Plus, historians of science were quick to point out that, pace Popper, theories, and particularly paradigms, are often falsified and rather than being challenged post hoc explanations are offered. For example, Newton's physics was falsified almost immediately when applied to astronomy. But rather than reject it, astronomers posited unobserved, more distant planets to explain the irregular orbits of visible planets. These were eventually identified with improvements in telescope technology, but were originally unobservable ad hoc posits. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So the system worked, in the end. True, one has to be patient. True also that there is no time limit on such waiting. In the mean time, opinions will differ and arguments will rage. Nothing wrong with that.

Right, and those "other criteria" are what are often used to suggest a fairly robust anti-realism, i.e., "sociology all the way down (with the world merely offering some "constraints"). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. But I don't see that anti-realism is a necessary consequence of the applicability of these criteria.

implausible reductions and eliminations (e.g. eliminating consciousness or all mental causality) are often justified in terms of "parsimony " paired with the claim that any difference between reduction/elimination and its opponent theories must be "underdetermined by empirical evidence." This is precisely why "parsimony" wins the day. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I can't see that the consequence is inevitable. Surely, it will depend on the details of the case.

Literally any observation of human behavior is easily rendered explicable by the theory itself, and challenges to the theory can be explained by the theory (just as challenges to Freudianism was a sign of a "complex"). — Count Timothy von Icarus

This could mean that the theory is underspecified couldn't it? Or not even suitable for assessment as though it were a "scientific" theory?

your current experiences are consistent with the world, and all of our memories, having been created 5 seconds ago, no? And they are consistent with all other human beings being clever robots, and your living in an alien or AI "zoo" of sorts. But surely there is a metaphysical and ethically relevant difference. — Count Timothy von Icarus

One difference is that there is not the slightest reason to take any of those possibilities seriously. They are all fantasies. "Here be dragons".

My interest though lay more in the use of underdetermination to support radical theses in philosophy, not so much basic model underdetermination. In part, this is because the historical comparison isn't that illuminative here. The ancients and medievals knew about and accepted model underdetermination ("saving appearances"), but the more interesting thing is that they didn't think this general form of argument led to much wider forms of underdetermination as respects rules, causation, induction, word meaning, free will, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Speaking of the general form of argument, these arguments look to me very much like re-heated old-fashioned scepticism. What's new about it?

Where is this reality? — RussellA

This is not a proper question, because there is insufficient context to define a correct answer. It's like asking where space is.

Our five sense are between our minds and a reality the other side. — RussellA

That presupposes that our minds and reality exist in the same space. Since our minds are not physical objects, that cannot be the case.

As you say, we accept that our concept of the sun is not identical with its object, in that our mind, contained within our brain, being of the order 30cm diameter, is less than the 1.39 million km diameter of the sun. — RussellA

Mental objects such as appearances, experiences, concepts are not physical objects, so do not occupy space.

As you also say, our concept of the sun is existentially dependent on its object. — RussellA

I don't see how that can be true. There are many concepts of things that do not exist.

The question is, where is this object? Where is this sun? — RussellA

You need to explain this question. In a normal context, the answer would be 93 million miles from the earth. No doubt there is an astronomical location within a wider context.

As an Indirect Realist, from appearances and experiences in my senses I can infer that their cause was the fact of there being a sun in reality. But this can only be an inference. — RussellA

With reservations, OK.

But how can we know without doubt the cause of the appearances and experiences in our senses? — RussellA

It depends what you mean by doubt. There is not a shred of evidence - apart from these philosophical arguments - that would make such a doubt less than idle speculation.

As an Indirect Realist, this is not a problem. I simply name the unknown cause of my appearances and experiences after the appearances and experiences themselves, such that I name the set {appearance of a circular shape, experience of seeing the colour yellow, experience of hotness} as "sun". — RussellA

So you form a collection of all the evidence that the sun exists, etc. and call that set the sun? That's like holding all the evidence that P implies Q and refusing to assert Q. That's not an inference of any kind. And how can you assert that this set is 1.39 million miles in diameter? Appearances and experience do not occupy space, so no collection of them can have a diameter.

Backwards in time, how can anyone know that the cause of a broken window was a stone or a bird when the observer was not present when the window broke? — RussellA

You must be using the words in unusual ways. From the fact that I am here, I can reliably infer that I was born. I can also infer reliably that I will die.

How can you know the cause of an appearance or experience in the senses when no one cause is necessary but many possible causes are contingent? — RussellA

You must be using the words in unusual ways. It is precisely experience in the senses that enable us to infer causation. If you think those inferences are wrong, I would be glad to see the evidence.

But for the Indirect Realist, they only have the map. They cannot directly look at the actual world to compare it to the map. — RussellA

What earthly use is a map if you cannot relate it to what it is a map of? Is it perhaps possible to look at the world indirectly?

The topic opens on p. 30. “How can one think what it is not the case?” The discussion of this will go on for the next 9 pages. This is too big a chunk for us, now. I shall cover what might be seen as the first phase, and identify the main stages in the argument after that.

There is “nothing easier” than to think what is not the case. In a sense, Wittgenstein needs not merely to announce his problem, but also to get us to see it as a problem He reminds of the the problem about measuring time, which he discussed earlier. (Ref. needed)

Wittgenstein comments that this is a “beautiful” example of a philosophical question. It is also a beautiful example of his method. It wanders through allied topics as it goes along and ends up with a different view of our starting-point, rather than unveiling a Solution.

His first diagnosis (p.31) is that we are misled by "object of thought", "fact", “and by the different meanings of the word "exist". His response is a discussion of imagining something and a critique of the idea that one can only reconstitute existing elements in a new configuration. I think this is because we can think something that doesn’t exist (such as a ‘false fact’) by imagining it. His critique of this is not fully developed, as he admits. He promises to return to it, but announces, in a sense, his first target. - “it is not the fact which we think". He points out that this depends on how one uses the word “fact”. I think he means that one could use the word fact in such a way that what I wish for is the fact of Mr. Smith arriving. That would evade, rather than resolve, the problem.

His next step (p. 32) introduces the familiar notion of propositions – “the sense of a the sentence” but presents them as “shadows” of facts. This presents the concept in an entirely new context, in which they can be treated as problems in a way that orthodox philosophy doesn’t. So a wholly new critique of the concept can be developed. It is not as if the concept of a proposition is not problematic, but this approach takes us out of the box.

Two transformations of the issue follow rapidly (still p. 32). "How can we know what the shadow is a shadow of?"-- "What makes a portrait a portrait of Mr. N?" and there’s a first answer "The similarity between the portrait and Mr. N". He rejects this answer “for it is in the essence of this idea that it should make sense to talk of a good or a bad portrait” The shadow cannot be treated in this way because, to put it this way, there is no Mr. N to compare it to. This is the essence of the problem, not a solution.

And he wanders off into a discussion of meaning, returning on p. 35, where we find a helpful diagnosis. Hie identifies two different uses of “I think x”. We have "I think that so-and-so will happen" or "that so-and-so is the case", but also "I think just the same thing as he". He also cites "I expect him", and "I expect that he will come" and compares "I shoot him".

This is followed by a discussion of shadows, pictures, and similarity. He is seeking to establish the paradoxical idea that a correct picture of something need have no similarity with its object. (I’m reminded of the picture theory of meaning.) On that basis, positing a shadow between “the sentence and reality” loses all point. The sentence itself can play the required role. (p. 37).

The topic seems to be finally closed when, on p. 38, he reminds us that the connection between thinking about a man and the man himself is established by an ordinary ostensive definition.

I am tempted to skip the discussion “what is not the case” and shadows, etc., and move to the mention of “intention” on p. 32, but if anyone else wants to take up or comment on that section, please do (as anyone can lead the charge at any time). — Antony Nickles

|I'll do something on that.

There's an awful lot going on here. I have to be selective. I don't think swopping assertions about tables and chairs, or relations is going to help much. I think of this debate as not about some fact of the matter, but an interpretation, a way of understanding some things about how we relate to the world, how we fit in to it.

I'm further confused by the presence of concepts, experiences, appearances all playing a similar role - that of getting between us and reality and preventing us from grasping it. In my book, those are the ways in which we grasp reality and distinguish what's real from what is not.

If we know that we don't know reality, we know it from our concepts, experiences, and what appears to us. Yet that's not what they tell us. All three of these concepts announce, quite clearly that they are about something. We have a concept of tables, our experience are experiences of chairs, and what appears in the morning is the sun. They are not identical with their objects, but they are existentially dependent on them. So denying the reality of those objects, or claiming that we don't know those objects, denies their reality. In other words, I can have no idea of these things without the idea of whatever the object is of the concept, experience or appearance they are linked to. Even the idea of perceptions as representations sends the same message.

Yes, of course we know that our senses are limited and appearances can be misleading. But we gain that knowledge from our senses and experiences. More important, when things have gone wrong, it is our senses and experiences that enable us to "see through" the misleadings and misdirections to what is actually real.

Let's think about representations.
If I want to find my way from A to B, I can use a map - a representation of the terrain. But it is no use to me unless I can read the map, and identify what point on the map represents where I am - I have to link the representation to what it is a representation of. That applies to a physical map, and, presumably, to a mental map.
But I don't have to use a map. I can follow a set of directions, such as the directions that a route-finder app will give you. Again, those directions are no use to me unless I can understand them and apply them in the actual world.
But I can actually find my way without either a map or directions. I can follow the sign-posts, for example. But again, I have to be able to interpret them and apply them.
Or, I may memorize a set of cues - turn left by the church, then right by the lake, and so forth. Again, implementing the cues is essential.

What I'm trying to point out is that, whatever mental object you posit in my head, the actual work is done by my mind, interpreting, applying and so forth. Those activities - skills - are what matters. The mental object doesn't actually do anything.

I think also that we are talking past each other most of the time. Perhaps the most radical example is that every time I read that the mind does this and that, what I hear is that people do this and that. We couldn't even have this debate if the question was whether people create the world or whether the world could exist without people in it.

This seems to assume this is about justification, and not an investigation of other examples to see why we insist on certain prerequisites (and what we miss in requiring them), instead of just taking them as just different answers to the same issue. — Antony Nickles

I'm not at all sure that historicism etc. are about justification, though I suppose it might be. That is, sosmeone might take a historical account of our form of life to be a justification. But if what Wittgenstein is interested in clarifying what our justification practices are, how we justify ourselves, then, in this context that is inappropriate. The attempt to justify our justification practices inevitably begs the question. Just as, in the end, there can't be an argument to the conclusion that logic justifies our arguments. That sets up an infinite regress or a circle of arguments. In the end, one simply has to "get" the point - a bit like a joke.

I only wanted to head off the presumption that this was about individuals, and not a matter, as you say, of our (people’s) culture (our language) coming before us. — Antony Nickles

No, no, I wasn't going there. Though, as individuals, we are deeply embedded in our culture and history. We are, in a sense, our culture and history -- to the point where our sense of our individuality is itself the product of them.

In the Investigations, “forms of life” are the background practices that make language intelligible. Witt insists they are not grounded in theory, but in “what we do.”
At first glance this sounds close to historicism or relativism (since forms of life can differ). But Wittgenstein doesn’t historicize them in Nietzsche’s or Foucault’s sense (as contingent, power-saturated events in a genealogy). — Joshs

I've always been a bit puzzled why he didn't take the obvious step from forms or life to historicism, relativism, or even perhaps naturalism. It's always been obvious to me that this was aching to be explored and developed. I just assumed that it was just where he stopped, leaving further development to the next generation. It sorted of fitted with how he does philosophy and he would have been justified in feeling that he had achieved his aims. There could have been plans that were never fulfilled.

It is clear from remarks he wrote elsewhere, that he thought that if he could come to believe in God and the Resurrection - if he could even come to attach some meaning to the expression of those beliefs - then it would not be because he had found any evidence, but rather because he had been redeemed.” — Joshs

I don't know if we are allowed to feel sorry for him. It seems somehow impertinent. Now I'm even more puzzled about his "wonderful life".

If ethical desire can transcend historical contingency, then perhaps this is why for Witt other kinds of desires as well (desire for certainty, generality, completeness) are not simply ‘what we do’ in the historical sense of contingent discursive practices, but confused expressions of a transcendent feeling. — Joshs

If he stuck with ethics as transcendent, is it possible that his ahistorical "form of life" was actually some sort of transcendent idea? One might feel that he doesn't seem to regard language as defined in the TLP as transcendent, but if the truths of logic cannot be said, but only shown, then it looks as if logic is also transcendent.

And, when I saw this part, I immediately thought the “someone” in this situation should be our culture, or the whole of human history, which would be the “us” or “we” like, humanity, from which meaning is not given independently. — Antony Nickles

In my book, culture and history come back to people, so, while I wouldn't disagree with you, I don't feel that there's a significant difference between us.

You are setting quite an agenda here.

For the Indirect Realist, objects such as tables and chairs only exist in the mind and not the world. The Indirect Realist believes that they don't experience the world as it really is, but only through representations of it. — RussellA

We don't experience tables and chairs through representations of them. If we can't compare a representation with the original, there is no way to know whether it is truth or illusion.

For the Indirect Realist, relations exist in the mind otherwise they would not have the concept of table, but relations between the parts in the world are unnecessary. There need be no ontological relations between parts in the world in order for the Indirect Realist to have the concept of tables and chairs. — RussellA

The concept of a table is not a table. Having a concept of a table does not mean that tables exist in your mind. Appropriate relations between the legs and top of a table are critical to its functioning.

For the Direct Realist, the experience of tables and chairs in the mind is a direct experience of the same tables and chairs that exist in the world. The Direct Realist believes they experience the world directly, and there is a direct correspondence between their concept of a table and the table in the world. — RussellA

I have never managed to work out what "direct experience" means. But I do think that thinking of our senses as if they were a biological kind of telescope or microscope or microphone is very misleading - and I think that's one mistake that being made here. I suspect that the model of direct experience is introspection and it is a truism to say that we do not experience the world by introspection. I don't see how it helps. (There is the further point that it turns out that we only "introspect" because we are physiologically equipped to do so and introspection is no more reliable that perception. )

For the Direct Realist, if the table exists as an ontological object in the world, then the relations between the parts that make up the table must also ontologically exist in the world. If ontological relations did not exist in the world then neither would the table ontologically exist in the world. — RussellA

I can buy this, I think. But I don't think I'm a Direct Realist, because I have no idea what "direct" means here.

If relations existed in the world but not in the mind, as with Kant's things-in-themselves, we would not be able to discuss them, as we would not know about them. — RussellA

I'm not sure about that. That we can perceive objects-in-the-world, and how they are related does not mean that they exist in the mind. An analogy. A machine can recognize a face from an image, or from the face itself. It does not need to form an image of the face in order to recognize it. The machine relates the face (or the image of it, as appropriate) to what needs to be done. An image in the machine would just get in the way. Why do you suppose that we need an image in our mind (apart from memory)?

An object such as a table exists as a relation between the parts that make it up. — RussellA

That's a bit convoluted. A table consists of various parts, suitably organized. In the real world, the organization is called a design. In our minds, the organization is called a Gestalt.

As you say "Counting relations is not as straightforward as it looks." A relation suggest two things. There is the relation between a table and a chair. But there is also a relation between the table top and its legs. But then again there is a relation between the atoms that make up the table top. And there is a relation between the elementary particles and forces that make up an atom. There is an "overpopulation" of relations. — RussellA

Not all relations are the same. There are transitive and intransitive relations. But I won't pick at the bulk of this. What matters is the "over-population". I don't see why "over-population" is a problem. Where does anything say what number of relations there should be in the world? The "overpopulation" is, so to say, mathematical, not a feature that can be dispensed with. Are you thinking of relations as objects alongside all the physical constituents of the table? That's a mistake. Relations do not occupy space, any more than boundaries do. Why are you not concerned about the overpopulation of points in space and time, since there are an infinite n umber of them?

As you say "Existing in both the mind and the world is hardest of all to understand. Does it mean that there are actually two relations? Which of them is the real one?" This is a problem for the Direct Realist as the relations in the world are duplicated in the mind, a case of "over-determination". For the Direct Realist, which are the real relations, the ones in the world or the ones in the mind. But this is not a problem for the Indirect Realist, in that the real relations are the one that exist in the mind. — RussellA

If the relations occupy space, they cannot be in the mind. If relations are even located in space, they are not in the mind. The mind is not a space - except metaphorically.

Relations don't need to ontologically exist in the world in order for there to be lines of latitude and longitude as the colour red does not need to ontologically exist in the world in order for there to be traffic lights. — RussellA

You are taking the description of the world in physics as "how the world really is". Can you justify that? I don't think that the description of the world as physics has chosen to see it is in any significant way different from out everyday description of the world. One could even argue that it is impoverished because it can't recognize colours, etc.

How can we know that relations exist in the world if we don't know where they are. If there is a relation in the world between A and B, and the relation cannot be found in A, the relation cannot be found in B and the relation cannot be found in a section of space between A and B, then why should we think that there are relations in the world at all. — RussellA

This is a category mistake. Where is the design of the table or chair? Where is the organization of our bodies? Where is a rainbow? Where is the age of our planet? You are trying to impose the framework of physical objects on something that isn't that kind of object.

In summary, the ontological existence of relations in the world is unnecessary, as Indirect realism, a valid theory of perception, does not require them. In addition, if relations did ontologically exist in the world, further problems would arise, including mereological overpopulation, the arbitrariness of determining the existence of objects, the question of whether a relation can exist independently of what it is relating and any scientific explanation of their nature alongside fundamental particles and forces. — RussellA

I don't think your theory of perception is valid. I don't see why "overpopulation" is a problem. You can say that some of our differentiations in the world are arbitrary, like boundaries between nations or real estates, but it doesn't follow that all are. The distinction between table and chair is not arbitrary. A relationshipt cannot exist independently of its relata. The fundamental particles are not particles in the same sense as molecules and atoms are. They are probability fields or something like that. Not objects of the same kind as tables and chairs.

If object A is 1.8 metre in size and object B is 1.7m in size, then there is a relation between their sizes. Does this relation exist in the mind, the world or both? — RussellA

The answer depends on what you mean by your question. Each word needs dissection.
However, one might start by asking whether A and B exist in the mind, the world or both. If A and B exist in the world, it is hard to see what one might mean by saying that the relation exists in the mind. But saying that it exists in the world generates that puzzle question about where it is. Existing in both the mind and the world is hardest of all to understand. Does it mean that there are actually two relations? Which of them is the real one?

If there were only 2 objects in the universe there is one relation. If there were only 3 objects in the universe there are 3 relations. If there were only 4 objects in the universe there are 6 relations. IE, in the Universe, there are more relations than objects. — RussellA

Look at this carefully: -

Each of A, B, C, D can be greater or smaller or equal to the size of each other object. So each object may be equal to itself. That gives numbers different from yours - much higher. So my question is where all those relations disappeared to?

You may not be counting A=A as a relation, and I grant you that there is something odd about that. We can just skip those cases for our purposes. In addition. since "smaller than" follows logically from "larger than", you may be treating them as the same.

(A,B) & (A,C) & (A,D)
(B,A) & (B,C) & (B,D)
(C,A) & (CB) & (C,D)
(DA) & (D,B) & (D,C)

Counting relations is not as straightforward as it looks.

If relations do exist in an ontological sense in the world, then there are more relations than actual objects. Where did these extra relations come from? — RussellA

What were you expecting? That there would be fewer, as there are in the case of 2 objects? That there would be just as many relations as objects, as in the case of 3 objects? Your surprise is just the result of not thinking through the situation in detail.
Counting relations is much trickier than you might think. Counting objects is even trickier. Count the number of bricks in a house. Count the number of walls in that house. Add the house itself. I would say that's double counting, wouldn't you?
I doubt it is even possible to count the number of sub-atomic particles in anything - mainly because they aren't particles in the usual sense.
Is a rainbow an object separate from the rain-drops that generate it? What about shadows?
I don't think the project is sufficiently defined to be capable of being implemented - even in a thought-experiment.

Relations are not unlike the lines of latitude and longitude. If those lines don't exist in the world, how can they enable navigators to know where they are in the world? Those lines are like boundaries, whether between nations or neighbours. Boundaries certainly have a location in the world - what is the point of them if they don't. But they are, let us say, one-dimensional - they have length, but not width or depth, unlike boundary markers, which have both. These objects are not objects like tables and chairs, which are three-dimensional (four, if you like), but what of that?
I'm very puzzled by the question where relations - even spatial ones - are. I don't think there is an answer to it. But it doesn't make any sense to me to deny that they are in space (the clue is in the name), even if we can't assign an exact location to them.

We choose a framework of sense that fits our desire for strictness, but we analogize it because that leverages our craving for simplicity to fill in the blanks of the disparate parts between the two cases with the likes of “sense data”, “appearance”, “reality”, “mind”, “forms”, or telling time using a tape measure. — Antony Nickles

That's about right. Though what counts as simplicity can be complicated. I mean that once you have learnt to drive a car it seems quite simple. But when you first sat in the driving seat, it was a different story.
It seems a pity, though, that we get so addicted to our analogies that we find them very hard to shake off. That's why we stick to our sense data etc. even though they create hideous complications. No-one, surely, can think that a table as the sum of all its possible appearances is simple. Can they?
I think that there is another motive at work here - the desire to find something surprising and interesting to say, the need to emerge from one's library with a trophy from all those explorations.

But let's not forget that a word hasn't got a meaning given to it, as it were, by a power independent of us, so that there could be a kind of scientific investigation into what the word really means. A word has the meaning someone has given to it. — p. 28

This is one of my hobby-horses. It is a well-established figure of speech, and everyone knows it. Perhaps it does not harm. But we learn to speak a language that already exists, from people who did not invent it. There is a sense in which there is a kind of scientific investigation into what the word really means - how people actually use it. Whether that information is likely to help with any philosophical question is not clear - empirical philosophy does, apparently, exist. (Did Austin invent it?) On the other hand, it is perfectly clear that language is maintained in existence by people who use it, and those users do change the language by introducing new uses. But what does not happen is a confabulation and decision. Except in countries like France and Sweden, introductions - even when they are invented by a known individual, as sometimes happens, - are taken up and spread almost unawares by the anonymous mass of users. "A word has the meaning someone has given it." is a misleading way of putting this.

... ordinary language is all right. Whenever we make up 'ideal languages' it is not in order to replace our ordinary language by them; but just to remove some trouble caused in someone's mind by thinking that he has got hold of the exact use of a common word. That is also why our method is not merely to enumerate actual usages of words, but rather deliberately to invent new ones, some of them because of their absurd appearance. — p. 28

All true. The difference between enumerating actual usages and Wittgenstein's therapy is I think at least close to getting at what it means to understand the meaning of a word.

Broadly speaking, an argument from underdetermination is one that attempts to show that available evidence is insufficient to determine which of several competing theories is true. That is, many different theories might be able to explain the same evidence, hence any move to choose between theories must be “underdetermined,” i.e., not determined by the evidence. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I have some questions about this. I hope it is not too disruptive to raise them.

1. What happened to falsification, which is based on the argument that there can never be enough evidence to establish a theory? Falsification is much easier and can be conclusive when positive proof is not available.

2. There are several criteria, I understand, that are applied in order to choose between two competing theories - Occam's razor, elegance, simplicity etc. Kuhn suggests that the wider context - sociological, technological, practical considerations - all have influence here.

3. If an alternative theory explains more data than the existing theory, it is preferable. If it explains less data, the existing theory is preferable. If both explain exactly the same data, how are they (relevantly) different?

4. Is there really anything special about our making decisions based on less than conclusive data? (We even have a special word for this - "judgement" - admittedly it is not always used in this way.)

But this doesn’t square with framing it as distinctly not foundational (“loose”, “conventional”, “only co-ordinates… with”, being “unable to answer” what is the defining criteria), despite the desire to know (for sure); and so the (philosophical) point is about the (inappropriate, out-of-context, ad hoc) desire, “particular purpose” (next, for strict rules). — Antony Nickles

OK. I see what you are saying. The discussion of the toothache is set in the context of practical use, and Wittgenstein's point is that the doubt is created by shifting (silently, unconsciously) to the context of strict use. It is not that either is wrong, but that the silent change is inappropriate. It looks as if the decision which context to adopt is pragmatic.
So we have another philosophical tactic to set alongside the discussion of the "meaning object".
As you say - on to strict rules.

I thought it was interesting (clever?) because philosophers see “always coinciding” and think either: here is a “form of life” that justifies the knowledge! or think: it is uncertain because the “always” could have until now been a coincidence! — Antony Nickles

I thought it was interesting and clever because, with a dictionary and a flick of the wrist, you turn the conventional trope (conventions as arbitrary) upside-down.

My point perhaps not being “validity” but just to shed light on the unrelenting nature of the desire for this to be a matter of knowledge (that mere accord wouldn’t stop anyway). — Antony Nickles

Yes. It is still floating about - and likely always will be. I thought when I read "You will be at a loss to answer this question, and find that here we strike rock bottom, that is we have come down to conventions." that Wittgenstein turns this conventional rock bottom into something real, almost foundational.

if we wanted a bottom of “rock”-like justification, we are only left with “this is how things are usually done” (a sense of convention). — Antony Nickles

There is a sense of being abandoned.

But, as you say, my main concern here is just to follow the process of his thought. — Antony Nickles

There is a good deal to be learnt from doing that.

Thanks for this. I can see the difficulty. You adopt a possible interpretation of "coincide", but I'm not convinced that it is valid in this context.

Now one may go on and ask: "How do you know that he has got toothache when he holds his cheek?" The answer to this might be, "I say, he has toothache when he holds his cheek because I hold my cheek when I have toothache". But what if we went on asking:--"And why do you suppose that toothache corresponds to his holding his cheek just because your toothache corresponds to your holding your cheek?" You will be at a loss to answer this question, and find that here we strike rock bottom, that is we have come down to conventions. (If you suggest as an answer to the last question that, whenever we've seen people holding their cheeks and asked them what's the matter, they have answered, "I have toothache",-remember that this experience only co-ordinates holding your cheek with saying certain words.) — pp. 24/25

I don't see how anyone who has not undergone even an introductory course in philosophy could not see this as a rehearsal of the sceptical attack on, in this case, other minds.
There is an opportunity, I would have said, for Wittgenstein to respond by saying that the conventions he refers to are definitions of meaning. But, for many people, this is a behaviourist/verificationist solution, which arbitrarily changes the meaning of a term that refers to inner experience. So he does well to avoid it. But the problem remains. With our knowledge of the future, we can see that this is where the private language argument is required. But I can see no hint of it. He seems to be offering only his discussion of criteria and symptoms in response. I don't think this really resolves the problem.

Wittgenstein seldom or never directly addresses orthodox philosophy, so it may be that he is simply thinking outside the box. But that won't help us here now. The only "solution" I have is to say that this is a work in progress and we need to swallow our doubts and allow Wittgenstein to pursue the argument further, as he does in the Phil. Inv.

PS. As and when you continue your reading, I would welcome the opportunity to see your thoughts and discuss them. Naturally, I shall base that on reading the text.

But the specter of skepticism remains, because a referential relation is implied between judgement and criteria. And this implication is deliberate on Wittgenstein’s part. As he elaborates later, what grounds the meaning of a phrase, its use, is not determined by a comparison between judgment and criteria. — Joshs

I don't understand your diagnosis here. I thought that criteria are what guides judgement in the application of linguistic rules. The "criteria vs symptoms" argument complicates that, but I can't see that it negates it. There is also the argument about rules, and this is what is recalled by the reference to "rock bottom", but I don't see any reference here to the discussion of rules that we find in the Phil. Inv.. Could you elaborate a bit?

That's a splendid example.

Can opacity vis-á-vis belief wholly semantic and logical? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Formal logic depends on treating language as a structure - unless someone has begin devising a logic that includes speakers - who would be an abstraction anyway.

But, if we want to keep to a view where opacity is purely a function of language/contexts itself, what of ambiguous statements in the context of something like an anonymous text, a p-zombie, random text generator, or AI? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think we would treat such texts as if there were a speaker. The text itself posits an author. The author of the text is not necessarily the same as any specific person. It's a trope in literary studies.
BTW I don't believe in p-zombies.

The writer's intention is irrelevant. The book says "Superman can fly" not "Clark Kent can fly", and any one who says otherwise would be misquoting. Substitution of co-referents is not licensed inside quotation or belief reports. — Banno

I have a feeling that what you meant to say was that the writer's intention is irrelevant for the purposes of logic. That's true. But if you know that Dostoevsky was a devout Christian, you will be licensed to interpret his texts in the light of that knowledge. Surely?

So the book example illustrates why opaque contexts may not be exhausted by local quotation rules — a single quote can’t capture the interpretive force of a whole body of text. That’s where holism starts to look more natural. — Banno

That's why we can't take "believes that.." as something like a quotation.

Davidson's account of "said that" starts from a quotation and analyzes it on that model. But quotation and reporting are not the same language games (contexts). The rules and criteria are different. Neither is the same as a recording, but a quotation is expected to be more like a recording than a report. The exact same words are key in a quotation, though pronunciation and tone are not relevant. This attracts philosophers, because it is (reasonably) clear and emphasizes accuracy But reports are more complex. On the other hand, "X reported the fire in the kitchen" is a rotten quotation but a perfectly acceptable report. In some contexts, we are not much bothered about the difference between "The President", "Trump". In others, we are.

In particular, we are not allowed to replace referring expressions inside a quotation. If someone said "Rickard Starkey was a drummer", we have to stick to "Richard Starkey" if we are quoting. But if we are reporting, depending on the audience, we may well substitute "Ringo Starr was a drummer", because that is more relevant in the context of the report or because it is more effective if the audience for the report cannot be expected to know that Richard Starkey was Ringo Starr.

"Water" can mean the liquid only, or it can mean any of liquid, solid, and gas. If we assert that water = H₂O, we are asserting the latter, since we are also by symmetry asserting that H₂O = water. I don't see an issue, provided we are clear here. Tim's post seems tangential. — Banno

That's right. The problem with the ice/bridge argument, IMO, is although one could argue that the first premiss tells us that the wider sense applies, the conclusion is misleading, because the substitution of "water" for "ice" suggests that the narrow sense applies. Does that work?

Referential opacity is a different issue to referential equivocation. — Banno

Yes. I'm a bit slow sometimes. I finally realize that referential opacity is the result of cross-contextual confusion, but old-fashioned equivocation, which is what @Count Timothy von Icarus is talking about takes place within a single context. Is that right?

Both the organisms and the world as they found it were necessary for this lineage to happen. — Punshhh

Absolutely.

Although, when it comes to the devastation of the planet, that turn of events happened when we had used intellect to subvert natural selection. — Punshhh

It seems to be true. Though one could also argue that the ability to do that was conferred by evolution and it looks as if the planet is taking action to restore balance.

The task of the philosopher is not to extract a common conceptual scheme from these myriad domains and to determine its faithfulness to some uncorrupted reality; it is, rather, to learn to navigate among the domains, and so to clarify their concerns in relation to each other. — Evan Thompson

I can sign up for that project. It makes sense to me.

We end up with worldview that literally uses universals constantly (in mathematics, definitions, logical inferences) while denying their ontological standing. — Wayfarer

I conclude that your position is somewhere in platonist territory, and that you think that nominalism amounts to denying their existence. I don't agree with either conjunct. In my book, there is no doubt that universals exist. The argument is about their mode of existence or (what comes to the same thing) what kind of object they are.

The fact that the theoretical constructs are an essential constituent of what is considered real, while they're not themselves existent in the way that the objects of the theory are. — Wayfarer

I don't get that. I thought you believed that our concepts and perceptions were all constructs.

That would be the mainstream understanding. The point of philosophical analysis is to see through it. — Wayfarer

No. The point of philosophy is to weigh up mainstream and fringe opinions and decide which are satisfactory and which are not.

Where did these extra relations come from? — RussellA

This is getting boring. There are no extra relations. They are spatial relations, so they must be in space, if anywhere.

There is very little to be learned from an endless series of the same puzzle. It's your puzzle, you answer it.

If we had progressed to some sort of intelligent discussion, it would have been worth it.

I'm here for the fun, not for exercises.

I've seen your other posts. You can do better than this.

Tell you what - you tell me where the end of the rainbow is and why I can never get to the horizon and why the only direction away from the north pole is southwards.

And in turn that begs the question as to what we might mean by "mind-independent'―a term that seems to be much more slippery than 'real'. — Janus

Yes. I keep getting myself into arguments that leave me wondering what definition of independence is in play. A lot of people seem to think that anything in one's mind must be mind-dependent. I think that only things that are created and maintained in existence by the mind are mind-dependent. That makes for quite a short list.

We end up with worldview that literally uses universals constantly (in mathematics, definitions, logical inferences) while denying their ontological standing. — Wayfarer

Sorry. What, exactly, is their ontological standing? Are we talking platonism here?

A science teacher teaching the water cycle or phases of matter would say just this sort of thing. There isn't a correct context for "cats are dogs." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't understand you. All I'm saying is that "water" is ambiguous and this makes it easy to fall into error. To be sure, we usually manage the ambiguity. BTW. "Cat" is ambiguous between the species and the genus. So there is a similar ambiguity there. I'm sure there are others.

Sometimes people hold money for other people, and they expect them not to mess around with it. Money is fungible though, so exchanging it isn't generally meaningful. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not sure I know what "fungible" means, but I think I get the point. Exchanging money for money would indeed be pointless. Borrowing and lending money is not a straightforward exchange so it is different.

Compare this with something with a strong principle of unity like a tree. Break a tree in half and you have a dead tree, you have timber, not a tree at all arguably. Break it up more and you have lumber that is clearly not a tree. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. That was my point.

This suggests that the mind, which depends on a brain, which has a physical size, should be able to cognise spatial relations. — RussellA

I won't argue with that.

The observer perceives that one person appears taller than the other. — RussellA

... or, alternatively, that one of them is further away than the other.

The mind has created the perception of a height difference, even though a height difference does not exist in the world. — RussellA

The mind does make mistakes, but it is a lot cleverer than that. It judges the size of distant objects by comparing their height with other objects in the field of vision. It knows the actual height of the other objects, so it can work out the height of the unknown object.
So, yes, it creates a perception, but not necessarily a false one.

Where does the relation between their heights exist in the world? — RussellA

Wherever they are.

If the relation between their heights existed in the world, then it wouldn't change dependent on how far the observer was standing away form them. — RussellA

The relation between their heights doesn't change depending how far away a given observer is.

The fact that the relation between their heights is relative to the observer suggests that the relation between their height exists in the observer not the world. — RussellA

No, it suggests that the observer exists in the world.

Where in an electromagnetic wavelength of 700nm can the colour red be discovered? — RussellA

Nowhere. Neither can it be discovered in my brain or my mind. Where do your eyes tell you it is?

(PS Actually, I've been told, the colours do not directly respond to actual wavelengths. Apparently, it is to do with the proportion of a given wavelength in the overall impacting wavelengths. The take-away is - it's complicated.)

Not minds in the usual sense of the word. But an agency, — Punshhh

Would that, perhaps, be the sort of agency that has enabled us to warm the climate and devastate much of the world?

The fact that I perceive the colour red does not mean the colour red exists in the world. — RussellA

Very good. What's your criterion for something to exist in the world? Colours, for example, occupy space - admittedly in two dimensions - and have definite locations.

Perhaps that is what I am trying to say. A relation is a concept in the mind rather than an object in the world. Relations exist in the mind, not the world. — RussellA

But then, how can the relationship "next to" be between between the ship and the quay? It is true that we can see that the ship is next to the quay, and you might choose to describe that as having the ship and the quay and the relationship between them in your mind in some sense. But that doesn't mean that your mind has created any of them. In any case, it can't be literally true. Your mind is not a spatial object - it occupies no space whatever. The physical substrate of your mind is in your brain (though I prefer to say that it is your entire body). Whichever it is, there is no room for the ship or the bollard and consequently not for the relationship between them.
I'm happy to say that a concept is in my mind, though neither mind nor concepts occupy any space at all - it's a metaphor. A relationship is indeed not an object in the world; it is something that holds between objects in the world. That mean it doesn't exist only in your mind. If it existed only in your mind, it would not be between the ship and the bollard. The thing is, a concept is always of something else, and the something else may well not be in your mind.

An intelligent and strategic response to the environment of these single cell organisms, which led to the T Rex and Sartre. — Punshhh

That's certainly true. The real genius of Darwin was that he managed to create or identify a purely causal, unthinking system which achieved the results of an intelligent system. There's no need to posit any minds - unless you want to include them for other reasons than explaining the phenomena.

The ship is not secured because of the relationship between the ship and the bollard, otherwise no rope would be needed. — RussellA

I see that you have decided that the relationship is between the ship and the bollard. Good choice. Now, can we agree that the relationship between Glasgow and Edinburgh is between Glasgow and Edinburgh and vice versa?
It depends on what you mean by "secured". But I would say that the rope secures the relationship and not the other way round. But the question that matters to us is whether we have secured that infinite regress.

Referential opacity is to do with individuals, not natural kinds. — Banno

I would have thought so, too. But what do we make of Kripke?

In Naming and Necessity, Kripke argues that proper names and certain natural kind terms—including biological taxa and types of natural substances (most famously, "water" and "H2O") designate rigidly. — Wikipedia - Rigid designator

I realize encyclopedias get things wrong, but this coincides with my memory.

Steam is H2O
Ice is H2O
Therefore, steam is ice
This is obviously incorrect. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's true. But you don't diagnose the problem.

It's the same as "All cats are mammals, all dogs are mammals, therefore all cats are dogs". — Banno

Banno is right. Undistributed middle.

Ice is water.
Ice makes for a good bridge.
Therefore water makes for a good bridge. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I have doubts about this. It is not wrong. But it doesn't mean that any old chunk of ice will make a good bridge. Ice only makes for a good bridge if it is handled properly. One could argue that the conclusion is true, provided we specify that it needs to be handled properly (i.e. turned into ice). There's a complication here because the same could be said of water.

The problem here is an equivocation on "water" as chemical identity versus as a particular phase of that substance. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. Mostly, this does not bother us, but in this kind of discussion, it matters.

it seems clear that my cup of water is the same water when it has frozen, ... — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think that this is where the example is clearly in a different category from our referential examples. "Water" is a mass term - it doesn't do individuals. The only ways you can identify "the same water" is indirectly, via, for example, a cup. When you borrow a cup of sugar from your neighbour, you will, of course, return it. But you don't have to return the same grains of sugar, do you? The same goes for borrowing money. You repay the money you borrowed, but not the same individual money - the very idea is meaningless.

Referential opacity is not about ambiguity. — Banno

Well, we agreed, I think, that the problems occur between contexts, which may be one kind of ambiguity. But it is true that there are ambiguities that are not about reference. Nonetheless, I'm beginning to think that there are issues about the "description under which" we think about things that I have not seen discussed.

The schema says that if we have a true formula containing an individual variable a, and if we have a=b, then we can replace a in with b, and the formula will remain true. — Banno

There is something I don't understand here. Presumably, the implication goes the other way, so that if we can replace a with b in a formula, then we have a=b. So we need an independent way of establishing one or the other.

That's a nice and thought-provoking collection of examples.
— Ludwig V
I don't agree. — Banno

Fair enough.

That's good stuff. Thank you. :smile:

Well, if the personas have different properties then you have solved the "puzzle." — Leontiskos

I don't know I would go that far. That "if" tells me that you have reservations. I suspect there will still be issues to discuss, but it might be a change from going through that argument over and over again.

Some philosophers are wary of admitting relations because they are difficult to locate. Glasgow is west of Edinburgh. This tells us something about the locations of these two cities. But where is the relation that holds between them in virtue of which Glasgow is west of Edinburgh? The relation can’t be in one city at the expense of the other, nor in each of them taken separately, since then we lose sight of the fact that the relation holds between them (McTaggart 1920: §80). Rather the relation must somehow share the divided locations of Glasgow and Edinburgh without itself being divided.

This won't do. Bradley had what he considered a general argument about this - as I'm sure you know. If aRb, then there must be two other relations that relate a to R and R to b. I shall write this down as a(r1)R(r2)b. What is the relationship between a and r1 and R and r2 and b? You see how it goes - a nice infinite regress that proves the impossibility (not merely non-existence) of any relation whatever. Great fun!

Suppose I want my ship next to a quay. I can sail it up until the ship is at location x, where the quay is at location y and x and y are next to each other. If you are thinking like Bradley, you will be thinking that something more needs to be said. So I shall add something to physically represent the relationship - a rope. I shall fix the rope to a bollard on the quay, and fix the other end to the ship. I shall fix the rope by wrapping it round the bollard in a clove hitch, and similarly on the ship. So I can represent all of a, r1, R, r2, and b. So you can be reassured that the ship is securely next to the quay and physics will prevent it from moving. You can decide where the relationship is. I say it is between the ship and the quay. How could it be anywhere else? It certainly isn't in my head.

Bradley wouldn't be happy with this, because he's a theoretician, playing with symbols, of which he has an infinite supply. That's the province of a logician, which I am not, so I'll leave you to read up on that. But for me Bradley's mistake is thinking of the relation as if it were an entity in its own right - an object corresponding to R. You are getting sucked in to his misleading metaphor because you are asking whether relations really exist, with (presumably) tables and chairs as your models. But symbols do not always represent entities that correspond to them. You can see from this example that there is no need for an infinite supply of entities linking the ship and the quay. To put the point another way, in 2+3=5, "2", "3", and "5" represent numbers, but "+" and "=" do not. It isn't a problem.

The relationship "west of" holds between Glasgow and Edinburgh, so I shall say that it is between Glasgow and Edinburgh. Similarly for the relationship "east of" between Edinburgh and Glasgow.

Oh, I see. I would have expressed that by saying that the number is the same in all possible worlds, so the numeral "9" designates the same number in all possible worlds. I should have worked that out. Sorry.

I get the point about "the number of planets".

Sorry, but I don't really get the relevance of being an abstract object to rigid designation.

Let's just share the blame.

The planet case is a misapplication because the number of planets isn't a proper noun. Both t1 and t2 have to be rigid designators. — frank

Do you mean something like a blank space to be filled in with a number - hopefully the correct number?
Or perhaps more like a question "How many planets are there?" I get that. Thanks.

BTW. What is "9" the rigid designator of?

Are you familiar with de re vs de dicto? — frank

Yes, but don't see how it applies in the planets case.

I rejected that this is a good way to determine real, but that it is clearly showing us that there is no universal acceptance of how to categorise things as real or unreal. — AmadeusD

I have a bit of a bee in my bonnet about "real" at the moment. So I hope you won't mind if I suggest that statement needs to be modified. I agree that there is no established way of categorising Heaven as real or not. But there is pretty much universal acceptance about how to categorise some other things as real. Unicorns, for example, forged paintings, dramatic performances. There is no single way of categorizing things as real or not. It depends on what kind of thing you are talking about. The same applies to questions of existence (which is what the issue of Heaven comes to). Numbers don't exist in the same way that tables and chairs do.

Read the exchange with I just had with Banno. You do need to understand the issue of Supervenience though in relation to Mental States/Identity. — I like sushi

I'm afraid I'm not competent to express an opinion about what you are trying to say. I don't understand it.

That's a nice and thought-provoking collection of examples.

You aren't using the identity elimination schema there. — frank

I'm afraid I don't know or can't recall exactly what the identity elimination schema. Do you mind just outlining what it is?