligence in giving him a fair interpretation. However, quite appropriately it is a nihilistic tendency to find meaninglessness or nonsense on what other find meaningful or sense-making. The Nietzche inspired Death of the Author opens up interpretation and subsequently criticism beyond the author's intended meaning. It is a doubly absurd nihilist that finds meaning in Camus' work and absurdly adventures into the hands of institutional moral realists. But it is this interpretation that the author's death can nihilistically criticize (no author). Also the interpretation of the nonnihilist who enjoys the story but sees the protagonist as a simple deviant. Giving the author his due doesnt account for the mass of casual readers and ultimately the effects of their interpretations that is the reality to negate.

The major theme of nihilist thinking is anti-totalitarian, anti-tyranny. Psychiatry, like policing or education etc. operates innocently. But the concern for authors like Foucault and Deleuze was an implicit fascism in its workings. If there are casual readings like Catcher in the Rye that will reach far more people than the former authors, the culture they produce will tighten the (proverbial and literal) straightjacket on society instead of enhancing liberty of anomic states like nihilism. Everything is pretty good right now but it is not by placing blind trust in powerful institutions that ultimately protects liberty.

Could be. Nature seems to exist for itself, so it is possible that nihilist angst isn't really about meaninglessness but against meanings. This is nuanced as in the case of meaninglessness nothing has meaning but to be against meaning is a skepticism and incredulity about what the world, particularly the social world, has to offer. To live in a state of nature where you hunt your prey and gather the forest's offerings would not require artificial inducements like work ethic and a system of rewards that are a house of cards for the animal in us to want to knock down. Once all the houses of cards with all their meaningless symbols have fallen maybe that would be the end of nihilism.

Maybe it does suggest more causative power than it has, but perhaps a more realistic diminishing of this effect by saying that the philosophy causes marginal behavior at the margins of society. It is not a mass movement despite the widespread popularity of the work. As I previously alluded to, the work the Catcher in the Rye by JD Salinger would only have socially disorganized adolescents as a minority of the readership, so the message that they might have a psychiatric problem would only be resisted by that small minority. For the rest of readers the connection between social disorganization in Catcher and criminality in The Stranger would link psychiatry in the first case and nihilism in the second. These are not likely the intended, but the latent functions of the work that cause a potentially intensification of institutionalization. Obviously my claim in this post approaches conjecture given the difficulty to measure the effect of these works on readership and subsequently institutions.

What citation can you provide to substantiate that this is how nihilism functions in practice? I think most forms of hard nihilism are more likely to end up as silence via apathy.

https://yorkspace.library.yorku.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10315/38809/Forsythe_Jeremy_E_2021_Masters.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y

This link from a graduate thesis paper discusses the history of nihilism (search: "Tzar") and describes the 19th century nihilist movement in Russia that advocated destruction of society (antisocial enough?) to purge society of unworthy social structures to act against oppression and tyranny.

In Camus' The Stanger, a nihilistic protagonist violates social codes, kills a man, and gets executed.


https://books.google.ca/books?hl=en&lr=&id=CS5dBwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA162&dq=nihilism+and+social+deviance+sociology&ots=NnuonKXok6&sig=St6Q1yrLbxHvc_q4MczkoppMPKI#v=onepage&q=nihilism%20and%20social%20deviance%20sociology&f=false

This interesting article discusses nihilism and violence but mentions Nietzche's evaluation of nihilism as potentially a destructive force of violence.

https://www.atlantis-press.com/proceedings/eac-law-20/125947687


"By nature, legal
responsibility is normative and is expressed through the
existing system of legal norms. Therefore, the first sign of
legal irresponsibility is the lack of legal norms that
regulate legal responsibility. It is worth mentioning that
this feature makes the term “legal irresponsibility” closer
to the concept of “legal anomie”. The latter has already
been used in legal sciences (criminology, criminal law) to
explain legal nihilism in the marginal behavior of the
subject from the internal (psychological) point of view. In
classical understanding, “anomie” is the lack or violation
of the rules of behavior and their internal rejection by the
majority of society (process)"

This article discusses criminality/ legal nihilism but draws an arbitrary distinction

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0803706X.2017.1333145

Article mentions moral nihilism and violence


Still looking and reading...

All depends on what you mean by antisocial. This forum is a kind of community which depends on people following all sorts of rules and codes. Let's say my nihilism just led me to disregard your feelings as nothing resulting in me being rude to you. If I continued to nihilistically lack compassion and empathy, reject your rational appeals as nothing, respond without sentence structure, grammar, punctuation and spelling (these conventions representing nothing), and descend the conversation into meaningless flaming I would soon provoke moderation. If this was a real world situation those provocations may lead to police getting involved if I had made threats or acted aggressively, from there who knows where that would lead if there is a medicalization of deviance or perhaps a unified church and state. This is really what motivates this post: the potential for totalitarian and authoritarian controls of social codes. Philosophical nihilism plays a role in countering this but the point of the OP is that Camus' philosophical nihilism feeds these regimes with unequipped absurd adventurers

I'm not sure if you are being deliberately contrarian, feigning ignorance or are just a little naive, but nihilism is tied with a number of abnormal psychologies and is part of the profile for sociopathy. Just these associations are enough to make nihilism a targeted disposition by moral institutions. That doesn't even consider the natural conflict that occurs on the level of fundamental argument between realists who are part of moral social constructions and nihilists that are incredulous of them. One of the third hand or fourth hand accounts of Camus's work that I read was an interpretation that the protagonist of The Stranger was a sociopath. This profile depicted by Camus serves, Catcher in the Rye like, to provide the non-nihilist reader with an archetype "to catch a body a comin through the rye"

What are societal values? — Tom Storm

The key ones here are health, order, and rationality (reason).

Can you explain what you mean in simple language? What moral argument is there against nihilism? — Tom Storm

Nihilists consider the things people take very seriously as nothing. The moral argument against nihilism, if there's only one, is simply that it does not recognize the cornerstones and pillars of society.

Perhaps that is the boulder rolling back down the hill, right? — Tom Storm

I'll have to make a sketch of that idea in my notebook. Thanks.

I can't follow what you mean — Tom Storm

I'm not going to be the one to write the next chapter in Nihilism, I just see a direction that it is taking.

To answer my own question: yes, of course Camus makes sense. His writing on absurdity is cogent. But to answer my own argument, I still don't think that there is any *sense* to it. This is apart from making sense in terms of being a philosophical system, for it is an extremely impractical form of nihilism in that it does not result in *nothing*. If the nihilist chooses not to kill himself and embrace the meaninglessness it does not end there, the nihilist at the very least becomes anomic and violates societal values. The nihilist reifies the moral argument against him into social institutions that are against lawlessness, intemperance, infidelity, immorality, antiestablishment, anarchism, anti-work etc. And Camus' philosophy ends there. The nihilst is all alone pushing for nothing while the opposite of nothing pushes back. The opposite of nothing is unbeatable by nothing, but as the history of nihilism proceeds there are other writers who have a little more sense to turn their nihilism against the moral institutions that the nihilist will come up against. Not turning nihilism against institutions, as he turned it against life itself, is what does not make sense about Camus, in my humble opinion.

PS I made a few other points against Camus as well, but I'm short on time.

Thanks everyone for your comments. Despite objections I still hold my ground that in the recent history of nihilism Camus' philosophy is disempowering to the nihilist and ultimately sends them blindly into social institutions that they ultimately empower. Foucault on the other hand empowers and gives tools to the nihilist so there is at least some revolutionary potential.

I guess I didn't express myself clearly enough in this post. The basic idea I tried to present was that if the death of god make's life meaningless/ purposeless/ absurd then it is questionable that you can not choose suicide due to the inherent self-destructiveness of absurd heroism. The contradiction that the death of god, makes god live in a very purposeful and practical way to me makes this philosophy not make sense.

I gave the example that a philosophy that said the death of god should be a point of departure for living a life believing in god is absurd.

To me that Camus' (and Sartre's) existentialism led into postmodern critiques of institutions by those such as Foucault and Deleuze is not coincidental but the ongoing process of the individual not only recognize god is dead but, what Camus did not recognize, to also keep god dead!

Seems like this post is not well recieved. The question is whether someone who accepts absurdity is ultimately choosing not to kill oneself and in the process of accepting absurdity is fuelling purposeful institutions that have always been connected to God. So there is a question lingering if Camus makes sense. I'm going on about giving examples of the self destructiveness of absurd heros and how they feed and empower these purposeful institutions. Someone who proceeds from a position that life has no meaning or purpose will almost certainly encounter one of these institutions. I dont think I am "out of my depth" in asking that question it seems like an obvious contradiction that finding no purpose without god will lead to risky behaviors that will feed the institutions most closely connected to god.

Re: natural law. Whether something is immoral does have a sort of objectivity to nature. Just as putting your hand on a hot stove has immediate disciplinary effect, and has moral implications regarding a persons duty to care for their body, committing unjust and immoral acts that don't have an implicit natural disciplinary corollary, are seemingly corrected eventually as if by force of nature. There is an inherent internal instability in immoral acts for one reason or another. The reason may be they are the result of poor decision making which will eventually lead a fatal wrong decision. Something in the logic of immorality will curse the immoral. The immoral action could also have negative effects which lead to the creation of laws to control the action and these laws simulate natural force and effect. It follows in this line of reasoning that modern contemporary society is an absurd simulacra of natural laws and natural force and effect like economic behaviors that create environmental damage are worshipping artificiality that rewards the processes that create the artificiality. If nature was seen as the objective source of morality and law as I have demonstrated a rudimentary basis for, then it woukd be nature governing nature rather than artificiality governing artificiality.

Very nice question. My answer is that we dont live in a moral universe. I doubt there is an objective morality given that the universe doesn't offer a moral basis or standard in nature to compare human actions. Animals that occur in nature eat meat as we do. Some insects will enslave other insects. If all animals ate plants and no insects enslaved other insects then immorality would be against the object order of nature. But instead morality is about how things make us feel. What makes us feel bad is bad vice versa. I truly don't believe in objective morality and anyone who makes morality out to be an objective thing is likely a hardcore moralist.

There is nothing positively good about democracy. It provides a good mechanism for a utilitarian style system(the greatest happiness for greatest number) but there's no reason to be excessively prodemocracy. That means a democratic system needn't be as democratic as possible. The point of the system is to create long term stability, with opposing but not revolutionary parties (theres a republican party in USA but not in Canada). I cant decide if the American system is broken or works too well.

Sorry I work a day job and didn't have time to respond. I wasn't thinking of presentism, although that is interesting. It's actually a very complex reason why things have changed the way they have. I think the simple reason is that everyone in the world potentially has a voice now, so it is rather difficult to do unjust things.

Yep, some of that soul is in me. I have proved to be too good at learning for my own good, and pieces of psycho-babble have made an impression on me. A big issue is the way people learn without an irony shield. Someone will become a psychiatric doctor without deflecting a single arrow drenched in that poison directed directly at their head. Yet when they are faced with criticism they will turn their psychiatric learning against you and see all sorts of aberrations. There are heaps of criticisms to be made.

I'm pretty interested in this kind of thing, but I found no meaning in her playing the flute.